ON TOLERATION IN RELIGIOUS MATTERS.
The question of the improvement of manners, treated in the preceding
chapters, naturally leads me to another, sufficiently thorny in itself,
and rendered still more so by innumerable prejudices. I allude to
toleration in matters of religion. The word Catholicity, to certain
persons, is the synonyme of intolerance; and the confusion of ideas
on this point has become such, that no more laborious task can be
undertaken than to clear them up. It is only necessary to pronounce the
word intolerance, to raise in the minds of some people all sorts of
black and horrible ideas. Legislation, institutions, and men of past
times, all are condemned without appeal, the moment there is seen the
slightest appearance of intolerance. More than one cause contributes
to this universal prejudice. Yet, if called upon to point out the
principal one, we would repeat the profound maxim of Cato, who, when
accused at the age of eighty-six of certain offences of his past life,
committed at times long gone by, said, "It is difficult to render an
account of one's own conduct to men belonging to an age different from
that in which one has lived." There are some things of which one cannot
accurately judge without, not only a knowledge of them, but also a
complete appreciation of the times when they occurred. How many men are
capable of attaining to this? There are few who are able to succeed
in freeing their minds from the influence of the atmosphere which
surrounds them; but there are fewer still who can do the same with
their hearts. The age in which we live is precisely the reverse of the
ages of intolerance; and this is the first difficulty which meets us in
discussing questions of this kind. The prejudice and bad faith of some
who have applied themselves to this subject, have contributed also in
a considerable degree to erroneous opinions. There is nothing in the
world which cannot be undervalued by showing only one side of it; for
thus considered, all things are false, or rather are not themselves.
All bodies have three dimensions; only to look at one is not to form an
idea of the body itself, but of a quantity very different from it. Take
any institution, the most just and useful that can be imagined, then
all the inconveniences and evils which it has caused, taking care to
bring together into a few pages what in reality was spread over a great
many ages; then your history will be disgusting, hideous, and worthy
of execration. Let a partisan of democracy describe to you in a narrow
compass, and by means of historical facts, all the inconveniences and
evils of monarchy, the vices and the crimes of kings; how will monarchy
then appear to you? But let a partisan of monarchy paint to you, in his
turn, by the same method of historical facts, democracy and demagogues;
and what will you then think of democracy? Assemble in one picture all
the evils occasioned to nations by a high degree of development of the
social state; civilization and refinement will then appear detestable.
By seeking and selecting in the annals of the human mind certain
traits, the history of science may be made the history of folly, and
even of crime. By heaping together the fatal accidents that have
occurred to masters of the healing art, their beneficent profession may
be represented as a career of homicide. In a word, every thing may be
falsified by proceeding in this way. God himself would appear to us as
a monster of cruelty and tyranny, if, taking away his goodness, wisdom,
and justice, we only attended to the evils which we see in a world
created by his power and governed by his providence.
Having laid down these principles, let us apply them. The spirit of the
age, particular circumstances, and an order of things quite different
from ours, are all forgotten, and the history of the religious
intolerance of Catholics is composed by taking care to condense into a
few pages, and paint in the blackest colours, the severity of Ferdinand
and Isabella, of Philip II., of Mary of England, of Louis XIV., and
every thing of the kind that occurred during three centuries. The
reader who receives, almost at the same moment, the impression of
events which occurred during a period of three hundred years,--the
reader, accustomed to live in society where prisons are being converted
into houses of recreation, and where the punishment of death is
vigorously opposed, can he behold the appearance of darksome dungeons,
the instruments of punishment, the _san-benitos_ and scaffolds, without
being deeply moved? He will bewail the unfortunate lot of those who
perish; he will be indignant against the authors of what he calls
horrible atrocities. Nothing has been said to this candid reader of the
principles and conduct of Protestants at the same time; he has not been
reminded of the cruelty of Henry VIII. and of Elizabeth of England.
Thus all his hatred is directed against Catholics, and he is accustomed
to regard Catholicity as a religion of tyranny and blood. But will a
judgment thus formed be just? Will this be a sentence passed with a
full knowledge of the cause? What would impartiality direct us to do,
if we met with a dark picture, painted in the way we have described,
of monarchy, democracy, or civilization, of science, or of the healing
art? What we should do, or rather what we ought to do, is to extend
our view further, to examine the subject in its different phases; to
inquire into its good as well as its evil: this would be to look upon
these evils as they really are, that is, spread at great distances over
the course of centuries; this would weaken the impression they had
made upon us: in a word, we should thus be just, we should take the
balance in hand to weigh the good and evil, to compare the one with
the other, as we ought always to do when we have duly to appreciate
things in the history of humanity. In the case in question, we should
act in the same way, in order to provide against the error into which
we may be led by the false statements and exaggerations of certain men,
whose evident intention it has been to falsify facts by representing
only one side of them. The Inquisition no longer exists, and assuredly
there is no probability of its being re-established; the severe laws in
force on this matter in former times no longer exist; they are either
abrogated or they are fallen into desuetude: no one, therefore, has an
interest in representing this institution in a false point of view. It
may be imagined that some men had an interest in this while they were
engaged in destroying their ancient laws, but that once attained, the
Inquisition and its laws are become a historical fact, which ought to
be examined here with attention and impartiality. We have here two
questions, that of principle, and that of its application; in other
words, that of intolerance, and that of the manner of showing it.
We must not confound these two things, which, although very closely
connected, are very different. I shall begin with the first.
The principle of universal toleration is now proclaimed, and all kind
of intolerance is condemned without appeal. But who takes care to
examine the real meaning of these words? who undertakes to analyze
the ideas which they contain by the light of reason, and explain them
by means of history and experience? Very few. They are pronounced
mechanically; they are constantly employed to establish propositions of
the highest importance, without even the suspicion that they contain
ideas, the right or wrong comprehension and application of which is
every thing for the preservation of society. Few persons consider
that these words include questions as profound as they are delicate,
and the whole of a large portion of history; very few observe that,
according to one solution given to the problem of toleration, all the
past is condemned, and all the present overturned; nothing is left
thereby to build on for the future but a moving bed of sand. Certainly,
the most convenient way in such a case is, to adopt and employ these
words such as we already find them in circulation, in the same way as
we take and circulate the current coin, without considering whether
it be composed of alloy or not. But what is the most convenient is
not always the most useful; and, as when receiving coins of value,
we carefully examine them, so we ought to weigh words the meaning of
which is of such paramount importance. Toleration--what is the meaning
of this word? It means, properly speaking, the patience with which
we suffer a thing which we judge to be bad, but which we think it
desirable not to punish. Thus, some kinds of scandals are tolerated;
prostitutes are tolerated; such and such abuses are tolerated; so that
the idea of toleration is always accompanied by the idea of evil.
When toleration is exercised in the order of ideas, it always supposes
a misunderstanding, or error. No one will say that he tolerates the
truth. We have an observation to make here. The phrase _to tolerate
opinions_ is commonly used: now, opinion is very different from error.
At first sight, the difficulty appears great; but if we examine the
thing well, we shall be able to explain it. When we say that we
tolerate an opinion, we always mean an opinion contrary to our own. In
this case, the opinion of another is, according to us, an error; for
it is impossible to have an opinion on any point whatever--that is, to
think that a thing is or is not, is in one way or in another--without
thinking at the same time that those who judge otherwise are deceived.
If our opinion is only an opinion--that is, if our judgment, although
based on reasons which appear to us to be good, has not attained to a
degree of complete certainty--our judgment of another will be only a
mere opinion; but if our conviction has become completely established
and confirmed--that is, if it has attained to certainty--we shall be
sure that those who form a judgment opposed to ours are deceived.
Thence it follows, that the word toleration, applied to opinions,
always means the toleration of an error. He who says, yes, thinks no
is false; and he who says, no, thinks yes is a mistake. This is only
an application of the well-known principle, _that it is impossible
for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time_. But, we
shall be asked, What do you mean when you use these words, 'to respect
opinions?' is it always understood that we respect errors? No; for
these words can have two different and equally reasonable meanings.
The first is founded on the feebleness of the conviction of the person
from whom the respect comes. When on any particular point we have only
just formed an opinion, it is understood that we have not reached
certainty; consequently, we know that there are reasons on the other
side. In this sense, we may well say that we respect the opinions of
others: we express thereby our conviction that it is possible that we
are deceived--that it is possible the truth is not on our side. In the
second meaning, to respect opinions is to respect, sometimes those who
profess them, sometimes their good faith, sometimes their intentions.
Thus, when we say that we respect prejudices, it is clear that we do
not mean a real respect professed in this place. We see thus, that the
expression 'to respect the opinions of others' has a very different
meaning, according as the person from whom the respect comes has or has
not assured convictions in the contrary sense.
In order the better to understand what toleration is, what its origin
and its effects, it is necessary, before we examine it in society,
to reduce it to its simplest element. Let us analyze toleration
considered in the individual. An individual is called tolerant, when
he is habitually in a disposition of mind to bear without irritation
or disturbance opinions contrary to his own. This toleration will
bear different names, according to the different matters to which it
relates. In religious matters, tolerance as well as intolerance may be
found in those who have religion as well as in those who have none; so
that neither of these situations, with respect to religion, necessarily
implies the one or the other. Some people imagine that tolerance is
peculiar to the incredulous, and intolerance to the religious; but they
are mistaken. Who is more tolerant than St. Francis de Sales? who more
intolerant than Voltaire?
Tolerance in religious men--that tolerance which does not come from
want of faith, and which is not inconsistent with an ardent zeal
for the preservation and propagation of the faith--is born of two
principles, charity and humility. Charity, which makes us love all
men, even our greatest enemies; charity, which inspires us with
compassion for their faults and errors, and obliges us to regard them
as brothers, to employ all the means in our power to withdraw them from
being fatally deceived; charity, which forbids us ever to regard them
as deprived of the hope of salvation as long as they live. Rousseau
has said, that "it is impossible to live in peace with those that
one believes to be damned." We do not, and we cannot, believe in the
condemnation of any man as long as he lives; however great may be his
iniquity, the mercy of God and the value of the blood of Jesus Christ
are still greater. We are so far from thinking with the philosopher
of Geneva, "that to love such people would be to hate God," that no
one could maintain such a doctrine among us without ceasing to belong
to our faith. The other source of tolerance is Christian humility:
humility, which inspires us with a profound sense of our weakness,
and makes us consider all that we have as given by God; humility,
which makes us consider our advantages over our neighbor as so many
more powerful motives for acknowledging the liberality of Providence;
humility, which, placing before our eyes the spectacle of humanity
in its proper light, makes us regard ourselves and all others as
members of the great family of the human race, fallen from its ancient
dignity by the sin of our first parent; humility, which shows us the
perverse inclinations of our hearts, the darkness of our minds, and the
claims which man has to pity and indulgence in his faults and errors;
humility, that virtue sublime even in its abasement. "If humility is so
pleasing to God," is the admirable observation of St. Theresa, "it is
because it is the truth." This is the virtue which renders us indulgent
towards all men, by never allowing us to forget that we ourselves,
perhaps, more than any others, have need of indulgence.
Yet for a man to be tolerant, in the full extent of the word, it is
not enough for him to be humble and charitable; this is a truth which
experience teaches and reason explains to us. In order perfectly to
clear up a point, the obscurity of which produces the confusion which
almost always prevails in these questions, let us make a comparison
between two men equally religious, whose principles are the same,
but whose conduct is very different. Let us suppose two priests both
distinguished for learning and eminent virtue. The one has passed
his life in retirement, surrounded by pious persons, and having no
intercourse with any but Catholics: the other has been a missionary
in countries where different religions are established, he has been
obliged to live and converse with men of creeds different from his
own; he has been under the necessity of witnessing the establishment
of temples of a false religion close to those of the true one. The
principles of Christian charity will be the same with both these
priests; both will look upon faith as a gift of God, which he has
received, and must preserve; their conduct, however, will be very
different, if they meet with a man of a faith different from their
own, or of none at all. The first, who, never having had intercourse
with any but the faithful, has always heard religion spoken of with
respect, will be horrified, will be indignant, at the first word he
shall hear against the faith or ceremonies of the Church; it will be
impossible, or nearly so, for him to remain calm during a conversation
or discussion on the question: the second, accustomed to such things,
to hear his faith impugned, to dispute with men of creeds opposed to
his own, will remain tranquil; he will engage in a discussion with
coolness, if it be necessary; he will skilfully avoid one, if prudence
shall advise such a course. Whence comes this difference? It is not
difficult to discover. The second of these priests, by intercourse
with men, by experience, by contradiction, has obtained a clear notion
of the real condition of men's minds in the world; he is aware of the
fatal combination of circumstances which has led a great number of
unfortunate persons into error, and keeps them there; he knows how,
in some measure, to put himself in their place; and the more lively
is his sense of the benefit conferred upon him by Providence, the
more mild and indulgent he is towards others. The other may be as
virtuous, as charitable, and as humble as you please; but how can you
expect of him that he will not be deeply moved, and give utterance
to his indignation, the first time that he hears that denied which
he has always believed with the most lively faith? He has up to this
time met with no opposition in the world, but a few arguments in
books. Certainly he was not ignorant that there existed heretics and
unbelievers, but he has not frequently met with them, he has not heard
them state their hundred different systems, and he has not witnessed
the erroneous creeds of men of all sorts, of different characters, and
the most varied minds; the lively susceptibility of his mind, which
has never met with resistance, has not been blunted; for this reason,
although endowed with the same virtues, and, if you will, with the same
knowledge as the other, he has not acquired that penetration, that
vivacity, so to speak, with which a man of practised intellect enters
into the minds of those with whom he has to deal, discerns the reasons,
seizes the motives which blind them and hinder them from obtaining a
knowledge of the truth.
Thus tolerance, in a person who is religious, supposes a certain
degree of gentleness of mind, the fruit of intercourse with men, and
the habits thereby engendered; yet this quality is consistent with
the deepest conviction, and the purest and most ardent zeal for the
propagation of the truth. In the moral, as in the physical world,
friction polishes, use wears away, and nothing can remain for a long
time in an attitude of violence. A man will be indignant, once, twice,
a hundred times, when he hears his manner of thinking attacked; but it
is impossible for him to remain so always; he will, in the end, become
accustomed to opposition; he will, by habit, bear it calmly. However
sacred may be his articles of belief, he will content himself with
defending and putting them forward at convenient opportunities; in all
other cases, he will keep them in the bottom of his soul, as a treasure
which he is desirous to preserve from any thing that may injure them.
Tolerance, then, does not suppose any new principles in a man, but
rather a quality acquired by practice; a disposition of mind, into
which a man finds himself insensibly led; a habit of patience, formed
in him by constantly having to bear with what he disapproves of.
Now, if we consider tolerance in men who are not religious, we shall
observe that there are two ways of being irreligious. There are men who
not only have no religion, but who have an animosity against it, either
on account of some fatal error they entertain, or because they find it
an obstacle to their designs. These men are extremely intolerant; and
their intolerance is the worst of all, because it is not accompanied
by any moral principle which can restrain it. A man thus circumstanced
feels himself, as it were, continually at war with himself and the
human race; with himself, because he must stifle the cries of his own
conscience: with the human race, because all protest against the mad
doctrine that pretends to banish the worship of God from the earth.
Therefore we find among men of this kind much rancor and spleen;
therefore their words are full of gall; therefore they have constantly
recourse to raillery, insult, and calumny.
But there is another class of men who, although devoid of religion,
are not strongly prejudiced against the faith. They live in a kind of
skepticism, into which the reading of bad books, or the observations
of a superficial and frivolous philosophy, have led them; they are
not attached to religion, but they are not its enemies. Many of them
acknowledge the importance of religion for the good of society, and
some of them even feel within themselves a certain desire to return
to the faith; in their moments of recollection and meditation, they
remember with pleasure the days when they offered to God an obedient
spirit and a pure heart; and at the sight of the rapid course of life,
they perhaps love to cherish the hope of becoming reconciled with the
God of their fathers, before they descend into the grave. These men
are tolerant; but, if carefully examined, their tolerance is not a
principle or a virtue, it is only a necessity resulting from their
position. It is difficult to be indignant at the opinions of others,
when we have none of our own--when, consequently, we do not come
into collision with any. It is difficult to be violently opposed to
religion, when we consider it as a thing necessary for the welfare of
society; there can be no hatred or rancor towards faith in a soul which
desires its mercy, and which, perhaps, fixes its eyes upon it as the
last beam of hope amid the terrors of an alarming future. Tolerance, in
this case, is nothing strange; it is natural and necessary. Intolerance
would be inconceivable and extravagant, and could arise only from a bad
heart.
In applying these remarks to society instead of individuals, it must
be observed that tolerance, as well as intolerance, may be considered
in government, or in society. It sometimes happens that government and
society are not agreed; while the former maintains one principle, the
reverse may prevail in the latter. As governments are composed of a
limited number of individuals, all that has been said of tolerance,
considered individually, may be applied to them. Let us not forget,
however, that men placed in authority are not free to give themselves
up without limit to the impulses of their own opinions or feelings;
they are often forced to immolate their own feelings on the altar of
public opinion. They may, owing to peculiar circumstances, oppose or
impede that opinion for a time; but it will soon stop them, and force
them to change their course.
As sooner or later government becomes the expression of the ideas
and feelings of society, we shall content ourselves with considering
tolerance in the latter; we shall observe that society, with respect to
tolerance, follows the same path as individuals. This is with it not
the effect of a principle, but of a habit. Men of different creeds, who
live together for a long time in the same society, end by tolerating
each other; they are led to this by growing weary of collision with
each other, and by the wish for a kind of life more quiet and peaceful.
But when men, thus divided in creed, find themselves face to face for
the first time, a shock more or less rude is the inevitable result. The
causes of this phenomenon are to be found in human nature itself; it is
one of those necessities against which we struggle in vain.
Some modern philosophers have imagined that society is indebted to them
for the spirit of toleration which prevails there; they have not seen
that it is much rather a fact slowly brought about by the force of
circumstances, than it is the fruit of their doctrines. Indeed, what
have they said that is new? They have recommended universal fraternity;
but this has always been one of the doctrines of Christianity. They
have exhorted men of all the different religions to live in peace
together; but before they had opened their mouths to tell them this,
men began to adopt this course in many countries of Europe; for,
unhappily, religions in many countries were so numerous and different,
that none of them could pretend to exclusive dominion. It is true
that some infidel, philosophers have a claim, and a deplorable one,
in support of their pretensions with respect to the development of
toleration; it is, that, by their efforts to disseminate infidelity
and skepticism, they have succeeded in making general, in nations and
governments, that false toleration which has nothing virtuous, but is
indifference with respect to all religions. Indeed, why is tolerance
so general in our age? or, rather, in what does our tolerance consist?
If you observe well, you will find that it is nothing but the result
of a social condition perfectly similar to that of the individual
who has no creed, but who does not hate creeds, because he considers
them as conducive to the public good, and cherishes a vague hope of
one day finding a last asylum therein. All that is good in this is
in no degree owing to the infidel philosophers, but may rather be
said to be a protest against them. Indeed, when they could not obtain
the supreme command, they lavished calumnies and sarcasms on all
that is most sacred in heaven and on earth; and, when they did raise
themselves to power, they overturned with indescribable fury all
that existed, and destroyed millions of victims in exile or on the
scaffolds. The multitude of religions,--infidelity, indifference, the
improvement of manners, the lassitude produced by wars,--industrial
and commercial organization, which every day becomes more powerful in
society,--communication rendered more frequent among men by means of
travelling,--the diffusion of ideas by the press;--such are the causes
which have produced in Europe that universal tolerance which has taken
possession of all, and has been established in fact when it could not
by law. These causes, as it is easy to observe, are of different kinds;
no doctrine can pretend to an exclusive influence; they are the result
of a thousand different influences, which act simultaneously on the
development of civilization.[24]