[355] Packer Corp. _v._ Utah, 285 U.S. 1_The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952

[356] Halter _v._ Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).

[357] McCloskey _v._ Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920).

[358] Natal _v._ Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).

[359] Murphy _v._ California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).

[360] Rosenthal _v._ New York, 226 U.S. 260 (1912).

[361] Thompson _v._ Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 76-77

(1937), citing Ohio Oil Co. _v._ Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 100 (1900);

Lindsley _v._ Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Oklahoma

_v._ Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).

[362] Champlin Ref. Co. _v._ Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210

(1932).

[363] Railroad Commission _v._ Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). _See also_

R.R. Commission _v._ Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); R.R. Commission _v._

Humble Oil & Refining Co., 311 U.S. 578 (1941).

[364] Thompson _v._ Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55

(1937).

[365] Cities Service Co. _v._ Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950);

Phillips Petroleum Co. _v._ Oklahoma, ibid., 190 (1950).

[366] Walls _v._ Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920). _See also_

Henderson Co. _v._ Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937).

[367] Bandini Petroleum Co. _v._ Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8 (1931).

[368] Gant _v._ Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933).

[369] Pennsylvania Coal Co. _v._ Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).

[370] Hudson County Water Co. _v._ McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-357

(1908).

[371] Miller _v._ Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 279 (1928).

[372] Sligh _v._ Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).

[373] Bayside Fish Flour Co. _v._ Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 426 (1936).

[374] Manchester _v._ Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Geer _v._

Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).

[375] Miller _v._ McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261, 264 (1930).

[376] Bayside Fish Flour Co. _v._ Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936).

[377] Geer _v._ Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).

[378] Silz _v._ Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).

[379] Reinman _v._ Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).

[380] Hadacheck _v._ Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

[381] Fischer _v._ St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361 (1904).

[382] Reinman _v._ Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).

[383] Bacon _v._ Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).

[384] Northwestern Laundry Co. _v._ Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916). For

a case embracing a rather special set of facts, _see_ Dobbins _v._ Los

Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).

[385] Welch _v._ Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).

[386] Euclid _v._ Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn _v._

Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectaw _v._ Cambridge, 277

U.S. 183 (1928); Cusack (Thomas) Co. _v._ Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917);

St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. _v._ St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919).

[387] Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. _v._ Roberage, 278 U.S.

116 (1928).

[388] Eubank _v._ Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).

[389] Gorieb _v._ Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).

[390] Buchanan _v._ Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).

[391] Pierce Oil Corp. _v._ Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).

[392] Standard Oil Co. _v._ Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929).

[393] Barbier _v._ Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Soon Hing _v._ Crowley,

113 U.S. 703 (1885).

[394] Maguire _v._ Reardon, 255 U.S. 271 (1921).

[395] Queenside Hills Co. _v._ Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).

[396] Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur _v._ Louisiana State

Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).

[397] Jacobson _v._ Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); New York ex rel.

Lieberman _v._ Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905).

[398] Perley _v._ North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919).

[399] California Reduction Co. _v._ Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S.

306 (1905).

[400] Hutchinson _v._ Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 (1913).

[401] Sligh _v._ Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915).

[402] Powell _v._ Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Magnano (A.) Co.

_v._ Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).

[403] North American Cold Storage Co. _v._ Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).

[404] Adams _v._ Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913).

[405] Baccus _v._ Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914).

[406] Roschen _v._ Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929).

[407] Minnesota ex rel. Whipple _v._ Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).

[408] Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. _v._ Iowa, 242 U.S. 153 (1916).

[409] Hebe Co. _v._ Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919).

[410] Price _v._ Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915).

[411] Sage Stores _v._ Kansas, 323 U.S. 32 (1944).

[412] Weaver _v._ Palmer Bros Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).

[413] Ah Sin _v._ Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).

[414] Marvin _v._ Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905).

[415] Stone _v._ Mississippi ex rel. Harris, 101 U.S. 814 (1880);

Douglas _v._ Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897).

[416] L'Hote _v._ New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).

[417] Petit _v._ Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900).

[418] Boston Beer Co. _v._ Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878); Mugler

_v._ Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Kidd _v._ Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888);

Purity Extract & Tonic Co. _v._ Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912); James Clark

Distilling Co. _v._ Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917);

Barbour _v._ Georgia, 249 U.S. 454 (1919).

[419] Mugler _v._ Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887).

[420] Hawes _v._ Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Van Oster _v._ Kansas, 272

U.S. 465 (1926).

[421] Stephenson _v._ Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).

[422] Stanley _v._ Public Utilities Commission, 295 U.S. 76 (1935).

[423] Stephenson _v._ Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).

[424] Michigan Public Utilities Commission _v._ Duke, 266 U.S. 570

(1925).

[425] Frost _v._ Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Smith _v._

Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).

[426] Bradley _v._ Pub. Util. Comm'n., 289 U.S. 92 (1933).

[427] Sproles _v._ Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).

[428] Railway Express _v._ New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).

[429] Reitz _v._ Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).

[430] Young _v._ Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).

[431] Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). _See also_ Packard _v._

Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Sprout _v._ South Bend, 277 U.S. 163

(1928); Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. _v._ Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335

(1932); Continental Baking Co. _v._ Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).

[432] Irving Trust Co. _v._ Day, 314 U.S. 556, 564 (1942).

[433] Demorest _v._ City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1944).

[434] Connecticut Ins. Co. _v._ Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). Justice

Jackson and Douglas dissented on the ground that New York is attempting

to escheat unclaimed funds not located either actually or constructively

in New York and which are the property of beneficiaries who may never

have been citizens or residents of New York.

[435] 341 U.S. 428 (1951).

[436] Snowden _v._ Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).

[437] Angle _v._ Chicago, St. P.M. & O.R. Co., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).

[438] Coombes _v._ Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442, 448 (1932).

[439] Gibbes _v._ Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).

[440] Shriver _v._ Woodbine Sav. Bank, 285 U.S. 467 (1932).

[441] Chase Securities Corp. _v._ Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-316

(1945).

[442] Sentell _v._ New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).

[443] Soliah _v._ Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).

[444] Trenton _v._ New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).

[445] Chicago _v._ Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).

[446] Louisiana ex rel. Folsom Bros. _v._ New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 289

(1883).

[447] Attorney General ex rel. Kies _v._ Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).

[448] Hunter _v._ Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).

[449] Stewart _v._ Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915).

[450] Tonawanda _v._ Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901); Cass Farm Co. _v._

Detroit, 181 U.S. 396 (1901).

[451] Southwestern Oil Co. _v._ Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 119 (1910).

[452] Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. _v._ Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1875); Jones

_v._ Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917); Green _v._ Frazier, 253 U.S. 233

(1920); Carmichael _v._ Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).

[453] Milheim _v._ Moffat Tunnel Improv. Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923).

[454] Jones _v._ Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).

[455] Green _v._ Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).

[456] Nicchia _v._ New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920).

[457] Milheim _v._ Moffat Tunnel Improv. Dist, 262 U.S. 710 (1923).

[458] Cochran _v._ Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).

[459] Carmichael _v._ Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).

[460] Fox _v._ Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 99 (1935).

[461] Stewart Dry Goods Co. _v._ Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). _See also_

Chapman _v._ Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915); Kelly _v._ Pittsburgh, 104

U.S. 78 (1881).

[462] Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. _v._ Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933);

Carmichael _v._ Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937). A

taxpayer therefore cannot contest the imposition of an income tax on the

ground that, in operation, it returns to his town less income tax than

he and its other inhabitants pay.--Dane _v._ Jackson, 256 U.S. 589

(1921).

[463] Stebbins _v._ Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140, 141 (1925).

[464] Cahen _v._ Brewster, 203 U.S. 543 (1906).

[465] Keeney _v._ New York, 222 U.S. 525 (1912).

[466] Salomon _v._ State Tax Commission, 278 U.S. 484 (1929).

[467] Orr _v._ Gilman, 183 U.S. 278 (1902); Chanler _v._ Kelsey, 205

U.S. 466 (1907).

[468] Nickel _v._ Cole, 256 U.S. 222, 226 (1921).

[469] Coolidge _v._ Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931).

[470] Binney _v._ Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936).

[471] Whitney _v._ State Tax Com., 309 U.S. 530, 540(1940).

[472] Welch _v._ Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).

[473] Hoeper _v._ Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).

[474] Welch _v._ Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-150 (1938).

[475] Puget Sound Power & Light Co. _v._ Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).

[476] New York, P. & N. Teleg. Co. _v._ Dolan, 265 U.S. 96 (1924).

[477] Barwise _v._ Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936).

[478] Nashville, O. & St. L. Ky. _v._ Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).

[479] Paddell _v._ New York, 211 U.S. 446 (1908).

[480] Hagar _v._ Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884).

[481] Butters _v._ Oakland, 263 U.S. 162 (1923).

[482] Missouri P.R. Co. _v._ Western Crawford Road Improv. Dist., 266

U.S. 187 (1924). _See also_ Roberts _v._ Richland Irrig. Co., 289 U.S.

71 (1933) in which it was also stated that an assessment to pay the

general indebtedness of an irrigation district is valid, even though in

excess of the benefits received.

[483] Houck _v._ Little River Drainage Dist, 239 U.S. 254 (1915).

[484] Road Improv. Dist. _v._ Missouri P.R. Co., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).

[485] Kansas City Southern R. Co. _v._ Road Improv. Dist., 266 U.S. 379

(1924).

[486] Louisville & N.R. Co. _v._ Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 197 U.S. 430

(1905).

[487] Myles Salt Co. _v._ Iberia & St. M. Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478

(1916).

[488] Wagner _v._ Leser, 239 U.S. 207 (1915).

[489] Charlotte Harbor & N.R. Co. _v._ Welles, 260 U.S. 8 (1922).

[490] Union Refrigerator Transit Co. _v._ Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204

(1905). _See also_ Louisville & J. Ferry Co. _v._ Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385

(1903).

[491] Carstairs _v._ Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co.

_v._ Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910); Frick _v._ Pennsylvania, 268 U.S.

473 (1925); Blodgett _v._ Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).

[492] New York ex rel. New York, C. & H.R.R. Co. _v._ Miller, 202 U.S.

584 (1906).

[493] Wheeling Steel Corp _v._ Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209-210 (1936); Union

Refrigerator Transit Co. _v._ Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 207 (1905);

Johnson Oil Ref. Co. _v._ Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158

(1933).

[494] Robert L. Howard, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: A Twelve

Year Cycle, 8 Missouri Law Review 155, 160-162 (1943); Ralph T. Rawlins,

State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: Some Modern Aspects, 18 Texas Law

Review 296, 314-315 (1940).

[495] Kirtland _v._ Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 498 (1879).

[496] Savings & L. Soc. _v._ Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421 (1898).

[497] Bristol _v._ Washington County, 177 U.S. 133, 141 (1900).

[498] Fidelity & C. Trust Co. _v._ Louisville, 245 U.S. 54 (1917).

[499] Rogers _v._ Hennepin County, 240 U.S. 184 (1916).

[500] Citizens Nat. Bank _v._ Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 109 (1921).

[501] Hawley _v._ Maiden, 232 U.S. 1, 12 (1914).

[502] First Bank Stock Corp. _v._ Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937).

[503] Schuylkill Trust Co. _v._ Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938).

[504] Harvester Co. _v._ Dept. of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).

[505] Wisconsin Gas Co. _v._ United States, 322 U.S. 526 (1944).

[506] New York ex rel. Hatch _v._ Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907).

[507] Graniteville Mfg. Co. _v._ Query, 283 U.S. 376 (1931).

[508] Buck _v._ Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907).

[509] Brooke _v._ Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928).

[510] Greenough _v._ Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 496-497 (1947).

[511] 277 U.S. 27 (1928).

[512] 280 U.S. 83 (1929).

[513] Senior _v._ Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1985).

[514] Stebbins _v._ Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140-141 (1925).

[515] 199 U.S. 194 (1905).--In dissenting in State Tax Commission _v._

Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 185 (1942), Justice Jackson asserted that a

reconsideration of this principle had become timely.

[516] 268 U.S. 473 (1925). _See also_ Treichler _v._ Wisconsin, 338 U.S.

251 (1949); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. _v._ Schnader, 293 U.S. 112

(1934).

[517] 240 U.S. 625, 631 (1916).--A decision rendered in 1920 which is

seemingly in conflict was Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. _v._ Doughton, 272

U.S. 567, in which North Carolina was prevented from taxing the exercise

of a power of appointment through a will executed therein by a resident,

when the property was a trust fund in Massachusetts created by the will

of a resident of the latter State. One of the reasons assigned for this

result was that by the law of Massachusetts the property involved was

treated as passing from the original donor to the appointee. However,

this holding was overruled in Graves _v._ Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657

(1942).

[518] 233 U.S. 434 (1914).

[519] Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. _v._ Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926).

[520] 277 U.S. 1 (1928).

[521] First National Bank _v._ Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 330-331 (1932).

[522] 280 U.S. 204 (1930).

[523] 188 U.S. 189 (1903).

[524] 281 U.S. 586 (1930).--In dissenting, Justice Holmes observed that

Wheeler _v._ Sohmer, 233 U.S. 434 (1914), previously mentioned,

apparently joined Blackstone _v._ Miller on the "Index Expurgatorius."

[525] 282 U.S. 1 (1930).

[526] 284 U.S. 312 (1932).

[527] 316 U.S. 174 (1942).

[528] 307 U.S. 357, 363, 366-368, 372 (1939).

[529] 308 U.S. 313 (1939).

[530] 307 U.S. 383 (1939).

[531] Ibid. 386.

[532] 315 U.S. 657, 660, 661 (1942).

[533] 4 Wheat. 316, 429 (1819).

[534] 319 U.S. 94 (1943).

[535] 306 U.S. 398 (1939).

[536] Wheeling Steel Corp. _v._ Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936). _See also_

Memphis Gas Co. _v._ Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 652 (1942).

[537] Adams Express Co. _v._ Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).

[538] Alpha Portland Cement Co. _v._ Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).

[539] Cream of Wheat Co. _v._ Grand Forks County, 253 U.S. 325 (1920).

[540] Newark Fire Ins. Co. _v._ State Board, 307 U.S. 313, 318, 324

(1939). Although the eight judges affirming this tax were not in

agreement as to the reasons to be assigned in justification of this

result, the holding appears to be in line with the dictum uttered by the

late Chief Justice Stone in Curry _v._ McCanless (307 U.S. at 368) to

the effect that the taxation of a corporation by a State where it does

business, measured by the value of the intangibles used in its business

there, does not preclude the State of incorporation from imposing a tax

measured by all its intangibles.

[541] Delaware L. & W.R. Co. _v._ Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905).

[542] Louisville & J. Ferry Co. _v._ Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).

[543] Kansas City Ry. _v._ Kansas, 240 U.S. 227 (1916); Kansas City, M.

& B.R. Co. _v._ Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916).

[544] Schwab _v._ Richardson, 263 U.S. 88 (1923).

[545] Western U. Teleg. Co. _v._ Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1

(1910); Pullman Co. _v._ Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56 (1910);

Looney _v._ Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); International Paper Co. _v._

Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918).

[546] Cudahy Packing Co. _v._ Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929).

[547] St. Louis S.W.R. Co. _v._ Arkansas ex rel. Norwood, 235 U.S. 350

(1914).

[548] Atlantic Refining Co. _v._ Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937).

[549] American Mfg Co. _v._ St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). Nor does a

State license tax on the production of electricity violate the due

process clause because it may be necessary, to ascertain, as an element

in its computation, the amounts delivered in another jurisdiction.--Utah

Power & Light Co. _v._ Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).

[550] James _v._ Dravo Contracting Co. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).

[551] Union Refrigerator Transit Co. _v._ Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).

[552] Southern Pacific Co. _v._ Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).

[553] Old Dominion Steamship Co. _v._ Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).

[554] 199 U.S. 194 (1905).

[555] Pullman's Palace Car Co. _v._ Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).

[556] Northwest Airlines _v._ Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294-297, 307

(1944).--The case was said to be governed by New York Central Railroad

_v._ Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 596 (1906). As to the problem of multiple

taxation of such airplanes, which had in fact been taxed proportionately

by other States, the Court declared that the "taxability of any part of

this fleet by any other State than Minnesota, in view of the taxability

of the entire fleet by that State, is not now before us." Justice

Jackson, in a concurring opinion, would treat Minnesota's right [to tax

as] exclusive of any similar right elsewhere.

[557] Johnson Oil Ref. Co. _v._ Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158

(1933).

[558] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. _v._ Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).

[559] Wallace _v._ Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920).--For example, the ratio of

track mileage within the taxing State to total track mileage cannot be

employed in evaluating that portion of total railway property found in

said State when the cost of the lines in the taxing State was much less

than in other States and the most valuable terminals of the railroad

were located in other States. _See also_ Fargo _v._ Hart, 193 U.S. 490

(1904); Union Tank Line _v._ Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).

[560] Great Northern R. Co. _v._ Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929).

[561] Illinois Cent. R. Co. _v._ Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).

[562] Lawrence _v._ State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).

[563] Shaffer _v._ Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Travis _v._ Yale & T.

Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).

[564] New York ex rel. Cohn _v._ Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).

[565] Maguire _v._ Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).

[566] Guaranty Trust Co. _v._ Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938).

[567] Whitney _v._ Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).

[568] Underwood Typewriter Co. _v._ Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920);

Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton _v._ State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).

[569] Hans Rees' Sons _v._ North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).

[570] Matson Nav. Co. _v._ State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936).

[571] Wisconsin _v._ J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 448-449 (1940).

Dissenting, Justice Roberts, along with Chief Justice Hughes and

Justices McReynolds and Reed, stressed the fact that the use and

disbursement by the corporation at its home office of income derived

from operations in many States does not depend on, and cannot be

controlled by, any law of Wisconsin. The act of disbursing such income

as dividends, he contended, is "one wholly beyond the reach of

Wisconsin's sovereign power, one which it cannot effectively command, or

prohibit or condition." The assumption that a proportion of the

dividends distributed is paid out of earnings in Wisconsin for the year

immediately preceding payment is arbitrary and not borne out by the

facts. Accordingly, "if the exaction is an income tax in any sense it is

such upon the stockholders [many of whom are nonresidents] and is

obviously bad."--_See also_ Wisconsin _v._ Minnesota Mining Co., 311

U.S. 452 (1940).

[572] Great A. & P. Tea Co. _v._ Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).

[573] Equitable L. Assur. Soc. _v._ Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143 (1915).

[574] Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. _v._ Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103

(1915).

[575] Continental Co. _v._ Tennessee, 311 U.S. 5, 6 (1940), (Emphasis

supplied).

[576] Palmetto F. Ins. Co. _v._ Connecticut, 272 U.S. 295 (1926).

[577] St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. _v._ Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).

[578] Connecticut General Co. _v._ Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).

[579] Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. _v._ New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907).

[580] Board of Assessors _v._ New York L. Ins. Co., 216 U.S. 517 (1910).

[581] Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. _v._ Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346

(1911).

[582] Orient Ins. Co. _v._ Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 358 (1911).

[583] Turpin _v._ Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 58 (1902); Glidden _v._

Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).

[584] McMillen _v._ Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).

[585] Bell's Gap R. Co. _v._ Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890).

[586] Hodge _v._ Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905).

[587] Hagar _v._ Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 709-710

(1884).

[588] Hagar _v._ Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 710 (1884).

[589] McMillen _v._ Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).

[590] Taylor _v._ Secor, (State Railroad Tax Cases), 92 U.S. 575, 610

(1876).

[591] Nickey _v._ Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934). _See also_

Clement Nat. Bank _v._ Vermont, 231 U.S. 120 (1914).

[592] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. _v._ Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).

[593] Michigan C.R. Co. _v._ Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 302 (1906).

[594] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. _v._ Board of Public Works, 172

U.S. 32, 45 (1898).

[595] St. Louis & K.C. Land Co. _v._ Kansas City, 241 U.S. 419, 430

(1916); Paulson _v._ Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 41 (1893); Bauman _v._ Ross,

167 U.S. 548, 590 (1897).

[596] Tonawanda _v._ Lyon, 161 U.S. 389, 391 (1901).

[597] Londoner _v._ Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).

[598] Withnell _v._ Ruecking Constr. Co., 249 U.S. 63, 68 (1919);

Browning _v._ Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 405 (1926). Likewise, the committing

to a board of county supervisors of authority to determine, without

notice or hearing, when repairs to an existing drainage system are

necessary cannot be said to deny due process of law to landowners in the

district, who, by statutory requirement, are assessed for the cost

thereof in proportion to the original assessments.--Breiholz _v._

Pocahontas County, 257 U.S. 118 (1921).

[599] Fallbrook Irrig. District _v._ Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 168, 175

(1896); Browning _v._ Hooper, 269 U S. 396, 405 (1926).

[600] Utley _v._ St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 109 (1934); French _v._

Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 341 (1901). _See also_ Soliah

_v._ Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).

[601] Hibben _v._ Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 321 (1903).

[602] Hancock _v._ Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 488 (1919).--Likewise, a

taxpayer does not have a right to a hearing before a State board of

equalization preliminary to issuance by it of an order increasing the

valuation of all property in a city by 40%.--Bi-Metallic Invest. Co.

_v._ State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).

[603] Detroit _v._ Parker, 181 U.S. 399 (1901).

[604] Paulsen _v._ Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 38 (1893).

[605] Londoner _v._ Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). _See also_ Cincinnati,

N.O. & T.P.R. Co. _v._ Kentucky (Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases), 115 U.S.

321, 331 (1885); Winona & St. P. Land Co. _v._ Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526,

537 (1895); Merchants' & Mfgrs. Nat. Bank _v._ Pennsylvania, 167 U.S.

461, 466 (1897); Glidden _v._ Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).

[606] Corry _v._ Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466, 478 (1905).

[607] Leigh _v._ Green, 193 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1904).

[608] Ontario Land Co. _v._ Yordy, 212 U.S. 152 (1909). _See also_

Longyear _v._ Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908).

[609] Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. _v._ Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).

[610] Central of Georgia R. Co. _v._ Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).

[611] Carpenter _v._ Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). _See also_ Ward _v._

Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).

[612] Farncomb _v._ Denver, 252 U.S. 7 (1920).

[613] Pullman Co. _v._ Knott, 235 U.S. 23 (1914).

[614] Bankers Trust Co. _v._ Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647 (1923).

[615] National Safe Deposit Co. _v._ Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914).

[616] Pierce Oil Corp. _v._ Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924).

[617] Carstairs _v._ Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co.

_v._ Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910).

[618] Travis _v._ Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1920).

[619] League _v._ Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).

[620] Palmer _v._ McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 669 (1890).

[621] Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. _v._ Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).

[622] King _v._ Mullins, 171 U.S. 404 (1898); Chapman _v._ Zobelein, 237

U.S. 135 (1915).

[623] Leigh _v._ Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).

[624] Davidson _v._ New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878).

[625] Dewey _v._ Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).

[626] League _v._ Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 (1902). _See also_ Straus

_v._ Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162 (1913).

[627] Exercisable as to every description of property, tangibles and

intangibles including choses in action, contracts, and charters, but

only for a public purpose, the power of eminent domain may also be

conferred by the State upon municipal corporations, public utilities,

and even upon individuals. Like every other governmental power, the

power of eminent domain cannot be surrendered by the State or its

subdivisions either by contract or by any other means.--Long Island

Water Supply Co. _v._ Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); Offield _v._ New

York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 203 U.S. 372 (1906); Sweet _v._ Rechel, 159 U.S.

380 (1895); Clark _v._ Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Pennsylvania Hospital

_v._ Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); Galveston Wharf Co. _v._

Galveston, 260 U.S. 473 (1923).

[628] Green _v._ Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920).

[629] 7 Pet. 243.

[630] 96 U.S. 97, 105.

[631] 166 U.S. 226, 233, 236-237 (1897); _see also_ Sweet _v_: Rechel,

159 U.S. 380, 398 (1895).

[632] Hairston _v._ Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908).

[633] Green _v._ Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 240 (1920); Cincinnati _v._

Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).

[634] Hairston _v._ Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).

[635] United States ex rel. T.V.A. _v._ Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-552,

556-558 (1946), citing Case _v._ Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946), and

New York _v._ United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)--Concurring in the

result, Justice Frankfurter insisted that "the fact that the nature of

the subject matter gives the legislative determination nearly immunity

from judicial review does not mean that the power to review is wanting."

Also concurring in the result, Justice Reed, for himself and Chief

Justice Stone, dissented from that portion of the opinion which

suggested that "there is no judicial review" of the question whether a

"taking is for a public purpose."

[636] Justice Reed concurring in United States ex rel. T.V.A. _v._

Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 557 (1946).

[637] Bragg _v._ Weaver, 251 U.S. 57-59 (1919).--It is no longer open to

question that the State legislature may confer upon a municipality the

authority to determine such necessity for itself.--Joslin Mfg. Co. _v._

Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923).

[638] Rindge Co. _v._ Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).

[639] Pumpelly _v._ Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, 177-178 (1872);

Welch _v._ Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Pennsylvania Coal Co. _v._ Mahon,

260 U.S. 393 (1922). _See also_ comparable cases involving the Federal

Government and discussed under the Fifth Amendment, United States _v._

Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States _v._ Cress, 243 U.S. 316

(1917); Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. _v._ United States, 260 U.S. 327

(1922); United States _v._ Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). _See also_ the

cases hereinafter discussed on the limitations on "uncompensated

takings."

[640] Long Island Water Supply Co. _v._ Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897)

[641] Clark _v._ Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).

[642] Strickley _v._ Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).

[643] Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. _v._. Alabama Interstate

Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916).

[644] Hendersonville Light & Power Co. _v._. Blue Ridge Interurban R.

Co., 243 U.S. 563 (1917).

[645] Roe _v._ Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191, 193 (1929).

[646] Dohany _v._ Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).

[647] Hairston _v._ Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).

[648] Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. _v._ Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928).

[649] Otis Co. _v._ Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 151, 153 (1906). _See

also_ Head _v._ Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 20-21 (1885).

[650] Missouri P.R. Co. _v._ Nebraska ex rel. Board of Transportation,

164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896). The State court in this case was declared to

have acknowledged that the taking was not for a public use. Hence, its

reversal by the Supreme Court did not conflict with the later

observation by the Court that "no case is recalled where this Court has

condemned * * * a taking upheld by the State court as a taking for

public uses in conformity with its laws."--_See_ Hairston _v._ Danville

& W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).

[651] Backus (A.) Jr. and Sons _v._ Port Street Union Depot Co., 169

U.S. 557, 573, 575 (1898).

[652] McGovern _v._ New York, 229 U.S. 363, 370-371 (1913).

[653] Ibid. 371.

[654] Provo Bench Canal and Irrig. Co. _v._ Tanner, 239 U.S. 323 (1915);

Appleby _v._ Buffalo, 221 U.S. 524 (1911).

[655] Backus (A.) Jr. and Sons _v._ Port Street Union Depot Co., 169

U.S. 557, 569 (1898).

[656] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. _v._ Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 250 (1897);

McGovern _v._ New York, 229 U.S. 363, 372 (1913).

[657] Roberts _v._ New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1935).

[658] Dohany _v._ Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).

[659] Joslin Mfg. Co. _v._ Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677 (1923).

[660] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. _v._ Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897).

[661] Manigault _v._ Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 484-485 (1905).

[662] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. _v._ Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 252 (1897).

[663] Darling _v._ Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919).

[664] Northern Transportation Co. _v._ Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879).

_See also_ Marchant _v._ Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 153 U.S. 380 (1894).

[665] Meyer _v._ Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 (1898). For cases illustrative of

the types of impairment or flooding consequent upon erection of dams or

aids to navigation which have been deemed to amount to a taking for

which compensation must be paid, _see_ Pumpelly _v._ Green Bay Company,

13 Wall. 166 (1872); United States _v._ Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903);

United States _v._ Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).

[666] Sauer _v._ New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907).

[667] Welch _v._ Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).

[668] Pennsylvania Coal Co. _v._ Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-414 (1922).

For comparable cases involving the Federal Government _see_ Portsmouth

Harbor L. & H. Co. _v._ United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) and United

States _v._ Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).

[669] Georgia _v._ Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 483 (1924).

[670] North Laramie Land Co. _v._ Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925).

_See also_ Bragg _v._ Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919).

[671] Bragg _v._ Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); Joslin Mfg. Co. _v._

Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923).

[672] Bragg _v._ Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919); North Laramie Land Co.

_v._ Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925).

[673] Bragg _v._ Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919).

[674] Long Island Water Supply Co. _v._ Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 695

(1897).

[675] Hays _v._ Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 238 (1920); Bailey _v._ Anderson,

326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945).

[676] The requirements of due process in tax and eminent domain

proceedings are discussed in conjunction with the coverage of these

topics. _See_ pp. 1056-1062, 1069.

[677] Hagar _v._ Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); Hurtado

_v._ California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).

[678] Brown _v._ New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Hurtado _v._

California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Twining _v._ New Jersey, 211 U.S.

78, 101 (1908); Anderson Nat. Bank _v._ Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244

(1944).

[679] Marchant _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).

[680] Ballard _v._ Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon,

133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).

[681] McMillen _v._ Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41 (1877).

[682] R.R. Commission _v._ Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941). _See also_

Railroad Commission _v._ Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).

[683] Dreyer _v._ Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902).

[684] New York ex rel. Lieberman _v._ Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562

(1905).

[685] Ohio ex rel. Bryant _v._ Akron Metropolitan Park Dist, 281 U.S.

74, 79 (1930).

[686] Carfer _v._ Caldwell, 200 U.S. 293, 297 (1906).

[687] Scott _v._ McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46 (1894); Pennoyer _v._ Neff, 95

U.S. 714, 733 (1878).

[688] National Exchange Bank _v._ Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 270 (1904); Iron

Cliffs Co. _v._ Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U.S. 463, 471 (1905).

[689] Arndt _v._ Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890); Grannis _v._ Ordean,

234 U.S. 385 (1914); Pennington _v._ Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271

(1917).

[690] Goodrich _v._ Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).

[691] Pennington _v._ Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).

[692] The jurisdictional requirements for rendering a valid decree in

divorce proceedings are considered under the full faith and credit

clause, _supra_, pp. 662-670.

[693] Pennoyer _v._ Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Simon _v._ Southern R.

Co., 236 U.S. 115, 122 (1915); Grannis _v._ Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 392,

394 (1914).

[694] Louisville & N.R. Co. _v._ Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900); McDonald

_v._ Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, (1917). _See also_ Adam _v._ Saenger, 303

U.S. 59 (1938).

[695] Rees _v._ Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (1874); Coe _v._ Armour

Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Griffin _v._ Griffin, 327

U.S. 220 (1946).

[696] Sugg _v._ Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889).

[697] Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills _v._ Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 193

(1915); Hess _v._ Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). _See also_

Harkness _v._ Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879); Wilson _v._ Seligman, 144 U.S.

41 (1892).

[698] Milliken _v._ Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-464 (1940).

[699] McDonald _v._ Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).

[700] Thus, in an older decision rendered in 1919, the Court held that

whereas "States could exclude foreign corporations * * *, and therefore

establish * * * [appointment of such an agent] as a condition to letting

them in," they had no power to exclude individuals; and as a

consequence, a statute was ineffective which treated nonresident

partners, by virtue of their having done business therein, as having

consented to be bound by service of process on a person who was their

employee when the transaction sued on arose but was not their agent at

the time of service.--Flexner _v._ Farson, 248. U.S. 289, 293 (1919).

Because it might be construed to negative extension to nonresidents,

other than motorists, of the statutory device upheld in Hess _v._

Pawloski, the doctrine of Flexner _v._ Farson, "that the mere

transaction of business in a State by a nonresident natural person does

not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts," was

recently condemned as inadequate "to cope with the increasing problem of

practical responsibility of hazardous business conducted in absentia * *

*"--Sugg _v._ Hendrix, 142 F. (2d) 740, 742 (1944).

[701] Hess _v._ Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Wuchter _v._ Pizzutti,

276 U.S. 13, 20, 24 (1928).

[702] 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

[703] 326 U.S. 310.

[704] Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. _v._ McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265

(1917).

[705] In a very few cases, "continuous operations within a State were

thought to be so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suits

against [a foreign corporation] on causes of action arising from

dealings entirely distinct from those" operations.--_See_ St. Louis

S.W.R. Co. _v._ Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Missouri, K. & T.R. Co.

_v._ Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921).

[706] Old Wayne Life Assn. _v._ McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907).

[707] Simon _v._ Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 129-130 (1915).--In

neither this case, nor the preceding decision were the defendant

corporations notified of the pendency of the action, service having been

made only on the Insurance Commissioner or the Secretary of State.

[708] Green _v._ Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). _See also_

Davis _v._ Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 (1923).

[709] Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. _v._ Gold Issue Min. & M. Co., 243 U.S.

93, 95-96 (1917).

[710] Rosenberg Bros. & Co. _v._ Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517

(1923).

[711] Goldey _v._ Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895).

[712] Conley _v._ Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903).

[713] Riverside Mills _v._ Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195 (1915).

[714] Mutual Life Insurance Co. _v._ Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).

[715] St. Clair _v._ Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). _See_ St. Louis

S.W.R. Co. _v._ Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).

[716] Mutual Reserve &c. Assn. _v._ Phelps, 190 U.S. 147, 156 (1903).

[717] Washington _v._ Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 365 (1933).

[718] 326 U.S. 310, 317-320 (1945).

[719] This departure was recognized by Justice Rutledge in a subsequent

opinion in Nippert _v._ Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422 (1946).

The principle that solicitation of business alone is inadequate to

confer jurisdiction for purposes of subjecting a foreign corporation to

a suit _in personam_ was established in Green _v._ Chicago, B. & Q.R.

Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); but was somewhat qualified by the later

holding in International Harvester Co. _v._ Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579

(1914) to the effect that when solicitation was connected with other

activities (in the latter case, the local agents collected from the

customers), a foreign corporation was then doing business within the

forum State. Inasmuch as the International Shoe Company, in addition to

having its agents solicit orders, also permitted them to rent quarters

for the display of merchandise, the observation has been made that the

Court, by applying the qualification of the International Harvester

Case, could have decided International Shoe Co. _v._ Washington, 326

U.S. 310 (1945) as it did without abandoning the "presence" doctrine.

[720] 326 U.S. 310, 316-317.

[721] Ibid. 319.

[722] 339 U.S. 643 (1950).

[723] Ibid. 647-649.--Concerning the holding in Minnesota Ass'n. _v._

Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923), that a similar Minnesota mail order insurance

company could not be viewed as doing business in Montana where the

claimant-plaintiff lived, and that the circumstances under which its

Montana contracts, executed and to be performed in Minnesota, were

consummated could not support in implication that the foreign insurer

had consented to be sued in Montana, the majority asserted that the

"narrow grounds relied on by the Court in the Benn Case cannot be deemed

controlling."

Declaring that what is necessary to sustain a suit by a policyholder in

Virginia against a foreign insurer is not determinative when the State

seeks to regulate solicitation within its borders, Justice Douglas, in a

concurring opinion, emphasized that it is the nature of the State's

action that determines the degree of activity in a State necessary for

satisfying the requirements of due process, and that solicitation by

existing members operates as though the insurer "had formally designated

Virginia members as its agents."

Insisting that "an _in personam_ judgment cannot be based upon service

by registered letter on a nonresident corporation or a natural person,

neither of whom has ever been" in Virginia, Justice Minton, with whom

Justice Jackson was associated in a dissenting opinion, would have

dismissed the appeal on the ground that "Virginia has not claimed the

power to require [the insurer] * * * to appoint the Secretary of State

as their agent for service of process, nor have [its] courts rendered

judgment in a suit where service was made in that manner." He would

therefore let Virginia "go through this shadow-boxing performance in

order to publicize the activities of" the insurer.--Justices Reed and

Frankfurter joined this dissent on the merits.--Ibid. 655-656, 658, 659.

In Perkins _v._ Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) it was held,

that the State of Ohio was free either to open its courts, or to refuse

to do so, to a foreign corporation owning gold and silver mines in the

Philippine Islands, but temporarily (during Japanese occupation)

carrying on a part of its general business in Ohio, including directors

meetings, business correspondence, banking, etc. Two members of the

Court dissented, contending that what it was doing was "giving

gratuitously an advisory opinion to the Ohio Supreme Court. [They] would

dismiss the writ [of certiorari] as improvidently granted." The case is

obviously too atypical to offer much promise of importance as a

precedent.

[724] Arndt _v._ Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890).

[725] Ballard _v._ Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254 (1907); Pennoyer _v._ Neff,

95 U.S. 714 (1878).

[726] Dewey _v._ Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 203 (1899); Pennoyer _v._

Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).

[727] American Land Co. _v._ Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911).

[728] Pennoyer _v._ Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); citing Boswell _v._ Otis,

9 How. 336 (1850); Cooper _v._ Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 (1870). Such

remedy, by way of example, is also available to a wife who is enabled

thereby to impound local bank deposits of her absent husband for

purposes of collecting unpaid instalments by him. Moreover, because of

the antiquity of the procedure authorized, a statute permitting the

impounding of property of an absconding father for the maintenance of

his children is not in conflict with due process because it fails to

provide for notice, actual or constructive, to the

absconder.--Pennington _v._ Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917);

Corn Exch. Bank _v._ Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 222 (1930). Likewise,

proceedings to attach wages in execution of a judgment for debt may be

instituted without any notice or service on the judgment debtor. The

latter, having had his day in court when the judgment was rendered, is

not entitled to be apprized of what action the judgment creditor may

elect to take to enforce collection.--Endicott Co. _v._ Encyclopedia

Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).

[729] Goodrich _v._ Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).

[730] McCaughey _v._ Lyall, 224 U.S. 558 (1912).

[731] RoBards _v._ Lamb, 127 U.S. 58, 61 (1888). Inasmuch as it is

within the power of a State to provide that one who has undertaken

administration of an estate shall remain subject to the order of its

courts until said administration is closed, it follows that there can be

no question as to the validity of a judgment for unadministered assets

obtained on service of publication plus service personally upon an

executor in the State in which he had taken refuge and in which he had

been adjudged incompetent.--Michigan Trust Co. _v._ Ferry, 228 U.S. 346

(1913). Also, when a mother petitions for her appointment as guardian,

and no one but the mother and her infant son of tender years, are

concerned, failure to serve notice of the petition upon the infant does

not invalidate the proceedings resulting in her appointment.--Jones _v._

Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195 (1927). Also a Pennsylvania statute

which establishes a special procedure for appointment of one to

administer the estate of absentees, which procedure is distinct from

that contained in the general law governing settlement of decedents'

estates and provides special safeguards to protect the rights of

absentees is not repugnant to the due process clause because it

authorizes notice by publication after an absence of seven

years.--Cunnius _v._ Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905).

[732] Hamilton _v._ Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 275 (1896).

[733] Security Sav. Bank _v._ California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).

[734] Anderson Nat. Bank _v._ Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).

[735] Mullane _v._ Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

[736] Voeller _v._ Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941).

[737] Grannis _v._ Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 395-396 (1914).

[738] Miedreich _v._ Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236 (1914).

[739] Twining _v._ New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908); Jacob _v._

Roberts, 223 U.S. 261, 265 (1912).

[740] Bi-Metallic Co. _v._ Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Bragg

_v._ Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). For the procedural requirements

that must be observed in the passage of legislation levying special

assessments or establishing assessment districts, _see_ pp. 1058-1059.

[741] Pacific States Box & Basket Co. _v._ White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935);

Western Union Telegraph Co. _v._ Industrial Com'n., 24 F. Supp. 370

(1938); Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52

Harvard Law Review, 259 (1938).

Whether action of an administrative agency, which voluntarily affords

notice and hearing in proceedings in which due process would require the

same, is voided by the fact that the statute in pursuance of which it

operates does not expressly provide such protection, is a question as to

which the Supreme Court has developed no definitive answer. It appears

to favor the doctrine enunciated by State courts to the effect that such

statutes are to be construed as impliedly requiring notice and hearing,

although, in a few instances, it has uttered comments rejecting this

notice-by-implication theory.--_See_ Toombs _v._ Citizens Bank, 281 U.S.

643 (1930); Paulsen _v._ Portland, 149 U.S. 30 (1893); Bratton _v._

Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R. Co. _v._

Kentucky, 115 U.S. 321 (1885). _Contra_: Central of Georgia R. Co. _v._

Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Coe _v._ Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S.

413 (1915); Wuchter _v._ Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).

[742] Bratton _v._ Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Missouri ex rel.

Hurwitz _v._ North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926).

[743] North American Cold Storage Co. _v._ Chicago, 211 U.S. 306,

315-316 (1908). For an exposition of the doctrine applicable for

determining the tort liability of administrative officers, _see_ Miller

_v._ Horton, 152 Mass. 540 (1891).

[744] Samuels _v._ McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925).

[745] 152 U.S. 133 (1894).

[746] Ibid. 140-141.

[747] Anderson National Bank _v._ Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246-247 (1944).

[748] Coffin Bros. & Co. _v._ Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).

[749] Postal Teleg. Cable Co. _v._ Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918);

Baker _v._ Baker, E. & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403 (1917); Louisville & N.R.

Co. _v._ Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).

[750] American Surety Co _v._ Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).

[751] Saunders _v._ Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).

[752] _See_ footnote 1, p. 1085. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to

Footnote 741, above.]

[753] Coe _v._ Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915);

Wuchter _v._ Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).

[754] Roller _v._ Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 407, 409 (1900).

[755] Goodrich _v._ Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909). One may, of course,

waive a right to notice and hearing, as in the case of a debtor or

surety who consents to the entry of a confessed judgment on the

happening of certain conditions.--Johnson _v._ Chicago & P. Elevator

Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886); American Surety Co. _v._ Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156

(1932).

[756] _See_ pp. 1084-1088.

[757] Holmes _v._ Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916); Louisville & N.R.

Co. _v._ Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).

[758] Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); West _v._

Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263 (1904); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. _v._

Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Jordan _v._ Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167,

176 (1912). The power of a State to determine the limits of the

jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which

shall be heard in them and to deny access to its courts, in the exercise

of its right to regulate practice and procedure; is also subject to the

restrictions imposed by the contract, full faith and credit, and

privileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution. Angel

_v._ Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).

[759] Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. _v._ Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151,

158 (1931); Iowa C.R. Co. _v._ Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896); Honeyman

_v._ Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937).

[760] Cincinnati Street R. Co. _v._ Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904).

[761] Ownbey _v._ Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). Thus, the Fourteenth

Amendment does not constrain the States to accept modern doctrines of

equity, or adopt a combined system of law and equity procedure, or

dispense with all necessity for form and method in pleading, or give

untrammeled liberty to make amendments.

[762] Cohen _v._ Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

[763] Young Co. _v._ McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931); Adam _v._

Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).

[764] Jones _v._ Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924).

[765] York _v._ Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman _v._ Wooters, 138

U.S. 285, 287 (1891).

[766] Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. _v._ Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915).

[767] Ownbey _v._ Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).--Consistently, with

due process, a State may provide that the doctrines of contributory

negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant shall not bar

recovery in actions brought against an employer for death or injury

resulting from dangerous machinery improperly safeguarded. A person

having no vested right to the defense of contributory negligence, a

State may take it away altogether, or may provide that said defense, as

well as that of assumption of risk, are questions of fact to be left to

the jury.--Bowersock _v._ Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34 (1917); Chicago, R.I. &

P.R. Co. _v._ Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 55 (1919); Herron _v._ Southern P. Co.,

283 U.S. 91 (1931).

[768] Sawyer _v._ Piper, 189 U.S. 154 (1903).

[769] Ballard _v._ Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 259 (1907).

[770] Missouri K. & T.R. Co. _v._ Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914).

[771] Lowe _v._ Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896).

[772] Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. _v._ Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912);

Chicago & N.W.R. Co. _v._ Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43-44

(1922); Hartford L. Ins. Co. _v._ Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129, 139 (1921);

Life & C. Ins. Co. _v._ McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).

[773] Pizitz Dry Goods Co. _v._ Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114 (1927).

[774] Coffey _v._ Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 663, 665 (1907).

[775] Wheeler _v._ Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890); Kentucky Union Co.

_v._ Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 156 (1911).

[776] Blinn _v._ Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911).

[777] Turner _v._ New York, 168 U.S. 90, 94 (1897).

[778] Soper _v._ Lawrence Bros. Co., 201 U.S. 359 (1906). Nor is a

former owner who had not been in possession for five years after and

fifteen years before said enactment thereby deprived of any property

without due process.

[779] Mattson _v._ Department of Labor, 293 U.S. 151, 154 (1934).

[780] Campbell _v._ Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623, 628 (1885).

[781] Chase Securities Corp. _v._ Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).

[782] Gange Lumber Co. _v._ Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945).

[783] Campbell _v._ Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885). _See also_ Stewart

_v._ Keyes, 295 U.S. 403, 417 (1935).

[784] Home Ins. Co. _v._ Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 398 (1930).

[785] Hawkins _v._ Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917); James-Dickinson

Farm Mortg. Co. _v._ Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 124 (1927). An omission in a

criminal trial of any reference to the presumption of innocence effects

no denial of due process of law where the State appellate court ruled

that such omission did not invalidate the proceedings. Howard _v._

Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903).

[786] Manley _v._ Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5 (1929); Western & A.R. Co. _v._

Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 642 (1929); Bailey _v._ Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,

233 (1911); Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. _v._ Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42

(1910).

[787] Bailey _v._ Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 233 (1911).

[788] Manley _v._ Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 7 (1929).

[789] Western & A.R. Co. _v._ Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).

[790] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. _v._ Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933). _See

also_ Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. _v._ Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).

[791] Hawes _v._ Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922).

[792] Bandini Petroleum Co. _v._ Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8, 19 (1931).

[793] Hawker _v._ New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).

[794] Cockrill _v._ California, 268 U.S. 258, 261 (1925).

[795] Morrison _v._ California, 288 U.S. 591 (1933).

[796] Morrison _v._ California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).

[797] "The limits are in substance these, that the State shall have

proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repeal

what has been proved * * *, or at least that upon a balancing of

convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the

burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the

accused to hardship or oppression."--Ibid. 88-89.

[798] Ibid. 87-91, 96-97.

[799] Leland _v._ Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).

[800] Walker _v._ Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); New York C.R. Co. _v._

White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917); Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,

105 (1934).

[801] Marvin _v._ Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 226 (1905).

[802] Tinsley _v._ Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 108 (1898); Eilenbecker _v._

District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36, 39 (1890).

[803] Delgado _v._ Chavez, 140 U.S. 586, 588 (1891).

[804] Wilson _v._ North Carolina ex rel. Caldwell, 169 U.S. 586 (1898);

Foster _v._ Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 U.S. 201, 206 (1884).

[805] Long Island Water Supply Co. _v._ Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 694

(1897).

[806] Montana Company _v._ St. Louis Min. & Mill Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171

(1894); Church _v._ Kelsey, 121 U.S. 282 (1887).

[807] Jordan _v._ Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).

[808] Maxwell _v._ Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).

[809] Winters _v._ New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-510, 515 (1948). _See

also_ Cline _v._ Frink Dairy, 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Cole _v._ Arkansas,

338 U.S. 345, 354 (1949).

[810] Lanzetta _v._ New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455 (1939).

[811] Minnesota _v._ Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).

[812] Hurtado _v._ California, 110 U.S. 516, 520, 538 (1884); Brown _v._

New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1890); Maxwell _v._ Dow, 176 U.S. 581,

602 (1900); Graham _v._ West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 627 (1912); Jordan

_v._ Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).

[813] Lem Woon _v._ Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913).

[814] Gaines _v._ Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 86 (1928).

[815] Norris _v._ Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). _See also_ Hale _v._

Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Pierre _v._ Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354

(1939); Smith _v._ Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Shepherd _v._ Florida,

341 U.S. 50 (1951).

[816] Powell _v._ Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66, 71 (1932).

[817] Palko _v._ Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-325 (1937).

[818] 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

[819] Ibid. 71.

[820] 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).--The Court presently seems to be holding

that in capital cases, notwithstanding the absence even of other

circumstances prejudicial to the defendant, the right to counsel is

unqualified. _See_ the later cases discussed herein, especially Tomkins

_v._ Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams _v._ Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471

(1945); Hawk _v._ Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); and the Court's summary of

its rulings in Uveges _v._ Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948), _supra_,

p. 1108.

[821] 308 U.S. 444 (1940).

[822] Ibid. 446-447.

[823] 312 U.S. 329 (1941).--In a post mortem comment on this case

appearing in the later decision of Betts _v._ Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464

(1942), there is contained the intimation that the mere failure to

appoint counsel, alone, in the absence of the proof of other facts

tending to show that the whole trial was "a mere sham and a pretense,"

would not have sufficed to support a finding of a denial of due process.

[824] 316 U.S. 455, 462-463 (1942).

[825] Ibid. 462, 473.

[826] In Powell _v._ Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Avery _v._ Alabama,

308 U.S. 444 (1940); and Smith _v._ O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941), a

State law required the appointment of counsel.

[827] 316 U.S. 455, 461-462, 474-476 (1942).--Dissenting, Justice Black,

with whom Justices Douglas and Murphy were in agreement, acknowledged

regretfully that the view that the "Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth

applicable to the States * * * has never been accepted by a majority of

this Court," and submitted a list of citations showing that by judicial

decision, as well as by constitutional and statutory provision, a

majority of States require that indigent defendants, in noncapital as

well as capital cases, be provided with counsel on request. This

evidence, he contended, supports the conclusion that "denial to the poor

of a request for counsel in proceedings based on serious charges of

crime," has "long been regarded throughout this country as shocking to

the 'universal sense of justice.'"

[828] 323 U.S. 471 (1945).

[829] 323 U.S. 485 (1945).

[830] 287 U.S. 45, 69, 71 (1932).

[831] 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945).

[832] 324 U.S. 42 (1945). _See also_ White _v._ Ragen, 324 U.S. 760

(1945).

[833] 326 U.S. 271 (1945).

[834] 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945).

[835] 324 U.S. 786 (1945).

[836] 327 U.S. 82 (1946). Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented, the

former contending that "the right to counsel means nothing unless it

means the right to counsel at each and every step in a criminal

proceeding."--Ibid. 89.

[837] 329 U.S. 173 (1946).

[838] Rice _v._ Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), was distinguished on the

ground that the record in the older case contained specific allegations

bearing on the disabilities of the accused to stand prosecution without

the aid of counsel and the complete absence of any uncontested finding,

as in the instant case, of an intelligent waiver of counsel.

Dissenting for himself and Justices Black and Rutledge, Justice Douglas

declared that, under the authority of Williams _v._ Kaiser, 323 U.S.

471, 476 (1945), "if * * * [the] defendant is not capable of making his

own defense, it is the duty of the Court, at least in capital cases, to

appoint counsel, whether requested so to do or not."--329 U.S. 173, 181

(1946). In a separate dissent, Justice Murphy observed that while "legal

technicalities doubtless afford justification for our pretense of

ignoring plain facts before us," facts which emphasize the absence of

any intelligent waiver of counsel, "the result certainly does not

enhance the high traditions of the judicial process."--Ibid. 183.

[839] 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947).

[840] 332 U.S. 134 (1947).

[841] 332 U.S. 145 (1947).

[842] 332 U.S. 134, 136 (1947).--Acknowledging that the decision is in

line with the precedent of Betts _v._ Brady, Justice Black, who was

joined by Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, lamented that the

latter was a "kind of precedent [which he] had hoped that the Court

would not perpetuate." Complaining of the loss of certainty occasioned

by the Court's refusal to read into the Fourteenth Amendment the

absolute right to counsel set out in the Sixth Amendment, Justice Black

contends that the fair trial doctrine as enunciated in this and in the

Adamson _v._ California case (_see_ p. 1115) decided on the same day is

"another example of the consequences which can be produced by the

substitution of this Court's day-to-day opinion of what kind of trial is

fair and decent for the kind of trial which the Bill of Rights

guarantees."--Ibid. 139, 140.--In a second dissenting opinion meriting

the concurrence of Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, Justice

Rutledge, who also is of the opinion that the absolute right to counsel

granted by the Sixth Amendment should be enjoyed in State criminal

trials, insisted that even under the fair trial doctrine, the accused

had not been accorded due process.

[843] 332 U.S. 145 (1947).

[844] 332 U.S. 561 (1947).

[845] 332 U.S. 596 (1948).

[846] _See_ p. 1103.

[847] 333 U.S. 640, 678, 680-682 (1948).--As against the assertion of

the majority that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

does not of its own force require appointment of counsel for one simply

because he would have a constitutional right to the assistance of

counsel in a comparable federal case, the minority, consisting of

Justices Black, Murphy, and Rutledge speaking through Justice Douglas,

declared that "the Bill of Rights is applicable to all courts at all

times"; for, otherwise, "of what value is the constitutional guarantee

of a fair trial if an accused does not have counsel to advise and defend

him." Noting that all members of the Court were in accord on the

requirement of counsel in capital offenses, the minority contended that

the considerations inducing such unanimity were "equally germane [in

noncapital cases] where liberty rather than life hangs in the balance."

Conceding that "it might not be nonsense to draw the Betts _v._ Brady

line somewhere between that case and the case of one charged with

violation of a parking ordinance, and to say the accused is entitled to

counsel in the former but not in the latter," the minority concluded as

follows: "* * * to draw the line between this case and cases where the

maximum penalty is death is to make a distinction which makes no sense

in terms of the absence or presence of need for counsel. Yet it is the

_need_ for counsel that establishes the real standard for determining

whether the lack of counsel rendered the trial unfair. And the need for

counsel, even by Betts _v._ Brady standards, is not determined by the

complexities of the individual case or the ability of the particular

person who stands as an accused before the Court. That need is measured

by the _nature_ of the _charge_ and the _ability_ of the _average_ man

to face it alone, unaided by an expert in the law."

[848] 334 U.S. 672, 683 (1948).

[849] 334 U.S. 728, 730, 731 (1948).

[850] 334 U.S. 736 (1948).

[851] Ibid. 740.--The majority also observed that "trial court's

facetiousness casts a somewhat somber reflection on the fairness of the

proceeding * * *"

Although Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton dissented

without an opinion in Townsend _v._ Burke, four Justices, Black,

Douglas, and Murphy speaking through Justice Rutledge filed a vigorous

dissent in Gryger _v._ Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 733, 736 (1948). Justice

Rutledge declared his inability to "square * * * [this] decision in this

case with that made in Townsend _v._ Burke. I find it difficult to

comprehend that the [trial] court's misreading or misinformation

concerning the facts of [the] record [Townsend _v._ Burke] vital to the

proper exercise of the sentencing function is prejudicial * * *, but its

misreading or misconception of the controlling statute, [Gryger _v._

Burke] in a matter so vital as imposing mandatory sentence or exercising

discretion concerning it, has no such effect. Perhaps the difference

serves only to illustrate how capricious are the results when the right

to counsel is made to depend not upon the mandate of the Constitution,

but upon the vagaries of whether judges, * * * will regard this incident

or that in the course of particular criminal proceedings as

prejudicial."

[852] 335 U.S. 437, 438-442 (1948).

[853] 337 U.S. 773, 780 (1949).

[854] 342 U.S. 184 (1951); _See also_ Per Curiam opinion granting

certiorari in Foulke _v._ Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951).

[855] 339 U.S. 660, 665 (1950).

[856] 342 U.S. 55 (1951).

[857] Ibid. 64.

[858] 335 U.S. 437, 440-441 (1948).

[859] Rice _v._ Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788-789 (1945).

[860] Wade _v._ Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 683-684 (1948); De Meerleer _v._

Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 664-665 (1947); Betts _v._ Brady, 316 U.S. 455,

472 (1942); Powell _v._ Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51-52, 71 (1932).

[861] Townsend _v._ Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739-741 (1948); De Meerleer

_v._ Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947); Smith _v._ O'Grady, 312 U.S.

329, 332-333 (1941).

[862] Rice _v._ Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789-791 (1945).

[863] Gibbs _v._ Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780-781 (1949). Devotion to the

Fair Trial doctrine has also created another problem for the Court, that

of a burdensome increase in the volume of its business. Inasmuch as

accurate appraisal of the effect of absence of counsel on the validity

of a State criminal proceeding has been rendered more difficult by the

vagueness of that doctrine as well as by the Court's acknowledged

variation in the application thereof, innumerable State prisoners have

been tempted to seek judicial reconsideration of their convictions. To

reduce the number of such cases which it is obliged to examine on their

merits, the Court had been compelled to have recourse to certain

protective rules. Thus, when a State prisoner seeks to attack the

validity of his conviction by way of _habeas corpus_ proceedings begun

in a lower federal court, application for that writ will be entertained

only after all State remedies available, including all appellate

remedies in State courts and in the Supreme Court by appeal or writ of

certiorari, have been exhausted. This rule, however, will not be applied

when no adequate State remedy is in fact available. Also when a

prisoner's petition for release on the grounds of the unconstitutionally

of his conviction has been rejected by a State court, a petition for

certiorari addressed to the United States Supreme Court will be denied

whenever it appears that the prisoner had not invoked the appropriate

State remedy. Or stated otherwise, where the State court's conviction or

refusal to grant writs of _habeas corpus_ to those under State sentences

may fairly be attributed to a rule of local procedure and is not

exclusively founded on the denial of a federal claim, such as, right to

counsel, the Supreme Court will refuse to intervene. As in the case of

other legal rules, Justices of the Supreme Court have often found

themselves in disagreement as to the manner of applying these

aforementioned principles; and vigorous dissents arising out of this

very issue were recorded in the cases of Marino _v._ Ragen, 332 U.S. 561

(1947); Wade _v._ Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); and Uveges _v._

Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948). Justice Frankfurter has frequently,

albeit unsuccessfully contended, that "intervention by * * * [the

Supreme Court] in the criminal process of States * * * should not be

indulged in unless no reasonable doubt is left that a State denies, or

has refused to exercise, means of correcting a claimed infraction of the

United States Constitution. * * * After all, [it should be borne in mind

that] this is the Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal, not a

super-legal-aid bureau."

[864] 176 U.S. 581 (1900).

[865] 110 U.S. 516 (1884).

[866] Jordan _v._ Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176. (1912).

[867] Maxwell _v._ Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).

[868] Hallinger _v._ Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892).

[869] Ibid. 318-320.

[870] Missouri _v._ Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880); Maxwell _v._ Dow, 176

U.S. 581, 603 (1900); Jordan _v._ Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176

(1912); Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).

[871] Brown _v._ New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175, 176 (1899).

[872] Ashe _v._ United States ex rel. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 425 (1926).

[873] Fay _v._ New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947); Moore _v._ New York,

333 U.S. 585 (1948).--Both cases reject the proposition that the

commandment of the Sixth Amendment, which requires a jury trial in

criminal cases in the federal courts is picked up by the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to become a limitation upon the

States.

[874] Fay _v._ New York, 332 U.S. 261, 283-284 (1947).--Since Congress,

by way of enforcing the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth

Amendment, has, by statute [18 Stat. 336, 377 (1875); 8 U.S.C. 44], made

it a crime to exclude a citizen from jury service only on account of

race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the Supreme Court

"never has interfered with the composition of State court juries except

in cases where this guidance of Congress was applicable." Without

suggesting that "no case of discrimination in jury drawing except those

involving race or color can carry such unjust consequences as to amount

to a denial of * * * due process," the Court has nevertheless required

that a defendant, alleging grounds not covered by that statute, "must

comply with the exacting requirements of proving clearly" that the

procedure in his case was destructive of due process.

These statements reflect the views of only five Justices. Speaking for

the minority (Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge), Justice Murphy

declared that "the vice lies in the very concept of 'blue ribbon'

panels--the systematic and intentional exclusion of all but the 'best'

or the most learned or intelligent of the general jurors. Such panels

are completely at war with the democratic theory of our jury system, a

theory formulated out of the experience of generations. One is

constitutionally entitled to be judged by a fair sampling of all one's

neighbors who are qualified, not merely those with superior intelligence

or learning. Jury panels are supposed to be representative of all

qualified classes. Within those classes, of course, are persons with

varying degrees of intelligence, wealth, education, ability and

experience. But it is from that welter of qualified individuals, who

meet specified minimum standards, that juries are to be chosen. Any

method that permits only the 'best' of these to be selected opens the

way to grave abuses. The jury is then in danger of losing its democratic

flavor and becoming the instrument of the select few." A "blue ribbon

jury" is neither "a jury of the * * * [defendant's] peers," nor "a jury

chosen from a fair cross-section of the community, * * *"--Moore _v._

New York, 333 U.S. 565, 569-570 (1948).

[875] Rawlins _v._ Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906). The Supreme Court "has

never entertained a defendant's objections to exclusions from the jury

except when he was a member of the excluded class."--Fay _v._ New York,

332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947).

[876] 211 U.S. 78, 93, 106-107, 113; citing Missouri _v._ Lewis, 101

U.S. 22 (1880); and Holden _v._ Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387, 389 (1898).

[877] In several decisions the Court, assuming, but without deciding,

that a State law requiring a witness to answer incriminating questions

would violate the due process clause, has then proceeded to conclude,

nevertheless, that a State antitrust law which grants immunity from

local prosecution to a witness compelled to testify thereunder is valid

even though testimony thus extracted may later serve as the basis of a

federal prosecution for violation of federal antitrust laws.--Jack _v._

Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 380 (1905).

[878] Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).

[879] Palko _v._ Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937).

[880] 297 U.S. 278, 285-286 (1936). For the significance of this

decision as a precedent in favor of a more careful scrutiny by the

Supreme Court of State trials in which a denial of constitutional rights

allegedly occurred, see p. 1138.

[881] Ibid, 285-286.

[882] 309 U.S. 227 (1940).

[883] Ibid. 228-229, 237-241.

[884] 310 U.S. 530 (1940).

[885] 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941). This dictum represents the closest

approach which the Court thus far has made toward inclusion of the

privilege against self-incrimination within the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. In all but a few of the forced confession

cases, however, the results achieved by application of the Fair Trial

doctrine differ scarcely at all from those attainable by incorporation

of the privilege within that clause.

[886] 316 U.S. 547 (1942).

[887] 322 U.S. 143 (1944).

[888] _See_ Baldwin _v._ Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).

[889] 322 U.S. 143, 160-162 (1944).--All members of the Court were in

accord, however, in condemning, as no less a denial of due process, the

admission at the second trial of Ashcraft [Ashcraft _v._ Tennessee, 327

U.S. 274 (1946)] of evidence uncovered in consequence of the written

confession, acceptance of which at the first trial had led to the

reversal of his prior conviction.

[890] 322 U.S. 596 (1944).

[891] Ibid. 602.--Of three Justices who dissented, Justice Murphy, with

whom Justice Black was associated, declared that it was "inconceivable *

* * that the second confession was free from the coercive atmosphere

that admittedly impregnated the first one"; and added that previous

decisions of this Court "in effect have held that the Fourteenth

Amendment makes the prohibition [of the Fifth pertaining to

self-incrimination] applicable to the States."--Ibid. 605-606.

[892] 324 U.S. 401 (1945).

[893] Chief Justice Stone, together with Justices Roberts, Reed, and

Jackson, all of whom dissented, would have sustained the conviction.

[894] Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented in part, assigning among

their reasons therefor their belief that the "subsequent confessions, *

* *, were vitiated with all the coercion which destroys admissibility of

the first one." According to Justice Rutledge, "a stricter standard is

necessary where the confession tendered follows a prior coerced one than

in the case of a single confession * * *. Once a coerced confession has

been obtained all later ones should be excluded from evidence, wherever

there is evidence that the coerced one has been used to secure the later

ones."--324 U.S. 401, 420, 428-429 (1945).

[895] In Lyons _v._ Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 601 (1944), the Court stated

that "when the State-approved instruction (to the jury) fairly raises

the question of whether or not the challenged confession was voluntary,

* * *, the requirements of due process, * * *, are satisfied and this

Court will not require a modification of local practice to meet views

that it might have as to * * * how specific an instruction * * * must

be." In Malinski _v._ New York, the four dissenting Justices declared

that "the trial court, * * *, instructed the jury that the evidence with

respect to the first confession was adduced only to show that the second

was coerced. And * * * that it could consider the second confession,

only if it found it voluntary, and that it could convict in that case.

In view of these instructions, we cannot say that the first confession

was submitted to the jury, or that in the absence of any exception or

request to charge more particularly, there was any error, of which the *

* * [accused] can complain."--324 U.S. 401, 437 (1945).

[896] The coercive nature of the first oral confession was apparently

acknowledged by the prosecuting attorney in his summation to the jury;

for he declared that the accused "was not hard to break," and that the

purpose of holding him _incommunicado_ and unclothed in a hotel room

from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., when the confession was made, was to "let him

think that he is going to get a shellacking (beating)."--324 U.S. 401,

407 (1945).

[897] 332 U.S. 46, 56 (1947).

[898] 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

[899] 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

[900] Adamson _v._ California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, 53, 56, 58 (1947).

[901] Adamson _v._ California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-60, 63-64, 66 (1947).

_See also_ Malinski _v._ New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414, 415, 417 (1945).

[902] Adamson _v._ California, 332 U.S. 46, 69, 74-75, 89

(1947).--Dissenting separately, Justice Murphy, together with Justice

Rutledge, announced their agreement with Justice Black, subject to one

reservation. While agreeing "that the specific guarantees of the Bill of

Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the

Fourteenth Amendment," they were "not prepared to say that the latter is

entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may

arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental

standards of procedure as to warrant * * * condemnation in terms of a

lack of due process despite the absence of a specific provision in the

Bill of Rights."--Ibid. 124.

In a lengthy article based upon a painstaking examination of original

data pertaining to the "understanding of the import of the * * * clauses

of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time the Amendment was

adopted"; that is, during the period 1866-1868, Professor Charles

Fairman has marshalled a "mountain of evidence" calculated to prove

conclusively the inaccuracy of Justice Black's reading of

history.--Charles Fairman. Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the

Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding.--2 Stanford Law Review,

5-139 (1949).

[903] 332 U.S. 596 (1948).

[904] Ibid. 600-601.--In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice

Vinson and Justices Jackson and Reed concurred, Justice Burton remarked

that inasmuch as the issue of the voluntariness of the confession was

one of fact, turning largely on the credibility of witnesses, the

determination thereof by the trial judge and jury should not be

overturned upon mere conjecture.--Ibid. 607, 615.

[905] 332 U.S. 742, 745 (1948).

[906] 335 U.S. 252 (1948).

[907] The Court also held that the procedure of Alabama, in requiring

the accused to obtain permission from an appellate court before filing a

petition in a trial court for a writ of error _coram nobis_ was

consistent with due process. Alabama was deemed to possess "ample

machinery for correcting the Constitutional wrong of which the * * *

[accused] complained."--Ibid. 254, 260-261.

[908] The accused, in his petition, neither denied his guilt nor any of

the acts on which his conviction was based. He simply contended that

because of fear generated by coercive police methods applied to him, he

had concealed such evidence from his own counsel at the time of the

trial and had informed the latter that his confessions were voluntary.

His charges of duress were supported by affidavits of three associates

in crime, none of whom claims to have seen the alleged beatings of the

petitioner.--Ibid. 265-266.

[909] In a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Rutledge

concurred, Justice Murphy maintained that inasmuch as there was some

evidence to substantiate the petitioner's claim, the latter should have

been allowed a hearing in the trial court. According to Justice Murphy,

a conviction based on a coerced confession is "void even though the

confession is in fact true" and the petitioner is guilty. Justice

Frankfurter criticized this dissenting opinion as having been "written

as though this Court was a court of criminal appeals for revision of

convictions in the State courts."--Ibid. 272, 275-276.

[910] 338 U.S. 49 (1949).

[911] 338 U.S. 62, 64 (1949).

[912] 338 U.S. 68 (1949).

[913] Watts _v._ Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).

[914] 309 U.S. 227 (1940).

[915] 322 U.S. 143 (1944).

[916] Watts _v._ Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949); citing Malinski _v._

New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Haley _v._ Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).

[917] 338 U.S. 49, 60 (1949).

[918] 338 U.S. 62 (1949).

[919] 338 U.S. 68 (1949).

[920] 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949). In the 1949, 1950, and 1951 terms only one

case arose which involved the forced confession issue in any significant

way. This was Rochin _v._ California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which is

discussed immediately below in another connection. _See also_ Jennings

_v._ Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); and Stroble _v._ California, 343

U.S. 181 (1952), in which diverse, but not necessarily conflicting,

results were reached.

[921] 232 U.S. 58 (1914).

[922] Consolidated Rendering Co. _v._ Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 552 (1908);

Hammond Packing Co. _v._ Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 348 (1909).

[923] Wolf _v._ Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

[924] 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

[925] 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

[926] 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).

[927] Ibid. 28-31.--In harmony with his views, as previously stated in

Malinski _v._ New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) and Adamson _v._ California,

332 U.S. 46, 59-66 (1947), Justice Frankfurter amplified his appraisal

of the due process clause as follows: "Due process of law * * * conveys

neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is the compendius

expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because

they are basic to our free society. But basic rights do not become

petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human

experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It

is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of

what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living

principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of

what may at a given time be deemed the limits of the essentials of

fundamental rights. To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination

of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement may

satisfy a longing for certainty but ignores the movements of a free

society. * * * The real clue to the problem confronting the judiciary in

the application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where the line

is once and for all to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the

Court to draw it by the gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and

exclusion.'"--Ibid. 27.

[928] 332 U.S. 46, 68, 71-72 (1947).

[929] Wolf _v._ Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949).

[930] Ibid. 40, 41, 44, 46, 47.

[931] Stefanelli _v._ Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Rochin _v._

California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

[932] 342 U.S. 117, 123.

[933] 342 U.S. 105, 168, citing Malinski _v._ New York, 324 U.S. 401,

412, 418 (1945).

[934] Ibid., 174.

[935] 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947). "Of course", said Justice Douglas,

citing Holt _v._ United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-253 (1910), "an

accused can be compelled to be present at the trial, to stand, to sit,

to turn this way or that, and to try on a cap or a coat." 342 U.S. at

179. _See_ the Self-incrimination Clause of Amendment V.

[936] Mooney _v._ Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).

[937] Ibid. 110.--Because judicial process adequate to correct this

alleged wrong was believed to exist in California and had not been fully

invoked by Mooney, the Court denied his petition. Subsequently, a

California court appraised the evidence offered by Mooney and ruled that

his allegations had not been established.--Ex parte Mooney, 10 Cal. (2d)

1, 73 P (2d) 554 (1937); certiorari denied, 305 U.S. 598 (1938). Mooney

later was pardoned by Governor Olson.--New York Times, January 8, 1939.

[938] 315 U.S. 411 (1942).

[939] 317 U.S. 213 (1942).

[940] 324 U.S. 760 (1945). _See also_ New York ex rel. Whitman _v._

Wilson, 318 U.S. 688 (1943); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).

[941] 315 U.S. 411, 413, 421-422 (1942).--Justice Black, together with

Justices Douglas and Murphy, dissented on the ground that the Florida

court, "with intimations of approval" by the majority, had never found

it necessary to pass on the credibility of Hysler's allegations, but had

erroneously declared that all his allegations, even if true and fully

known to the trial court, would not have precluded a conviction.

In an earlier case, Lisenba _v._ California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), the

Court, without discussion of this principle relating to the use of

perjured testimony, sustained a California appellate court's denial of a

petition for _habeas corpus_. The accused, after having been convicted

and sentenced to death for murder, filed his petition supported by

affidavits of a codefendant, who, after pleading guilty and serving as a

witness for the State had received a life sentence. The latter affirmed

that his testimony at the trial of the petitioner "was obtained by

deceit, fraud, collusion, and coercion, and was known to the prosecutor

to be false." Even though the California court had denied the petition

for _habeas corpus_ without taking oral evidence and without requiring

the State to answer, the Supreme Court upheld this action on the ground

that there was no adequate showing of a corrupt bargain between the

prosecution and the codefendant and that the appraisal of conflicting

evidence was for the Court below. Even if latter's refusal to believe

the codefendant's depositions were erroneous, such error, the Court

added, would not amount to a denial of due process.

[942] 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).

[943] 324 U.S. 760 (1945). Certiorari was denied, however, for the

reason that the State court's refusal to issue the writ of _habeas

corpus_ was based upon an adequate nonfederal ground.

[944] Schwab _v._ Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 448 (1802).--This statement is

a dictum, however; for the issue presented by the accused's petition for

a writ of _habeas corpus_ was that the State appellate court had denied

him due process in ruling on his appeal from his conviction in the

absence of both the petitioner and his counsel and without notice to

either as to the date of its decision. Insofar as a right to be present

exists, its application, the Supreme Court maintained, is limited to

courts of original jurisdiction trying criminal cases.

[945] Howard _v._ Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164 (1906).

[946] 201 U.S. 123, 130 (1906).

[947] 237 U.S. 309, 343 (1915).

[948] Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).

[949] Ibid. 105, 106, 107, 108, 118.--In a dissent, in which Justices

Brandeis, Butler, and Sutherland concurred, Justice Roberts insisted

that "it * * * [was] not a matter of assumption but a certainty * * *

[that] * * * the * * * privilege of the accused to be present throughout

his trial is of the very essence of due process," and, in that

connection, "the great weight of authority is that" the view by the jury

"forms part of the trial." Even if "the result would have been the same

had the [accused] been present, still the denial of the constitutional

right ought not to be condoned. * * * Nor ought this Court to convert

the inquiry from one as to the denial of the right into one as to the

prejudice suffered by the denial. To pivot affirmance on the question of

the amount of harm done the accused is to beg the constitutional

question involved. * * * The guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment is

not that a just result shall have been obtained, but that the result,

whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair way."--Ibid. 130-131, 134,

136-137.

[950] 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

[951] Ibid. 246-247, 249-250.--Dissenting, Justice Murphy maintained

that the use in a capital case of probation reports which "concededly

[would] not have been admissible at the trial, and * * * [were] not

subject to examination by the defendant, * * *" violated "the high

commands of due process * * *"--Ibid. 253. Justice Rutledge dissented

without an opinion.

[952] 339 U.S. 9 (1950).

[953] Ibid. 12-13.--Disagreeing, Justice Frankfurter contended that a

State is "precluded by the due process clause from executing a man who

has temporarily or permanently become insane"; and thus bereft of

unlimited discretion as to "how it will ascertain sanity," a State "must

afford rudimentary safeguards for establishing [that] fact."--Ibid. 16,

19, 21, 24-25.

[954] In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). On application for _habeas

corpus_, the prisoner's commitment was reviewed by the Michigan

appellate court in the light, not of the whole record, but only of

fragmentary excerpts showing merely the testimony alleged to be false

and evasive.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Rutledge advocated disposing of the

case on the ground that the Michigan one-man grand jury system was in

its entirety in conflict with the requirements of due process.

On the ground that the Michigan courts had not passed on the

constitutionality of the procedure at issue, Justices Frankfurter and

Jackson dissented and urged the remanding of the case. _See also_ Gaines

_v._ Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 85 (1928).

[955] 336 U.S. 155 (1949).

[956] Justice Douglas, with Justice Black concurring, dissented on the

ground that even if "such elements of misbehavior as expression, manner

of speaking, bearing, and attitude * * * [had] a contemptuous flavor. *

* * freedom of speech should [not] be so readily sacrificed in a

courtroom." Stressing that the trial judge penalized Fisher only for his

forbidden comment and not for his behavior, and that it took a ruling of

the Texas appellate court to settle the issue whether such comment was

improper under Texas practice, Justice Douglas concluded that the record

suggests only that "the judge picked a quarrel with this lawyer and used

his high position to wreak vengeance." There having been no substantial

obstruction of the trial, Justice Murphy believed that the trial judge's

use of his power was inconsistent with due process; whereas Justice

Rutledge, in dissenting, contended "there can be no due process in trial

in the absence of calm judgment and action, untinged with anger, from

the bench."--Ibid. 165-166, 167, 169.

[957] Tumey _v._ Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). _See also_ Jordan _v._

Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).

[958] "Unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be

properly ignored as within the maxim _de minimis non curat lex_."--_See_

Tumey _v._ Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 531 (1927).

[959] Dugan _v._ Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).

[960] Frank _v._ Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).

[961] Moore _v._ Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).

[962] Thiel _v._ Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). _See also_

Fay _v._ New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), _supra_ p. 1110. [Transcriber's

Note: Reference is to Footnote 873, above.]

[963] Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934).

[964] Lisenba _v._ California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).

[965] Buchalter _v._ New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943). The Court also

declared that the due process clause did "not draw to itself the

provisions of State constitutions or State laws."

[966] Powell _v._ Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Snyder _v._

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).

[967] Cole _v._ Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202 (1948). _See also_ Williams

_v._ North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942), wherein the Court also

stated that where a conviction in a criminal prosecution is based upon a

general verdict that does not specify the ground on which it rests, and

one of the grounds upon which it may rest is invalid under the

Constitution, the judgment cannot be sustained.

[968] Paterno _v._ Lyons, 334 U.S. 314, 320-321 (1948).

[969] McKane _v._ Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).--The prohibition of the

requirement of excessive bail, expressed in the Eighth Amendment as a

restraint against the Federal Government, has never been deemed to be

applicable to the States by virtue of the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. However, in a recent civil suit, a United States

District Court judge asserted his belief, by way of dictum, that

protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures, invasion of

freedom of speech and press, unlawful and unwarranted incarcerations,

arrests, and _failure to allow reasonable bail_ would all be fundamental

rights protected by [the Fourteenth] Amendment from State

invasion."--International Union, Etc. _v._ Tennessee Copper Co., 31 F.

Supp. 1015 (1940).

[970] Collins _v._ Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 510 (1915).--In affirming a

judgment obtained by Texas in a civil suit to recover penalties for

violation of its antitrust law, the Supreme Court proffered the

following vague standard for determining the validity of penalties

levied by States. "The fixing of punishment for crime or penalties for

unlawful acts against its laws is within the police power of the State.

We can only interfere with such legislation and judicial action of the

States enforcing it if the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to

amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law."

However, a fine of $1,600,000 levied in this case against a corporation

having assets of $40,000,000 and paying out dividends as high as 700%,

and which was shown to have profited from its wrong doing was not

considered to be excessive.--Waters-Pierce Oil Co. _v._ Texas, 212 U.S.

86, 111 (1909).

[971] Graham _v._ West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912). _See also_

Ughbanks _v._ Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 498 (1908).

[972] 136 U.S. 436, 447-448 (1890).

[973] 329 U.S. 459 (1947).

[974] Concurring in the result, Justice Frankfurter concentrated on the

problem suggested by the proposed absorption of the Bill of Rights by

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and restated his

previously disclosed position as follows: "Not until recently was it

suggested that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was

merely a compendious reference to the Bill of Rights whereby the States

were now restricted in devising and enforcing their penal code precisely

as is the Federal Government by the first eight amendments. On this

view, the States would be confined in the enforcement of their criminal

codes by those views for safeguarding the rights of the individual which

were deemed necessary in the eighteenth century. Some of these

safeguards have perduring validity. Some grew out of transient

experience or formulated remedies which time might well improve. The

Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to imprison the States into the

limited experience of the eighteenth century. It did mean to withdraw

from the States the right to act in ways that are offensive to a decent

respect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his freedom.

"These are very broad terms by which to accommodate freedom and

authority. As has been suggested * * *, they may be too large to serve

as the basis for adjudication in that they allow much room for

individual notions of policy. That is not our concern. The fact is that

the duty of such adjudication on a basis no less narrow has been

committed to this Court.

"In an impressive body of decisions this Court has decided that the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses a demand for

civilized standards which are not defined by the specifically enumerated

guarantees of the Bill of Rights. They neither contain the

particularities of the first eight amendments nor are they confined to

them. * * * Insofar as due process under the Fourteenth Amendment

requires the States to observe any of the immunities 'that are as valid

as against the Federal Government by force of the specific pledges of

particular amendments' it does so because they 'have been found to be

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the

Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the States,'" [citing

Palko _v._ Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324, 325 (1937).]--Ibid. 467-469.

Justice Burton, with whom Justices Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge were

associated, dissented on the grounds that "the proposed repeated, and at

least second, application to the * * * [defendant] of an electric

current sufficient to cause death is * * *, a cruel and unusual

punishment violative of due process of law."--Ibid. 479.

In Solesbee _v._ Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), the Court declined to

intervene in case coming up from Georgia in which appellant, claiming

that he had become insane following conviction and sentence of death,

sought a postponement of execution from the governor of the State.

Justice Frankfurter dissented, asserting that the due process clause of

Amendment XIV prohibits a State from executing an insane convict.

[975] 187 U.S. 71, 86 (1902). _See also_ Keerl _v._ Montana, 213 U.S.

135 (1909).

[976] 177 U.S. 155 (1900).

[977] 207 U.S. 188 (1907).

[978] Graham _v._ West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912).

[979] 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

[980] In a lengthy dictum, Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court,

rejected the defendant's view that "Whatever would be a violation of the

original bill of rights (Amendments One to Eight) if done by the federal

government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment

if done by a state." By a selective process of inclusion and exclusion,

he conceded that "the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may

make it unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of

speech which the First Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the

Congress, * * * or the like freedom of the press, * * * or the free

exercise of religion, * * * or the right of peaceable assembly * * *, or

the right of one accused of crime to the benefit of counsel." However,

insofar as such "immunities, [which] are valid as against the Federal

Government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments,

have become valid as against the States," that result is attributable,

not to the absorption by the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of particular provisions of the Bill of Rights, but to the

fact that such immunities "have been found to be implicit in the concept

of ordered liberty * * *" protected by that clause.--Ibid. 323, 324-325.

[981] Justice Butler dissented without an opinion.

[982] 320 U.S. 459, 462, 463 (1947).--In line with its former ruling in

Graham _v._ West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), the Court reiterated in

Gryger _v._ Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), that a life sentence imposed on

a fourth offender under a State habitual criminal act is a stiffened

penalty for his latest offense, which is considered to be an aggravated

offense because a repetitive one, and is therefore not invalid as

subjecting the offender to a new jeopardy.

[983] Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).

[984] White _v._ Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 n. 1 (1945).

[985] McKane _v._ Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); Andrews _v._ Swartz

156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895); Murphy _v._ Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158

(1900); Reetz _v._ Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903).

[986] Thus, where on the day assigned for hearing of a writ of error, it

appeared that the accused had escaped from jail, the Court, without

denial of due process, could order that the writ be dismissed unless the

accused surrender himself within 60 days or be captured.--Allen _v._

Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).

[987] Carter _v._ Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175-176 (1946).

[988] Frank _v._ Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).

[989] For rules of self-limitation formulated by the Court not only to

minimize its opportunities for such interference but also to curtail the

volume of litigation reaching it for final disposition, _see_ p. 1109.

[990] 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

[991] 237 U.S. 309 (1915).

[992] 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

[993] Despite the court's contention that Moore _v._ Dempsey was

disposed of in conformity with the principles enunciated in Frank _v._

Mangum, the two decisions are distinguishable not only by the different

results reached therein, but by the fact that the State appellate court

in Frank _v._ Mangum had ruled that the trial court had correctly

concluded, on the basis of the evidence submitted, that the allegations

of mob violence were unsubstantiated whereas the Arkansas appellate

court, in Moore _v._ Dempsey, conceded a similar allegation to be

correct but did not deem it sufficient to render the trial a nullity.

Although in the later case, Arkansas demurred and thereby admitted the

allegations supporting the _habeas corpus_ petition to be true, that

fact is a lesser significance, for even in Frank _v._ Mangum, the

Supreme Court abided by the rule that the writ of _habeas corpus_

relates to matters of substance and not of mere form, and declared that

the petitioner's allegations should be treated as if conceded by the

sheriff having custody of the petitioner.--237 U.S. 309, 332, 346

(1915).

[994] James _v._ Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 137 (1904); Pittsburgh, C.C. & St.

L.R. Co. _v._ Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894); Standard Oil Co. _v._

Missouri ex rel. Hadley, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912); Baldwin _v._ Iowa

State Traveling Men's Assoc., 283 U.S. 522, 524 (1931).

[995] Tracy _v._ Ginzberg, 205 U.S. 170 (1907); Allen _v._ Georgia, 166

U.S. 138, 140 (1897); Fallbrook Irrig. District _v._ Bradley, 164 U.S.

112, 157 (1896).

[996] Thorington _v._ Montgomery, 147 U.S. 490, 492 (1893).

[997] Cross _v._ North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131 (1889).

[998] Ballard _v._ Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 258 (1907); Lyons _v._

Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Gryger _v._ Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).

[999] McDonald _v._ Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 233 U.S. 665, 670 (1914).

[1000] Caldwell _v._ Texas, 137 U.S. 691, 692, 698 (1891); Bergemann

_v._ Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 656 (1895).

[1001] Rogers _v._ Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905).

[1002] West _v._ Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).

[1003] Chicago L. Ins. Co. _v._ Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 30 (1917).

[1004] Standard Oil Co. _v._ Missouri ex rel. Hadley, 224 U.S. 270, 287

(1912); Patterson _v._ Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454,

461 (1907); Stockholders _v._ Sterling, 300 U.S. 175, 182 (1937)

[1005] Virginia _v._ Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).

[1006] Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. _v._ Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28, 29

(1889).

[1007] Yick Wo _v._ Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373, 374 (1886).

[1008] Snowden _v._ Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).

[1009] Truax _v._ Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).

[1010] Neal _v._ Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).

[1011] Shelley _v._ Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

[1012] Ibid. 19.

[1013] Missouri ex rel. Gaines _v._ Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 343 (1938).

[1014] Smith _v._ Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). _Cf._ Nixon _v._

Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon _v._ Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);

Grovey _v._ Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1938).

[1015] Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1873).

[1016] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. _v._ Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik _v._

Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chicago, M. & St.

P.R. Co. _v._ Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Winona & St. P.R. Co. _v._

Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877).

[1017] Santa Clara County _v._ Southern P.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).

The ruling stood unchallenged until 1938 when Justice Black asserted in

a dissenting opinion that "I do not believe the word 'person' in the

Fourteenth Amendment includes corporations." Connecticut General Life

Insurance Co. _v._ Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938). More recently

Justice Douglas expressed the same view in a dissenting opinion in which

Justice Black concurred. Wheeling Steel Corporation _v._ Glander, 337

U.S. 562, 576 (1949).

[1018] Yick Wo _v._ Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).

[1019] Newark _v._ New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); Williams _v._

Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).

[1020] _Cf._ Hillsborough _v._ Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1846).

[1021] Blake _v._ McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 261 (1898); Sully _v._ American

Nat. Bank, 178 U.S. 289 (1900).

[1022] Kentucky Finance Corp. _v._ Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262

U.S. 544 (1923).

[1023] Hillsborough _v._ Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946).

[1024] Wheeling Steel Corp. _v._ Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949); Hanover

Insurance Co. _v._ Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926).

[1025] Fire Asso. of Philadelphia _v._ New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886).

[1026] Yick Wo _v._ Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).

[1027] Barbier _v._ Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).

[1028] Ibid. 31-32.

[1029] Truax _v._ Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-333 (1921).

[1030] Barrett _v._ Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913).

[1031] Watson _v._ Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910).

[1032] Orient Ins. Co. _v._ Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 562 (1899).

[1033] Bachtel _v._ Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41 (1907). _See also_ Frost

_v._ Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515, 522 (1929); Smith _v._

Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 566-567 (1931).

[1034] Lindsley _v._ Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).

[1035] Middleton _v._ Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157 (1919);

Madden _v._ Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).

[1036] Crescent Cotton Oil Co. _v._ Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129, 137

(1921).

[1037] West Coast Hotel Co. _v._ Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).

[1038] Lindsley _v._ Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 81 (1911).

_Cf._ United States _v._ Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).

[1039] Dominion Hotel _v._ Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268 (1919).

[1040] West Coast Hotel _v._ Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952 · 第 33 / 39 章

[355] Packer Corp. _v._ Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).