THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR FROM 1895 TO 1902
The General Confederation of Labor has continued its existence under the
same name since its foundation in 1895. Still the period from 1895 to
1902 may be considered separately for two reasons: first, during this
period the organization of the Confederation under which it now
functions was evolved;[103] and secondly, during this period the
tendency known as revolutionary syndicalism became definite and
complete. This period may be considered therefore as the formative
period both from the point of view of organization and from the point of
view of doctrine.
[103] The changes in the form of organization which have been made since
1902 are in harmony with the fundamental ideas of the constitution
adopted in 1902.
The gradual elaboration of organization and of doctrine may best be
considered from year to year. The 700 syndicats which formed the General
Confederation at Limoges in 1895 aimed to "establish among themselves
daily relations which would permit them to formulate in common the
demands studied individually; they wanted also and particularly to put
an end to the disorganization which penetrated their ranks under cover
of the political spirit."[104]
[104] _XI Congrès National Corporatif_ (Paris, 1900), p. 35.
The Congress held the following year at Tours (1896) showed that the
aim was not attained. Only 32 organizations had paid the initiation fee
(two francs) as requested by the statutes adopted at Limoges. Of the 32
only four, the _Fédération des Travailleurs du Livre_,[105] the Syndicat
of Railway Men, the Circle of Machinists, and the Federation of
Porcelain Workers, paid their dues regularly; the rest paid irregularly
or did not pay at all. The entire income for the year amounted to 740
francs.[106]
[105] Typographical Union.
[106] Seilhac, p. 328.
The National Council of the Confederation did not function because the
number of delegates elected by the adhering organizations was
insufficient to constitute the committees among which the work was to be
divided. The few delegates that did attend the meetings quarreled for
political and other reasons. The Federation of Bourses showed itself
hostile, because the statutes adopted at Limoges admitted Bourses,
single syndicats, local and regional federations.
The "Committee for the propaganda of the General Strike" could also
report but little progress. The Committee had been authorized by the
Congress of Nantes (1894) to collect 10 per cent of all subscriptions
for strikes. The Committee, however, reported to the Congress of Tours,
that the syndicats and Bourses did not live up to the decision. From
December 1, 1894, to September 12, 1892, 329 francs 75 centimes was
collected; for 1895-96, 401 francs 95 centimes. With such limited means
but little headway could be made.[107]
[107] Seilhac, _Congrès Ouvriers_, p. 325; Ch. Franck, _op. cit._, p.
323.
The Congress of Tours tried to remedy the situation by making several
changes in the statutes. Single Bourses were not to be admitted. This
was a concession to the Federation of Bourses, which was invited to
join the Confederation; single syndicats were to be admitted only if
there were no national federations in their trades. Each National
Federation of trade or of industry could send three delegates to the
National Council; syndicats and local federations, only one. Each
delegate to the National Council could represent two organizations only,
while formerly he could represent five. The National Council was to
nominate an executive committee consisting of a secretary, assistant
secretary, treasurer, assistant treasurer, and archivist. The work of
the Confederation was to be divided among seven committees. Dues were to
be paid on a graduated scale according to membership.
Besides modifying the statutes, the Congress of Tours discussed several
other questions; eight-hour day, weekly rest, the general strike and the
establishment of a trade organ.
The idea of the general strike, defended by Allemanists and anarchists,
was indorsed by the Congress with a greater majority than at previous
Congresses. By this time, however, several modifications had taken place
in the conception of the general strike. These were emphasized by M.
Guérard who defended the idea before the Congress. Said M. Guérard:
The conquest of political power is a chimera; there are at present
only three or four true socialists in the Chamber of Deputies out
of 585. Of 36,000 communes, only 150 have as yet been conquered.
The partial strikes fail because the workingmen become demoralized
and succumb under the intimidation of the employers protected by
the government. The general strike will last a short while and its
repression will be impossible; as to intimidation, it is still less
to be feared. The necessity of defending the factories, workshops,
manufactures, stores, etc., will scatter and disperse the army....
And then, in the fear that the strikes may damage the railways, the
signals, the works of art, the government will be obliged to
protect the 39,000 kilometers of railroad lines by drawing up the
troops all along them. The 300,000 men of the active army, charged
with the surveillance of 39 million meters, will be isolated from
one another by 130 meters, and this can be done only on the
condition of abandoning the protection of the depots, of the
stations, of the factories, etc. ... and of abandoning the employers
to themselves, thus leaving the field free in the large cities to
the revolted workingmen.
The principal force of the general strike consists in its power of
imposing itself. A strike in one trade, in one branch of industry,
must involve other branches.
The general strike can not be decreed in advance; it will burst
forth suddenly: a strike of the railway men, for instance, if
declared, will be the signal of the general strike. It will be the
duty of militant workingmen, when this signal is given, to make
their comrades in the syndicats leave their work. Those who
continue to work on that day will be compelled, or forced, to
quit.[108]
[108] Seilhac, _Congrès Ouvriers_, pp. 331-2.
And M. Guérard, applauded by the audience, concluded: "The general
strike will be the Revolution, peaceful or not."
However, as a concession to the opponents of the general strike, the
Congress of Tours decided that the "Committee for the propaganda of the
general strike" should be independent of the Confederation. It was also
from now on to collect only five per cent of all strike-subscriptions.
The Congress of Tours also admonished the syndicats to abandon their
political preoccupations which were held to be the cause of
disorganization.
These changes helped but little. During 1896-97 the Confederation
counted 11 federations, 1 federated union, 1 trade union, the Union of
Syndicats of Paris, and three national syndicats. The Federation of
Bourses declined either to join or to help the Confederation. The number
of delegates to the National Council was again insufficient to
constitute the committees. The income for the year, including the
balance from the previous year, amounted to 1,558 francs.[109]
[109] Ch. Franck, _op. cit._, pp. 226-7.
The Congress of Toulouse, therefore, decided to make new changes.
Accepting the suggestion of the Federation of Bourses whose adherence
was desired, the Confederation was to consist now of (1) the Federation
of Bourses du Travail, (2) of National federations of trade and of
industry, and (3) of local syndicats or of local federations of trades
which were not yet organized nationally or whose national federations
refused to join the Confederation. The Confederation was to be
represented by the Federal Committee of the Federation of Bourses and by
the National Council of the Federations of trade.
The Congress of Toulouse again declared that "the general strike was
synonymous with Revolution," and decided that sub-committees for the
propaganda of the general strike should be established in the _Bourses
du Travail_ to keep in touch with the General Committee in Paris. It
discussed several other questions: trade-journal, suppression of
prison-work, eight-hour day, and among these, for the first time, the
questions of the boycott and of _sabotage_.
The report on boycott and _sabotage_[110] was prepared by two
anarchists, Pouget and Delesalle. The report explained the origin of
the boycott and of _sabotage_, and gave instances of their application
in different countries. It referred in particular to the _Go Canny_
practice of the English workingmen whose principle the report merely
wanted to generalize and to formulate.
[110] _Sabotage_ means the obstruction in all possible ways of the
regular process of production; _cf._ ch. v.
Up to the present time [read the report] the workingmen have
declared themselves revolutionary; but most of the time they have
remained on theoretical ground: they have labored to extend the
ideas of emancipation, they have tried to sketch a plan of a future
society from which human exploitation should be eliminated.
But why, beside this educational work, the necessity of which is
incontestable, has nothing been tried in order to resist the
encroachments of capitalists and to render the exigencies of
employers less painful to the workingmen?
To this end the report recommended the use of the boycott and of
_sabotage_, which should take place by the side of the strike as the
workingmen's means of defense and offense. The report shows how these
methods could be used in particular cases. _Sabotage_ particularly,
sometimes applied to the quantity, sometimes to the quality, should
bring home to the employer that the workingmen are determined to render
"poor work for poor pay".
The report concluded:
The boycott and its indispensable complement, _sabotage_, furnishes
us with an effective means of resistance which--while awaiting the
day when the workingmen will be sufficiently strong to emancipate
themselves completely--will permit us to stand our ground against
the exploitation of which we are the victims.
It is necessary that the capitalists should know it: the workingman
will respect the machine only on that day when it shall have become
for him a friend which shortens labor, instead of being, as it now
is, the enemy, the robber of bread, the killer of workingmen.[111]
[111] E. Pouget, _Le Sabotage_ (Paris, 1910), pp. 15-16.
The Congress adopted unanimously and with great enthusiasm a motion
inviting the workingmen to apply the boycott and _sabotage_ when strikes
would not yield results.
During 1897-98 the Federation of Bourses and the Confederation were to
work together, but no harmony was possible. The report presented to the
Congress of Rennes (1898) is full of complaints and of accusations on
both sides. Personal difficulties between the two secretaries, M.
Pelloutier and M. Lagailse, who was an "Allemanist," sprang up; besides,
the National Council and the Federal Committee were animated by a
different spirit. The Federal Committee evidently tried to dominate the
National Council. The latter was weak. It counted only 18 organizations,
and no new members were gained during 1897-98. The National Council did
not function regularly; the explanation given was that as no
functionaries were paid, they had but little time to devote to the
business of the Confederation. The dues paid during 1897-8 amounted to
793 francs; the whole income was 1,702 francs. The treasurer thought
that this showed that the "General Confederation of Labor was in a
flourishing condition."
The "Committee for the propaganda of the General Strike" admitted on the
contrary that it had accomplished little. Only twenty Bourses formed
sub-committees. The five per cent of strike subscriptions was not paid
by the syndicats. Only 835 francs came in from this source; together
with the income from other sources, the receipts of the Committee
totaled 1,086 francs; of this it spent 822 francs.
During 1898 the Syndicat of Railroad Workers had a conflict with the
railroad companies and a railroad strike was imminent. The Secretary of
the General Confederation of Labor sent out a circular to all syndical
organizations of France calling their attention to the "formidable
consequences for capitalism" which such a strike could have, if joined
by all trades. The circular formulated eight demands, such as old-age
pensions; eight-hour day, etc., which "could be realized in a few days
if the working-class, conscious of its force, and of its rights, was
willing to act energetically."[112]
[112] _X Congrès National Corporatif_ (IV de la C. G. T.), Rennes, 1898,
p. 77.
The "Committee for the propaganda of the general strike" also took up
the question. It sent out a question to all syndicats for a referendum
vote. The question was: "Are you for an immediate general strike in case
the railroad workingmen should declare a strike?" The report of the
Committee to the Congress of Rennes complained that the syndicats voted
for the general strike at conventions but changed their opinions or
their disposition "when the hour for action came."[113] "It was
disastrous to make such a discovery," read the report,
when it was expected that by the strike of our comrades of the
railroads, many other trades would be compelled by the force of
events to quit work, and that this would have been the
starting-point of the general strike, and possibly of that economic
revolution which alone can solve the great problems which confront
the entire world.[114]
[113] _X Congrès National Corporatif_ (Rennes, 1898), p. 334.
[114] _Ibid._, p. 334.
The Syndicat of the Railroad Workingmen voted for a strike. But the
government intercepted the strike order of the National Committee of the
Syndicat, and the strike did not take place.
The Congress of Rennes made new changes in the statutes of the
Confederation. The Federation of Bourses was to leave the Confederation.
The latter was to be composed only of national federations of trade and
of national syndicats and to be represented by the National Council. The
"Committee of the general strike" was to be part of the Confederation,
but was to be autonomous and was to live on its own resources.
The Congress discussed a number of questions: Alcoholism, suppression of
employment bureaus, election of inspectors of industry, etc. Most
reports on the various questions adopted by the Congress assert that the
workingmen must solicit the co-operation of their representatives in the
legislative bodies of the country in order to obtain any reforms. But
one report was presented which emphasized the opposite idea of "direct
action".
This report was presented by the "Committee on the Label, the Boycott,
and _Sabotage_." The reporter on the boycott and _sabotage_--M.
Pouget--noted the little progress that had been accomplished in the
application of these two methods since 1897, but again affirmed their
validity and recommended them to the workingman; the report affirmed
that the menace, only, of _sabotage_ is often sufficient to produce
results. "The Congress," said the report,
cannot enter into the details of these tactics; such things depend
upon the initiative and the temperament of each and are subordinate
to the diversity of industries. We can only lay down the theory and
express the wish that the boycott and the _sabotage_ should enter
into the arsenal of weapons which the workingmen use in their
struggle against capitalists on the same plane as the strike, and
that, more and more, the direction of the social movement should be
towards the direct action of individuals and towards a greater
consciousness of their personal powers.[115]
[115] _X Congrès National Corporatif_ (Rennes, 1898), p. 302.
The Congress of Paris (1900) again recorded but little progress. In the
interval since Rennes (1898-1900) only a few new federations joined the
General Confederation. The others, whose adherence was solicited,
refused or even were not "polite enough" to make a reply. The adhering
organizations paid irregularly; the decisions of the Congresses were not
executed. The Committees still did not function because the number of
delegates to the National Council was small. The total income for both
years amounted to 3,678 francs, of which 1,488 were dues paid.
The "Committee for the propaganda of the general strike" had collected
during this period (1898-1900) 4,262 francs. Of this 3,172 francs were
the five per cent of the strike subscriptions. It may also be
interesting to note that the organizations which contributed most to
this sum were: Union of Syndicats of Seine, 901 francs; the Union of
Machinists of Seine, 727 francs; the Federation of Moulders, 536 francs;
the Federation of Metallurgy, 457 francs. The Committee published
thirteen numbers of a journal, "The General Strike," and a brochure on
the general strike.
The general strike was again the subject of a long discussion at the
Congress of Paris. But the discussion was given a new turn. The question
now was: "The general strike, its organization, its eventuality, its
consequences." And the ideas that prevailed revealed some further
modifications in the conception.
The question was given this turn because certain syndicats thought that
the principle of the general strike had been sufficiently affirmed and
that it was time to treat the subject practically. As the discussion
showed, the majority of the delegates thought that the general strike
could take place at any moment and that in order to be successful, it
did not presuppose a majority of organized workingmen, nor big sums of
money. A daring revolutionary minority conscious of its aim could carry
away with it the majority of workingmen and accomplish the act of
appropriating the means of production for society as a whole. Some even
thought that in order that the general strike should be prompt and lead
to the aim in view it was best to have no money at all; everyone would
then take what he needed wherever he found it, and the result would be
the completest possible emancipation.[116] As one of the delegates
expressed it: "Count exclusively upon the enthusiasm (_entrainement_) of
the working-class."[117]
[116] _XI Congrès National Corporatif_ (Paris, 1900), p. 198.
[117] _Ibid._, p. 113.
This conception of the general strike attributed to the syndicat a
revolutionary rôle, as the syndicat was to take possession of the means
of production in the name of society as a whole. It did not exclude
however the parallel action of political parties. The latter could
profit by the general strike and seize the political power of the State
to co-operate in the transformation of society. But the syndicats were
not to count upon this possibility; on the contrary it was their task to
make the general strike absolutely independent of all political parties,
to perform the principal part in the economic revolution and to leave to
the new government, if one arose, no other function but that of
sanctioning the economic change accomplished by the syndicats.
This emphasis upon the revolutionary and preponderant part to be played
by the syndicats went together with a mistrust and defiance of political
parties. "All politicians are betrayers,"[118] exclaimed one delegate.
"In politics one has always to deal with intrigues," said another, and
the same sentiment pervaded the other speeches. Though not refusing to
make use of all methods, "for the disorganization of capitalism," all
delegates emphasized the necessity for the workingmen to rely mainly
upon themselves and upon their syndical organizations.
[118] _XI Congrès National Corporatif_ (Paris, 1900), p. 110.
The majority of delegates recognized also that the general strike must
necessarily have a violent character. Though a few still thought of the
general strike as of a "peaceful revolution," a "strike of folded arms,"
the majority rejected this conception as childish and foresaw the
inevitable collision to which the general strike would lead.
All these ideas were briefly summarized in the conclusions of the
Committee appointed by the Congress to report on the question. This
Commission recommended leaving the "Committee for the propaganda of the
general strike" as free as possible in its action. The Congress merely
determined the syndicats which were to elect the members of the
Committee. The latter was now to obtain regular monthly dues for the
continuation of its work.
The revolutionary spirit which manifested itself in the conception of
the general strike expressed itself also in the resolution of the
Congress on the army. This resolution demanded the suppression of
permanent armies, and invited the syndicats to establish relations with
the workingmen in military service, to invite them to social gatherings
and to assist them financially (to establish the so-called _Sou du
Soldat_).
The same spirit characterized the report of the Committee which
formulated the ideas of the Congress on the "practical means of
realizing the international harmony of the workingmen." "Capital," read
the report, "in its various forms is international," and it is necessary
that labor should also be organized internationally. The slight
differences in conditions of life varying from country to country are
not important. "The predominating fact everywhere, in all countries, is
the division of society into two categories; the producer and the
non-producer, the wage-earner and the employer." The report went on to
say that the idea of "fatherland" (_patrie_) is a means of protecting
the strong against the weak, "an emblem of speculation, of
exploitation," "a synonym of property," "a fiction for the workingmen
who possess nothing."[119] The practical conclusion of the Committee
was to bring together the wage-earners of all countries in an
international organization which should be represented by an
international secretariat.
[119] _XI Congrès National Corporatif_ (Paris, 1900), p. 205.
During 1900-1 the Confederation displayed a little more activity than
before. The National Council employed a permanent employee to attend to
the business of the Confederation, at first for two, then for four hours
a day at a remuneration of 50 and then 100 francs a month. In December,
1900, the Confederation began also to publish its own weekly, _La Voix
du Peuple_. Since 1896 the question of a trade-journal had been on the
order of the day. It was discussed at every Congress and various plans
were recommended in order to obtain the financial means for a daily. The
Congress of Paris, in view of the financial impossibility of starting a
daily and recognizing that "it was more than ever necessary to create a
revolutionary syndicalist organ," decided to publish a weekly. One of
the Committees of the National Council was to attend to it.
The _Voix du Peuple_, however, was not in a satisfactory condition at
the time of the Congress of Lyons (1901). Pouget, the editor of the
paper and the secretary of the Committee of the _Voix du Peuple_,
complained that the _Voix du Peuple_ "suffered from the apathy and the
negligence of the comrades." Only 260 syndicats subscribed for the paper
(out of 2,700 syndicats then in existence). In Paris only 600 copies
were sold weekly. The finances showed a deficit for the year of over
6,000 francs. The number of copies printed fell from 12,000-14,000
during the first months to 800 during the later months.
The secretary of the Confederation, M. Guérard, also complained that the
"Confederation was anaemic for lack of means." The twenty
organizations--federations and syndicats--which adhered to the
Confederation during 1900-1901 paid in 1,478 francs. The total income
was 4,125 francs. With such limited means the Confederation could do
nothing. The Congress of Lyons (1901)--where all these reports were
read--was provided for by a subvention from the municipality of Lyons
which appropriated 7,000 francs for the purpose.
The Congress of Lyons, nevertheless, showed that the Confederation was
beginning to feel a little more confidence in its future. The Congress
decided that henceforth only syndicats adhering to the Confederation
should take part in its Congresses. Previous to that all syndicats were
invited to send a delegate or their mandate to the Congresses of the
Confederation. The Congresses, therefore, neither revealed the strength
of the Confederation, nor had a binding character, and were significant
merely as revealing the state of mind of a large part of the organized
workingmen of the time. The decision of the Congress of Lyons was to do
away with this condition and to give the Congresses of the Confederation
a more coherent and binding character.
Another decision taken by the Congress of Lyons was to admit local and
regional federations of syndicats. This was directed against the
Federation of Bourses. Though more friendly since 1900, the relations
between the two organizations still gave trouble. The question of unity,
however, was urged by many workingmen, and the Congress decided to call
a special Congress for 1902 to solve this problem.
The Congress of Lyons revealed the further progress of revolutionary
ideas among the delegates. There were 226 delegates; these represented
26 Bourses and 8 local federations, comprising 1,035 syndicats with
245,000 members;[120] eight regional federations composed of 264
syndicats with 36,000 members; 8 federations of trade or industry
counting 507 syndicats with 196,000 members; 492 syndicats with 60,000
workingmen were represented directly. The exact number of syndicats and
of workingmen represented cannot be obtained from these figures, because
one syndicat could be represented several times in a local federation,
in a Bourse, and in the federation of trade. The delegates, however,
came from different parts of the country and were numerous enough to
show that the ideas they expressed were accepted by a considerable
number of French workingmen.
[120] The growth of syndicats in France since 1895 is shown in the
following table:
_Year_ _Syndicats_ _Members_
1895 2,163 419,781
1896 2,243 422,777
1898 2,324 437,793
1899 2,361 419,761
1900 2,685 492,647
1901 3,287 588,832
Of the questions discussed at Lyons three had a particular significance
as showing the revolutionary tendency which the Confederation was
taking. These were the questions of the general strike, of labor-laws,
and of the relations to the political parties.
The "Committee for the propaganda of the General Strike" reported more
activity for the year 1900-1 and greater success in its work. The
Committee published a brochure on the General Strike of which 50,000
copies were distributed. It collected over 1,500 francs in monthly dues,
and its total income amounted to 2,447 francs. It was in touch with a
number of sub-committees in the different _Bourses du Travail_, arranged
a number of meetings on various occasions, and lent its support to some
strikes. The Committee affirmed that the idea of the general strike had
spread widely during the year and attributed this fact to the big
strikes which had taken place in France after the International
Exhibition of 1900 and which had thrown the workingmen into a state of
agitation.
At the time the Congress of Lyons was being held, the miners were
threatening to strike, if their demands were not granted by the
companies. The delegate of the miners was at the Congress, and the
discussion that took place under these conditions was very
characteristic.
The Committee on the general strike which consisted of fifteen members
reported:
The idea of the general strike is sufficiently understood to-day.
In repeatedly putting off the date of its coming, we risk
discrediting it forever by enervating the revolutionary energies.
What better occasion to realize it!
The miners will give the signal on the first of November; the
working-class--in case of a revolution--counts upon this movement
which must bring them their economic liberation.
And the report of the Committee went on to point out the conditions
which in its opinion indicated "that the moment had come to try the
general strike (_faire la Grève générale_) with strong chances of
success."[121]
[121] _XII Congrès National Corporatif_ (Lyons, 1901), p. 170.
The delegate from the miners said: "If you wish to join us, we will be
able not only to strike, but to bring about the revolution; if we were
made sure of the co-operation of all trades, even if it were necessary
to wait for it two, three, or even six months, we are ready to grant you
this concession."[122]
[122] _Ibid._, pp. 177-8.
The following motion was then adopted:
The Congress declares that the General Strike cannot be the means
merely of obtaining amelioration for any category of workingmen.
Its aim can be only the complete emancipation of the proletariat
through the violent expropriation of the capitalist class.
The Congress, in view of the situation, declares that the movement
which may take place in favor of the miners, the importance or
character of which nobody can foresee and which may go to the point
of a general emancipation, will be in any case a movement of
solidarity which will not impair in the least the revolutionary
principle of the general strike of all workingmen.[123]
[123] _Ibid._, p. 179.
The delegate of the Typographical Union (_La Fédération du Livre_)
combated the idea of the general strike and argued that it was
impossible in view of the small number of organized workingmen. But his
argument had no effect on the Congress. It was rejected as of no
importance because the minority of organized workingmen could carry away
with it the majority.
The question of labor laws was the subject of an animated discussion at
the Congress because of its importance. The answer given to this
question was to determine the attitude of the General Confederation to
legislative reforms and to the State in general.
The question was a very practical one. The government of
Waldeck-Rousseau (22 June, 1899-6 June, 1902), in which the socialist,
Millerand, was Minister of Commerce and Industry, outlined a number of
labor laws which touched upon the most vital questions of the labor
movement. The most important of these law-projects were on strikes and
arbitration, on the composition of the superior Council of Labor, on the
institution of Councils of Labor, and on the modification of the law of
1884.
The policy of the government in planning these laws was clear and
expressly stated. It was the continuation and accentuation of the policy
which had guided M. Waldeck-Rousseau in 1884 when he was Minister of the
Interior in the Cabinet of Jules Ferry, and which had then found partial
expression in the ministerial circular on the application of the new law
on syndicats.
This "Circular," sent out to the Prefects August 25, 1884, pointed out
to the Prefects that it was the duty of the State not merely to watch
over the strict observation of the law, but "to favor the spirit of
association" among the workingmen and "to stimulate" the latter to make
use of the new right. In the conception of the government the syndicats
were to be "less a weapon of struggle" than "an instrument of material,
moral and intellectual progress." It was "the wish of the Government and
of the Chambers to see the propagation, in the largest possible measure,
of the trade associations and of the institutions which they were
destined to engender" (such as old-age pension funds, mutual credit
banks, libraries, co-operative societies, etc.) and the government
expected the Prefects "to lend active assistance" in the organization of
syndicats and in the creation of syndical institutions.[124]
[124] See the "Circulaire" in G. Severac, _Guide Pratique des Syndicats
Professionnels_ (Paris, 1908), pp. 125-136.
The aim of Waldeck-Rousseau was to bring about the "alliance of the
bourgeoisie and of the working-class"[125] which Gambetta and other
republican statesmen had untiringly preached as the only condition of
maintaining the Republic. In the period 1899-1902 this policy seemed
still more indispensable. It was the time when the agitation caused by
the Dreyfus affair assumed the character of a struggle between the
republican and anti-republican forces of France. Republicans, Radicals,
Socialists, and Anarchists were fighting hand in hand against
Monarchists, Nationalists, Anti-Semites and Clericals. The cabinet of
Waldeck-Rousseau constituted itself a "Cabinet of Republican Defense"
and it sought to attain its end by securing the support of all
republican elements of the country. This was the cause which prompted
Waldeck-Rousseau to invite a socialist, Millerand, to enter his cabinet
and to accentuate his policy of attaching the working-class to the
Republic by a series of protective labor laws.
[125] G. Hanoteaux, _Modern France_ (tr. by J. C. Tarver, New York,
1903-09), vol. ii, p. 181.
The policy of the Government was clearly expressed by Millerand in the
Chamber of Deputies on November 23, 1899. "It has appeared to me," said
he, "that the best means for bringing back the working masses to the
Republic, is to show them not by words, but by facts, that the
republican government is above everything else the government of the
small and of the weak."[126]
[126] A. Lavy, _L'Oeuvre de Millerand_ (Paris, 1902), p. 2.
The facts by which M. Millerand undertook to show this were a number of
decrees by which the government tried to enforce a stricter observation
of labor-laws already in existence and a series of new law-projects for
the future protection of labor, such as the bill on a ten-hour day,
which became law on March 30, 1900. As M. Millerand expressed it, this
law was "a measure of moralization, of solidarity, and of social
pacification."
Social pacification was the supreme aim of M. Millerand and of the
government. M. Millerand hoped to attain this by calling workingmen to
participation in the legislative activities of the Republic, by
accustoming them to peaceable discussions with employers, and by
regulating the more violent forms of the economic struggle.
A decree from September 1, 1899, modified the constitution of the
Superior Council of Labor, in existence since 1891, so that it should
henceforth consist of 22 elected workingmen, 22 elected employers and 22
members appointed by the Minister from among the deputies of the
Chamber, the senators and other persons representing "general
interests." The Superior Council of Labor was "an instrument of study,
of information and of consultation" in matters of labor legislation. It
studied law-projects affecting the conditions of labor, made its own
suggestions to the government, but had no legislative powers.
The decree of M. Millerand was particularly significant in one respect:
it called upon the workingmen organized in the syndicats to elect
fifteen members of the Superior Council of Labor. M. Millerand pointed
out the significance of this measure in a speech delivered on June 5,
1900. Said he:
The workingmen are henceforth warned, that in order to participate
through delegates sprung from their own ranks in the elaboration of
economic reforms which concern them most, it is necessary and
sufficient that they enter the ranks of that great army of which
the syndicats are the battalions. How can they refuse to do this?
By inducing them to do so we believe that we are defending their
legitimate interests at the same time that we are serving the cause
of social peace in this country.[127]
[127] A. Lavy, _op. cit._, p. 66.
The "Councils of Labor" were organized by two decrees from September 17,
1900, and from January 2, 1901. Composed of an equal number of
workingmen and of employers, these Councils had for their principal
mission to enlighten the government, as well as workingmen and
employers, on the actual and necessary conditions of labor, to
facilitate thereby industrial harmony and general agreement between the
interested parties, to furnish in cases of collective conflicts
competent mediators, and to inform the public authorities on the effects
produced by labor legislation.[128]
[128] _Ibid._, p. 79.
M. Millerand emphasized that the Councils of Labor were to bring
workingmen and employers together for the discussion of "their general
interests" and that this new institution would be one more motive for
the utilization of the law of 1884 on syndicats. "To encourage by all
means the formation of these trade-associations, so useful for the
progress of social peace," wrote the Minister in his decree, "is a task
which a republican government cannot neglect."[129]
[129] A. Lavy, _op. cit._, p. 80.
To enlarge the possible operations of the syndicats, the government also
introduced a bill into the Chamber (November 14, 1899) which contained
several modifications of the law of 1884. This bill proposed to extend
the commercial capacities of the syndicat and to grant the syndicat the
rights of a juridical person.
To complete the series of measures which were to impart a peaceful
character to the syndical movement, M. Millerand introduced into the
chamber a bill (November 15, 1900) on the regulation of strikes and on
arbitration. This law-project proposed a complicated mechanism for the
settlement of economic conflicts. It hinged on the principle that
strikes should be decided by secret ballot and by a majority vote
renewed at brief intervals by all workingmen concerned; permanent
arbitration boards in the industrial establishments were part of the
mechanism.[130]
[130] Only the most important measures of M. Millerand are mentioned;
they do not by any means exhaust his legislative activities during this
period.
Toward this series of labor laws the Congress of Lyons was to define its
attitude. The principle of the Superior Council of Labor was accepted by
a majority of 258 against 205 votes (5 blank); the project on the
regulation of strikes and on arbitration was rejected by a unanimous
vote minus five; the Councils of Labor proposition was rejected by a
majority of 279 against 175 (18 blank).
The discussion on the labor laws brought out the fact that the idea of
"direct action" had undergone further modifications as a result of the
policy of the government. M. Waldeck-Rousseau was denounced by the
speakers as "a clever defender of the interests of the bourgeoisie" who
wished merely to stop the offensive movement of the workingmen.[131]
The legislative measures of the "pseudo-socialist minister",[132]
Millerand, were interpreted as schemes for restraining the revolutionary
action of the syndicats.[133] The workingmen were warned that, if they
accepted the laws, they would "reinforce a power which they wanted to
destroy".[134] They were reminded that the main function of the syndicat
was to organize the workmen for their final emancipation which
presupposes the "abolition of the wage-system" and that all "so-called
labor laws" would only retard the hour of final liberation.
[131] _XII Congrès National Corporatif_ (VI de la C. G. T.), Lyons,
1901, p. 110.
[132] _Ibid._, p. 114.
[133] _Ibid._, p. 210.
[134] _Ibid._, p. 112.
The revolutionary elements of the Congress did not deny, however, the
possibility or the desirability of reforms. They insisted only upon
particular methods of obtaining reforms and upon a particular kind of
reforms. They rejected all peaceful discussion with employers because
the interests of employers and of workingmen were held to be distinct
and antagonistic. They did not want an "economic parliamentarism"[135]
which would necessarily take the sting out of the workingmen's weapons
and deprive the syndicats of their force. They wanted such reforms only
as should "undermine the foundations"[136] of existing society and which
should advance the movement for "integral emancipation" by
strengthening the forces and the organization of the workingmen.
[135] _Ibid._, p. 218.
[136] _Ibid._, p. 110.
Such reforms could be obtained only "independently of all
parliamentarism",[137] by the workingmen organized in their syndicats
displaying all their initiative, manifesting all their energies, relying
only upon themselves and not upon intermediaries. Only in this way would
the syndicats wrest "piece by piece from capitalistic society reforms
the application of which would finally give the exploited class the
force which is indispensable in order to bring about the social
revolution".[138]
[137] _XI Congrès National Corporatif_, p. 114.
[138] _Ibid._, p. 119.
These ideas showed the further application which the principle of
"direct action" was given by the revolutionary elements in the
syndicats. The syndicats were not only to carry on their struggle
"directly" against employers by strikes, boycotts and _sabotage_, but
also against the State, and not only against the State appearing as the
"enemy of labor", but also against the State wishing to become the
protector and benefactor of the workingmen. This hostility to the State
and to its reform-legislation marked a further accentuation of the ideas
of revolutionary syndicalism.
The Congress of Lyons took, also, a decided stand on the relations of
the syndicats to political action. Under "political action" of course
the action of the Socialist parties was meant. After the foundation of
the General Confederation of Labor certain important changes had taken
place in the socialist movement of France which could not but have their
effect upon the syndicats.
In 1893 the socialist parties had their first big success in the general
elections. They obtained about 600,000 votes[139] and elected over 50
deputies. The socialist deputies in the Chamber constituted a
Parliamentary Group--_Union Socialiste_--which acted in common. This
strengthened the tendency toward union which had already manifested
itself, during the elections, when the Socialists had entered into
unions among themselves.
[139] A. Hamon, _Le Socialisme et le Congrès de Londres_ (Paris, 1897),
p. 11.
The unity in action was further made possible by a unity in views which
was becoming more and more manifest. After 1892, when the Guesdists
obtained a large number of votes in the municipal elections and gained a
number of municipalities, their ideas on some of the most important
points of their program began to change. In 1894, at their Congress of
Nantes, the Guesdists elaborated a detailed program of reforms designed
to win the votes of the agricultural population. This program made no
mention of the collective appropriation of the soil; on the contrary, it
stated that, "in the agricultural domain, the means of production, which
is the soil, is in many places still in the possession of the producers
themselves as individual property" and that "if this state of
conditions, characterized by peasant proprietorship, must inevitably
disappear, socialism must not precipitate its disappearance."[140] With
similar promises of reform the Guesdists addressed other classes of the
population: artisans, small merchants and the lower strata of the middle
classes.
[140] L. Blum, _Congrès Ouvriers et Socialistes_, p. 146.
Formerly ardent revolutionists, they now began to emphasize the legal
aspect of their activity and the emancipating influence of universal
suffrage. Jules Guesde himself in his speeches in the Chamber of
Deputies on various occasions expressed his belief that universal
suffrage was the instrument with which all questions might be peacefully
solved,[141] and that nothing but legal weapons would throw the Republic
into the hands of the socialist army. G. Deville, then one of the
principal theorists of the party, affirmed in 1896 that the only actual
task of the party was to increase the number of socialist electors and
representatives.[142] With the affirmation of the emancipating
significance of universal suffrage the importance of parliamentary
action was more and more emphasized.
[141] _Chambre des Deputés, Débats Parlementaires_; July 11, 1895;
November 22, 1895.
[142] Deville, _Principes Socialistes_.
Thus the "revolutionary" socialists were approaching the reformist
elements composed of Broussists and of Independents. In 1896 this
_rapprochement_ was manifested at the banquet of Saint Mandé arranged on
the occasion of the success obtained by the socialists during the
municipal elections of that year. All socialist parties took part in it
and Millerand delivered a speech in which he outlined the common points
of the socialist program. This program emphasized the peaceful and
evolutionary character of socialism: "We address ourselves only to
universal suffrage," said Millerand, ... "In order to begin the
socialization of the means of production, it is necessary and sufficient
for the Socialist party to pursue with the help of universal suffrage
the conquest of the political powers."[143] Guesde, present at the
banquet, approved and "applauded" the definition of Socialism given by
Millerand.
[143] A. Millerand, _Le Socialisme Réformiste Français_ (Paris, 1903),
pp. 31-32.
The Dreyfus affair brought the socialists for some time into still
closer contact. A "Committee of Harmony" (_Comité d'Entente_) was formed
in which all the socialist organizations were represented. The demand
for unity was expressed in the socialist periodical press, and J. Jaurès
outlined a plan according to which the old separate and rival factions
were to disappear in one unified party.[144] The belief in the
possibility of such a unified party was general.
[144] _Le Mouvement Socialiste_, Jan., 1899.
The entrance of Millerand into the Ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau was a
sudden shock which again disrupted the elements tending toward union.
The Guesdists, Blanquists and a few other groups denounced the act of
Millerand as a violation of the principles of class and
class-struggle--the fundamental principles of Socialism. The
Independents, Broussists and similar elements, on the contrary, insisted
upon the necessity of taking part in the general life of the country and
of assuming responsibilities when they are inevitable. At two general
Congresses of all socialist organizations held in Paris (December, 1899,
and September, 1900) this question was discussed. The Congresses ended
with a quarrel among the various socialist organizations which led to
complete rupture at the following Congress in Lyons in May, 1901. The
Guesdists, Blanquists and several regional federations formed the _Parti
Socialiste de France_; the Independents, Broussists, and Allemanists
formed the _Parti Socialiste Français_, which supported Millerand and
the cabinet of Waldeck-Rousseau. Within each new grouping, however, the
old organizations remained intact.
The "case Millerand" raised such violent polemics, such bitter mutual
accusations among the Socialists that many members of the party felt
disgusted. Even the French socialist movement, so rich in inner
divisions and dissensions, had never before experienced such a critical
condition.
In view of this situation the organized workingmen were anxious now more
than ever to keep politics out of the syndicats. The resolution adopted
unanimously by the Congress of Lyons insisted upon the fact that the
introduction of politics into the syndicats would cause division in the
syndicalist ranks, and therefore invited the syndicats and the
federations to remain independent of all political parties, "leaving to
individuals the undeniable right to devote themselves to that kind of
struggle which they prefer in the political field." The syndicat as an
organization, however, should remain neutral; otherwise it would be
"false to its true rôle which consists in grouping all the exploited
without distinction of race, nationality, philosophical or religious
opinions, and political views."[145]
[145] _XII Congrès Corporatif_ (Lyons, 1901), p. 151.
The reaction of socialist workingmen, however, to the situation created
by the "case Millerand" was of a more complicated character. While the
entrance of a socialist minister into the government aroused hopes and
expectations in the minds of many, to others it seemed the beginning of
the end of socialism. Habitually regarding socialism as a
class-movement, imbued with the ideas of class and class-struggle, they
were shocked and grieved at the "collaboration of classes" which
Millerand practised in the government and the Socialists in Parliament.
To these socialist workingmen the danger seemed the greater because it
presented itself as a crowning act of a policy that had been pursued for
some time by all the socialists. As we have seen, even the
revolutionary Guesdists had become more and more moderate. They had
co-operated in Parliament with the republican parties and had concluded
alliances during elections with "bourgeois" parties. At the general
Congress of socialists in Paris in 1899, M. Briand in a clever and
somewhat biting speech pointed out to the revolutionary socialists that
their policy had made the "case Millerand" possible. "It seems," said
Briand, "that great astonishment has been aroused in our comrades of the
_Parti Ouvrier_ (Guesdists) by the entrance of our comrade Millerand
into a bourgeois government. But, citizens of the _Parti Ouvrier_, what
has taken place is the very consequence of the policy which by
successive concessions you have forced upon the entire socialist
party."[146] And Briand pointed out these "successive concessions" which
deprived the Guesdists of their revolutionary character. To quote M.
Briand again:
[146] _Congrès Général des Organisations Socialistes_ (Paris, 1899), p.
152.
Yes, you become interested in these [electoral] struggles which
gave immediate results, and little by little our militant comrades
also became interested in them, took a liking for them to such a
degree that they soon came to believe that in order to triumph
definitely over the capitalist society nothing was necessary but to
storm the ballot-boxes. Thus within recent years the country could
gain the impression that the socialist party was no longer a
revolutionary party.[147]
[147] _Ibid._, p. 155.
This impression many socialist workingmen had, and the "case Millerand"
strengthened it in them. But preservation of the revolutionary character
of socialism was for them a necessity, equivalent to maintaining their
belief in the coming of socialism at all. These workingmen of all
socialist parties, Allemanists, Blanquists, and even Guesdists,
therefore, now threw themselves with greater energy into the syndicalist
movement which seemed to them the only refuge for the revolutionary
spirit. There they met the Communist-Anarchists who had been taking an
active part in the syndicalist movement for some time. The
Communist-Anarchists before 1895 had generally shown little sympathy for
the syndicats where the workingmen, they said, were either engaged in
politics or trying to obtain paltry reforms. But tired of carrying on a
merely verbal propaganda and spurred on by Pelloutier,[148] they began
to change their attitude after 1895, and after 1899 became influential
in many syndicalist organizations. Their criticism of electoral action,
their denunciation of political intriguing, now under the conditions
created by the "case Millerand," fell on prepared ground and yielded
fruit. A decided anti-political tendency gained strength in the
syndicats.
[148] To understand the change in the attitude of the anarchists towards
the syndicats, the disillusioning effect of their terroristic campaign
from 1890 to 1894, during which the exploits of Ravachole, Henri,
Casiers, and others took place, must also be considered.
This tendency was further strengthened by the economic events of the
period. During these years, particularly after the Exhibition of Paris,
a series of big strikes took place in various parts of France, among the
miners in the north, the dockers in the ports of the south, in the
Creusot works, etc. These strikes were partly the result of the large
expectations aroused in the workingmen by the entrance of a socialist
minister into the government. But the government sent troops against
some of the strikers and in two or three cases blood was shed. The
agitation aroused by the bloodshed was great and intensified the
defiance toward Millerand and toward the political parties in general. On
the other hand, some of the strikes became more or less general in
character and were won by the energetic action of the strikers. This
strengthened the conviction in the efficacy of economic action and in
the possibility of the general strike.
Under the combined influence of all these conditions, the socialist and
anarchist workingmen, during this period, began to ascribe to the
syndicats a decided preponderance in all respects, and they actively
engaged in making their revolutionary ideas predominant in the syndical
organizations. The resolutions and discussions at the Congress of Lyons
revealed this state of mind and the progress attained. The revolutionary
elements of the syndicats had by this time become conscious of
themselves, and in opposition to the program of the political
socialists, they advanced the idea of the General Confederation of Labor
as a distinctly unifying conception which in the future was to play a
great social rôle. "The General Confederation of Labor uniting all the
workingmen's syndical forces," said the Secretary, Guérard, in his
report to the Congress of Lyons, "is destined to become the
revolutionary instrument capable of transforming society."[149] In
greeting the delegates at the opening of the Congress, Bourchet
addressed them as "the representatives of the great party of Labor"
(_grand parti du travail_).[150] The same term was used by other
delegates,[151] and in the summing-up of the work of the Congress, the
emphasis was laid upon the demarcation between the syndicalists and the
politicians which the Congress had clearly shown.
[149] _XI Congrès Corporatif_, (Lyons, 1901), p. 29.
[150] _Ibid._, p. 14.
[151] _Ibid._, p. 69.
Thus, with the Congress of Lyons the General Confederation of Labor may
be said to have entered definitely upon the revolutionary path. The main
ideas of revolutionary syndicalism were clearly formulated and
consciously accepted. The main functionaries elected after the Congress
were revolutionists, viz., the secretary Griffuelhes and the assistant
secretary and editor of the _Voix du Peuple_ Pouget.
The Congress of Montpellier held next year (1902) showed constant
accentuation of the revolutionary tendencies. The Congress of
Montpellier was almost entirely occupied with the elaboration of a new
constitution which would unite the General Confederation and the
Federation of Bourses. Statutes acceptable to both organizations were
adopted to go into force on January 1, 1903.
At the Congress of Montpellier the report of the Secretary Griffuelhes
claimed that during the year the Confederation had made progress. But
this progress was very slight. The real growth of the Confederation
began after its fusion with the Federation of Bourses. Since then also
dates the more active participation of the Confederation in the
political and social life of the country. But before taking up the
history of the General Confederation since 1902, it seems advisable to
sum up the main ideas of revolutionary syndicalism in a more systematic
way.