[A FEW days after the inauguration of general Harrison as
president of the United States――on the seventeenth of March,
1841――he issued a proclamation convening an extra session of
congress on the thirty-first of May, on which day both houses
assembled, and formed a quorum. President Harrison having died
on the fourth of April, was succeeded by the vice-president
Tyler, who, in his message to congress, recommended, among
other matters, the adoption of measures to create a fiscal agent
for the convenience of government, and the regulation of the
currency. A bill to establish a fiscal bank of the United States
was reported, and, after discussion, passed the senate by a vote
of twenty-six to twenty-three, and the house, by one hundred
and twenty-eight to ninety-one. On the sixteenth of August,
president Tyler, much to the surprise and regret of those to
whom he owed his election, returned the bill to the senate, with
his objections, and on the nineteenth, the executive message
being under consideration, Mr. Clay addressed the senate as
follows; to which Mr. Rives replied, and the same day Mr. Clay
made his rejoinder to Mr. Rives, in the remarks following this
speech.]
MR. PRESIDENT, the bill which forms the present subject of our
deliberations, had passed both houses of congress by decisive
majorities, and, in conformity with the requirement of the
constitution, was presented to the president of the United States
for his consideration. He has returned it to the senate, in which it
originated, according to the direction of the constitution, with a
message announcing his veto of the bill, and containing his objections
to its passage. And the question now to be decided is, shall the
bill pass, by the required constitutional majority of two thirds,
the president’s objections notwithstanding?
Knowing, sir, but too well that no such majority can be obtained,
and that the bill must fall, I would have been rejoiced to have found
myself at liberty to abstain from saying one word on this painful
occasion. But the president has not allowed me to give a silent
vote. I think, with all respect and deference to him, he has not
reciprocated the friendly spirit of concession and compromise which
animated congress in the provisions of this bill, and especially in
the modification of the sixteenth fundamental condition of the bank. He
has commented, I think, with undeserved severity, on that part of the
bill; he has used, I am sure unintentionally, harsh if not reproachful
language; and he has made the very concession, which was prompted as a
peace-offering, and from friendly considerations, the cause of stronger
and more decided disapprobation of the bill. Standing in the relation
to that bill which I do, and especially to the exceptionable clause,
the duty which I owe to the senate and to the country, and self-respect,
impose upon me the obligation of at least attempting the vindication of
a measure which has met with a fate so unmerited, and so unexpected.
On the fourth of April last, the lamented Harrison, the president of
the United States, paid the debt of nature. President Tyler, who, as
vice-president, succeeded to the duties of that office, arrived in
the city of Washington, on the sixth of that month. He found the whole
metropolis wrapped in gloom, every heart filled with sorrow and sadness,
every eye streaming with tears, and the surrounding hills yet flinging
back the echo of the bells which were tolled on that melancholy
occasion. On entering the presidential mansion, he contemplated the
pale body of his predecessor stretched before him, and clothed in the
black habiliments of death. At that solemn moment, I have no doubt that
the heart of president Tyler was overflowing with mingled emotions of
grief, of patriotism, and of gratitude――above all, of gratitude to that
country, by a majority of whose suffrages, bestowed at the preceding
November, he then stood the most distinguished, the most elevated, the
most honored of all living whigs of the United States.
It was under these circumstances, and in this probable state of mind,
that president Tyler, on the tenth day of the same month of April,
voluntarily promulgated an address to the people of the United States.
That address was in the nature of a coronation oath, which the chief
of the state in other countries, and under other forms, takes, upon
ascending the throne. It referred to the solemn obligations, and the
profound sense of duty, under which the new president entered upon the
high trust which had devolved upon him, by the joint acts of the people
and of Providence, and it stated the principles, and delineated the
policy, by which he would be governed in his exalted station. It was
emphatically a whig address, from beginning to end――every inch of it
was whig, and was patriotic.
In that address the president, in respect to the subject matter
embraced in the present bill, held the following conclusive and
emphatic language.
‘I shall _promptly_ give my sanction to any constitutional
measure, which, _originating in congress_, shall have for
its object the restoration of a sound circulating medium,
_so essentially necessary_ to give confidence in all the
transactions of life, to secure _to industry its just and
adequate rewards, and to reëstablish the public prosperity_.
In deciding upon the adaptation of any such measure to the end
proposed, _as well as its conformity to the constitution_, I
shall resort to the _fathers of the great republican school_
for advice and instruction, to be drawn from their sage views of
our system of government, and the light of their ever _glorious
example_.’
To this clause in the address of the president, I believe but one
interpretation was given throughout this whole country, by friend and
foe, by whig and democrat, and by the presses of both parties. It was,
by every man with whom I conversed on the subject at the time of its
appearance, or of whom I have since inquired, construed to mean that
the president intended to occupy the Madison ground, and to regard
the question of the power to establish a national bank as immovably
settled. And I think I may confidently appeal to the senate and to the
country, to sustain the fact, that this was the contemporaneous and
unanimous judgment of the public. Reverting back to the period of the
promulgation of the address, could any other construction have been
given to its language? What is it? ‘I shall _promptly_ give my sanction
to any constitutional measure, which, _originating in congress_,’
shall have certain defined objects in view. He concedes the vital
importance of a sound circulating medium to industry, and to the public
prosperity. He concedes that its origin must be in congress. And to
prevent any inference from the qualification, which he prefixes to
the measure, being interpreted to mean that a United States bank was
unconstitutional, he declares, that in deciding on the adaptation
of the measure to the end proposed, and its _conformity_ to the
constitution, he will resort to the fathers of the great republican
school. And who were they? If the father of his country is to be
excluded, are Madison, (the father of the constitution,) Jefferson,
Monroe, Gerry, Gallatin, and the long list of republicans who acted
with them, not to be regarded as among those fathers? But president
Tyler declares, not only that he should appeal to them for advice and
instruction, but to the light of their ever glorious EXAMPLE. What
example? What other meaning could have been possibly applied to the
phrase, than that he intended to refer to what had been done during
the administration of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe?
Entertaining this opinion of the address, I came to Washington at the
commencement of the session, with the most confident and buoyant hopes
that the whigs would be able to carry all their prominent measures, and
especially a bank of the United States, by far that one of the greatest
immediate importance. I anticipated nothing but cordial coöperation
between the two departments of government; and I reflected with
pleasure, that I should find, at the head of the executive branch, a
personal and political friend, whom I had long and intimately known,
and highly esteemed. It will not be my fault, if our amicable relations
should unhappily cease, in consequence of any difference of opinion
between us on this occasion. The president has been always perfectly
familiar with my opinion on this bank question.
Upon the opening of the session, but especially on the receipt of a
plan of a national bank, as proposed by the secretary of the treasury,
fears were excited that the president had been misunderstood in his
address, and that he had not waived but adhered to his constitutional
scruples. Under these circumstances, it was hoped, that, by the
indulgence of a mutual spirit of compromise and concession, a bank,
competent to fulfil the expectations and satisfy the wants of the
people, might be established.
Under the influence of that spirit, the senate and the house agreed,
first, as to the name of the proposed bank. I confess, sir, that there
was something exceedingly _outré_ and revolting to my ears, in the
term ‘fiscal bank;’ but I thought, ‘what is there in a name? A rose
by any other name would smell as sweet.’ Looking, therefore, rather
to the utility of the substantial faculties, than to the name of the
contemplated institution, we consented to that which was proposed.
Secondly, as to the place of location of the bank. Although Washington
had passed through my mind as among the cities in which it might be
expedient to place the bank, it was believed to be the least eligible
of some four or five other cities. Nevertheless, we consented to fix it
here.
And, lastly, in respect to the branching power, there was not, probably,
a solitary vote given in either house of congress for the bill, that
did not greatly prefer the unqualified branching power, as asserted
in the charters of the two former banks of the United States, to the
sixteenth fundamental condition, as finally incorporated in this bill.
It is perfectly manifest, therefore, that it was not in conformity
with the opinion and wish of majorities in congress, but in a friendly
spirit of concession towards the president and his particular friends,
that the clause assumed that form. So repugnant was it to some of the
best friends of a national bank in the other house, that they finally
voted against the bill, because it contained that compromise of the
branching power.
It is true, that in presenting the compromise to the senate, I stated,
as was the fact, that I did not know whether it would be acceptable to
the president or not; that, according to my opinion, each department
of the government should act upon its own responsibility, independently
of the other; and that I presented the modification of the branching
power because it was necessary to insure the passage of the bill in the
senate, having ascertained that the vote would stand twenty-six against
it to twenty-five, if the form of that power which had been reported by
the committee were persisted in. But I nevertheless did entertain the
most confident hopes and expectations, that the bill would receive
the sanction of the president; and this motive, although not the
immediate one, had great weight in the introduction and adoption of
the compromise clause. I knew that our friends who would not vote for
the bill as reported, were actuated, as they avowed, by considerations
of union and harmony, growing out of supposed views of the president,
and I presumed that he would not fail to feel and appreciate their
sacrifices. But I deeply regret that we were mistaken. Notwithstanding
all our concessions, made in a genuine and sincere spirit of
conciliation, the sanction of the president could not be obtained, and
the bill has been returned by him with his objections.
And I shall now proceed to consider those objections, with as much
brevity as possible, but with the most perfect respect, official and
personal, towards the chief magistrate.
After stating that the power of congress to establish a national bank,
to operate _per se_, has been a controverted question from the origin
of the government, the president remarks:
‘Men most justly and deservedly esteemed for their high
intellectual endowments, their virtue and their patriotism, have,
in regard to it, entertained different and conflicting opinions.
Congress have differed. The approval of one president has been
followed by the disapproval of another.’
From this statement of the case it may be inferred, that the
president considers the weight of authority, pro and con, to be equal
and balanced. But if he intended to make such an array of it, if he
intended to say that it was an equilibrium, I must respectfully, but
most decidedly, dissent from him. I think the conjoint testimony of
history, tradition, and the knowledge of living witnesses proves the
contrary. How stands the question as to the opinion of congresses? The
congress of 1791, the congress of 1813–14, the congress of 1815–16,
the congress of 1831–32, and, finally, the present congress, have all
respectively and unequivocally, affirmed the existence of a power in
congress to establish a national bank to operate _per se_. We behold,
then, the concurrent opinion of five different congresses on one side.
And what congress is there on the opposite side? The congress of 1811?
I was a member of the senate in that year, when it decided, by the
casting vote of the vice-president, against the renewal of the charter
of the old bank of the United States. And I now here, in my place, add
to the testimony already before the public, by declaring that it is
within my certain knowledge, that that decision of the senate did not
proceed from a disbelief of a majority of the senate in the power of
congress to establish a national bank, but from combined considerations
of expediency and constitutionality. A majority of the senate, on the
contrary, as I know, entertained no doubt as to the power of congress.
Thus the account, as to congresses, stands five for and not one, or, at
most, not more than one, against the power.
Let us now look into the state of authority derivable from the opinions
of presidents of the United States. President Washington believed in
the power of congress, and approved a bank bill. President Jefferson
approved acts to extend branches into other parts of the United States,
and to punish counterfeiters of the notes of the bank――acts which
were devoid of all justification, whatever, upon the assumption of the
unconstitutionality of the bank. For how could branches be extended,
or punishment be lawfully inflicted, upon the counterfeiters of the
paper of a corporation which came into existence without any authority,
and in violation of the constitution of the land? James Madison,
notwithstanding those early scruples which he had entertained, and
which he probably still cherished, sanctioned and signed a bill to
charter the late bank of the United States. It is perfectly well known
that Mr. Monroe never did entertain any scruples or doubts in regard
to the power of congress. Here, then, are four presidents of the United
States who have directly or collaterally borne official testimony
to the existence of the bank power in congress. And what president
is there, that ever bore unequivocally opposite testimony――that
disapproved a bank charter, in the sense intended by president Tyler?
General Jackson, although he did apply the veto power to the bill for
rechartering the late bank of the United States in 1832, it is within
the perfect recollection of us all, not only testified to the utility
of a bank of the United States, but declared, that, if he had been
applied to by congress, he could have furnished the plan of such a bank.
Thus, Mr. President, we perceive, that, in reviewing the action of
the legislative and executive departments of the government, there
is a vast preponderance of the weight of authority maintaining the
existence of the power in congress. But president Tyler has, I presume
unintentionally, wholly omitted to notice the judgment and decisions
of the third coördinate department of the government upon this
controverted question――that department, whose interpretations of the
constitution, within its proper jurisdiction and sphere of action, are
binding upon all; and which, therefore, may be considered as exercising
a controlling power over both the other departments. The supreme court
of the United States, with its late chief justice, the illustrious
Marshall, at its head, unanimously decided that congress possessed this
bank power; and this adjudication was sustained and reaffirmed whenever
afterwards the question arose before the court.
After recounting the occasions, during his public career, on which he
had expressed an opinion against the power of congress to charter a
bank of the United States, the president proceeds to say:
‘Entertaining the opinions alluded to, and having taken this
oath, the senate and the country will see that I could not give
my sanction to a measure of the character described, without
surrendering all claim to the respect of honorable men――all
confidence on the part of the people, all self-respect,
all regard for moral and religious obligations; without an
observance of which no government can be prosperous, and no
people can be happy. It would be to commit a _crime_, which I
would not wilfully commit to gain any earthly reward, and which
would _justly_ subject me to the ridicule and scorn of all
virtuous men.’
Mr. President, I must think, and hope I may be allowed to say, with
profound deference to the chief magistrate, that it appears to me, he
has viewed with too lively sensibility the personal consequences to
himself of his approval of the bill; and that, surrendering himself
to a vivid imagination, he has depicted them in much too glowing and
exaggerated colors, and that it would have been most happy, if he had
looked more to the deplorable consequences of a veto upon the hopes,
the interests, and the happiness of his country. Does it follow that a
magistrate who yields his private judgment to the concurring authority
of numerous decisions, repeatedly and deliberately pronounced, after
the lapse of long intervals, by all the departments of government,
and by all parties, incurs the dreadful penalties described by the
president? Can any man be disgraced and dishonored, who yields his
private opinion to the judgment of the nation? In this case, the
country, (I mean a majority,) congress, and, according to common fame,
a unanimous cabinet, were all united in favor of the bill. Should any
man feel himself humbled and degraded in yielding to the conjoint force
of such high authority? Does any man, who at one period of his life
shall have expressed a particular opinion, and at a subsequent period
shall act upon the opposite opinion, expose himself to the terrible
consequences which have been portrayed by the president? How is it
with the judge, in the case by no means rare, who bows to the authority
of repeated precedents, settling a particular question, whilst in his
private judgment, the law was otherwise? How is it with that numerous
class of public men in this country, and with the two great parties
that have divided it, who, at different periods have maintained and
acted on opposite opinions in respect to this very bank question?
How is it with James Madison, the father of the constitution――that
great man whose services to his country placed him only second to
Washington; whose virtues and purity in private life, whose patriotism,
intelligence, and wisdom in public councils, stand unsurpassed? He was
a member of the national convention that formed, and of the Virginia
convention that adopted, the constitution. No man understood it better
than he did. He was opposed, in 1791, to the establishment of the bank
of the United States, upon constitutional ground; and, in 1816, he
approved and signed the charter of the late bank of the United States.
It is a part of the secret history connected with the first bank, that
James Madison had, at the instance of general Washington, prepared
a veto for him in the contingency of his rejection of the bill. Thus
stood James Madison, when, in 1815, he applied the veto to a bill to
charter a bank upon considerations of expediency, but with a clear
and express admission of the existence of a constitutional power of
congress to charter one. In 1816, the bill which was then presented to
him being free from the objections applicable to that of the previous
year, he sanctioned and signed it. Did James Madison surrender ‘all
claim to the respect of honorable men, all confidence on the part
of the people, all self-respect, all regard for moral and religious
obligations?’ Did the pure, the virtuous, the gifted James Madison,
by his sanction and signature to the charter of the late bank of the
United States, commit a _crime_, which _justly_ subjected him ‘to the
ridicule and scorn of all virtuous men?’
Not only did the president, as it respectfully appears to me, state
entirely too strongly the consequences of his approval of the bill, but
is he perfectly correct in treating the question, (as he seems to me to
have done,) which he was called upon to decide, as presenting the sole
alternative of his direct approval or rejection of the bill? Was the
preservation of the consistency and the conscience of the president
wholly irreconcilable with the restoration of the blessings of a sound
currency, regular and moderate exchanges, and the revival of confidence
and business, which congress believes will be secured by a national
bank? Was there no alternative but to prolong the sufferings of a
bleeding country, or to send us this veto? From the administration
of the executive department of the government, during the last twelve
years, has sprung most of the public ills which have afflicted the
people. Was it necessary that that source of suffering should continue
to operate, in order to preserve the conscience of the president
unviolated? Was that the only sad and deplorable alternative? I think,
Mr. President, there were other alternatives worthy of the serious and
patriotic consideration of the president. The bill might have become
a law, in virtue of the provision which required its return within ten
days. If the president had retained it three days longer, it would have
been a law, without his sanction and without his signature. In such
a contingency, the president would have remained passive, and would
not have been liable to any accusation of having himself violated
the constitution. All that could have been justly said would be, that
he did not choose to throw himself in the way as an obstacle to the
passage of a measure indispensable to the prosperity of the nation,
in the judgment of the party which brought him into power, of the
whig congress which he first met, and, if public fame speaks true, of
the cabinet which the lamented Harrison called around him, and which
he voluntarily continued. In an analagous case, Thomas McKean, when
governor of Pennsylvania, than whom the United States have produced
but few men of equal vigor of mind and firmness of purpose, permitted a
bill to become a law, although, in his opinion, it was contrary to the
constitution of that state. And I have heard, and, from the creditable
nature of the source, I am inclined to believe, although I will not
vouch for the fact, that towards the close of the charter of the first
bank of the United States during the second term of Mr. Jefferson,
some consideration of the question of the renewal of the charter
was entertained, and that he expressed a wish, that, if the charter
were renewed, it might be effected by the operation of the ten days’
provision, and his consistency thus preserved.
If it were possible to disinter the venerated remains of James
Madison, reanimate his perishing form, and place him once more in
that chair of state, which he so much adorned, what would have been
his course, if this bill had been presented to him, even supposing
him never to have announced his acquiescence in the settled judgment
of the nation? He would have said, that human controversy, in regard
to a single question, should not be perpetual, and ought to have a
termination. This, about the power to establish a bank of the United
States, has been long enough continued. The nation, under all the forms
of its public action, has often and deliberately decided it. A bank,
and associated financial and currency questions, which had long slept,
were revived, and have divided the nation during the last ten years
of arduous and bitter struggle; and the party which put down the bank,
and which occasioned all the disorders in our currency and finances,
has itself been signally put down, by one of those great moral and
political revolutions which a free, a patriotic people can but seldom
arouse itself to make. Human infallibility has not been granted by
God; and the chances of error are much greater on the side of one man,
than on that of the majority of a whole people and their successive
legislatures during a long period of time. I yield to the irresistible
force of authority. I will not put myself in opposition to a measure so
imperatively demanded by the public voice, and so essential to elevate
my depressed and suffering countrymen.
And why should not president Tyler have suffered the bill to become
a law without his signature? Without meaning the slightest possible
disrespect to him, (nothing is further from my heart than the
exhibition of any such feeling towards that distinguished citizen,
long my personal friend,) it cannot be forgotten, that he came into
his present office under peculiar circumstances. The people did not
foresee the contingency which has happened. They voted for him as
vice-president. They did not, therefore, scrutinize his opinions with
the care which they probably ought to have done, and would have done,
if they could have looked into futurity. If the present state of the
fact could have been anticipated――if at Harrisburg, or at the polls, it
had been foreseen, that general Harrison would die in one short month
after the commencement of his administration; that vice-president Tyler
would be elevated to the presidential chair; that a bill, passed by
decisive majorities of the first whig congress, chartering a national
bank, would be presented for his sanction, and that he would veto the
bill, do I hazard any thing, when I express the conviction, that he
would not have received a solitary vote in the nominating convention
nor one solitary electoral vote in any state in the union?
Shall I be told that the honor, the firmness, the independence of the
chief magistrate might have been drawn in question if he had remained
passive, and so permitted the bill to become a law? I answer, that
the office of chief magistrate is a sacred and exalted trust, created
and conferred for the benefit of the nation, and not for the private
advantage of the person who fills it. Can any man’s reputation for
firmness, independence, and honor, be of more importance than the
welfare of a great people? There is nothing, in my humble judgment,
in such a course, incompatible with honor, with firmness, with
independence, properly understood. Certainly, I most respectfully
think, in reference to a measure like this, recommended by such high
sanctions――by five congresses, by the authority of four presidents,
by repeated decisions of the supreme court, by the acquiescence and
judgment of the people of the United States during long periods of
time, by its salutary operation on the interests of the community for a
space of forty years, and demanded by the people whose suffrages placed
president Tyler in that second office from whence he was translated to
the first that he might have suppressed the promptings of all personal
pride of private opinion, if any arose in his bosom, and yielded to
the wishes and wants of his country. Nor do I believe, that, in such
a course, he would have made the smallest sacrifice, in a just sense,
of personal honor, firmness, or independence.
But, sir, there was still a third alternative, to which I allude, not
because I mean to intimate that it should be embraced, but because I am
reminded of it by a memorable event in the life of president Tyler. It
will be recollected, that, after the senate had passed the resolutions
declaring the removal of the public deposits from the late bank of the
United States to have been derogatory to the constitution and laws of
the United States, for which resolution, president, then senator Tyler,
had voted, the general assembly of Virginia instructed the senators
from that state to vote for the expunging of that resolution. Senator
Tyler declined voting in conformity with that instruction, and resigned
his seat in the senate of the United States. This he did because
he could not conform, and did not think it right to go counter, to
the wishes of those who had placed him in the senate. If, when the
people of Virginia, or the general assembly of Virginia, were his
only constituency, he would not set up his own particular opinion, in
opposition to theirs, what ought to be the rule of his conduct when the
people of twenty-six states――a whole nation――compose his constituency?
Is the will of the constituency of one state to be respected, and
that of twenty-six to be wholly disregarded? Is obedience due only
to the single state of Virginia? The president admits, that the bank
question deeply agitated and continues to agitate the nation. It
is incontestable, that it was the great, absorbing, and controlling
question, in all our recent divisions and exertions. I am firmly
convinced, and it is my deliberate judgment, that an immense majority,
not less than two thirds of the nation, desire such an institution. All
doubts in this respect ought to be dispelled, by the recent decisions
of the two houses of congress. I speak of them _as evidence_ of popular
opinion. In the house of representatives the majority was one hundred
and thirty-one to one hundred. If the house had been full, and but for
the modification of the sixteenth fundamental condition, there would
have been a probable majority of forty-seven. Is it to be believed that
this large majority of the immediate representatives of the people,
fresh from amongst them, and to whom the president seemed inclined,
in his opening message, to refer this very question, have mistaken the
wishes of their constituents?
I pass the sixteenth fundamental condition, in respect to the
branching power, on which I regret to feel myself obliged to say,
that I think the president has commented with unexampled severity,
and with a harshness of language not favorable to the maintenance of
that friendly and harmonious intercourse, which is so desirable between
coördinate departments of the government. The president could not
have been uninformed, that every one of the twenty-six senators, and
every one of the hundred and thirty-one representatives who voted for
the bill, if left to his own separate wishes, would have preferred
the branching power to have been conferred unconditionally, as it
was in the charters of the two former banks of the United States. In
consenting to the restrictions upon the exercise of that power, he
must have been perfectly aware, that they were actuated by a friendly
spirit of compromise and concession. Yet nowhere in his message does
he reciprocate or return this spirit. Speaking of the assent or dissent
which the clause requires, he says, ‘this _iron_ rule is to give way
to no circumstances――it is unbending and inflexible. It is the language
of the master to the vassal. An unconditional answer is claimed
_forthwith_.’ The ‘high privilege’ of a submission of the question, on
the part of the state representatives, to their constituents, according
to the message, is denied. He puts the cases of a popular branch of
a state legislature, expressing its dissent ‘by a unanimous vote,
and its resolution may be defeated by a tie vote in the senate,’ and
‘both branches of the legislature may concur in a resolution of decided
dissent, and yet the governor may exert the veto power conferred on him
by the state constitution, and their legislative action be defeated.’
‘The state may afterwards _protest_ against such unjust inference, but
its authority _is gone_.’ The president continues: ‘to inferences so
violent, and as they seem to me _irrational_. I cannot yield my consent.
No court of justice would or could sanction them, without reversing all
that is established in judicial proceeding, by introducing presumptions
_at variance with fact_, and inferences _at the expense of reason_.
A state in a condition of duresse would be presumed to speak as an
individual, manacled and in prison, might be presumed to be in the
enjoyment of freedom. Far better to say to the states, boldly and
frankly, _congress wills, and submission is demanded_.’
Now, Mr. President, I will not ask whether these animadversions were
prompted by a reciprocal spirit of amity and kindness, but I inquire
whether all of them are perfectly just.
Beyond all question, those who believed in the constitutional right
of congress to exercise the branching power within the states,
unconditionally and without limitation, did make no small concession
when they consented that it should be subjected to the restrictions
specified in the compromise clause. They did not, it is true, concede
every thing; they did not absolutely renounce the power to establish
branches without the authority of the states, during the whole period
of the existence of the charter; but they did agree that reasonable
time should be allowed to the several states to determine whether they
would or would not give their assent to the establishment of branches
within their respective limits. They did not think it right to leave
it an open question, for the space of twenty years; nor that a state
should be permitted to grant to-day and revoke to-morrow its assent;
nor that it should annex onerous or impracticable conditions to its
assent, but that it should definitively decide the question, after the
lapse of ample time for full deliberation. And what was that time? No
state would have had less time than four months, and some of them from
five to nine months, for consideration. Was it, therefore, entirely
correct for the president to say, that an ‘unconditional answer is
claimed _forthwith_?’ Forthwith means immediately, instantly, without
delay, which cannot be affirmed of a space of time varying from four to
nine months. And the president supposes, that the ‘high privilege’ of
the members of the state legislature’s submitting the question to their
constituents is denied? But could they not, at any time during that
space, have consulted their constituents?
The president proceeds to put what I must, with the greatest deference
and respect, consider as extreme cases. He supposes the popular branch
to express its dissent by a unanimous vote, which is overruled by a
tie in the senate. He supposes, that ‘both branches of the legislature
may concur in a resolution of decided dissent, and yet the governor
may exert the veto power.’ The unfortunate case of the state whose
legislative will should be so checked by executive authority, would
not be worse than that of the union, the will of whose legislature, in
establishing this bank, is checked and controlled by the president.
But did it not occur to him, that extreme cases brought forward on
the one side, might be met by the extreme cases suggested on the
other? Suppose the popular branch were to express its assent to the
establishment of a branch bank, by a unanimous vote, which is overruled
by an equal vote in the senate. Or suppose that both branches of
the legislature, by majorities in each, exactly wanting one vote
to make them two thirds, were to concur in a resolution inviting
the introduction of a branch within the limits of the state, and the
governor were to exercise the veto power, and defeat the resolution.
Would it be very unreasonable, in these two cases, to infer the assent
of the state to the establishment of a branch?
Extreme cases should never be resorted to. Happily for mankind, their
affairs are but seldom affected or influenced by them, in consequence
of the rarity of their occurrence.
The plain, simple, unvarnished statement of the case is this. Congress
believes itself invested with constitutional power to authorize,
unconditionally, the establishment of a bank of the United States
and branches, any where in the United States, without asking any other
consent of the states than that which is already expressed in the
constitution. The president does not concur in the existence of that
power, and was supposed to entertain an opinion, that the previous
assent of the states was necessary. Here was an unfortunate conflict
of opinion. Here was a case for compromise and mutual concession, if
the difference could be reconciled. Congress advanced so far towards
a compromise as to allow the states to express their assent or dissent,
but then it thought that this should be done within some limited, but
reasonable time; and it believed, since the bank and its branches were
established for the benefit of twenty-six states, if the authorities of
any one of them really could not make up their mind within that limited
time, either to assent or dissent to the introduction of a branch,
that it was not unreasonable, after the lapse of the appointed time,
without any positive action, one way or the other, on the part of the
state, to proceed as if it had assented. Now, if the power contended
for by congress really exists, it must be admitted that here was a
concession――a concession according to which an unconditional power
is placed under temporary restrictions――a privilege offered to the
states, which was not extended to them by either of the charters of the
two former banks of the United States. And I am totally at a loss to
comprehend how the president reached the conclusion, that it would have
been ‘far better to say to the states, boldly and frankly, congress
wills, and submission is demanded.’ Was it better for the states that
the power of branching should be exerted without consulting them at
all? Was it nothing to afford them an opportunity of saying whether
they desired branches or not? How can it be believed, that a clause
which qualifies, restricts, and limits the branching power, is more
derogatory to the dignity, independence, and sovereignty of the
states, than if it inexorably refused to the states any power whatever
to deliberate and decide on the introduction of branches? Limited as
the time was, and unconditionally as they were required to express
themselves, still those states, (and that probably would have been the
case with the greater number,) that chose to announce their assent or
dissent, could do so, and get or prevent the introduction of a branch.
But the president remarks, that ‘the state may express, after the
most solemn form of legislation, its dissent, which may from time to
time thereafter be repeated, in full view of its own interest, which
can never be separated from the wise and beneficent operation of
this government; and yet congress may, by virtue of the last proviso,
overrule its law, and upon grounds which, to such state, will appear
to rest on a constructive necessity and propriety, and nothing more.’
Even if the dissent of a state should be overruled, in the manner
supposed by the president, how is the condition of that state worse
than it would have been if the branching power had been absolutely
and unconditionally asserted in the charter? There would have been,
at least, the power of dissenting conceded, with a high degree of
probability, that if the dissent were expressed, no branch would be
introduced.
The last proviso to which the president refers is in these words:
‘and provided, nevertheless, that whenever it shall become necessary
and proper for carrying into execution any of the powers granted by the
constitution, to establish an office or offices in any of the states
whatever, and the establishment thereof shall be directed by law, it
shall be the duty of the said directors to establish such office or
offices accordingly.’
This proviso was intended to reserve a power to congress to compel
the bank to establish branches, if the establishment of them should be
necessary to the great purposes of this government, notwithstanding the
dissent of a state. If, for example, a state had once unconditionally
dissented to the establishment of a branch, and afterwards assented,
the bank could not have been compelled, without this reservation
of power, to establish the branch, however urgent the wants of the
treasury might be.
The president, I think, ought to have seen, in the form and language
of the proviso, the spirit of conciliation in which it was drawn, as
I know. It does not assert the power; it employs the language of the
constitution itself, leaving every one free to interpret that language
according to his own sense of the instrument.
Why was it deemed necessary to speak of its being ‘the language of the
master to the vassal,’ of ‘this iron rule,’ that ‘congress wills, and
submission is demanded?’ What is this whole federal government but a
mass of powers abstracted from the sovereignty of the several states,
and wielded by an organized government for their common defence and
general welfare, according to the grants of the constitution? These
powers are necessarily supreme; the constitution, the acts of congress,
and treaties being so declared by the express words of the constitution.
Whenever, therefore, this government acts within the powers granted
to it by the constitution, submission and obedience are due from all;
from states as well as from persons. And if this present the image of a
master and a vassal, of state subjection and congressional domination,
it is the constitution, created or consented to by the states, that
ordains these relations. Nor can it be said, in the contingency
supposed, that an act of congress has repealed an act of state
legislation. Undoubtedly in case of a conflict between a state
constitution or state law, and the constitution of the United States,
or an act of congress passed in pursuance of it, the state constitution
or state law would yield. But it could not, at least, be formally or
technically said, that the state constitution or law was repealed. Its
operation would be suspended or abrogated by the necessary predominance
of the paramount authority.
The president seems to have regarded as objectionable that provision
in the clause which declares, that a branch being once established,
it should not afterwards be withdrawn or removed without the previous
consent of congress. That provision was intended to operate both
upon the bank and the states. And, considering the changes and
fluctuations in public sentiment in some of the states within the last
few years, was the security against them to be found in that provision
unreasonable? One legislature might invite a branch, which the next
might attempt, by penal or other legislation, to drive away. We have
had such examples heretofore, and I cannot think that it was unwise
to profit by experience. Besides, an exactly similar provision was
contained in the scheme of a bank which was reported by the secretary
of the treasury, and to which it was understood the president had given
his assent. But if I understand this message, that scheme could not
have obtained his sanction, if congress had passed it without any
alteration whatever. It authorized what is termed by the president
local discount, and he does not believe the constitution confers upon
congress power to establish a bank having that faculty. He says, indeed,
‘I regard the bill as asserting for congress the right to incorporate
a United States bank, with power and right to establish offices of
discount and deposit in the several states of this union, _with or
without their consent; a principle to which I have always heretofore
been opposed, and which can never obtain my sanction_.’ I pass with
pleasure from this painful theme; deeply regretting that I have been
constrained so long to dwell on it.
On a former occasion I stated, that in the event of an unfortunate
difference of opinion between the legislative and executive departments,
the point of difference might be developed, and it would be then seen
whether they could be brought to coincide in any measure corresponding
with the public hopes and expectations. I regret that the president
has not, in this message, favored us with a more clear and explicit,
exhibition of his views. It is sufficiently manifest that he is
decidedly opposed to the establishment of a new bank of the United
States formed after the two old models. I think it is fairly to be
inferred, that the plan of the secretary of the treasury could not have
received his sanction. He is opposed to the passage of the bill which
he has returned; but whether he would give his approbation to any bank,
and, if any, what sort of a bank, is not absolutely clear. I think
it may be collected from the message, with the aid or information
derived through other sources, that the president would concur in the
establishment of a bank whose operations should be limited to dealing
in bills of exchange, to deposits, and to the supply of a circulation,
excluding the power of discounting promissory notes. And I understand
that some of our friends are now considering the practicability of
arranging and passing a bill in conformity with the views of president
Tyler? Whilst I regret that I can take no active part in such an
experiment, and must reserve to myself the right of determining,
whether I can or cannot vote for such a bill after I see it in its
matured form, I assure my friends that they shall find no obstacle or
impediment in me. On the contrary, I say to them, go on: God speed you
in any measure which will serve the country, and preserve or restore
harmony and concert between the departments of government. An executive
veto of a bank of the United States, after the sad experience of late
years, is an event which was not anticipated by the political friends
of the president; certainly not by me. But it has come upon us with
tremendous weight, and amidst the greatest excitement within and
without the metropolis. The question now is, what shall be done? What,
under this most embarrassing and unexpected state of things, will our
constituents expect of us? What is required by the duty and the dignity
of congress? I repeat, that if, after a careful examination of the
executive message, a bank can be devised which will afford any remedy
to existing evils, and secure the president’s approbation, let the
project of such a bank be presented. It shall encounter no opposition,
if it should receive no support, from me.
But what further shall we do? Never, since I have enjoyed the honor
of participating in the public councils of the nation, a period now
of nearly thirty-five years, have I met congress under more happy or
more favorable auspices. Never have I seen a house of representatives
animated by more patriotic dispositions; more united, more determined,
more business-like. Not even that house which declared war in 1812,
nor that which, in 1815–16, laid broad and deep foundations of national
prosperity, in adequate provisions for a sound currency, by the
establishment of a bank of the United States, for the payment of the
national debt, and for the protection of American industry. This
house has solved the problem of the competency of a large deliberative
body to transact the public business. If happily there had existed a
concurrence of opinion and cordial coöperation between the different
departments of the government, and all the members of the party, we
should have carried every measure contemplated at the extra session,
which the people had a right to expect from our pledges, and should
have been, by this time, at our respective homes. We are disappointed
in one, and an important one, of that series of measures; but shall
we therefore despair? Shall we abandon ourselves to unworthy feelings
and sentiments? Shall we allow ourselves to be transported by rash and
intemperate passions and counsels? Shall we adjourn, and go home in
disgust? No! No! No! A higher, nobler, and more patriotic career lies
before us. Let us here, at the east end of Pennsylvania avenue, do our
duty, our whole duty, and nothing short of our duty, towards our common
country. We have repealed the sub-treasury. We have passed a bankrupt
law――a beneficent measure of substantial and extensive relief. Let us
now pass the bill for the distribution of the proceeds of the public
lands, the revenue-bill, and the bill for the benefit of the oppressed
people of this district. Let us do all, let us do every thing we can
for the public good. If we are finally to be disappointed in our hopes
of giving to the country a bank, which will once more supply it with a
sound currency, still let us go home and tell our constituents, that we
did all that we could under actual circumstances; and that, if we did
not carry every measure for their relief, it was only because to do so
was impossible. If nothing can be done at this extra session, to put
upon a more stable and satisfactory basis the currency and exchanges
of the country, let us hope that hereafter some way will be found to
accomplish that most desirable object, either by an amendment of the
constitution, limiting and qualifying the enormous executive power,
and especially the veto, or by increased majorities in the two houses
of congress, competent to the passage of wise and salutary laws, the
president’s objections notwithstanding.
This seems to me to be the course now incumbent upon us to pursue; and
by conforming to it, whatever may be the result of laudable endeavors,
now in progress or in contemplation in relation to a new attempt to
establish a bank, we shall go home bearing no self-reproaches for
neglected or abandoned duty.