[MR. CLAY, having accepted an invitation to visit his friends
in his native county of Hanover, Virginia, met them at a public
entertainment given him at Taylorsville, in that county, on the
above day, and, in accordance with their wishes and expectations,
he addressed them in the following elaborate remarks on topics
of great interest, which then particularly engaged the public
mind. Reviewing the measures of Mr. Van Buren’s administration,
preceded by those of general Jackson’s, he gives his views
of the measures necessary to be adopted to restore public
prosperity, and concludes with an exhortation to his whig
friends to do their duty in the then forthcoming election, which
resulted in the success of their candidate, general Harrison.]
THE sentiment in compliment to Mr. Clay was received with a
long-continued applause. That gentleman rose and addressed the company
substantially as follows.
I think, friends and fellow-citizens, that, availing myself of the
privilege of my long service in the public councils, just adverted
to, the resolution, which I have adopted, is not unreasonable, of
leaving to younger men, generally, the performance of the duty, and the
enjoyment of the pleasure, of addressing the people in their primary
assemblies. After the event which occurred last winter at the capitol
of Pennsylvania, I believed it due to myself, to the whig cause, and
to the country, to announce to the public, with perfect truth and
sincerity, and without any reserve, my fixed determination heartily
to support the nomination of William Henry Harrison there made. To put
down all misrepresentations, I have, on suitable occasions, repeated
this annunciation; and now declare my solemn conviction, that the
purity and security of our free institutions, and the prosperity of the
country, imperatively demand the election of that citizen to the office
of chief magistrate of the United States.
But the occasion forms an exception from the rule which I have
prescribed to myself. I have come here to the county of my nativity
in the spirit of a pilgrim, to meet, perhaps for the last time,
the companions, and the descendants of the companions, of my youth.
Wherever we roam, in whatever climate or land we are cast by the
accidents of human life, beyond the mountains or beyond the ocean, in
the legislative halls of the capitol, or in the retreats and shades
of private life, our hearts turn with an irresistible instinct to
the cherished spot which ushered us into existence. And we dwell with
delightful associations on the recollection of the streams in which,
during our boyish days, we bathed, the fountains at which we drank,
the piny fields, the hills and the valleys where we sported, and the
friends who shared these enjoyments with us. Alas! too many of these
friends of mine have gone whither we must all shortly go, and the
presence here of the small remnant left behind, attests both our loss
and our early attachment. I would greatly prefer, my friends, to employ
the time which this visit affords in friendly and familiar conversation
on the virtues of our departed companions, and on the scenes and
adventures of our younger days; but the expectation which prevails, the
awful state of our beloved country, and the opportunities which I have
enjoyed in its public councils, impose on me the obligation of touching
on topics less congenial with the feelings of my heart, but possessing
higher public interest. I assure you, fellow-citizens, however, that
I present myself before you for no purpose of exciting prejudices or
inflaming passions, but to speak to you in all soberness and truth,
and to testify to the things which I know, or the convictions which I
entertain, as an ancient friend, who has lived long, and whose career
is rapidly drawing to a close. Throughout an arduous life, I have
endeavored to make truth and the good of our country the guides of my
public conduct; but in Hanover county, for which I cherish sentiments
of respect, gratitude, and veneration, above all other places, would I
avoid saying any thing that I did not sincerely and truly believe.
Why is the plough deserted, the tools of the mechanic laid aside, and
all are seen rushing to gatherings of the people? What occasions those
vast and unusual assemblages, which we behold in every state, and in
almost every neighborhood? Why those conventions of the people, at a
common centre, from all the extremities of this vast union, to consult
together upon the sufferings of the community, and to deliberate on the
means of deliverance? Why this rabid appetite for public discussions?
What is the solution of the phenomenon, which we observe, of a great
nation agitated upon its whole surface, and at its lowest depths, like
the ocean when convulsed by some terrible storm? There must be a cause,
and no ordinary cause.
It has been truly said, in the most memorable document that ever issued
from the pen of man, that ‘all experience hath shown that mankind are
more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right
themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.’ The
recent history of our people furnishes confirmation of that truth. They
are active, enterprising, and intelligent; but are not prone to make
groundless complaints against public servants. If we now every where
behold them in motion, it is because they feel that the grievances
under which they are writhing can be no longer tolerated. They feel
the absolute necessity of a change, that no change can render their
condition worse, and that any change must better it. This is the
judgment to which they have come; this the brief and compendious
logic which we daily hear. They know that, in all the dispensations of
Providence, they have reason to be thankful and grateful; and if they
had not, they would be borne with fortitude and resignation. But there
is a prevailing conviction and persuasion, that, in the administration
of government, there has been something wrong, radically wrong, and
that the vessel of state has been in the hands of selfish, faithless,
and unskilful pilots, who have conducted it amidst the breakers.
In my deliberate opinion, the present distressed and distracted state
of the country may be traced to the single cause of the action, the
encroachments, and the usurpations of the executive branch of the
government. I have not time here to exhibit and to dwell upon all the
instances of these, as they have occurred in succession, during the
last twelve years. They have been again and again exposed, on other
more fit occasions. But I have thought this a proper opportunity to
point out the enormity of the pretensions, principles, and practices
of that department, as they have been, from time to time, disclosed,
in these late years, and to show the rapid progress which has been
made in the fulfilment of the remarkable language of our illustrious
countryman, that the federal executive had an awful squinting towards
monarchy. Here, in the county of his birth, surrounded by sons, some of
whose sires with him were the first to raise their arms in defence of
American liberty against a foreign monarch, is an appropriate place to
expose the impending danger of creating a domestic monarch. And may I
not, without presumption, indulge the hope, that the warning voice of
another, although far humbler, son of Hanover, may not pass unheeded?
The late president of the United States advanced certain new and
alarming pretensions for the executive department of the government,
the effect of which, if established and recognised by the people,
must inevitably convert it into a monarchy. The first of these, and it
was a favorite principle with him, was, that the executive department
should be regarded as a unit. By this principle of unity, he meant
and intended, that all the executive officers of government should
be bound to obey the commands and execute the orders of the president
of the United States, and that they should be amenable to him, and
he be responsible for them. Prior to his administration, it had been
considered that they were bound to observe and obey the constitution
and laws, subject only to the general superintendence of the president,
and responsible by impeachment, and to the tribunals of justice, for
injuries inflicted on private citizens.
But the annunciation of this new and extraordinary principle was not
of itself sufficient for the purpose of president Jackson; it was
essential that the subjection to his will, which was its object, should
be secured by some adequate sanction. That he sought to effect by an
extension of another principle, that of dismission from office, beyond
all precedent, and to cases and under circumstances which would have
furnished just grounds of his impeachment, according to the solemn
opinion of Mr. Madison, and other members of the first congress, under
the present constitution.
Now, if the whole official corps, subordinate to the president of
the United States, are made to know and to feel that they hold their
respective offices by the tenure of conformity and obedience to his
will, it is manifest, that they must look to that will, and not to
the constitution and laws, as the guide of their official conduct. The
weakness of human nature, the love and emoluments of office, perhaps
the bread necessary to the support of their families, would make this
result absolutely certain.
The development of this new character to the power of dismission,
would have fallen short of the aims in view, without the exercise of it
were held to be a prerogative, for which the president was to be wholly
irresponsible. If he were compelled to expose the grounds and reasons
upon which he acted, in dismissals from office, the apprehension of
public censure would temper the arbitrary nature of the power, and
throw some protection around the subordinate officer. Hence the new and
monstrous pretension has been advanced, that, although the concurrence
of the senate is necessary by the constitution, to the confirmation
of an appointment, the president may subsequently dismiss the person
appointed, not only without communicating the grounds on which he
has acted to the senate, but without any such communication to the
people themselves, for whose benefit all offices are created! And so
bold and daring has the executive branch of the government become,
that one of its cabinet ministers, himself a subordinate officer, has
contemptuously refused, to members of the house of representatives, to
disclose the grounds on which he has undertaken to dismiss from office
persons acting as deputy postmasters in his department!
As to the gratuitous assumption, by president Jackson, of
responsibility for all the subordinate executive officers, it is the
merest mockery that was ever put forth. They will escape punishment
by pleading his orders, and he, by alleging the hardship of being
punished, not for his own acts, but for theirs. We have a practical
exposition of this principle in the case of the two hundred thousand
militia. The secretary of war comes out to screen the president, by
testifying that he never saw what he strongly recommended; and the
president reciprocates that favor by retaining the secretary in place,
notwithstanding he has proposed a plan for organizing the militia,
which is acknowledged to be unconstitutional. If the president is not
to be held responsible for a cabinet minister, in daily intercourse
with him, how is he to be rendered so for a receiver; in Wisconsin
or Iowa? To concentrate all responsibility in the president, is to
annihilate all responsibility. For who ever expects to see the day
arrive when a president of the United States will be impeached; or,
if impeached, when he cannot command more than one third of the senate
to defeat the impeachment?
But to construct the scheme of practical despotism, whilst all the
forms of free government remained, it was necessary to take one further
step. By the constitution, the president is enjoined to take care that
the laws be executed. This injunction was merely intended to impose
on him the duty of a general superintendence; to see that offices were
filled; officers at their respective posts, in the discharge of their
official functions; and all obstructions to the enforcement of the laws
were removed, and, when necessary for that purpose, to call out the
militia. No one ever imagined, prior to the administration of president
Jackson, that a president of the United States was to occupy himself
with supervising and attending to the execution of all the minute
details of every one of the hosts of offices in the United States.
Under the constitutional injunction just mentioned, the late president
put forward that most extraordinary pretension that the constitution
and laws of the United States were to be executed _as he understood
them_; and this pretension was attempted to be sustained, by an
argument equally extraordinary, that the president, being a sworn
officer, must carry them into effect, according to _his_ sense of their
meaning. The constitution and laws were to be executed, not according
to their import, as handed down to us by our ancestors, as interpreted
by contemporaneous expositions, as expounded by concurrent judicial
decisions, as fixed by an uninterrupted course of congressional
legislation, but in _that sense_ in which a president of the United
States happened to understand them!
To complete this executive usurpation, one further object remained.
By the constitution, the command of the army and the navy is conferred
on the president. If he could unite the purse with the sword, nothing
would be left to gratify the insatiable thirst for power. In 1838
the president seized the treasury of the United States, and from that
day to this, it has continued substantially under his control. The
seizure was effected by the removal of one secretary of the treasury,
understood to be opposed to the measure, and by the dismissal of
another, who refused to violate the law of the land upon the orders
of the president.
It is, indeed, said, that not a dollar in the treasury can be touched
without a previous appropriation by law, nor drawn out of the treasury,
without the concurrence and signature of the secretary, the treasurer,
the register, and the comptroller. But are not all these pretended
securities idle and unavailing forms? We have seen, that by the
operation of the irresponsible power of dismission, all those officers
are reduced to mere automata, absolutely subjected to the will of the
president. What resistance would any of them make, with the penalty of
dismission suspended over their heads, to any orders of the president,
to pour out the treasure of the United States, whether an act of
appropriation existed or not? Do not mock us with the vain assurance of
the honor and probity of a president, nor remind us of the confidence
which we ought to repose in his imagined virtues. The pervading
principles of our system of governments――of all free government――is not
merely the possibility, but the absolute certainty of infidelity and
treachery, with even the highest functionary of the state; and hence
all the restrictions, securities, and guarantees, which the wisdom of
our ancestors or the sad experience of history had inculcated, have
been devised and thrown around the chief magistrate.
Here, friends and fellow-citizens, let us pause and contemplate
this stupendous structure of executive machinery and despotism, which
has been reared in our young republic. The executive branch of the
government is a unit; throughout all its arteries and veins, there is
to be but one heart, one head, one will. The number of the subordinate
executive officers and dependents in the United States has been
estimated, in an official report, founded on public documents, made by
a senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) at one hundred thousand.
Whatever it may be, all of them, wherever they are situated, are bound
implicitly to obey the orders of the president. And absolute obedience
to his will is secured and enforced, by the power of dismissing
them, at his pleasure, from their respective places. To make this
terrible power of dismission more certain and efficacious, its exercise
is covered up in mysterious secrecy, without exposure, without the
smallest responsibility. The constitution and laws of the United States
are to be executed in the sense in which the president understands them,
although that sense may be at variance with the understanding of every
other man in the United States. It follows, as a necessary consequence,
from the principles deduced by the president from the constitutional
injunction as to the execution of the laws, that, if an act of congress
be passed, in _his opinion_, contrary to the constitution, or if a
decision be pronounced by the courts, in his opinion, contrary to
the constitution or the laws, that act or that decision the president
is not obliged to enforce, and he could not cause it to be enforced,
without a violation, as is pretended, of his official oath. Candor
requires the admission that the principle has not yet been pushed in
practice in these cases; but it manifestly comprehends them; and who
doubts that, if the spirit of usurpation is not arrested and rebuked,
they will be finally reached? The march of power is ever onward. As
times and seasons admonished, it openly and boldly, in broad day,
makes its progress; or, if alarm be excited by the enormity of its
pretensions, it silently and secretly, in the dark of the night, steals
its devious way. It now storms and mounts the ramparts of the fortress
of liberty; it now saps and undermines its foundations. Finally, the
command of the army and navy being already in the president, and having
acquired a perfect control over the treasury of the United States, he
has consummated that frightful union of purse and sword, so long, so
much, so earnestly deprecated by all true lovers of civil liberty. And
our present chief magistrate stands solemnly and voluntarily pledged,
in the face of the whole world, to follow in the footsteps, and carry
out the measures and the principles, of his illustrious predecessor!
The sum of the whole is, that there is but one power, one control,
one will, in the state. All is concentrated in the president. He
directs, orders, commands, the whole machinery of the state. Through
the official agencies, scattered throughout the land, and absolutely
subjected to his will, he executes, according to his pleasure or
caprice, the whole power of the commonwealth, which has been absorbed
and engrossed by him. And one sole will predominates in, and animates
the whole of, this vast community. If this be not practical despotism,
I am incapable of conceiving or defining it. Names are nothing. The
existence or non-existence of arbitrary government does not depend upon
the title or denomination bestowed on the chief of the state, but upon
the quantum of power which he possesses and wields. Autocrat, sultan,
emperor, dictator, king, doge, president, are all mere names, in which
the power respectively possessed by them is not to be found, but is
to be looked for in the constitution, or the established usages and
practices, of the several states which they govern and control. If the
autocrat of Russia were called president of all the Russias, the actual
power remaining unchanged, his authority, under his new denomination,
would continue undiminished; and if the president of the United States
were to receive the title of autocrat of the United States, the amount
of his authority would not be increased, without an alteration of the
constitution.
General Jackson was a bold and fearless reaper, carrying a wide row,
but he did not gather the whole harvest; he left some gleanings to
his faithful successor, and he seems resolved to sweep clean the field
of power. The duty of inculcating on the official corps the active
exertion of their personal and official influence, was left by him
to be enforced by Mr. Van Buren, in all popular elections. It was not
sufficient that the official corps was bound implicitly to obey the
will of the president. It was not sufficient that this obedience was
coerced by the tremendous power of dismission. It soon became apparent,
that this corps might be beneficially employed, to promote, in other
matters than the business of their offices, the views and interest of
the president and his party. They are far more efficient than any
standing army of equal numbers. A standing army would be separated, and
stand out from the people, would be an object of jealousy and suspicion;
and, being always in corps, or in detachments, could exert no influence
on popular elections. But the official corps is dispersed throughout
the country, in every town, village, and city, mixing with the people,
attending their meetings and conventions, becoming chairmen and members
of committees, and urging and stimulating partisans to active and
vigorous exertion. Acting in concert, and, throughout the whole union,
obeying orders issued from the centre, their influence, aided by
executive patronage, by the post-office department, and all the vast
other means of the executive, is almost irresistible.
To correct this procedure, and to restrain the subordinates of the
executive from all interference with popular elections, my colleague,
(Mr. Crittenden,) now present, introduced a bill in the senate. He
had the weight of Mr. Jefferson’s opinion, who issued a circular to
restrain federal officers from intermeddling in popular elections. He
had before him the British example, according to which, place-men and
pensioners were not only forbidden to interfere, but were not, some of
them, even allowed to vote at popular elections. But his bill left them
free to exercise the elective franchise, prohibiting only the use of
their official influence. And how was this bill received in the senate?
Passed, by those who profess to admire the character, and to pursue
the principles of Mr. Jefferson? No such thing. It was denounced as
a sedition bill. And the just odium of that sedition bill, which was
intended to protect office-holders against the people, was successfully
used to defeat a measure of protection of the people against the
office-holders! Not only were they left unrestrained, but they were
urged and stimulated by an official report, to employ their influence
in behalf of the administration, at the elections of the people.
Hitherto, the army and the navy have remained unaffected by the power
of dismission, and they have not been called into the political service
of the executive. But no attentive observer of the principles and
proceedings of the men in power could fail to see that the day was
not distant, when they, too, would be required to perform the partisan
offices of the president. Accordingly, the process of converting them
into executive instruments has commenced in a court-martial assembled
at Baltimore. Two officers of the army of the United States have been
there put upon their solemn trial, on the charge of prejudicing the
democratic party, by making purchases for the supply of the army,
from members of the whig party! It is not pretended that the United
States were prejudiced by those purchases; on the contrary, it was,
I believe, established that they were cheaper than could have been
made from the supporters of the administration. But the charge was,
that the purchase at all from the opponents, instead of the friends,
of the administration, was an injury to the democratic party, which
required that the offenders should be put upon their trial, before
a court-martial! And this trial was commenced at the instance of a
committee of a democratic convention, and conducted and prosecuted by
them! The scandalous spectacle is presented to an enlightened world,
of the chief magistrate of a great people executing the orders of a
self-created power, organized within the bosom of the state; and, upon
such an accusation, arraigning before a military tribunal, gallant men,
who are charged with the defence of the honor and the interest of their
country, and with bearing its eagles in the presence of an enemy!
But the army and navy are too small, and, in composition, are too
patriotic to subserve all the purposes of this administration. Hence,
the recent proposition of the secretary of war, strongly recommended
by the president, under color of a new organization of the militia, to
create a standing force of two hundred thousand men, an amount which
no conceivable foreign exigency can ever make necessary. It is not
my purpose now to enter upon an examination of that alarming and most
dangerous plan of the executive department of the federal government.
It has justly excited a burst of general indignation; and nowhere has
the disapprobation of it been more emphatically expressed than in this
ancient and venerable commonwealth.
The monstrous project may be described in a few words. It proposes to
create the force by breaking down Mason and Dixon’s line, expunging
the boundaries of states; melting them up in a confluent mass, to be
subsequently cut up into ten military parts, alienates the militia from
its natural association, withdraws it from the authority and command
and sympathy of its constitutional officers, appointed by the states,
puts it under the command of the president, authorises him to cause it
to be trained, in palpable violation of the constitution, and subjects
it to be called out from remote and distant places, at his pleasure,
and on occasions not warranted by the constitution!
Indefensible as this project is, fellow-citizens, do not be deceived,
by supposing that it has been or will be abandoned. It is a principle
of those who are now in power, that an election or a reëlection of
the president implies the sanction of the people to all the measures
which he had proposed, and all the opinions which, he had expressed,
on public affairs, prior to that event. We have seen this principle
applied on various occasions. Let Mr. Van Buren be reëlected in
November next, and it will be claimed that the people have thereby
approved of this plan of the secretary of war. All entertain the
opinion, that it is important to train the militia, and render it
effective; and it will be insisted, in the contingency mentioned, that
the people have demonstrated that they approve of that specific plan.
There is more reason to apprehend such a consequence, from the fact
that a committee of the senate, to which this subject was referred,
instead of denouncing the scheme as unconstitutional, and dangerous to
liberty, presented a labored apologetic report, and the administration
majority in that body ordered twenty thousand copies of the apology
to be printed, for circulation among the people. I take pleasure in
testifying, that one administration senator had the manly independence
to denounce, in his place, the project as unconstitutional. That
senator was from your own state.
I have thus, fellow-citizens, exhibited to you a true and faithful
picture of executive power, as it has been enlarged and expanded within
the last few years, and as it has been proposed further to extend it.
It overshadows every other branch of the government. The source of
legislative power is no longer to be found in the capitol, but in the
palace of the president. In assuming to be a part of the legislative
power, as the president recently did, contrary to the constitution, he
would have been nearer the actual fact if he had alleged that he was
the sole legislative power of the union. How is it possible for public
liberty to be preserved, and the constitutional distributions of power,
among the departments of government, to be maintained, unless the
executive career be checked and restrained?
It may be urged that two securities exist; first, that the presidential
term is of short duration; and, second, the elective franchise. But it
has been already shown, that whether a depository of power be arbitrary
or compatible with liberty, does not depend upon the duration of the
official term, but upon the amount of power invested. The dictatorship
in Rome, was an office of brief existence, generally shorter than
the presidential term. Whether the elective franchise be an adequate
security or not, is a problem to be solved next November. I hope and
believe it _yet_ is. But if Mr. Van Buren should be reëlected, the
power already acquired by the executive be retained, and that which is
in progress be added to that department, it is my deliberate judgment
that there will be no hope remaining for the continuance of the
liberties of the country.
And yet the partisans of this tremendous executive power arrogate to
themselves the name of democrats, and bestow upon us, who are opposed
to it, the denomination of federalists! In the senate of the United
States, there are five gentlemen who were members of the federal
party, and four of them have been suddenly transformed into democrats,
and are now warm supporters of this administration, whilst I, who had
exerted the utmost of my humble abilities to arouse the nation to a
vindication of its insulted honor, and its violated rights, and to the
vigorous prosecution of the war against Great Britain, to which they
were violently opposed, find myself, by a sort of magical influence,
converted into a federalist! The only American citizen that I ever
met with, who was an avowed monarchist, was a supporter of the
administration of general Jackson; and he acknowledged to me, that his
motive was to bring about the system of monarchy, which his judgment
preferred.
There were other points of difference between the federalists and the
democratic, or rather republican party, of 1798, but the great, leading,
prominent discrimination between them, related to the constitution of
the executive department of the government. The federalists believed
that, in its structure, it was too weak, and was in danger of being
crushed by the preponderating weight of the legislative branch. Hence
they rallied around the executive, and sought to give to it strength
and energy. A strong government, an energetic executive was, among them,
the common language and the great object of that day. The republicans,
on the contrary, believed that the real danger lay on the side of the
executive; that, having a continuous and uninterrupted existence, it
was always on the alert, ready to defend the power it had, and prompt
in acquiring more; and that the experience of history demonstrated
that it was the encroaching and usurping department. They, therefore,
rallied around the people and the legislature.
What are the positions of the two great parties of the present day?
Modern democracy has reduced the federal theory of a strong and
energetic executive to practical operation. It has turned from the
people, the natural ally of _genuine_ democracy, to the executive,
and, instead of vigilance, jealousy, and distrust, has given to that
department all its confidence, and made to it a virtual surrender
of all the powers of government. The recognised maxim of royal
infallibility is transplanted from the British monarchy into modern
American democracy, and the president can do no wrong! This new
school adopts, modifies, changes, renounces, renews, opinions at the
pleasure of the executive. Is the bank of the United States a useful
and valuable institution? Yes, unanimously pronounces the democratic
legislature of Pennsylvania. The president vetoes it as a pernicious
and dangerous establishment. The democratic majority in the same
legislature pronounce it to be pernicious and dangerous. The democratic
majority of the house of representatives of the United States, declare
the deposits of the public money in the bank of the United States to
be safe. The president says they are unsafe, and removes them. The
democracy say they are unsafe, and approve the removal. The president
says that a scheme of a sub-treasury is revolutionary and disorganizing.
The democracy say it is revolutionary and disorganizing. The president
says it is wise and salutary. The democracy say it is wise and salutary.
The whigs of 1840 stand where the republicans of 1798 stood, and where
the whigs of the revolution were, battling for liberty, for the people,
for free institutions, against power, against corruption, against
executive encroachments, against monarchy.
We are reproached with struggling for offices and their emoluments.
If we acted on the avowed and acknowledged principle of our opponents,
‘that the spoils belong to the victors,’ we should indeed be unworthy
of the support of the people. No! fellow-citizens; higher, nobler,
more patriotic motives actuate the whig party. Their object is the
restoration of the constitution, the preservation of liberty, and
rescue of the country. If they were governed by the sordid and selfish
motives acted upon by their opponents, and unjustly imputed to them,
to acquire office and emolument, they have only to change their names,
and enter the presidential palace. The gate is always wide open, and
the path is no narrow one which leads through it. The last comer, too,
often fares best.
On a resurvey of the few past years we behold enough to sicken and
sadden the hearts of true patriots. Executive encroachment has quickly
followed upon executive encroachment; persons honored by public
confidence, and from whom nothing but grateful and parental measures
should have flowed, have inflicted stunning blow after blow, in such
rapid succession, that, before the people could recover from the
reeling effects of one, another has fallen heavily upon them. Had
either of various instances of executive misrule stood out separate
and alone, so that its enormity might have been seen and dwelt upon
with composure, the condemnation of the executive would have long
since been pronounced; but it has hitherto found safety and impunity
in the bewildering effects of the multitude of its misdeeds. The nation
has been in the condition of a man who, having gone to bed after his
barn has been consumed by fire, is aroused in the morning to witness
his dwelling-house wrapped in flames. So bold and presumptuous had
the executive become, that, penetrating in its influence the hall
of a coördinate branch of the government, by means of a submissive
or instructed majority of the senate, it has caused a record of the
country to be effaced and expunged, the inviolability of which was
guarantied by a solemn injunction of the constitution! And that
memorable and scandalous scene was enacted only because the offensive
record contained an expression of disapprobation of an executive
proceeding.
If this state of things were to remain――if the progress of executive
usurpation were to continue unchecked, hopeless despair would seize the
public mind, or the people would be goaded to acts of open and violent
resistance. But, thank God, the power of the president, fearful and
rapid as its strides have been, is not _yet_ too great for the power
of the elective franchise; and a bright and glorious prospect, in the
election of William Henry Harrison, has opened upon the country. The
necessity of a change of rulers has deeply penetrated the hearts of
the people; and we every where behold cheering manifestations of that
happy event. The fact of his election alone, without reference to
the measures of his administration, will powerfully contribute to the
security and happiness of the people. It will bring assurance of the
cessation of that long series of disastrous experiments which have
so greatly afflicted the people. Confidence will immediately revive,
credit be restored, active business will return, prices of products
will rise; and the people will feel and know that, instead of their
servants being occupied in devising measures for their ruin and
destruction, they will be assiduously employed in promoting their
welfare and prosperity.
But grave and serious measures will, unquestionably, early and
anxiously command the earnest attention of the new administration.
I have no authority to announce, and do not pretend to announce the
purposes of the new president. I have no knowledge of them, other than
that which is accessible to every citizen. In what I shall say as to
the course of a new administration, therefore, I mean to express my own
sentiments, to speak for myself, without compromiting any other person.
Upon such an interesting occasion as this is, in the midst of the
companions of my youth, or their descendants, I have felt that it is
due to them and to myself, explicitly to declare my sentiments, without
reserve, and to show that I have been, and, as I sincerely believe, the
friends with whom I have acted have been, animated by the disinterested
desire to advance the best interests of the country, and to preserve
its free institutions.
The first, and, in my opinion, the most important object, which
should engage the serious attention of a new administration, is that
of circumscribing the executive power, and throwing around it such
limitations and safe-guards as will render it no longer dangerous to
the public liberties.
Whatever is the work of man necessarily partakes of his imperfections;
and it was not to be expected, that, with all the acknowledged wisdom
and virtues of the framers of our constitution, they could have sent
forth a plan of government, so free from all defect, and so full
of guarantees, that it should not, in the conflict of embittered
parties and of excited passions, be perverted and misinterpreted.
Misconceptions or erroneous constructions of the powers granted
in the constitution, would probably have occurred, after the lapse
of many years, in seasons of entire calm, and with a regular and
temperate administration of the government; but, during the last twelve
years, the machine, driven by a reckless charioteer, with frightful
impetuosity, has been greatly jarred and jolted, and it needs careful
examination and a thorough repair.
With the view, therefore, to the fundamental character of the
government itself, and especially of the executive branch, it seems
to me that, either by amendments of the constitution, when they are
necessary, or by remedial legislation, when the object falls within
the scope of the powers of congress, there should be,
First, a provision to render a person ineligible to the office of
president of the United States, after a service of one term.
Much observation and deliberate reflection have satisfied me that too
much of the time, the thoughts, and the exertions of the incumbent, are
occupied, during his first term, in securing his reëlection. The public
business, consequently, suffers; and measures are proposed or executed
with less regard to the general prosperity than to their influence upon
the approaching election. If the limitation to one term existed, the
president would be exclusively devoted to the discharge of his public
duties; and he would endeavor to signalize his administration by the
beneficence and wisdom of its measures.
Secondly, the veto power should be more precisely defined, and be
subjected to further limitations and qualifications. Although a large,
perhaps the largest, proportion of all the acts of congress passed at
the short session of congress, since the commencement of the government,
were passed within the three last days of the session, and when, of
course, the president for the time being had not the ten days for
consideration, allowed by the constitution, president Jackson, availing
himself of that allowance, has failed to return important bills. When
not returned by the president, within the ten days, it is questionable
whether they are laws or not. It is very certain that the next congress
cannot act upon them by deciding whether or not they shall become
laws, the president’s objections notwithstanding. All this ought to
be provided for.
At present, a bill, returned by the president, can only become a law by
the concurrence of two thirds of the members of each house. I think if
congress passes a bill after discussion and consideration, and, after
weighing the objections of the president, still believes it ought to
pass, it should become a law provided a majority of _all_ the members
of each house concur in its passage. If the weight of his argument, and
the weight of his influence conjointly, cannot prevail on a majority,
against their previous convictions, in my opinion, the bill ought not
to be arrested. Such is the provision of the constitutions of several
of the states, and that of Kentucky among them.
Thirdly, the power of dismission from office should be restricted, and
the exercise of it be rendered responsible.
The constitutional concurrence of the senate is necessary to the
confirmation of all important appointments; but, without consulting
the senate, without any other motive than resentment or caprice, the
president may dismiss, at his sole pleasure, an officer created by the
joint action of himself and the senate. The practical effect is, to
nullify the agency of the senate. There may be, occasionally, cases
in which the public interest requires an immediate dismission without
waiting for the assembling of the senate; but, in all such cases,
the president should be bound to communicate fully the grounds and
motives of the dismission. The power would be thus rendered responsible.
Without it, the exercise of the power is utterly repugnant to free
institutions, the basis of which, is perfect responsibility, and
dangerous to the public liberty, as has been already shown.
Fourthly, the control over the treasury of the United States, should be
confided and confined exclusively to congress; and all authority of the
president over it, by means of dismissing the secretary of the treasury,
or other persons having the immediate charge of it, be rigorously
precluded.
You have heard much, fellow-citizens, of the divorce of banks and
government. After crippling them and impairing their utility, the
executive and its partisans have systematically denounced them. The
executive and the country, were warned again and again of the fatal
course that has been pursued; but the executive nevertheless persevered,
commencing by praising, and ending by decrying, the state banks. Under
cover of the smoke which has been raised, the real object all along
has been, and yet is, to obtain the possession of the money power of
the union. That accomplished and sanctioned by the people――the union
of the sword and the purse in the hands of the president effectually
secured――and farewell to American liberty. The sub-treasury is the
scheme for effecting that union; and, I am told, that of all the
days in the year, that which gave birth to our national existence
and freedom, is the selected day to be disgraced by ushering into
existence a measure imminently perilous to the liberty, which, on
that anniversary, we commemorate in joyous festivals. Thus, in the
spirit of destruction which animates our rulers, would they convert
a day of gladness and of glory, into a day of sadness and mourning.
Fellow-citizens, there _is one_ divorce urgently demanded by the safety
and the highest interests of the country――a divorce of the president
from the treasury of the United States.
And, fifthly, the appointment of members of congress to any office, or
any but a few specific offices, during their continuance in office, and
for one year thereafter, should be prohibited.
This is a hackneyed theme, but it is not less deserving of serious
consideration. The constitution now interdicts the appointment of a
member of congress to any office created, or the emoluments of which
had been increased whilst he was in office. In the purer days of
the republic, that restriction might have been sufficient, but in
these more degenerate times, it is necessary, by an amendment of the
constitution, to give the principle greater extent.
These are the subjects, in relation to the permanent character of
the government itself, which, it seems to me, are worthy of the
serious attention of the people, and of a new administration. There are
others, of an administrative nature, which require prompt and careful
consideration.
First, the currency of the country, its stability and uniform
value, and, as intimately and indissolubly connected with it, the
insurance of the faithful performance of the fiscal services, necessary
to the government, should be maintained and secured by exercising
all the powers requisite to those objects with which congress is
constitutionally invested. These are the great ends to be aimed at; the
means are of subordinate importance. Whether these ends, indispensable
to the well being of both the people and the government, are to
be attained by sound and safe state banks, carefully selected, and
properly distributed, or by a new bank of the United States, with such
limitations, conditions, and restrictions, as have been indicated by
experience, should be left to the arbitrament of enlightened public
opinion.
Candor and truth require me to say, that, in my judgment, whilst
banks continue to exist in the country, the services of a bank of the
United States cannot be safely dispensed with. I think that the power
to establish such a bank is a settled question; settled by Washington
and by Madison, by the people, by forty years’ acquiescence, by the
judiciary, and by both of the great parties which so long held sway
in this country. I know and I respect the contrary opinion, which is
entertained in this state. But, in my deliberate view of the matter,
the power to establish such a bank being settled, and being a necessary
and proper power, the only question is, as to the expediency of its
exercise. And on questions of mere expediency, public opinion ought
to have a controlling influence. Without banks, I believe we cannot
have a sufficient currency; without a bank of the United States, I
fear we cannot have a sound currency. But it is the _end_, that of a
sound and sufficient currency, and a faithful execution of the fiscal
duties of government, that should engage the dispassionate and candid
consideration of the whole community. There is nothing in the name of
the bank of the United States which has any magical charm, or to which
any one need be wedded. It is to secure certain great objects, without
which society cannot prosper; and if, contrary to my apprehension,
these objects can be accomplished by dispensing with the agency of
a bank of the United States, and employing that of state banks, all
ought to rejoice, and heartily acquiesce, and none would more than I
should.
Second, that the public lands, in conformity with the trusts
created expressly, or by just implication, on their acquisition, be
administered in a spirit of liberality towards the new states and
territories, and in a spirit of justice towards all the states.
The land bill which was rejected by president Jackson, and acts of
occasional legislation, will accomplish both these objects. I regret
that the time does not admit of my exposing here the nefarious plans
and purposes of the administration as to this vast national resource.
That, like every other great interest of the country, is administered
with the sole view of the effect upon the interests of the party in
power. A bill has passed the senate, and is now pending before the
house, according to which, forty millions of dollars are stricken from
the real value of a certain portion of the public lands by a short
process; and a citizen of Virginia, residing on the southwest side of
the Ohio, is not allowed to purchase lands as cheap by half a dollar
per acre, as a citizen living on the northwest side of that river. I
have no hesitation in expressing my conviction, that the whole public
domain is gone if Mr. Van Buren be reëlected.
Third, that the policy of protecting and encouraging the production of
American industry, entering into competition with the rival productions
of foreign industry, be adhered to and maintained on the basis of the
principles and in the spirit of the compromise of March, 1833.
Protection and national independence are, in my opinion, identical
and synonymous. The principle of abandonment of the one, cannot be
surrendered without a forfeiture of the other. Who, with just pride
and national sensibility, can think of subjecting the products of our
industry to all the taxation and restraints of foreign powers, without
effort, on our part, to counteract their prohibitions and burdens, by
suitable countervailing legislation? The question cannot be, ought not
to be, one of principle, but of measure and degree. I adopt that of
the compromise act, not because that act is irrepealable, but because
it met with the sanction of the nation. Stability, with moderate
and certain protection, is far more important than instability, the
necessary consequence of high protection. But the protection of the
compromise act will be adequate, in most, if not as to all interests.
The twenty per centum which it stipulates, cash duties, home valuations,
and the list of free articles inserted in the act for the particular
advantage of the manufacturer, will insure, I trust, sufficient
protection. All together, they will amount probably to no less than
thirty per centum, a greater extent of protection than was secured
prior to the act of 1828, which no one stands up to defend. Now the
valuation of foreign goods is made not by the American authority,
except in suspected cases, but by foreigners and abroad. They assess
the value, and we the duty; but, as the duty depends in most cases,
upon the value, it is manifest that those who assess the value fix the
duty. The home valuation will give our government what it rightfully
possesses, both the power to ascertain the true value of the thing
which it taxes, as well as the amount of that tax.
Fourth, that a strict and wise economy, in the disbursement of the
public money, be steadily enforced; and that, to that end, all useless
establishments, all unnecessary offices and places, foreign and
domestic, and all extravagance, either in the collection or expenditure
of the public revenue, be abolished and repressed.
I have not time to dwell on details in the application of this
principle. I will say that a pruning-knife, long, broad, and sharp,
should be applied to every department of the government. There is
abundant scope for honest and skilful surgery. The annual expenditure
may, in reasonable time, be brought down from its present amount of
about forty millions, to nearly one third of that sum.
Fifth, the several states have made such great and gratifying progress
in their respective systems of internal improvement, and have been
so aided by the distribution under the deposit act, that, in future,
the erection of new roads and canals should be left to them, with such
further aid only from the general government, as they would derive from
the payment of the last instalment under that act, from an absolute
relinquishment of the right of congress to call upon them to refund
the previous instalments, and from their equal and just quotas, to be
received by a future distribution of the net proceeds from the sales of
the public lands.
And, sixth, that the right to slave property, being guarantied by the
constitution, and recognised as one of the compromise incorporated in
that instrument by our ancestors, should be left where the constitution
has placed it, undisturbed and unagitated by congress.
These, fellow-citizens, are views both of the structure of the
government and of its administration, which appear to me worthy of
commanding the grave attention of the public and its new servants.
Although, I repeat, I have neither authority nor purpose to commit
any body else, I believe most, if not all, of them, are entertained
by the political friends with whom I have acted. Whether the salutary
reforms which they include will be effected or considered, depends
upon the issue of that great struggle which is now going on throughout
all this country. This contest has had no parallel since the period
of the revolution. In both instances, there is a similarity of object.
That was to achieve, this is to preserve the liberties of the country.
Let us catch the spirit which animated, and imitate the virtues which
adorned our noble ancestors. Their devotion, their constancy, their
untiring activity, their perseverance, their indomitable resolution,
their sacrifices, their valor! If they fought for liberty or death,
in the memorable language of one of the most illustrious of them, let
us never forget that the prize now at hazard, is liberty or slavery.
We should be encouraged by the fact, that the contest, to the success
of which they solemnly pledged their fortunes, their lives, and their
sacred honor, was far more unequal than that in which we are engaged.
But, on the other hand, let us cautiously guard against too much
confidence. History and experience prove that more has been lost by
self-confidence and contempt of enemies, than won by skill and courage.
Our opponents are powerful in numbers, and in organization, active,
insidious, possessed of ample means, and wholly unscrupulous in the
use of them. They count upon success by the use of two words, democracy
and federalism; democracy, which, in violation of all truth, they
appropriate to themselves, and federalism, which, in violation of all
justice, they apply to us. And allow me to conjure you not to suffer
yourselves to be diverted, deceived, or discouraged by the false rumors
which will be industriously circulated, between the present time and
the period of the election, by our opponents. They will put them forth
in every variety, and without number, in the most imposing forms,
certified and sworn to by conspicuous names. They will brag, they will
boast, they will threaten. Regardless of all their arts, let us keep
steadily and faithfully and fearlessly at work.
But if the opposition perform its whole duty; if every member of it act
as in the celebrated battle of Lord Nelson, as if the eyes of the whole
nation were fixed on him, and as if on his sole exertions depended the
issue of the day, I sincerely believe, that at least twenty of the
states of the union, will unite in the glorious work of the salvation
of the constitution, and the redemption of the country.
Friends, and fellow-citizens, I have detained you too long. Accept my
cordial thanks, and my profound acknowledgments for the honors of this
day, and for all your feelings of attachment and confidence towards me;
and allow me, in conclusion, to propose a sentiment:
Hanover county――it was the first, in the commencement of the
evolution, to raise its arms, under the lead of Patrick Henry,
in defence of American liberty; it will be the last to prove
false or recreant to the holy cause.