IT is not my purpose, at the present stage of consideration of this
resolution, and I hope it will not be necessary at any stage, to say
much with the view of enforcing the arguments in its favor, which
are contained in the report of the committee. In the present posture
of our relations with France, the course which has appeared to me
and to the committee most expedient being to await the issue of those
deliberations in the French chambers which may even at this moment be
going on, it would not be proper to enter at large, at the present time,
into all the particulars touched upon in the report. On all questions
connected with the foreign affairs of the country, differences of
opinion will arise, which will finally terminate in whatever way the
opinion of the people of this country may so tend as to influence their
representatives. But, whenever the course of things shall be such that
a rupture shall unfortunately take place between this country and any
foreign country, (whether France or any other,) I take this opportunity
of saying, that, from that moment, whatever of energy or ability,
whatever of influence I may possess in my country, shall be devoted to
the carrying on of that war with the utmost vigor which the arms and
resources of the United States can give to it. I will not anticipate,
however, such a state of things; nay, I feel very confident that such
a rupture will not occur between the United States and France.
With respect to the justice of our claim upon France for payment of
the indemnity stipulated by the treaty, the report of the committee is
in entire concurrence with the executive. The opinion of the committee
is, that the claims stipulated to be paid are founded in justice;
that we must pursue them; that we must finally obtain satisfaction for
them, and to do so, must, if necessary, employ such means as the law of
nations justifies and the constitution has placed within our power. On
these points there is no diversity of sentiment between the committee
and the president; there _could_ be no diversity between either the
committee or the president and any American citizen.
In all that the president has said of the obligation of the French
government to make the stipulated provision for the claims, the
committee entirely concur. If the president, in his message, after
making his statement of the case, had stopped there, and abstained from
the recommendation of any specific measure, there could not have been
possibly any diversity of opinion on the subject between him and any
portion of the country. But, when he declares the confidence which he
entertains in the French government; when he expresses his conviction
that the executive branch of that government is honest and sincere in
its professions, and recites the promise by it of a renewed effort to
obtain the passage of a bill of appropriation by the French chambers,
it did appear to the committee inconsistent with these professions of
confidence, that they should be accompanied by the recommendation of
a measure which could only be authorized by the conviction that no
confidence, or, at least, not entire confidence, could be placed in
the declaration and professions of the French government. Confidence
and distrust are unnatural allies. If we profess confidence any where,
especially if that confidence be but for a limited period, it should
be unaccompanied with any indication whatever of distrust; a confidence
full, free, frank. But to say, as the president, through our minister,
has said, that he will await the issue of the deliberations of the
chambers, confiding in the sincerity of the king, and this, too, after
hearing of the rejection of the first bill of appropriation by the
chambers, and now, at the very moment when the chambers are about
deliberating on the subject, to throw out in a message to congress what
the president himself considered might possibly be viewed as a menace,
appeared to the committee, with all due deference to the executive,
and to the high and patriotic purposes which may be supposed to have
induced the recommendation, to be inconsistent to such a degree as
not to be seconded by the action of congress. It also appeared to the
committee, after the distinct recommendation by the president on this
subject, that there should be some expression of the sense of congress
in regard to it. Such an expression is proposed by the resolution now
under consideration.
In speculating upon probabilities in regard to the course of the
French government, in reference to the treaty, four contingencies
might be supposed to arise――first, that the French government may
have made the appropriation to carry the treaty into effect _before_
the reception of the president’s message; second, the chambers may make
the appropriation _after_ the reception of the president’s message,
and notwithstanding the recommendation on this subject contained in it;
third, the chambers may, in consequence of that recommendation, hearing
of it before they shall have acted finally on the subject, refuse to
make any appropriation until what they may consider a menace shall
have been explained or withdrawn; or, fourth, they may, either on that
ground, or on the ground of dissatisfaction with the provisions of the
treaty, refuse to pass the bill of appropriation. Now, in any of these
contingencies, after what has passed, an expression of the sense of
congress on the subject appears to me indispensable, either to the
passage of the bill, or the subsequent payment of the money, if passed.
Suppose the bill to have passed before the reception of the message,
and the money to be in the French treasury, it would throw upon the
king a high responsibility to pay the money, unless the recommendation
of the message should be explained or done away, or at any rate unless
a new motive to the execution of the treaty should be furnished in the
fact that the two houses of congress, having considered the subject,
had deemed it inexpedient to act until the French chambers should have
had an opportunity to be heard from. In the second contingency, that of
the passage of a bill of appropriation after receiving the message, a
vote of congress, as proposed, would be soothing to the pride of France,
and calculated to continue that good understanding which it must be the
sincere desire of every citizen of the United States to cultivate with
that country. If the chambers shall have passed the bill, they will see
that though the president of the United States, in the prosecution of
a just claim, and in the spirit of sustaining the rights of the United
States, had been induced to recommend the measure of reprisals, yet
that a confidence was entertained in both branches of congress that
there would be a compliance, on the part of the French government,
with the pledges it had given, and so forth. In that contingency, the
expression of such a sentiment by congress could not but have a happy
effect. In the other contingency supposed, also, it is indispensable
that some such measure should be adopted. Suppose the bill of
appropriation to be rejected, or its passage to be suspended, until
the chambers ascertain whether the recommendation by the president is
to be carried out by the passage of a law by congress, a resolution
like this will furnish the evidence desired of the disposition of
congress.
If, indeed, upon the reception of the president’s message the
chambers shall have refused to make the appropriation, they will have
put themselves in the wrong by not attending to the distribution of
the powers of this government, and informing themselves whether those
branches which alone can give effect to the president’s recommendation,
would respond to it. But, if they take the other course suggested,
that of suspending action on the bill until they ascertain whether the
legislative department of the government coincides with the executive
in the contingent measure recommended, they will then find that the
president’s recommendation――the expression of the opinion of one
high in authority, indeed, having a strong hold on the affections and
confidence of the people, wielding the executive power of the nation,
but still an inchoate act, having no effect whatever without the
legislative action――had not been responded to by congress, and so forth.
Thus under all contingencies happening on the other side of the water,
and adapted to any one of those contingencies, the passage of this
resolution can do no mischief in any event, but is eminently calculated
to prevent mischief, and to secure the very object which the president
doubtless proposed to accomplish by his recommendation.
I will not now consume any more time of the house by further remarks,
but will resume my seat with the intimation of my willingness to modify
the resolution in any manner, not changing its result, which may be
calculated to secure, what on such an occasion would be so highly
desirable, the unanimous vote of the senate in its favor. I believe it,
however, all-essential that there should be a declaration that congress
do not think it expedient, in the present state of the relations
between the United States and France, to pass any law whatever
concerning them.
[After brief remarks by several other members, the resolution
was slightly modified passed by a unanimous vote.]