I regret that I find myself utterly unable to reconcile with the
duty I owe to my country a vote in favor of this nomination. I regret
it, because in all the past strife of party the relations of ordinary
civility and courtesy were never interrupted between the gentleman
whose name is before us and myself. But I regard my obligations to the
people of the United States, and to the honor and character of their
government, as paramount to every private consideration. There was
no necessity known to us for the departure of this gentleman from the
United States, prior to the submission of his name to the senate. Great
Britain was represented here by a diplomatic agent, having no higher
rank than that of a _chargé des affaires_. We were represented in
England by one of equal rank; one who had shed lustre upon his country
by his high literary character, and of whom it may be justly said, that
in no respect was he inferior to the gentleman before us. Although I
shall not controvert the right of the president, in an extraordinary
case, to send abroad a public minister without the advice and consent
of the senate, I do not admit that it ever ought to be done without
the existence of some special cause, to be communicated to the senate.
We have received no communication of the existence of any such special
cause. This view of the matter might not have been sufficient alone
to justify a rejection of this nomination; but it is sufficient to
authorize us to examine the subject with as perfect freedom as we
could have done if the minister had remained in the United States,
and awaited the decision of the senate. I consider myself, therefore,
not committed by the separate and unadvised act of the president in
despatching Mr. Van Buren in the vacation of the senate, and not a very
long time before it was to assemble.
My main objection to the confirmation of his appointment arises out of
his instructions to the late minister of the United States at the court
of Great Britain. The attention of the senate has been already called
to parts of those instructions, but there are other parts of them, in
my opinion, highly reprehensible. Speaking of the colonial question,
he says, ‘in reviewing the events which have preceded, and more or less
contributed, to a result so much to be regretted, there will be found
three grounds, on which we are most _assailable_. First, in our _too
long_ and _too tenaciously_ resisting the _right_ of Great Britain
to impose protecting duties in her colonies.’ * * * * ‘And, thirdly,
in omitting to accept the terms offered by the act of parliament of
July, 1825, after the subject had been brought before congress, and
deliberately acted upon by our government. * * * * You will, therefore,
see the propriety of possessing yourself of all the explanatory and
_mitigating_ circumstances connected with them, that you may be enabled
to obviate, as far as practicable, the unfavorable impression which
they have produced.’ And after reproaching the late administration
with setting up _claims_ for the _first_ time, which they _explicitly_
abandoned, he says, in conclusion, ‘I will add nothing as to the
impropriety of suffering any _feelings_, that find their origin in the
past _pretensions_ of this government, to have adverse influence upon
the present conduct of Great Britain.’
On our side, according to Mr. Van Buren, all was wrong; on the
British side, all was right. We brought forward nothing but _claims_
and _pretensions_. The British government asserted, on the other hand,
a clear and incontestable _right_. We erred in too tenaciously and
too long insisting upon our _pretensions_, and not yielding at once
to the force of their _just_ demands. And Mr. McLane was commanded to
avail himself of all the circumstances in his power to _mitigate_ our
_offence_, and to dissuade the British government from allowing their
feelings, justly incurred by the past conduct of the party driven from
power, to have an adverse influence towards the American party now in
power. Sir, was this becoming language from one independent nation to
another? Was it proper, in the mouth of an American minister? Was it
in conformity with the high, unsullied, and dignified character of our
previous diplomacy? Was it not, on the contrary, the language of an
humble vassal to a proud and haughty lord? Was it not prostrating and
degrading the American eagle before the British lion?
Let us examine a little those _pretensions_ which the American
government so unjustly put forward, and so pertinaciously maintain. The
American government contended, that the produce of the United States
ought to be admitted into the British West Indies, on the same terms as
similar produce of the British American continental possessions; that
without this equality our produce could not maintain in the British
West Indies a fair competition with the produce of Canada, and that
British preference given to the Canadian produce in the West Indies
would draw from the western part of New York, and the northern part of
Ohio, American produce into Canada, aggrandizing Montreal and Quebec,
and giving employment to British shipping, to the prejudice of the
canals of New York, the port of New York, and American shipping.
This was the offence of the American government, and we are at this
moment realizing the evils which it foresaw. Our produce is passing
into Canada, enriching her capitals, and nourishing British navigation.
Our own wheat is transported from the western part of New York into
Canada, there manufactured, and then transported in British ships in
the form of Canadian flour. We are thus deprived of the privilege even
of manufacturing our own grain. And when the produce of the United
States, shipped from the Atlantic ports, arrives at the British West
Indies, it is unable, in consequence of the heavy duties with which
most of it is burdened, to sustain a competition with British or
colonial produce, freely admitted.
The general rule may be admitted, that every nation has a right to
favor its own productions, by protecting duties, or other regulations;
but, like all general rules, it must have its exceptions. And the
relation in which Great Britain stands to her continental and West
India colonies, from which she is separated by a vast sea, and the
relations in which the United States stand to those colonies, some of
which are in juxtaposition with them, constitute a fit case for such an
exception.
It is true, that the late administration did authorize Mr. Gallatin
to treat with Great Britain on the basis of the rule which has been
stated, but it was with the express understanding, that some competent
provision should be made in the treaty to guard against the British
monopoly of the transportation of our own produce passing through
Canada. Mr. Gallatin was informed, ‘that the United States consent to
the demand which they have heretofore made of the admission of their
productions into British colonies, at the same and no higher rate of
duty as similar productions are chargeable with when imported from
one into another British colony, _with the exception of our produce
descending the St. Lawrence and the Sorell_.’
There was no abandonment of our right, no condemnation of the previous
conduct of our government, no humiliating admission, that we had put
forth and too tenaciously clung to unsustainable pretensions, and that
Great Britain had all along been in the right. We only forebore for the
present to assert a _right_, leaving ourselves at liberty subsequently
to resume it. What Mr. Gallatin was authorized to do was, to make
a temporary concession, and it was proposed with this preliminary
annunciation. ‘But, notwithstanding on a full consideration of the
whole subject, the president, anxious to give a strong proof to Great
Britain of the desire of the government of the United States to arrange
this long _contested_ matter of the colonial intercourse in a manner
mutually satisfactory, authorizes you,’ &c. And Mr. Gallatin was
required ‘to endeavor to make a lively impression on the British
government of the conciliatory spirit of that of the United States,
which has dictated the present liberal offer, and of their expectation
to meet, in the progress of the negotiations, with a corresponding
friendly disposition.’
Now, sir, keeping sight of the object which the late secretary of
state had in view, the opening of the trade with the British colonies,
which was the best mode to accomplish it――to send our minister to
prostrate himself as a suppliant before the British throne, and to say
to the British king, we have offended your majesty! the late American
administration brought forward _pretensions_ which we cannot sustain,
and they too _long_ and too _tenaciously_ adhered to them! your
majesty was always in the right; but we hope that your majesty will
be graciously pleased to recollect, that it was not we who are now
in possession of the American power, but those who have been expelled
from it, that wronged your majesty, and that we, when out of power,
were on the side of your majesty; and we do humbly pray, that your
majesty, taking all mitigating circumstances into consideration, will
graciously condescend to extend to us the privileges of the British act
of parliament of 1825, and to grant us the boon of a trade with your
majesty’s West India colonies――or to have presented himself before the
British monarch in the manly and dignified attitude of a minister of
this republic, and, abstaining from all condemnation or animadversion
upon the past conduct of _his own_ government, to have placed the
withdrawal of our former demand upon the ground of concession in a
spirit of amity and compromise?
But the late secretary of state, the appointed organ of the American
people to vindicate their rights with all foreign powers, and to expose
the injustice of any unfounded demands which they might assert, was
not content to exert his own ingenuity to put his own country in the
wrong, and the British government in the right. He endeavored to attach
to the late administration the discredit of bringing forward unfounded
_pretensions_, and by disclaiming them, to propitiate the favor of the
British king. He says, that the views of the present administration
upon the subject of the colonial trade ‘have been submitted to the
people of the United States, and the counsels by which your conduct
is now directed are the result of the judgment expressed by the only
earthly tribunal to which the late administration was amenable for
its acts. It should be sufficient, that the claims set up by _them_,
and what caused the interruption of the trade in question, have been
explicitly abandoned by those who _first_ asserted them, and are
not revived by their successors.’ The late secretary of state――the
gentleman under consideration――here makes the statement, that the late
administration were the _first_ to set up the claims to which he refers.
Now, under all the high responsibility which belongs to the seat which
I occupy, I deliberately pronounce that this statement is untrue, and
that the late secretary either must have known it to be untrue, or he
was culpably negligent of his duty in not ascertaining what had been
done under prior administrations. I repeat the charge, the statement
must have been known to be untrue, or there was culpable negligence.
If it were material, I believe it could be shown, that the claim in
question――the right to the admission into the British West Indies of
the produce of the United States upon an equal footing with similar
produce of the British continental colonies――is coeval with the
existence of our present constitution, and that whenever the occasion
arose for asserting the claim, it was asserted. But I shall go no
further back than to Mr. Madison’s administration. Mr. Monroe, the
then secretary of state, instructed our then minister at London
upon this subject. He negotiated with lord Castlereagh in respect to
it, and this very claim prevented an adjustment at that time of the
colonial question. It was again brought forward under Mr. Monroe’s
administration, when Mr. Rush was our minister at London. He opened a
long and protracted negotiation upon this and other topics, which was
_suspended_ in the summer of 1824, principally because the parties
could not agree on any satisfactory arrangement of this very colonial
question.
Thus, at least, two administrations prior to that of Mr. Adams’s had
brought forward this identical claim or _pretension_, which his was the
_first_ to assert, according to the late secretary of state.
The next charge which the late secretary of state――the official
defender of the rights of the American people――preferred against his
own government, was that of ‘omitting to accept the terms offered
by the act of parliament, of July, 1825, after the subject had
been _brought_ before congress, and deliberately acted upon by our
government.’ Never was there a more unfounded charge brought forward
by any native against _his own_ government, and never was there
a more unwarranted apology set up for a foreign government; and a
plain, historical narrative, will demonstrate the truth of both these
propositions.
It has been already stated, that the negotiations of Mr. Rush,
_embracing the precise colonial claim under consideration, was
suspended_ in 1824, with an understanding between the two governments,
that it was to be resumed on _all points_, at some future convenient
period. Early in July, 1825, neither government having then proposed
a resumption of the negotiation, the British parliament passed an
act to regulate the colonial trade with foreign powers. This act was
never, during the late administration, either at London or Washington,
officially communicated by the British to the American government,
and we only obtained it through other channels. Now if it had been
the purpose of the British government, by the passage of that act, to
withdraw the colonial question from the negotiation, it ought to have
communicated that purpose to this government, and at the same time,
the act of parliament, as supplanting and substituting the negotiation.
But it never did communicate such purpose. The act itself did not
specifically embrace the United States, and offered terms, which, upon
the face of the act, it was impossible for the United States to accede
to. It required, for example, that, to entitle powers not possessing
colonies, to the benefit of the act, they must place the navigation
and commerce of Great Britain upon the footing of the most _favored_
nations. To have done this, would have admitted British shipping to
import into the United States, on the same conditions with native
shipping, the productions of any quarter of the globe, _without a
reciprocal liberty, on the part of the shipping of the United States,
in British ports_. The act itself was differently construed, in
different colonial ports of Great Britain, and an order of the local
government of Halifax, closing that port against our vessels from the
fifth of January, was subsequently revoked, thereby confirming the
impression, that the act of parliament was not intended to dispense
with the previous negotiation. And to conclude this part of the
narrative, as late as the twentieth of October, 1826, Mr. Vaughan,
the British minister, upon being interrogated by the then secretary of
state, was totally uninstructed to afford any information, as to the
meaning or intent of the act of July, 1825.
Meantime, in March, more than six months after the passage of the act
of parliament, Mr. Vaughan notified the department of state, that he
had ‘received instructions from his majesty’s government, to acquaint
you that it is _preparing_ to proceed to the important _negotiations_
between that country and the United States, now placed in the hands
of the American minister, in London.’ * * * ‘The negotiations will
therefore be forthwith resumed.’ * * * Here the _negotiations_
were spoken of without exception of the colonial question, the most
important of them. If it had been intended to withdraw that, no time
could have been more suitable to announce that intention, but no such
annunciation was made. Mr. Vaughan was informed, that we also would
prepare for the negotiation, (including, of course, the colonial
question,) and Mr. Gallatin was accordingly shortly after sent out,
with full powers and instructions, amicably to settle that question.
On his arrival in England, in the summer of 1826, he was told by the
British government, that they would not negotiate on the colonial
question; that they had made up their mind, from the passage of the
act of July, 1825, not to negotiate about it; and he was informed by
the sarcastic Mr. Canning, that as we had failed to accept the _boon_
which the British government had then offered, we were then too late!
Such is the state of the case on which the late secretary of state
so authoritatively pronounces judgment against his own government, for
‘_omitting_ to _accept_ the terms offered by the act of parliament,
of July, 1825!’ He adds, indeed, ‘after the subject had been brought
before congress, and deliberately acted upon by our government.’ It was
brought before congress in the session of 1825–6, not at the instance
of the American executive, but upon the spontaneous and ill-judged
motion of the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Smith), and Mr. Gallatin
was informed that if the bill proposed by that gentleman had been
passed, it would have been unsatisfactory to the British government.
I have another objection to this nomination. I believe, upon
circumstances which satisfy my mind, that to this gentleman is
principally to be ascribed the introduction of the odious system
of proscription, for the exercise of the elective franchise, in the
government of the United States. I understand that it is the system
on which the party in his own state, of which he is the reputed head,
constantly acts. He was among the first of the secretaries, to apply
that system to the dismission of clerks in his department, known
to me to be highly meritorious, and among them one who is now a
representative in the other house. It is a detestable system, drawn
from the worst periods of the Roman republic, and if it were to be
perpetuated――if the offices, honors, and dignities of the people
were to be put up to a scramble, and to be decided by the results of
every presidential election――our government and institutions, becoming
intolerable, would finally end in a despotism as inexorable as that at
Constantinople.
Sir, the necessity under which we are placed is painful. But it is
no fault of the senate, whose consent and advice are required by the
constitution, to consummate this appointment, that the minister has
been sent out of the United States, without their concurrence. I hope
that the public will not be prejudiced by his rejection, if he should
be rejected. And I feel perfectly assured, that if the government
to which he has been deputed, shall learn that he has been rejected,
because he has _there_, by his instructions to Mr. McLane, stained the
character of our country, the moral effect of our decision will greatly
outweigh any advantages to be derived from _his_ negotiations, whatever
they may have been intended to be.