[THE tariff of 1824, as it passed both houses of congress and
became a law, was avowedly adopted as a measure to protect
American industry. The bill was reported by the committee on
manufactures, of which Mr. Tod of Pennsylvania was chairman.
While under discussion in committee of the whole, Mr. Clay
(speaker) made the following elaborate argument in support of
an AMERICAN SYSTEM for the protection of American industry.
On this occasion he met and replied to the ablest opponents of
the system, which at that time included Mr. Webster. The latter
subsequently changed his opinion and became a supporter of
protection.]
THE gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Barbour) has embraced the occasion
produced by the proposition of the gentleman from Tennessee to strike
out the minimum price in the bill on cotton fabrics, to express his
sentiments at large on the policy of the pending measure; and it is
scarcely necessary for me to say that he has evinced his usual good
temper, ability, and decorum. The parts of the bill are so intermingled
and interwoven together, that there can be no doubt of the fitness of
this occasion to exhibit its merits or its defects. It is my intention,
with the permission of the committee, to avail myself also of this
opportunity, to present to its consideration those general views,
as they appear to me, of the true policy of this country, which
imperiously demand the passage of this bill. I am deeply sensible,
Mr. Chairman, of the high responsibility of my present situation. But
that responsibility inspires me with no other apprehension than that I
shall be unable to fulfil my duty; with no other solicitude than that
I may, at least, in some small degree, contribute to recall my country
from the pursuit of a fatal policy, which appears to me inevitably
to lead to its impoverishment and ruin. I do feel most awfully this
responsibility. And, if it were allowable for us, at the present day,
to imitate ancient examples, I would invoke the aid of the Most High.
I would anxiously and fervently implore His divine assistance; that
He would be graciously pleased to shower on my country His richest
blessings; and that He would sustain, on this interesting occasion, the
humble individual who stands before Him, and lend him the power, moral
and physical, to perform the solemn duties which now belong to his
public station.
Two classes of politicians divide the people of the United States.
According to the system of one, the produce of foreign industry
should be subjected to no other impost than such as may be necessary
to provide a public revenue; and the produce of American industry
should be left to sustain itself, if it can, with no other than that
incidental protection, in its competition, at home as well as abroad,
with rival foreign articles. According to the system of the other class,
whilst they agree that the imposts should be mainly, and may under any
modification be safely, relied on as a fit and convenient source of
public revenue, they would so adjust and arrange the duties on foreign
fabrics as to afford a gradual but adequate protection to American
industry, and lessen our dependence on foreign nations, by securing
a certain and ultimately a cheaper and better supply of our own wants
from our own abundant resources. Both classes are equally sincere
in their respective opinions, equally honest, equally patriotic, and
desirous of advancing the prosperity of the country. In the discussion
and consideration of these opposite opinions, for the purpose of
ascertaining which has the support of truth and reason, we should,
therefore, exercise every indulgence, and the greatest spirit of mutual
moderation and forbearance. And, in our deliberations on this great
question, we should look fearlessly and truly at the actual condition
of the country, retrace the causes which have brought us into it,
and snatch, if possible, a view of the future. We should, above all,
consult experience――the experience of other nations, as well as our
own――as our truest and most unerring guide.
In casting our eyes around us, the most prominent circumstance which
fixes our attention, and challenges our deepest regret, is the general
distress which pervades the whole country. It is forced upon us by
numerous facts of the most incontestable character. It is indicated
by the diminished exports of native produce; by the depressed and
reduced state of our foreign navigation; by our diminished commerce;
by successive unthrashed crops of grain, perishing in our barns and
barn-yards for the want of a market; by the alarming diminution of the
circulating medium; by the numerous bankruptcies, not limited to the
trading classes, but extending to all orders of society; by a universal
complaint of the want of employment, and a consequent reduction of the
wages of labor; by the ravenous pursuit after public situations, not
for the sake of their honors and the performance of their public duties,
but as a means of private subsistence; by the reluctant resort to the
perilous use of paper money; by the intervention of legislation in the
delicate relation between debtor and creditor; and, above all, by the
low and depressed state of the value of almost every description of
the whole mass of the property of the nation, which has, on an average,
sunk not less than about fifty per centum within a few years. This
distress pervades every part of the union, every class of society;
all feel it, though it may be felt, at different places, in different
degrees. It is like the atmosphere which surrounds us――all must inhale
it, and none can escape it. In some places it has burst upon our people,
without a single mitigating circumstance to temper its severity. In
others, more fortunate, slight alleviations have been experienced in
the expenditure of the public revenue, and in other favoring causes.
A few years ago, the planting interest consoled itself with its
happy exemptions, but it has now reached this interest also, which
experiences, though with less severity, the general suffering. It is
most painful to me to attempt to sketch or to dwell on the gloom of
this picture. But I have exaggerated nothing. Perfect fidelity to the
original would have authorized me to have thrown on deeper and darker
hues. And it is the duty of the statesman, no less than that of the
physician, to survey, with a penetrating, steady, and undismayed eye,
the actual condition of the subject on which he would operate; to
probe to the bottom the diseases of the body politic, if he would apply
efficacious remedies. We have not, thank God, suffered in any great
degree for food. But distress, resulting from the absence of a supply
of the mere physical wants of our nature, is not the only nor perhaps
the keenest distress, to which we may be exposed. Moral and pecuniary
suffering is, if possible, more poignant. It plunges its victim into
hopeless despair. It poisons, it paralyses, the spring and source
of all useful exertion. Its unsparing action is collateral as well
as direct. It falls with inexorable force at the same time upon the
wretched family of embarrassment and insolvency, and upon its head.
They are a faithful mirror, reflecting back upon him, at once, his own
frightful image, and that, no less appalling, of the dearest objects
of his affection. What is the CAUSE of this wide-spreading distress,
of this deep depression, which we behold stamped on the public
countenance? We are the same people. We have the same country. We
cannot arraign the bounty of Providence. The showers still fall in the
same grateful abundance. The sun still casts his genial and vivifying
influence upon the land; and the land, fertile and diversified in
its soils as ever, yields to the industrious cultivator, in boundless
profusion, its accustomed fruits, its richest treasures. Our vigor is
unimpaired. Our industry has not relaxed. If ever the accusation of
wasteful extravagance could be made against our people, it cannot now
be justly preferred. They, on the contrary, for the few last years,
at least, have been practicing the most rigid economy. The causes,
then, of our present affliction, whatever they may be, are human causes,
and human causes not chargeable upon the people, in their private and
individual relations.
What, again I would ask, is the CAUSE of the unhappy condition of our
country, which I have faintly depicted? It is to be found in the fact
that, during almost the whole existence of this government, we have
shaped our industry, our navigation, and our commerce, in reference to
an extraordinary war in Europe, and to foreign markets, which no longer
exist; in the fact, that we have depended too much upon foreign sources
of supply, and excited too little the native; in the fact that, whilst
we have cultivated, with assiduous care, our foreign resources, we have
suffered those at home to wither, in a state of neglect and abandonment.
The consequence of the termination of the war of Europe has been, the
resumption of European commerce, European navigation, and the extension
of European agriculture and European industry, in all its branches.
Europe, therefore, has no longer occasion, to any thing like the same
extent as that she had during her wars, for American commerce, American
navigation, the produce of American industry. Europe, in commotion, and
convulsed throughout all her members, is to America no longer the same
Europe as she is now, tranquil, and watching with the most vigilant
attention all her own peculiar interests, without regard to the
operation of her policy upon us. The effect of this altered state of
Europe upon us has been, to circumscribe the employment of our marine,
and greatly to reduce the value of the produce of our territorial labor.
The further effect of this twofold reduction has been, to decrease the
value of all property, whether on the land or on the ocean and which I
suppose to be about fifty per centum. And the still further effect has
been, to diminish the amount of our circulating medium, in a proportion
not less, by its transmission abroad, or its withdrawal by the banking
institutions, from a necessity which they could not control. The
quantity of money, in whatever form it may be, which a nation wants,
is in proportion to the total mass of its wealth, and to the activity
of that wealth. A nation that has but little wealth, has but a limited
want of money. In stating the fact, therefore, that the total wealth
of the country has diminished, within a few years, in a ratio of about
fifty per centum, we shall, at once, fully comprehend the inevitable
reduction which must have ensued, in the total quantity of the
circulating medium of the country. A nation is most prosperous when
there is a gradual and untempting addition to the aggregate of its
circulating medium. It is in a condition the most adverse, when there
is a rapid diminution in the quantity of the circulating medium, and
a consequent depression in the value of property. In the former case,
the wealth of individuals insensibly increases, and income keeps ahead
of expenditure. But in the latter instance, debts have been contracted,
engagements made, and habits of expense established, in reference to
the existing state of wealth and of its representative. When these come
to be greatly reduced, individuals find their debts still existing,
their engagements unexecuted, and their habits inveterate. They see
themselves in the possession of the same property, on which, in good
faith, they had bound themselves. But that property, without their
fault, possesses no longer the same value; and hence discontent,
impoverishment, and ruin, arise. Let us suppose, Mr. Chairman, that
Europe was again the theatre of such a general war as recently raged
throughout all her dominions――such a state of the war as existed in
her greatest exertions and in our greatest prosperity; instantly there
would arise a greedy demand for the surplus produce of our industry,
for our commerce, for our navigation. The languor which now prevails
in our cities, and in our sea-ports, would give way to an animated
activity. Our roads and rivers would be crowded with the produce of the
interior. Every where we should witness excited industry. The precious
metals would reflow from abroad upon us. Banks, which have maintained
their credit, would revive their business; and new banks would be
established to take the place of those which have sunk beneath the
general pressure. For it is a mistake to suppose that they have
produced our present adversity; they may have somewhat aggravated it,
but they were the effect and the evidence of our prosperity. Prices
would again get up; the former value of property would be restored. And
those embarrassed persons who have not been already overwhelmed by the
times, would suddenly find, in the augmented value of their property,
and the renewal of their business, ample means to extricate themselves
from all their difficulties. The greatest want of civilized society is,
a market for the sale and exchange of the surplus of the produce of the
labor of its members. This market may exist at home or abroad, or both;
but it must exist somewhere, if society prospers; and, wherever it does
exist, it should be competent to the absorption of the entire surplus
of production. It is most desirable that there should be both a home
and a foreign market. But, with respect to their relative superiority,
I cannot entertain a doubt. The home market is first in order, and
paramount in importance. The object of the bill under consideration,
is, to create this home market, and to lay the foundations of a genuine
American policy. It is opposed; and it is incumbent upon the partizans
of the foreign policy (terms which I shall use without any invidious
intent), to demonstrate that the foreign market is an adequate vent
for the surplus produce of our labor. But is it so? First, foreign
nations cannot, if they would, take our surplus produce. If the source
of supply, no matter of what, increases in a greater ratio than the
demand for that supply, a glut of the market is inevitable, even if we
suppose both to remain perfectly unobstructed. The duplication of our
population takes place in terms of about twenty-five years. The term
will be more and more extended as our numbers multiply. But it will
be a sufficient approximation to assume this ratio for the present.
We increase, therefore, in population, at the rate of about four per
centum per annum. Supposing the increase of our production to be in the
same ratio, we should, every succeeding year, have of surplus produce,
four per centum more than that of the preceding year, without taking
into the account the differences of seasons which neutralize each other.
If, therefore, we are to rely upon the foreign market exclusively,
foreign consumption ought to be shown to be increasing in the same
ratio of four per centum per annum, if it be an adequate vent for our
surplus produce. But, as I have supposed the measure of our increasing
production to be furnished by that of our increasing population, so
the measure of their power of consumption must be determined by that
of the increase of their population. Now, the total foreign population,
who consume our surplus produce, upon an average, do not double their
aggregate number in a shorter term than that of about one hundred years.
Our powers of production increase then, in a ratio four times greater
than their powers of consumption. And hence their utter inability to
receive from us our surplus produce.
But, secondly, if they could, they will not. The policy of all Europe
is adverse to the reception of our agricultural produce, so far as
it comes into collision with its own; and under that limitation we
are absolutely forbid to enter their ports, except under circumstances
which deprive them of all value as a steady market. The policy of
all Europe rejects those great staples of our country, which consist
of objects of human subsistence. The policy of all Europe refuses to
receive from us any thing but those raw materials of smaller value,
essential to their manufactures, to which they can give a higher value,
with the exception of tobacco and rice, which they cannot produce. Even
Great Britain, to which we are its best customer, and from which we
receive nearly one half in value of our whole imports, will not take
from us articles of subsistence produced in our country cheaper than
can be produced in Great Britain. In adopting this exclusive policy,
the states of Europe do not inquire what is best for us, but what suits
themselves respectively; they do not take jurisdiction of the question
of our interests, but limit the object of their legislation to that
of the conservation of their own peculiar interests, leaving us free
to prosecute ours as we please. They do not guide themselves by that
romantic philanthropy, which we see displayed here, and which invokes
us to continue to purchase the produce of foreign industry, without
regard to the state or prosperity of our own, that foreigners may
be pleased to purchase the few remaining articles of ours, which
their restricted policy has not yet absolutely excluded from their
consumption. What sort of a figure would a member of the British
parliament have made, what sort of a reception would his opposition
have obtained, if he had remonstrated against the passage of the
corn-law, by which British consumption is limited to the bread-stuffs
of British production, to the entire exclusion of American, and stated,
that America could not and would not buy British manufactures, if
Britain did not buy American flour?
Both the inability and the policy of foreign powers, then, forbid us to
rely upon the foreign market, as being an adequate vent for the surplus
produce of American labor. Now let us see if this general reasoning is
not fortified and confirmed by the actual experience of this country.
If the foreign market may be safely relied upon, as furnishing an
adequate demand for our surplus produce, then the official documents
will show a progressive increase, from year to year, in the exports
of our native produce, in a proportion equal to that which I have
suggested. If, on the contrary, we shall find from them that, for
a long term of past years, some of our most valuable staples have
retrograded, some remained stationary, and others advanced but little,
if any, in amount, with the exception of cotton, the deductions of
reason and the lessons of experience will alike command us to withdraw
our confidence in the competency of the foreign market. The total
amount of all our exports of domestic produce for the year, beginning
in 1795, and ending on the thirtieth September, 1796, was forty
millions seven hundred and sixty-four thousand and ninety-seven.
Estimating the increase according to the ratio of the increase of our
population, that is, at four per centum per annum, the amount of the
exports of the same produce, in the year ending on the thirtieth of
September last, ought to have been eighty-five millions four hundred
and twenty thousand eight hundred and sixty-one. It was in fact,
only forty-seven millions one hundred and fifty-five thousand four
hundred and eight. Taking the average of five years, from 1803 to
1807, inclusive, the amount of native produce exported, was forty-three
millions two hundred and two thousand seven hundred and fifty-one for
each of those years. Estimating what it ought to have been, during
the last year, applying the principle suggested to that amount, there
should have been exported seventy-seven millions seven hundred and
sixty-six thousand seven hundred and fifty-one, instead of forty-seven
millions one hundred and fifty-five thousand four hundred and eight.
If these comparative amounts of the aggregate actual exports, and what
they ought to have been, be discouraging, we shall find, on descending
into particulars, still less cause of satisfaction. The export of
tobacco in 1791, was one hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and
twenty-eight hogsheads. That was the year of the largest exportation
of that article; but it is the only instance in which I have selected
the maximum of exportation. The amount of what we ought to have
exported last year, estimated according to the scale of increase which
I have used, is two hundred and sixty-six thousand three hundred and
thirty-two hogsheads. The actual export was ninety-nine thousand and
nine hogsheads. We exported, in 1803, the quantity of one million three
hundred and eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty-three barrels of
flour and ought to have exported last year, two millions three hundred
and sixty-one thousand three hundred and thirty-three barrels. We, in
fact, exported only seven hundred and fifty-six thousand seven hundred
and two barrels. Of that quantity, we sent to South America one hundred
and fifty thousand barrels, according to a statement furnished me by
the diligence of a friend near me, (Mr. Poinsett,) to whose valuable
mass of accurate information, in regard to that interesting quarter of
the world, I have had occasion frequently to apply. But that demand is
temporary, growing out of the existing state of war. Whenever peace is
restored to it, and I now hope, that the day is not distant when its
independence will be generally acknowledged, there cannot be a doubt
that it will supply its own consumption. In all parts of it, the soil,
either from climate or from elevation, is well adapted to the culture
of wheat; and no where can better wheat be produced, than in some
portions of Mexico and Chili. Still the market of South America, is
one which, on other accounts, deserves the greatest consideration.
And I congratulate you, the committee, and the country, on the recent
adoption of a more auspicious policy towards it.
We exported, in 1803, Indian corn to the amount of two millions
seventy-four thousand six hundred and eight bushels. The quantity
should have been, in 1823, three millions seven hundred and thirty-four
thousand two hundred and eighty-eight bushels. The actual quantity
exported, was seven hundred and forty-nine thousand and thirty-four
bushels, or about one fifth of what it should have been, and a little
more than one third of what it was more than twenty years ago. We ought
not, then, to be surprised at the extreme depression of the price of
that article, of which I have heard my honorable friend (Mr. Bassett)
complain, nor of the distress of the corn-growing districts adjacent
to the Chesapeake Bay. We exported seventy-seven thousand nine hundred
and thirty-four barrels of beef in 1803, and last year but sixty-one
thousand four hundred and eighteen, instead of one hundred and forty
thousand two hundred and seventy-four barrels. In the same year (1803)
we exported ninety-six thousand six hundred and two barrels of pork,
and last year fifty-five thousand five hundred and twenty-nine, instead
of one hundred and seventy-three thousand eight hundred and eighty-two
barrels. Rice has not advanced, by any means, in the proportion which
it ought to have done. All the small articles, such as cheese, butter,
candles, and so forth, too minute to detail, but important in their
aggregate, have also materially diminished. Cotton alone has advanced.
But, whilst the quantity of it is augmented, its actual value is
considerably diminished. The total quantity last year, exceeded that
of the preceding year, by nearly thirty millions of pounds. And yet
the total value of the year of smaller exportation, exceeded that of
the last year by upwards of three and a half millions of dollars. If
this article, the capacity of our country to produce which was scarcely
known in 1790, were subtracted from the mass of our exports, the value
of the residue would only be a little upwards of twenty-seven millions
during the last year. The distribution of the articles of our exports
throughout the United States, cannot fail to fix the attention of
the committee. Of the forty-seven millions one hundred and fifty-five
thousand four hundred and eight, to which they amounted last year,
three articles alone, (cotton, rice, and tobacco,) composed together
twenty-eight millions five hundred and forty-nine thousand one hundred
and seventy-seven. Now these articles are chiefly produced to the south.
And if we estimate that portion of our population who are actually
engaged in their culture, it would probably not exceed two millions.
Thus, then, less than one fifth of the whole population of the United
States produced upwards of one half, nearly two thirds, of the entire
value of the exports of the last year.
Is this foreign market, so incompetent at present, and which, limited
as its demands are, operates so unequally upon the productive labor
of our country, likely to improve in future? If I am correct in the
views which I have presented to the committee, it must become worse and
worse. What can improve it? Europe will not abandon her own agriculture
to foster ours. We may even anticipate that she will more and more
enter into competition with us in the supply of the West India market.
That of South America, for articles of subsistence, will probably soon
vanish. The _value_ of our exports, for the future, may remain at about
what it was last year. But, if we do not create some new market; if
we persevere in the existing pursuits of agriculture, the inevitable
consequence must be, to augment greatly the quantity of our produce,
and to lessen its value in the foreign market. Can there be a doubt on
this point? Take the article of cotton, for example, which is almost
the only article that now remunerates labor and capital. A certain
description of labor is powerfully attracted towards the cotton-growing
country. The cultivation will be greatly extended, the aggregate amount
annually produced, will be vastly augmented. The price will fall. The
more unfavorable soils will then be gradually abandoned. And I have no
doubt that, in a few years, it will cease to be profitably produced,
any where north of the thirty-fourth degree of latitude. But, in the
mean time, large numbers of the cotton-growers will suffer the greatest
distress. And whilst this distress is brought upon our own country,
foreign industry will be stimulated by the very cause which occasions
our distress. For, by surcharging the markets abroad, the price of the
raw material being reduced, the manufacturer will be able to supply
cotton fabrics cheaper; and the consumption, in his own country, and in
foreign nations, other than ours, (where the _value_ of the import must
be limited to the value of the export, which I have supposed to remain
the same,) being proportionally extended, there will be, consequently,
an increased demand for the produce of _his_ industry.
Our agricultural is our greatest interest. It ought ever to be
predominant. All others should bend to it. And, in considering what
is for its advantage, we should contemplate it in all its varieties,
of planting, farming, and grazing. Can we do nothing to invigorate it;
nothing to correct the errors of the past, and to brighten the still
more unpromising prospects which lie before us? We have seen, I think,
the causes of the distresses of the country. We have seen, that an
exclusive dependence upon the foreign market must lead to still severer
distress, to impoverishment, to ruin. We must then change somewhat our
course. We must give a new direction to some portion of our industry.
We must speedily adopt a genuine American policy. Still cherishing
the foreign market, let us create also a home market, to give further
scope to the consumption of the produce of American industry. Let us
counteract the policy of foreigners, and withdraw the support which
we now give to their industry, and stimulate that of our own country.
It should be a prominent object with wise legislators, to multiply
the vocations and extend the business of society as far as it can be
done, by the protection of our interests at home, against the injurious
effects of foreign legislation. Suppose we were a nation of fishermen,
or of skippers, to the exclusion of every other occupation, and the
legislature had the power to introduce the pursuits of agriculture and
manufactures, would not our happiness be promoted by an exertion of
its authority? All the existing employments of society――the learned
professions――commerce――agriculture――are now overflowing. We stand
in each other’s way. Hence the want of employment. Hence the eager
pursuit after public stations, which I have before glanced at. I have
been again and again shocked, during this session, by instances of
solicitation for places, before the vacancies existed. The pulse of
incumbents who happen to be taken ill, is not marked with more anxiety
by the attending physicians, than by those who desire to succeed
them, though with very opposite feelings. Our old friend, the faithful
sentinel, who has stood so long at our door, and the gallantry of
whose patriotism deserves to be noticed, because it was displayed when
that virtue was most rare and most wanted, on a memorable occasion
in this unfortunate city, became indisposed some weeks ago. The
first intelligence which I had of his dangerous illness, was by an
application for his unvacated place. I hastened to assure myself of
the extent of his danger, and was happy to find that the eagerness
of succession outstripped the progress of disease. By creating a new
and extensive business, then, we should not only give employment to
those who want it, and augment the sum of national wealth, by all that
this new business would create, but we should meliorate the condition
of those who are now engaged in existing employments. In Europe,
particularly in Great Britain, their large standing armies, large
navies, large even on their peace arrangement, their established church,
afford to their population employments, which, in that respect, the
happier constitution of our government does not tolerate but in a very
limited degree. The peace establishments of our army and our navy, are
extremely small, and I hope ever will be. We have no established church,
and I trust never shall have. In proportion as the enterprise of our
citizens in public employments is circumscribed, should we excite and
invigorate it in private pursuits.
The creation of a home market is not only necessary to procure for
our agriculture a just reward of its labors, but it is indispensable
to obtain a supply of our necessary wants. If we cannot sell, we
cannot buy. That portion of our population, (and we have seen that it
is not less than four fifths,) which makes comparatively nothing that
foreigners will buy, has nothing to make purchases with from foreigners.
It is in vain that we are told of the amount of our exports supplied
by the planting interest. They may enable the planting interest to
supply all its wants: but they bring no ability to the interests not
planting; unless, which cannot be pretended, the planting interest
was an adequate vent for the surplus produce of the labor of all other
interests. It is in vain to tantalize us with the greater cheapness of
foreign fabrics. There must be an ability to purchase, if an article
be obtained, whatever may be the price, high or low, at which it is
sold. And a cheap article is as much beyond the grasp of him who has
no means to buy, as a high one. Even if it were true that the American
manufacturer would supply consumption at dearer rates, it is better
to have his fabrics than the unattainable foreign fabrics; because
it is better to be ill supplied than not supplied at all. A coarse
coat, which will communicate warmth and cover nakedness, is better
than no coat. The superiority of the home market results, first,
from its steadiness and comparative certainty at all times; secondly,
from the creation of reciprocal interest; thirdly, from its greater
security; and, lastly, from an ultimate and not distant augmentation of
consumption, (and consequently of comfort,) from increased quantity and
reduced prices. But this home market, highly desirable as it is, can
only be created and cherished by the PROTECTION of our own legislation
against the inevitable prostration of our industry, which must ensue
from the action of FOREIGN policy and legislation. The effect and the
value of this domestic care of our own interests will be obvious from
a few facts and considerations. Let us suppose that half a million of
persons are now employed abroad in fabricating, for our consumption,
those articles, of which, by the operation of this bill, a supply
is intended to be provided within ourselves. That half a million of
persons are, in effect, subsisted by us; but their actual means of
subsistence are drawn from foreign agriculture. If we could transport
them to this country, and incorporate them in the mass of our own
population, there would instantly arise a demand for an amount of
provisions equal to that which would be requisite for their subsistence
throughout the whole year. That demand, in the article of flour alone,
would not be less than the quantity of about nine hundred thousand
barrels, besides a proportionate quantity of beef, and pork, and other
articles of subsistence. But nine hundred thousand barrels of flour
exceeded the entire quantity exported last year, by nearly one hundred
and fifty thousand barrels. What activity would not this give, what
cheerfulness would it not communicate, to our now dispirited farming
interest! But if, instead of these five hundred thousand artisans
emigrating from abroad, we give by this bill employment to an equal
number of our own citizens, now engaged in unprofitable agriculture,
or idle, from the want of business, the beneficial effect upon the
productions of our farming labor would be nearly doubled. The quantity
would be diminished by a subtraction of the produce from the labor of
all those who should be diverted from its pursuits to manufacturing
industry, and the value of the residue would be enhanced, both by that
diminution and the creation of the home market, to the extent supposed.
And the honorable gentleman from Virginia may repress any apprehensions
which he entertains, that the plough will be abandoned, and our fields
remain unsown. For, under all the modifications of social industry,
if you will secure to it a just reward, the greater attractions of
agriculture will give to it that proud superiority which it has always
maintained. If we suppose no actual abandonment of farming, but, what
is most likely, a gradual and imperceptible employment of population in
the business of manufacturing, instead of being compelled to resort to
agriculture, the salutary effect would be nearly the same. Is any part
of our common country likely to be injured by a transfer of the theatre
of fabrication, for our own consumption, from Europe to America? All
that those parts, if any there be, which will not, nor cannot engage
in manufactures, should require, is, that their consumption should be
well supplied; and if the objects of that consumption are produced in
other parts of the union, that can manufacture, far from having on that
account any just cause of complaint, their patriotism will and ought
to inculcate a cheerful acquiescence in what essentially contributes,
_and_ is indispensably _necessary_, to the prosperity of the common
family.
The great desideratum in political economy is the same as in private
pursuits; that is, what is the best application of the aggregate
industry of a nation, that can be made honestly to produce the largest
sum of national wealth? Labor is the source of all wealth; but it is
not natural labor only. And the fundamental error of the gentleman
from Virginia, and of the school to which he belongs, in deducing, from
our sparse population, our unfitness for the introduction of the arts,
consists in their not sufficiently weighing the importance of the power
of machinery. In former times, when but little comparative use was made
of machinery, manual labor, and the price of wages, were circumstances
of the greatest consideration. But it is far otherwise in these latter
times. Such are the improvements and the perfection of machinery, that,
in analysing the compound value of many fabrics, the element of natural
labor is so inconsiderable as almost to escape detection. This truth
is demonstrated by many facts. Formerly, Asia, in consequence of the
density of her population, and the consequent lowness of wages, laid
Europe under tribute for many of her fabrics. Now Europe reacts upon
Asia, and Great Britain, in particular, throws back upon her countless
millions of people, the rich treasures produced by artificial labor, to
a vast amount, infinitely cheaper than they can be manufactured by the
natural exertions of that portion of the globe. But Britain is herself
the most striking illustration of the immense power of machinery. Upon
what other principle can you account for the enormous wealth which she
has accumulated, and which she annually produces? A statistical writer
of that country, several years ago, estimated the total amount of the
artificial or machine labor of the nation, to be equal to that of one
hundred millions of able-bodied laborers. Subsequent estimates of her
artificial labor, at the present day, carry it to the enormous height
of two hundred millions. But the population of the three kingdoms is
twenty-one millions five hundred thousand. Supposing that, to furnish
able-bodied labor to the amount of four millions, the natural labor
will be but two per centum of the artificial labor. In the production
of wealth she operates, therefore, by a power (including the whole
population) of two hundred and twenty-one millions five hundred
thousand; or, in other words, by a power eleven times greater than
the total of her natural power. If we suppose the machine labor of the
United States to be equal to that of ten millions of able-bodied men,
the United States will operate, in the creation of wealth, by a power
(including all their population) of twenty millions. In the creation of
wealth, therefore, the power of Great Britain, compared to that of the
United States, is as eleven to one. That these views are not imaginary,
will be, I think, evinced, by contrasting the wealth, the revenue, the
power, of the two countries. Upon what other hypothesis can we explain
those almost incredible exertions which Britain made during the late
wars of Europe? Look at her immense subsidies! Behold her standing,
unaided and alone, and breasting the storm of Napoleon’s colossal power,
when all continental Europe owned and yielded to its irresistible sway;
and finally, contemplate her vigorous prosecution of the war, with
and without allies, to its splendid termination, on the ever-memorable
field of Waterloo. The British works which the gentleman from Virginia
has quoted, portray a state of the most wonderful prosperity, in regard
to wealth and resources, that ever was before contemplated. Let us look
a little into the semi-official pamphlet, written with great force,
clearness, and ability, and the valuable work of Lowe, to both of which
that gentleman has referred. The revenue of the united kingdom amounted,
during the latter years of the war, to seventy millions of pounds
sterling; and one year it rose to the astonishing height of ninety
millions sterling, equal to four hundred millions of dollars. This was
actual revenue, made up of real contributions, from the purses of the
people. After the close of the war, ministers slowly and reluctantly
reduced the military and naval establishments, and accommodated them
to a state of peace. The pride of power, every where the same, always
unwillingly surrenders any of those circumstances, which display its
pomp and exhibit its greatness. Contemporaneous with this reduction,
Britain was enabled to lighten some of the heaviest burdens of taxation,
and particularly that most onerous of all, the _income tax_. In
this lowered state, the revenue of peace, gradually rising from the
momentary depression incident to a transition from war, attained, in
1822, the vast amount of fifty-five millions sterling, upwards of two
hundred and forty millions of dollars, and more than eleven times that
of the United States for the same year; thus indicating the difference,
which I have suggested, in the respective productive powers of the
two countries. The excise alone (collected under twenty-five different
heads) amounted to twenty-eight millions, more than one half of the
total revenue of the kingdom. This great revenue allows Great Britain
to constitute an efficient sinking fund of five millions sterling,
being an excess of actual income beyond expenditure, and amounting to
more than the entire revenue of the United States.
If we look at the commerce of England, we shall perceive that its
prosperous condition no less denotes the immensity of her riches. The
average of three years’ exports, ending in 1789, was between thirteen
and fourteen millions. The average for the same term, ending in 1822,
was forty millions sterling. The average of the imports for three years,
ending in 1789, was seventeen millions. The average for the same term,
ending in 1822, was thirty-six millions, showing a favorable balance of
four millions. Thus, in a period not longer than that which has elapsed
since the establishment of our constitution, have the exports of that
kingdom been trippled; and this has mainly been the effect of the power
of machinery. The total amount of the commerce of Great Britain is
greater since the peace, by one fourth, than it was during the war.
The average of her tonnage, during the most flourishing period of the
war, was two millions four hundred thousand tons. Its average, during
the three years, 1819, 1820, and 1821, was two millions six hundred
thousand; exhibiting an increase of two hundred thousand tons. If we
glance at some of the more prominent articles of her manufactures,
we shall be assisted in comprehending the true nature of the sources
of her riches. The amount of cotton fabrics exported, in the most
prosperous year of the war, was eighteen millions sterling. In the
year 1820, it was sixteen millions six hundred thousand; in 1821,
twenty millions five hundred thousand; in 1822, twenty-one millions
six hundred and thirty-nine thousand pounds sterling; presenting the
astonishing increase in two years of upwards of five millions. The
total amount of imports in Great Britain, from all foreign parts, of
the article of cotton wool, is five millions sterling. After supplying
most abundantly the consumption of cotton fabrics within the country,
(and a people better fed and clad and housed, are not to be found
under the sun than the British nation,) by means of her industry,
she gives to this cotton wool a new value, which enables her to sell
to foreign nations to the amount of twenty-one millions six hundred
and thirty-nine thousand pounds, making a clear profit of upwards of
sixteen millions five hundred thousand pounds sterling! In 1821, the
value of the export of woollen manufactures was four millions three
hundred thousand pounds. In 1822, it was five millions five hundred
thousand pounds. The success of her restrictive policy is strikingly
illustrated in the article of silk. In the manufacture of that article
she labors under great disadvantages, besides that of not producing
the raw material. She has subdued them all, and the increase of the
manufacture has been most rapid. Although she is still unable to
maintain, in foreign countries, a successful competition with the
silks of France, of India, and of Italy, and therefore exports but
little, she gives to the two millions of the raw material which she
imports, in various forms, a value of ten millions, which chiefly enter
into British consumption. Let us suppose that she was dependent upon
foreign nations for these ten millions, what an injurious effect would
it not have upon her commercial relations with them? The average of
the exports of British manufactures, during the peace, exceeds the
average of the most productive years of the war. The amount of her
wealth annually produced, is three hundred and fifty millions sterling;
bearing a large proportion to all of her preëxisting wealth. The
agricultural portion of it is said, by the gentleman from Virginia, to
be greater than that created by any other branch of her industry. But
that flows mainly from a policy similar to that proposed by this bill.
One third only of her population is engaged in agriculture; the other
two thirds furnishing a market for the produce of that third. Withdraw
this market, and what becomes of her agriculture? The power and the
wealth of Great Britain cannot be more strikingly illustrated than by a
comparison of her population and revenue with those of other countries
and with our own. [Here Mr. Clay exhibited the following table, made
out from authentic materials.]
Taxes & Taxation
public per
Population. burdens. capita.
―――――――――― ――――――――――― ――――――――
Russia in Europe 37,000,000 £18,000,000 £0 9 9
France, including Corsica 30,700,000 37,000,000 1 4 0
Great Britain, exclusive of
Ireland, (the taxes computed
according to the value of
money on the European
continent.) 14,500,000 40,000,000 2 15 0
Great Britain and Ireland
collectively 21,500,000 44,000,000 2 0 0
England alone 11,600,000 36,000,000 3 2 0
Spain 11,000,000 6,000,000 0 11 0
Ireland 7,000,000 4,000,000 0 11 0
The United States of America 10,000,000 4,500,000 0 9 0
From this exhibit we must remark, that the wealth of Great Britain,
and consequently her power, is greater than that of any of the other
nations with which it is compared. The amount of the contributions
which she draws from the pockets of her subjects, is not referred
to for imitation, but as indicative of their wealth. The burden of
taxation is always relative to the ability of the subjects of it.
A poor nation can pay but little. And the heavier taxes of British
subjects, for example, in consequence of their greater wealth, may be
more easily borne than the much lighter taxes of Spanish subjects, in
consequence of their extreme poverty. The object of wise governments
should be, by sound legislation, so to protect the industry of their
own citizens against the policy of foreign powers, as to give to it
the most expansive force in the production of wealth. Great Britain
has ever acted, and still acts, on this policy. She has pushed her
protection of British interest, further than any other nation has
fostered its industry. The result is, greater wealth among her subjects,
and consequently greater ability to pay their public burdens. If their
taxation is estimated by their _natural_ labor alone, nominally it
is greater than the taxation of the subjects of any other power. But,
if on a scale of their national and artificial labor, compounded, it
is less than the taxation of any other people. Estimating it on that
scale, and assuming the aggregate of the natural and artificial labor
of the united kingdom to be what I have already stated, two hundred
and twenty-one millions five hundred thousand, the actual taxes paid
by a British subject, are only about three and seven-pence sterling.
Estimating our own taxes, on a similar scale――that is, supposing
both descriptions of labor to be equal to that of twenty millions of
able-bodied persons――the amount of tax paid by each soul in the United
States is four shillings and six-pence sterling.
The committee will observe, from that table, that the measure of the
wealth of a nation is indicated by the measure of its protection of its
industry; and that the measure of the poverty of a nation is marked by
that of the degree in which it neglects and abandons the care of its
own industry, leaving it exposed to the action of foreign powers. Great
Britain protects most her industry, and the wealth of Great Britain, is
consequently the greatest. France is next in the degree of protection,
and France is next in the order of wealth. Spain most neglects the
duty of protecting the industry of her subjects, and Spain is one of
the poorest of European nations. Unfortunate Ireland, disinherited or
rendered in her industry subservient to England, is exactly in the same
state of poverty with Spain, measured by the rule of taxation. And the
United States are still poorer than either.
The views of British prosperity, which I have endeavored to present,
show that her protecting policy is adapted alike to a state of war
and of peace. Self-poised, resting upon her own internal resources,
possessing a home market, carefully cherished and guarded, she is ever
prepared for any emergency. We have seen her coming out of a war of
incalculable exertion, and of great duration, with her power unbroken,
her means undiminished. We have seen, that almost every revolving year
of peace has brought along with it an increase of her manufactures,
of her commerce, and, consequently, of her navigation. We have seen,
that, constructing her prosperity upon the solid foundation of her
own protecting policy, it is unaffected by the vicissitudes of other
states. What is our own condition? Depending upon the state of foreign
powers, confiding exclusively in a foreign, to the culpable neglect of
a domestic policy, our interests are affected by all their movements.
Their wars, their misfortunes, are the only source of our prosperity.
In their peace, and our peace, we behold our condition the reverse of
that of Great Britain, and all our interests stationary or declining.
Peace brings to us none of the blessings of peace. Our system is
anomalous; alike unfitted to general tranquillity, and to a state of
war or peace, on the part of our own country. It can succeed only in
the rare occurrence of a general state of war throughout Europe. I
am no eulogist of England. I am far from recommending her systems of
taxation. I have adverted to them only as manifesting her extraordinary
ability. The political and foreign interests of that nation may have
been, as I believe them to have been, often badly managed. Had she
abstained from the wars into which she has been plunged by her ambition,
or the mistaken policy of her ministers, the prosperity of England
would, unquestionably, have been much greater. But it may happen that
the public liberty, and the foreign relations of a nation, have been
badly provided for, and yet that its political economy has been wisely
managed. The alacrity or sullenness with which a people pay taxes,
depends upon their wealth or poverty. If the system of their rulers
leads to their impoverishment, they can contribute but little to the
necessities of the state; if to their wealth, they cheerfully and
promptly pay the burdens imposed on them. Enormous as British taxation
appears to be, in comparison with that of other nations, but really
lighter, as it in fact is, when we consider its great wealth, and
its powers of production, that vast amount is collected with the most
astonishing regularity. [Here Mr. Clay read certain passages from Holt,
showing that, in 1822, there was not a solitary prosecution arising
out of the collection of the assessed taxes, which are there considered
among the most burdensome, and that the prosecution for violations
of the excise laws, in all its numerous branches, were sensibly and
progressively decreasing.]
Having called the attention of the committee to the present adverse
state of our country, and endeavored to point out the causes which have
led to it; having shown that similar causes, wherever they exist in
other countries, lead to the same adversity in their condition; and
having shown that, wherever we find opposite causes prevailing, a high
and animating state of national prosperity exists, the committee will
agree with me in thinking that it is the solemn duty of government
to apply a remedy to the evils which afflict our country, if it can
apply one. Is there no remedy within the reach of the government?
Are we doomed to behold our industry languish and decay, yet more and
more? But there is a remedy, and that remedy consists in modifying
our foreign policy, and in adopting a genuine AMERICAN SYSTEM. We must
naturalize the arts in our country; and we must naturalize them by
the only means which the wisdom of nations has yet discovered to be
effectual; by adequate protection against the otherwise overwhelming
influence of foreigners. This is only to be accomplished by the
establishment of a tariff, to the consideration of which I am now
brought.
And what is this tariff? It seems to have been regarded as a sort
of monster, huge and deformed――a wild beast, endowed with tremendous
powers of destruction, about to be let loose among our people, if not
to devour them, at least to consume their substance. But let us calm
our passions, and deliberately survey this alarming, this terrific
being. The sole object of the tariff is to tax the produce of foreign
industry, with the view of promoting American industry. The tax is
exclusively levelled at foreign industry. That is the avowed and the
direct purpose of the tariff. If it subjects any part of American
industry to burdens, that is an effect not intended, but is altogether
incidental, and perfectly voluntary.
It has been treated as an imposition of burdens upon one part of the
community by design, for the benefit of another; as if, in fact, money
were taken from the pockets of one portion of the people and put into
the pockets of another. But is that a fair representation of it? No
man pays the duty assessed on the foreign article by compulsion, but
voluntarily; and this voluntary duty, if paid, goes into the common
exchequer, for the common benefit of all. Consumption has four objects
of choice. First, it may abstain from the use of the foreign article,
and thus avoid the payment of the tax. Second, it may employ the rival
American fabric. Third, it may engage in the business of manufacturing,
which this bill is designed to foster. Fourth, or it may supply itself
from the household manufactures. But it is said, by the honorable
gentleman from Virginia, that the south, owing to the character of a
certain portion of its population, cannot engage in the business of
manufacturing. Now, I do not agree in that opinion, to the extent in
which it is asserted. The circumstance alluded to may disqualify the
south from engaging in every branch of manufacture, as largely as other
quarters of the union, but to some branches of it, that part of our
population is well adapted. It indisputably affords great facility in
the household or domestic line. But, if the gentleman’s premises were
true, could his conclusion be admitted? According to him, a certain
part of our population, happily much the smallest, is peculiarly
situated. The circumstance of its degradation unfits it for the
manufacturing arts. The well-being of the other, and the larger part
of our population, requires the introduction of those arts. What is
to be done in this conflict? The gentleman would have us abstain from
adopting a policy called for by the interest of the greater and freer
part of our population. But is that reasonable? Can it be expected
that the interests of the greater part should be made to bend to the
condition of the servile part of our population? That, in effect, would
be to make us the slaves of slaves. I went, with great pleasure, along
with my southern friends, and I am ready again to unite with them in
protesting against the exercise of any legislative power, on the part
of congress, over that delicate subject, because it was my solemn
conviction, that congress was interdicted, or at least not authorized,
by the constitution, to exercise any such legislative power. And I am
sure that the patriotism of the south may be exclusively relied upon to
reject a policy which should be dictated by considerations altogether
connected with that degraded class, to the prejudice of the residue
of our population. But does not a perseverance in the foreign policy,
as it now exists in fact, make all parts of the union, not planting,
tributary to the planting parts? What is the argument? It is, that
we must continue freely to receive the produce of foreign industry,
without regard to the protection of American industry, that a market
may be retained for the sale abroad of the produce of the planting
portion of the country; and that, if we lessen in all parts of
America――those which are not planting as well as the planting
sections――the consumption of foreign manufactures, we diminish to
that extent the foreign market for the planting produce. The existing
state of things, indeed, presents a sort of tacit compact between the
cotton-grower and the British manufacturer, the stipulations of which
are, on the part of the cotton-grower, that the whole of the United
States, the other portions as well as the cotton-growing, shall remain
open and unrestricted in the consumption of British manufactures; and,
on the part of the British manufacturer, that, in consideration thereof,
he will continue to purchase the cotton of the south. Thus, then, we
perceive that the proposed measure, instead of sacrificing the south
to the other parts of the union, seeks only to preserve them from being
absolutely sacrificed under the operation of the tacit compact which
I have described. Supposing the south to be actually incompetent, or
disinclined, to embark at all in the business of manufacturing, is not
its interest, nevertheless, likely to be promoted by creating a new and
an American source of supply for its consumption? Now foreign powers,
and Great Britain, principally, have the monopoly of the supply of
southern consumption. If this bill should pass, an American competitor,
in the supply of the south, would be raised up, and ultimately, I
cannot doubt, that it will be supplied more cheaply and better. I
have before had occasion to state, and will now again mention, the
beneficial effects of American competition with Europe, in furnishing a
supply of the article of cotton bagging. After the late war, the influx
of the Scottish manufacture prostrated the American establishments.
The consequence was, that the Scotch possessed the monopoly of the
supply; and the price of it rose, and attained, the year before the
last, a height which amounted to more than an equivalent for ten years
protection to the American manufacture. This circumstance tempted
American industry again to engage in the business, and several valuable
manufactories have been established in Kentucky. They have reduced
the price of the fabric very considerably; but, without the protection
of government, they may again be prostrated, and then, the Scottish
manufacturer engrossing the supply of our consumption, the price will
probably again rise. It has been tauntingly asked, if Kentucky cannot
maintain herself in a competition with the two Scottish towns of
Inverness and Dundee? But is that a fair statement of the case? Those
two towns are cherished and sustained by the whole protecting policy of
the British empire, whilst Kentucky cannot, and the general government
will not, extend alike protection to the few Kentucky villages in which
the article is made.
If the cotton-growing consumption could be constitutionally exempted
from the operation of this bill, it might be fair to exempt it, upon
the condition that foreign manufactures, the proceeds of the sale of
cotton abroad, should not enter at all into the consumption of the
other parts of the United States. But such an arrangement as that, if
it could be made, would probably be objected to by the cotton-growing
country itself.
Second. The second objection to the proposed bill is, that it will
diminish the amount of our exports. It can have no effect upon our
exports, except those which are sent to Europe. Except tobacco and
rice, we send there nothing but the raw materials. The argument is,
that Europe will not buy of us, if we do not buy of her. The first
objection to it is, that it calls upon us to look to the question, and
to take care of European ability in legislating for American interests.
Now if, in legislating for their interests, they would consider and
provide for our ability, the principle of reciprocity would enjoin us
so to regulate our intercourse with them, as to leave their ability
unimpaired. But I have shown that, in the adoption of their own policy,
their inquiry is strictly limited to a consideration of their peculiar
interests, without any regard to that of ours. The next remark I
would make, is, that the bill only operates upon _certain_ articles
of European industry, which it is supposed our interest requires us
to manufacture within ourselves; and although its effect will be to
diminish the amount of our imports of _those_ articles, it leaves them
free to supply us with any other produce of their industry. And since
the circle of human comforts, refinements, and luxuries, is of great
extent, Europe will still find herself able to purchase from us what
she has hitherto done, and to discharge the debt in some of those
objects. If there be any diminution in our exports to Europe, it will
probably be in the article of cotton to Great Britain. I have stated
that Britain buys cotton wool to the amount of about five millions
sterling, and sells to foreign states to the amount of upwards of
twenty-one millions and a half. Of this sum, we take a little upwards
of a million and a half. The residue, of about twenty millions, she
must sell to other foreign powers than to the United States. Now their
market will continue open to her, as much after the passage of this
bill, as before. She will therefore require from us the raw material to
supply their consumption. But, it is said, she may refuse to purchase
it of us, and seek a supply elsewhere. There can be but little doubt
that she now resorts to us, because we can supply her more cheaply
and better than any other country. And it would be unreasonable to
suppose that she would cease, from any pique towards us, to pursue
her own interest. Suppose she was to decline purchasing from us. The
consequence would be, that she would lose the market for the twenty
millions sterling, which she now sells other foreign powers, or enter
it under a disadvantageous competition with us, or with other nations,
who should obtain their supplies of the raw material from us. If there
should be any diminution, therefore, in the exportation of cotton,
it would only be in the proportion of about one and a half to twenty;
that is, a little upwards of five per centum; the loss of a market for
which, abroad, would be fully compensated by the market for the article
created at home. Lastly, I would observe, that the new application of
our industry, producing new objects of exportation, and they possessing
much greater value than in the raw state, we should be, in the end,
amply indemnified by their exportation. Already the item in our foreign
exports of manufactures is considerable; and we know that our cotton
fabrics have been recently exported in a large amount to South America,
where they maintain a successful competition with those of any other
country.