[IN this speech, which was made in committee of the whole, on
a proposition to lay a direct tax for the purpose of providing
for the interest on the public debt, and for other objects, as
expressed in the report of the committee of ways and means, Mr.
Clay enters into a general view of the state of public affairs,
as they existed at the conclusion of the war with Great Britain.
His defence of the policy of the war, and of the treaty of peace
concluded by himself and the other commissioners at Ghent, will
be found interesting and valuable, as a portion of our national
history. On the present occasion, it will be observed, Mr. Clay
first boldly avows his sympathies for the cause of the patriots
of South America; thus shadowing forth, at this early period,
the feelings which prompted him, in 1818, to propose, in a
definite form, the recognition of their independence. This
speech concludes with a masterly, although rapid, sketch of
the true policy of the country, in which are seen the outlines
of the _American system_, a subject always prominent in the
thoughts of this statesman.]
MR. CLAY (speaker) said, the course had been pursued, ever since he had
had the honor of a seat on this floor, to select some subject during
the early part of the session, on which, by a general understanding,
gentlemen were allowed to indulge themselves in remarks on the existing
state of public affairs. The practice was a very good one, he said, and
there could be no occasion more proper than that of a proposition to
lay a direct tax.
Those who have for fifteen years past administered the affairs of
this government, have conducted this nation to an honorable point of
elevation, at which they may justly pause, challenge a retrospect, and
invite attention to the bright field of prosperity which lies before us.
The great objects of the committee of finance, in the report under
consideration, are, in the first place, to provide for the payment of
the public debts, and in the second, to provide for the support of the
government, and the payment of such expenses as should be authorized by
congress. The greater part of the debt, Mr. Clay admitted, had grown
out of the late war; yet a considerable portion of it consisted of
that contracted in the former war for independence, and a portion
of it, perhaps, of that which arose out of the wars with Tripoli and
Algiers. Gentlemen had, on this occasion, therefore, fairly a right to
examine into the course of administration heretofore, to demonstrate
the impolicy of those wars, and the injudiciousness of the public
expenditures generally. In the cursory view which he should take of
this subject, he must be allowed to say, he should pay no particular
attention to what had passed before, in debate. An honorable colleague
(Mr. Hardin) who spoke the other day, like another gentleman who
preceded him in debate, had taken occasion to refer to his (Mr. Clay’s)
late absence from this country on public business; but, Mr. Clay said,
he trusted, among the fruits of that absence were a greater respect
for the institutions which distinguish this happy country, a greater
confidence in them, and an increased disposition to cling to them.
Yes, sir; I was in the neighborhood of the battle of Waterloo, and some
lessons I did derive from it; but they were lessons which satisfied
me, that national independence was only to be maintained by national
resistance against foreign encroachments; by cherishing the interests
of the people, and giving to the whole physical power of the country
an interest in the preservation of the nation. I have been taught that
lesson; that we should never lose sight of the possibility, that a
combination of despots, of men unfriendly to liberty, propagating what
in their opinion constitutes the principle of legitimacy, might reach
our happy land, and subject us to that tyranny and degradation which
seems to be one of their objects in another country. The result of my
reflections is, the determination to aid with my vote in providing my
country with all the means to protect its liberties, and guard them
even from serious menace. Motives of delicacy, which the committee
would be able to understand and appreciate, prevented him from noticing
some of his colleague’s (Mr. Hardin’s) remarks; but he would take the
occasion to give him one admonition――that, when he next favored the
house with an exhibition of his talent for wit――with a display of those
elegant implements, for his possession of which, the gentleman from
Virginia had so handsomely complimented him――that he would recollect
that it is _bought_, and not _borrowed_ wit, which the adage recommends
as best. With regard to the late war with Great Britain, history, in
deciding upon the justice and policy of that war, will determine the
question according to the state of things which existed when that war
was declared. I gave a vote for the declaration of war. I exerted all
the little influence and talents I could command to make the war. The
war was made; it is terminated; and I declare with perfect sincerity,
if it had been permitted me to lift the veil of futurity, and to have
foreseen the precise series of events which has occurred, my vote would
have been unchanged. The policy of the war, as it regarded our state of
preparation, must be determined with reference to the state of things
at the time that war was declared. He need not take up the time of the
house, in demonstrating that we had cause sufficient for war. We had
been insulted and outraged, and spoilated upon by almost all Europe――by
Great Britain, by France, Spain, Denmark, Naples, and, to cap the
climax, by the little, contemptible power of Algiers. We had submitted
too long and too much. We had become the scorn of foreign powers,
and the contempt of our own citizens. The question of the policy of
declaring war at the particular time when it was commenced, is best
determined by applying to the enemy himself; and what said _he!_――that
of all the circumstances attending its declaration, none was so
aggravating as that we should have selected the moment which of
all others was most inconvenient to him; when he was struggling for
self-existence in a last effort against the gigantic power of France.
The question of the state of preparation for war at any time is a
relative question――relative to our own means, the condition of the
other power, and the state of the world at the time of declaring it.
We could not expect, for instance, that a war against Algiers would
require the same means or extent of preparation, as a war against Great
Britain; and if it was to be waged against one of the primary powers of
Europe, at peace with all the rest of the world, and therefore all her
force at command, it could not be commenced with so little preparation,
as if her whole force were employed in another quarter. It is not
necessary again to repel the stale, ridiculous, false story of French
influence, originating in Great Britain, and echoed here. I now contend,
as I have always done, that we had a right to take advantage of the
condition of the world, at the time war was declared. If Great Britain
were engaged in war, we had a right to act on the knowledge of the fact,
that her means of annoyance, as to us, were diminished; and we had a
right to obtain all the collateral aid we could, from the operations
of other powers against her, without entering into those connections
which are forbidden by the genius of our government. But it was rather
like disturbing the ashes of the dead, now to discuss the questions of
the justice or expediency of the war. They were questions long since
settled, and on which the public opinion was decisively made up, in
favor of the administration.
He proceeded to examine the conditions of the peace and the fruits of
the war――questions of more recent date, and more immediately applicable
to the present discussion. The terms of the peace must be determined by
the same rule that was applicable to the declaration of war――that rule
which was furnished by the state of the world at the time the peace
was made; and, even if it were true, that all the sanguine expectations
which might have been formed at the time of the declaration of war,
were not realized by the terms of the subsequent peace, it did not
follow that the war was improperly declared, or the peace dishonorable,
unless the condition of the parties, in relation to other powers,
remained substantially the same, throughout the struggle, and at the
time of the termination of the war, as it was at the commencement of
it. At the termination of the war, France was annihilated――blotted out
of the map of Europe; the vast power wielded by Bonaparte existed no
longer. Let it be admitted, that statesmen, in laying their course, are
to look at probable events; that their conduct is to be examined, with
reference to the course of events, which in all human probability might
have been anticipated; and is there a man in this house, in existence,
who can say, that on the eighteenth day of June, 1812, when the war
was declared, it would have been anticipated, that Great Britain, by
the circumstance of a general peace, resulting from the overthrow of
a power whose basements were supposed to be deeper laid, more ramified,
and more extended, than those of any power ever were before, would be
placed in the attitude in which she stood in December, 1814? Would any
one say, that this government could have anticipated such a state of
things, and ought to have been governed in its conduct accordingly?
Great Britain, Russia, Germany, did not expect――not a power in Europe
believed――as late even as January, 1814, that, in the ensuing March,
Bonaparte would abdicate, and the restoration of the Bourbons would
follow. What, then, was the actual condition of Europe, when peace
was concluded? A perfect tranquillity reigned throughout; for, as late
as the first of March, the idea of Napoleon’s reappearing in France,
was as little entertained as that of a man’s coming from the moon to
take upon himself the government of the country. In December, 1814,
a profound and apparently a permanent peace existed; Great Britain
was left to dispose of the vast force, the accumulation of twenty-five
years, the work of an immense system of finance and protracted war;
she was at liberty to employ that undivided force against this country.
Under such circumstances, it did not follow, according to the rules
laid down, either that the war ought not to have been made, or that
peace on such terms ought not to have been concluded.
What, then, were the terms of the peace? The regular opposition in this
country, the gentlemen on the other side of the house, had not come out
to challenge an investigation of the terms of the peace, although they
had several times given a sidewipe at the treaty, on occasions with
which it had no necessary connection. It had been sometimes said, that
we had gained nothing by the war, that the fisheries were lost, &c.
How, he asked, did this question of the fisheries really stand? By the
first part of the third article of the treaty of 1783, the right was
recognized in the people of the United States to take fish of every
kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland;
also in the gulf of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea,
where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time to fish.
This right was a necessary incident to our sovereignty, although it is
denied to some of the powers of Europe. It was not contested at Ghent;
it has never been drawn in question by Great Britain. But by the same
third article it was further stipulated, that the inhabitants of the
United States shall have ‘liberty to take fish of every kind on such
part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but
not to dry or cure the same on that island), and also on the coasts,
bays, and creeks, of all other of his Britannic majesty’s dominions
in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry
and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of
Nova Scotia, Magdalen islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall
remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be
settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure
fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose
with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.’ The
British commissioners, assuming that these liberties had expired by the
war between the two countries, at an early period of the negotiation,
declared that they would not be revived without an equivalent. Whether
the treaty of 1783 does not form an exception to the general rule,
according to which treaties are vacated by a war breaking out between
the parties, is a question on which he did not mean to express an
opinion. The first article of that treaty, by which the king of Great
Britain acknowledges the sovereignty of the United States, certainly
was not abrogated by the war; that all the other parts of the same
instrument, which define the limits, privileges, and liberties
attaching to that sovereignty, were equally unaffected by the
war, might be contended for with at least much plausibility. If we
determined to offer them the equivalent required, the question was,
what should it be? When the British commissioners demanded, in their
_projet_, a renewal to Great Britain of the right to the navigation of
the Mississippi, secured by the treaty of 1783, a bare majority of the
American commissioners offered to renew it, upon the condition that
the liberties in question were renewed to us. He was not one of that
majority. He would not trouble the committee with his reasons for
being opposed to the offer. A majority of his colleagues, actuated
he believed by the best motives, made, however, the offer, and it was
refused by the British commissioners.
If the British interpretation of the treaty of 1783 be correct, we have
lost the liberties in question. What the value of them really is, he
had not been able to meet with any two gentlemen who agreed. The great
value of the whole mass of our fishery interests, as connected with
our navigation and trade, was sufficiently demonstrated by the tonnage
employed; but of what was the relative importance of these liberties,
there was great contrariety of statements. They were liberties to be
exercised within a foreign jurisdiction, and some of them were liable
to be destroyed by the contingency of settlement. He did not believe,
that much importance attached to such liberties. And, supposing them to
be lost, we are, perhaps, sufficiently indemnified by the redemption of
the British mortgage upon the navigation of the Mississippi. This great
stream, on that supposition, is placed where it ought to be, in the
same independent condition with the Hudson, or any other river in the
United States.
If, on the contrary, the opposite construction of the treaty of 1783
be the true one, these liberties remain to us, and the right to the
navigation of the Mississippi, as secured to Great Britain by that
instrument, continues with her.
But he was surprised to hear a gentleman from the western country
(Mr. Hardin) exclaim, that we had gained nothing by the war. Great
Britain acquired, by the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, the right to
trade with the Indians within our territories. It was a right upon
which she placed great value, and from the pursuit of which she did not
desist without great reluctance. It had been exercised by her agents
in a manner to excite the greatest sensibility in the western country.
This right was clearly lost by the war; for, whatever may be the
true opinion as to the treaty of 1783, there can be no doubt that the
stipulations of that of 1794 no longer exist.
It had been said, that the great object, in the continuation of the
war, had been to secure our mariners against impressment, and that
peace was made without accomplishing it. With regard to the opposition,
he presumed that they would not urge any such argument. For, if their
opinion was to be inferred (though he hoped in this case it was not)
from that of an influential and distinguished member of the opposition,
we had reason to believe that they did not think the British doctrines
wrong on this subject. He alluded to a letter said to be written by a
gentleman of great consideration, residing in an adjoining state, to a
member of this house, in which the writer states, that he conceives the
British claim to be right, and expresses his hope that the president,
however he might kick at it, would be compelled to swallow the bitter
pill. If the peace had really given up the American doctrine, it would
have been, according to that opinion, merely yielding to the force
of the British right. In that view of the subject, the error of the
administration would have been in contending for too much in behalf
of this country; for he presumed there was no doubt, that, whether
right or wrong, it would be an important principle gained to secure
our seamen against British impressment. And he trusted in God that all
future administrations would rather err on the side of contending for
too much than too little for America.
But he was willing to admit, that the conduct of the administration
ought to be tried by their own opinions, and not those of the
opposition. One of the great causes of the war, and of its continuance,
was the practice of impressment exercised by Great Britain, and if
this claim has been admitted, by necessary implication or express
stipulation, the administration has abandoned the rights of our
seamen. It was with utter astonishment that he heard, that it had been
contended in this country, that because our right of exemption from the
practice had not been expressly secured in the treaty, it was therefore
given up! It was impossible that such an argument could be advanced
on the floor. No member who regarded his reputation would have dared
advance such an argument here.
Had the war terminated, the practice continuing, he admitted that
such might be a fair inference; and on some former occasion he had laid
down the principle, which he thought correct, that if the United States
did not make peace with Great Britain, the war in Europe continuing,
and therefore she continuing the exercise of the practice, without
any stipulation to secure us against its effects, the plain inference
would be, that we had surrendered the right. But what is the fact? At
the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace, Great Britain had
ceased the practice of impressment; she was not only at peace with all
the powers of Europe, but there was every prospect of a permanent and
durable peace. The treaty being silent on the subject of impressment,
the only plain rational result was, that neither party had conceded its
rights, but they were left totally unaffected by it. He recollected to
have heard, in the British house of commons, whilst he was in Europe,
the very reverse of the doctrine advanced here on this subject. The
British ministry were charged by a member of the opposition with
having surrendered their right of impressment, and the same course of
reasoning was employed to prove it, as he understood was employed in
this country to prove our acquiescence in that practice. The argument
was this: the war was made on the professed ground of resistance
of the practice of impressment; the peace having been made without
a recognition of the right of America, the treaty being silent on
the subject, the inference was, that the British authorities had
surrendered the right――that they had failed to secure it, and, having
done so, had in effect yielded it. The member of the opposition in
England was just as wrong as any member of the house would be, who
should contend that the right of impressment is surrendered to the
British government. The fact, was, neither party had surrendered its
rights; things remain as though the war had never been made――both
parties are in possession of all the rights they had anterior to the
war. Lest it might be deduced that his sentiments on the subject of
impressment had undergone a change, he took the opportunity to say,
that, although he desired to preserve peace between Great Britain and
the United States, and to maintain between them that good understanding
calculated to promote the interest of each, yet, whenever Great Britain
should give satisfactory evidence of her design to apply her doctrine
of impressment as heretofore, he was, for one, ready to take up arms
again to oppose her. The fact was, that the two nations had been placed
in a state of hostility as to a practice growing out of the war in
Europe. The war ceasing between Great Britain and the rest of Europe,
left England and America engaged in a contest on an aggression which
had also practically ceased. The question had then presented itself,
whether the United States should be kept in war, to gain an abandonment
of what had become a mere abstract principle; or, looking at the
results, and relying on the good sense and sound discretion of both
countries, we should not recommend the termination of the war. When
no practical evil could result from the suspension of hostilities, and
there was no more than a possibility of the removal of the practice of
impressment, I, as one of the mission, consented with sincere pleasure
to the peace, satisfied that we gave up no right, sacrificed no honor,
compromited no important principle. He said, then, applying the rule
of the actual state of things, as that by which to judge of the peace,
there was nothing in the conditions or terms of the peace that was
dishonorable, nothing for reproach, nothing for regret.
Gentlemen have complained, that we had lost the islands in the bay
of Passamaquoddy. Have they examined into that question, and do they
know the grounds on which it stands? Prior to the war we occupied
Moose Island, the British Grand Menan. Each party claimed both islands;
America, because they are within the limits of the United States,
as defined by the treaty of 1783; and Great Britain, because, as she
alleges, they were in the exception contained in the second article
of that treaty as to islands within the limits of the province of
Nova Scotia. All the information which he had received concurred in
representing Grand Menan as the most valuable island. Does the treaty,
in stipulating for an amicable and equitable mode of settling this
controversy, yield one foot of the territory of the United States? If
our title to Moose Island is drawn in question, that of Great Britain
to Grand Menan is equally so. If we may lose the one, she may the
other. The treaty, it was true, contained a provision that the party
in possession, at the time of its ratification, may hold on until the
question of right is decided. The committee would observe, that this
stipulation, as to possession, was not limited to the moment of the
signature, but looked to the period of the ratification of the treaty.
The American commissioners had thought they might safely rely on the
valor of Massachusetts, or the arms of the United States, to drive
the invader from our soil; and had also hoped that we might obtain
possession of Grand Menan. It is true, they have been disappointed in
the successful application of the force of that state and of that of
the union. But it is not true that we have parted with the right. It
is fair to presume that Great Britain will, with good faith, coöperate
in carrying the stipulations into effect; and she has, in fact, already
promptly proceeded to the appointment of commissioners under the treaty.
What have we gained by the war? He had shown we had lost nothing
in rights, territory, or honor; nothing for which we ought to have
contended, according to the principles of the gentlemen on the other
side, or according to our own. Have we gained nothing by the war?
Let any man look at the degraded condition of this country before the
war――the scorn of the universe, the contempt of ourselves――and tell me,
if we have gained nothing by the war? What is our present situation?
Respectability and character abroad; security and confidence at home.
If we have not obtained, in the opinion of some, the full measure of
retribution, our character and constitution are placed on a solid basis,
never to be shaken. The glory acquired by our gallant tars, by our
Jacksons and our Browns on the land, is that nothing? True, we have had
our vicissitudes――that there were humiliating events which the patriot
could not review without deep regret. But the great account, when it
came to be balanced, thank God, would be found vastly in our favor. Is
there a man, he asked, who would have obliterated from the proud pages
of our history the brilliant achievements of Jackson, Brown, Scott,
and the host of heroes on land and sea whom he would not enumerate?
Is there a man who could not desire a participation in the national
glory acquired by the war?――yes, national glory; which, however
the expression may be condemned by some, must be cherished by every
genuine patriot. What do I mean by national glory? Glory such as
Hull, of the Constitution, Jackson, Lawrence, Perry, have acquired.
And are gentlemen insensible to their deeds? to the value of them,
in animating the country in the hour of peril hereafter? Did the
battle of Thermopylæ preserve Greece but once? Whilst the Mississippi
continues to bear the tributes of the Iron mountains and the Alleghany
to her Delta and to the Gulf of Mexico, the eighth of January shall be
remembered, and the glory of that day shall stimulate future patriots,
and nerve the arms of unborn freemen, in driving the presumptuous
invader from our country’s soil! Gentlemen may boast of their
insensibility to feelings inspired by the contemplation of such events.
But he would ask, does the recollection of Bunker’s hill, of Saratoga,
of York-town, afford them no pleasure? Every act of noble sacrifice to
the country――every instance of patriotic devotion to her cause――has its
beneficial influence. A nation’s character is the sum of its splendid
deeds. They constitute one common patrimony――the nation’s inheritance.
They awe foreign powers. They arouse and animate our own people.
Do gentlemen derive no pleasure from the recent transactions in the
Mediterranean? Can they regard unmoved the honorable issue of a war,
in support of our national rights, declared, prosecuted, and terminated
by a treaty in which the enemy submitted to a carte blanche, in the
short period of forty days? The days of chivalry are not gone. They
have been revived in the person of commodore Decatur, who, in releasing
from infidel bondage Christian captives――the subjects of a foreign
power――and restoring them to their country and their friends, has
placed himself beside the most renowned knights of former times. I
love true glory. It is this sentiment which ought to be cherished;
and in spite of cavils and sneers and attempts to put it down, it
will finally conduct this nation to that height to which God and
nature have destined it. Three wars, those who at present administer
this government may say, and say with proud satisfaction, they have
safely conducted us through. Two with powers, which, though otherwise
contemptible, have laid almost all Europe under tribute――a tribute
from which we are exonerated. The third, with one of the most gigantic
powers that the world ever saw. These struggles have not been without
their sacrifices, nor without their lessons. They have created, or
rather greatly increased, the public debt. They have taught, that,
to preserve the character we have established, preparation for war is
necessary.
The public debt exists. However contracted, the faith of the nation
is pledged for its redemption. It can only be paid by providing an
excess of revenue beyond expenditure, or by retrenchment. Did gentlemen
contend that the results of the report were inaccurate――that the
proceeds of the revenue would be greater, or the public expenses
less, than the estimate? On these subjects, he believed it would be
presumption in him, when the defence of the report was in such able
hands (Mr. Lowndes’s), to attempt its vindication. Leaving the task
to that gentleman, he should assume, for the present, its accuracy.
He would lay down a general rule, from which there ought never to be
a departure, without absolute necessity――that the expenses of the year
ought to be met by the revenue of the year. If in time of war it were
impossible to observe this rule, we ought, in time of peace, to provide
for as speedy a discharge of the debt contracted in the preceding war
as possible. This can only be done by an effective sinking fund, based
upon an excess of revenue beyond expenditure, and a protraction of the
period of peace. If in England the sinking fund had not fulfilled what
was promised, it was because of a failure to provide such a revenue,
and because the interests of peace in that country had been too few
and too short. From the revolution to 1812, a period of one hundred and
twenty-four years, there had been sixty-three years of war, and only
sixty-one of peace; and there had been contracted £638,129,577 of debt,
and discharged only £39,594,305. The national debt at the peace of
Utrecht amounted to £52,681,076, and during the peace which followed,
being twenty-seven years, from 1714 to 1740, there was discharged only
£7,231,503. When the operations of our sinking fund were contrasted
with those of Great Britain, they would be found to present the most
gratifying results. Our public debt, existing on the first day of
January, 1802, amounted to $78,754,568 70; and on the first of January,
1815, we had extinguished $33,873,463 98. Thus in thirteen years, one
half the period of peace that followed the treaty of Utrecht, we had
discharged more public debt than Great Britain did during that period.
In twenty-six years she did not pay much more than a seventh of her
debt. In thirteen years we paid more than a third of ours. If, then,
a public debt, contracted in a manner, he trusted, satisfactory to
the country, imposed upon us a duty to provide for its payment; if we
were encouraged, by past experience, to persevere in the application
of an effective sinking fund, he would again repeat, that the only
alternatives were the adoption of a system of taxation producing the
revenue estimated by the committee of ways and means, or by great
retrenchment of the public expenses.
In what respect can a reduction of the public expenses be effected?
Gentlemen who assailed the report on this ground have, by the
indefinite nature of the attack, great advantage on their side. Instead
of contenting themselves with crying out retrenchment! retrenchment!
a theme always plausible, an object always proper, when the public
interest will admit of it, let them point the attention of the house
to some specified subject. If they really think a reduction of the army
and navy, or either of them, be proper, let them lay a resolution upon
the table to that effect. They had generally, it was true, singled out,
in discussing this report, (and he had no objection to meet them in
this way, though he thought the other the fairest course,) the military
establishment. He was glad that the navy had fought itself into favor,
and that no one appeared disposed to move its reduction or to oppose
its gradual augmentation. But the ‘standing army’ is the great object
of gentlemen’s apprehensions. And those who can bravely set at defiance
hobgoblins, the creatures of their own fertile imaginations, are
trembling for the liberties of the people, endangered by a standing
army of ten thousand men. Those who can courageously vote against taxes,
are alarmed for the safety of the constitution and the country, at
such a force scattered over our extensive territory! This could not
have been expected, at least in the honorable gentleman (Mr. Ross),
who, if he had been storming a fort, could not have displayed more
cool, collected courage than he did, when he declared, that he would
show to Pennsylvania, that she had one faithful representative, bold
and independent enough to vote against a tax!
He had happened, very incidentally, the other day, and in a manner
which he had supposed could not attract particular attention, to state,
that the general condition of the world admonished us to shape our
measures with a view to the possible conflicts into which we might be
drawn; and he said, he did not know when he should cease to witness
the attacks made upon him in consequence of that general remark; when
he should cease to hear the cry of ‘standing army,’ ‘national glory,’
&c. &c. From the tenor of gentlemen’s observations, it would seem as
if, for the first time in the history of this government, it was now
proposed, that a certain regular force should constitute a portion of
the public defence. But from the administration of general Washington,
down to this time, a regular force, a standing army (if gentlemen
please), had existed, and the only question about it, at any time, had
been, what should be the amount. Gentlemen themselves, who most loudly
decry this establishment, did not propose an entire disbandment of it;
and the question, ever with them, is, not whether a regular force be
necessary, but whether a regular force of this or that amount be called
for by the actual state of our affairs.
The question is not, on any side of the house, as to the nature, but
the quantum of the force. He maintained the position, that, if there
was the most profound peace that ever existed; if we had no fears
from any quarter whatever; if all the world was in a state of the most
profound and absolute repose; a regular force of ten thousand men was
not too great for the purposes of this government. We knew too much,
he said, of the vicissitudes of human affairs, and the uncertainty
of all our calculations, not to know, that, even in the most profound
tranquillity, some tempest may suddenly arise, and bring us into
a state requiring the exertion of military force, which cannot be
created in a moment, but requires time for its collection, organization,
and discipline. When gentlemen talked of the force which was deemed
sufficient some twenty years ago, what did they mean? That this force
was not to be progressive? That the full grown man ought to wear the
clothes and habits of his infancy? That the establishment maintained by
this government, when its population amounted to four or five millions
only, should be the standard by which our measures should be regulated,
in all subsequent states of the country? If gentlemen meant this, as
it seemed to him they did, he and they should not agree. He contended,
that establishments ought to be commensurate with the actual state
of the country, should grow with its growth, and keep pace with its
progress. Look at that map (said he, pointing to the large map of the
United States, which hangs in the hall of representatives)――at the
vast extent of that country which stretches from the Lake of the Woods,
in the northwest, to the Bay of Fundy, in the east. Look at the vast
extent of our maritime coast; recollect we have Indians and powerful
nations conterminous on the whole frontier; and that we know not at
what moment the savage enemy, or Great Britain herself, may seek to
make war with us. Ought the force of the country to be graduated by the
scale of our exposure, or are we to be uninfluenced by the increase of
our liability to war? Have we forgotten that the power of France, as a
counterpoise to that of Great Britain, is annihilated――gone, never to
rise again, I believe, under the weak, unhappy, and imbecile race who
now sway her destinies? Any individual must, I think, come to the same
conclusion with myself, who takes these considerations into view, and
reflects on our growth, the state of our defence, the situation of the
nations of the world, and above all, of that nation with whom we are
most likely to come into collision――for it is in vain to conceal it;
this country must have many a hard and desperate tug with Great Britain,
let the two governments be administered how and by whom they may. That
man must be blind to the indications of the future, who cannot see that
we are destined to have war after war with Great Britain, until, if one
of the two nations be not crushed, all grounds of collision shall have
ceased between us. I repeat, if the condition of France were that of
perfect repose, instead of that of a volcano, ready to burst out again
with a desolating eruption; if with Spain our differences were settled;
if the dreadful war raging in South America were terminated; if the
marines of all the powers of Europe were resuscitated as they stood
prior to the revolution of France; if there was universal repose, and
profound tranquillity among all the nations of the earth; considering
the actual growth of our country, in my judgment, the force of ten
thousand men would not be too great for its exigences. Do gentlemen ask,
if I rely on the regular force entirely for the defence of the country?
I answer, it is for garrisoning and keeping in order our fortifications,
for the preservation of the national arms, for something like a safe
depository of military science and skill, to which we may recur in time
of danger, that I desire to maintain an adequate regular force. I know,
that in the hour of peril, our great reliance must be on the whole
physical force of the country, and that no detachment of it can be
exclusively depended on. History proves that no nation, not destitute
of the military art, whose people were united in its defence, ever
was conquered. It is true, that in countries where standing armies
have been entirely relied on, the armies have been subdued, and
the subjugation of the nation has been the consequence of it; but
no example is to be found of a united people being conquered, who
possessed an adequate degree of military knowledge. Look at the Grecian
republics, struggling successfully against the overwhelming force of
Persia; look more recently at Spain. I have great confidence in the
militia, and I would go with my honorable colleague (Mr. M’Kee), whose
views I know are honest, hand in hand, in arming, disciplining, and
rendering effective, the militia; I am for providing the nation with
every possible means of resistance. I ask my honorable colleague, after
I have gone thus far with him, to go a step further with me, and let us
retain the force we now have for the purposes I have already described.
I ask gentlemen who propose to reduce the army, if they have examined
in detail the number and extent of the posts and garrisons on our
maritime and interior frontier? If they have not gone through this
process of reasoning, how shall we arrive at the result that we can
reduce the army with safety? There is not one of our forts adequately
garrisoned at this moment; and there is nearly one fourth of them
that have not one solitary man. I said the other day, that I would
rather vote for the augmentation than the reduction of the army. When
returning to my country from its foreign service, and looking at this
question, it appeared to me that the maximum was twenty thousand, the
minimum ten thousand of the force we ought to retain. And I again say,
that rather than reduce I would vote to increase the present force.
A standing army had been deemed necessary, from the commencement of
the government to the present time. The question was only as to the
quantum of force; and not whether it should exist. No man who regards
his political reputation, would place himself before the people, on a
proposition for its absolute disbandment. He admitted a question as to
quantum might be carried so far as to rise into a question of principle.
If we were to propose to retain an army of thirty, or forty, or fifty
thousand men, then truly the question would present itself, whether
our rights were not in some danger from such a standing army; whether
reliance was to be placed altogether on a standing army, or on that
natural safe defence which, according to the habits of the country
and the principles of our government, is considered the bulwark of our
liberties. But, between five and ten thousand men, or any number under
ten thousand, it could not be a question of principle; for, unless
gentlemen were afraid of spectres, it was utterly impossible that
any danger could be apprehended from ten thousand men, dispersed on
a frontier of many thousand miles; here twenty or thirty, there an
hundred; and the largest amount, at Detroit, not exceeding a thin
regiment. And yet, brave gentlemen――gentlemen who are not alarmed at
hobgoblins――who can intrepidly vote _even against taxes_――are alarmed
by a force of this extent! What, he asked, was the amount of the
army in the time of Mr. Jefferson――a time, the orthodoxy of which had
been so ostentatiously proclaimed? It was true, when that gentleman
came into power, it was with a determination to retrench, as far as
practicable. Under the full influence of these notions, in 1802, the
bold step of wholly disbanding the army, never was thought of. The
military peace establishment was then fixed at about four thousand men.
But, before Mr. Jefferson went out of power, what was done――that is,
in April, 1808? In addition to the then existing peace establishment,
eight regiments, amounting to between five and six thousand men, were
authorized, making a total force precisely equal to the present peace
establishment. It was true, that all this force had never been actually
enlisted and embodied; that the recruiting service had been suspended;
and that at the commencement of the war we had far from this number;
and we have not now actually ten thousand men――being at least two
thousand deficient of that number. He adverted to what had been said,
on this and other occasions, of Mr. Jefferson’s not having seized
the favorable moment for war, which was afforded by the attack on the
Chesapeake. He had always entertained the opinion, he said, that Mr.
Jefferson on that occasion took the correct, manly, and frank course,
in saying to the British government, your officers have done this; it
is an enormous aggression; do you approve the act; do you make it your
cause, or not? That government did not sanction the act; it disclaimed
it, and promptly too; and although they for a long time withheld the
due redress, it was ultimately tendered. If Mr. Jefferson had used his
power to carry the country into a war at that period, it might have
been supported by public opinion, during the moment of fever, but it
would soon abate, and the people would begin to ask, why this war had
been made without understanding whether the British government avowed
the conduct of its officers, and so forth. If the threatening aspect of
our relations with England had entered into the consideration which had
caused the increase of the army at that time, there were considerations
equally strong at this time, with our augmented population, for
retaining our present force. If, however, there were no threatenings
from any quarter; if the relative force of European nations, and
the general balance of power existing before the French revolution
were restored; if South America had not made the attempt, in which he
trusted in God she would succeed, to achieve her independence; if our
affairs with Spain were settled, he would repeat, that ten thousand men
would not be too great a force for the necessities of the country, and
with a view to future emergences.
He had taken the liberty, the other day, to make some observations
which he might now repeat as furnishing auxiliary considerations for
adopting a course of prudence and precaution. He had then said, that
our affairs with Spain were not settled; that the Spanish minister
was reported to have made some inadmissible demands of our government.
The fact turned out as he had presented it. It appeared that what was
then rumor, was now fact; and Spain had taken the ground, not only
that there must be a discussion of our title to that part of Louisiana,
formerly called West Florida, (which it might be doubted whether it
ought to take place,) but had required that we must surrender the
territory first, and discuss the right to it afterwards. Besides this
unsettled state of our relations with Spain, he said, there were other
rumors, and he wished to God we had the same means of ascertaining
their correctness, as we had found of ascertaining the truth of the
rumor just noticed; it was rumored that the Spanish province of Florida
had been ceded, with all her pretensions, to Great Britain. Would
gentlemen tell him, then, that this was a time when any statesman would
pursue the hazardous policy of disarming entirely, of quietly smoking
our pipes by our firesides, regardless of impending danger? It might be
a palatable doctrine to some, but he was persuaded was condemned by the
rules of conduct in private life, by those maxims of sound precaution
by which individuals would regulate their private affairs. He did not
here mean to take up the question in relation to South America. Still,
it was impossible not to see, that, in the progress of things, we might
be called on to decide the question, whether we would or would not lend
them our aid. This opinion he boldly declared, and he entertained it,
not in any pursuit of vain glory, but from a deliberate conviction
of its being conformable to the best interests of the country; that,
having a proper understanding with foreign powers――that understanding
which prudence and a just precaution recommended――it would undoubtedly
be good policy to take part with the patriots of South America. He
believed it could be shown, that, on the strictest principles of public
law, we have a right to take part with them, that it is our interest
to take part with them, and that our interposition in their favor would
be effectual. But he confessed, with infinite regret, that he saw a
supineness on this interesting subject, throughout our country, which
left him almost without hope, that what he believed the correct policy
of the country would be pursued. He considered the release of any
part of America from the dominions of the old world, as adding to the
general security of the new. He could not contemplate the exertions of
the people of South America, without wishing that they might triumph,
and nobly triumph. He believed the cause of humanity would be promoted
by the interposition of any foreign power which should terminate the
contest between the friends and enemies of independence in that quarter,
for a more bloody and cruel war never had been carried on since the
days of Adam, than that which is now raging in South America; in
which not the least regard is paid to the laws of war, to the rights
of capitulation, to the rights of prisoners, nor even to the rights
of kindred. I do not offer these views, expecting to influence the
opinions of others; they are opinions, of my own. But, on the question
of general policy, whether or not we shall interfere in the war in
South America, it may turn out that, whether we will or will not choose
to interfere in their behalf, we shall be drawn into the contest in the
course of its progress. Among other demands by the minister of Spain,
is the exclusion of the flag of Buenos Ayres, and other parts of South
America, from our ports. Our government has taken a ground on this
subject, of which I think no gentleman can disapprove――that all parties
shall be admitted and hospitably treated in our ports, provided they
conform to our laws whilst among us. What course Spain may take on this
subject, it was impossible now to say. Although I would not urge this
as an argument for increasing our force, I would place it among those
considerations which ought to have weight with every enlightened mind,
in determining upon the propriety of its reduction. It is asserted that
Great Britain has strengthened, and is strengthening herself in the
provinces adjoining us. Is this a moment when in prudence we ought
to disarm? No, sir. Preserve your existing force. It would be extreme
indiscretion to lessen it.
Mr. Clay here made some observations, to show that a reduction of the
army to from four to five thousand men, as had been suggested, would
not occasion such a diminution of expense as to authorize the rejection
of the report, or any essential alteration in the amount of revenue,
which the system proposes to raise from internal taxes, and his
colleague (Mr. M’Kee) appeared equally hostile to all of them. Having,
however, shown that we cannot in safety reduce the army, he would leave
the details of the report in the abler hands of the honorable chairman
(Mr. Lowndes), who, he had no doubt, could demonstrate, that with all
the retrenchments which had been recommended, the government would
be bankrupt in less than three years, if most of these taxes were
not continued. He would now hasten to that conclusion, at which the
committee could not regret more than he did, that he had not long since
arrived.
As to the attitude in which this country should be placed, the duty of
congress could not be mistaken. My policy is to preserve the present
force, naval and military; to provide for the augmentation of the navy;
and, if the danger of war should increase, to increase the army also.
Arm the militia, and give it the most effective character of which
it is susceptible. Provide in the most ample manner, and place in
proper depots, all the munitions and instruments of war. Fortify and
strengthen the weak and vulnerable points indicated by experience.
Construct military roads and canals, particularly from the Miami of
the Ohio to the Miami of Erie; from the Sciota to the bay of Sandusky;
from the Hudson to Ontario; that the facilities of transportation may
exist, of the men and means of the country, to points where they may be
wanted. I would employ on this subject a part of the army, which should
also be employed on our line of frontier, territorial and maritime, in
strengthening the works of defence. I would provide steam batteries for
the Mississippi, for Borgne and Ponchartrain, and for the Chesapeake,
and for any part of the north or east, where they might be beneficially
employed. In short, I would act seriously, effectively act, on the
principle, that in peace we ought to prepare for war; for I repeat,
again and again, that, in spite of all the prudence exerted by the
government, and the forbearance of others, the hour of trial will
come. These halcyon days of peace, this calm will yield to the storm
of war, and when that comes, I am for being prepared to breast it.
Has not the government been reproached for the want of preparation at
the commencement of the late war? And yet the same gentlemen who utter
these reproaches, instead of taking counsel from experience, would
leave the country in an unprepared condition.
He would as earnestly commence the great work, too long delayed, of
internal improvement. He desired to see a chain of turnpike roads and
canals, from Passamaquoddy to New Orleans; and other similar roads
intersecting the mountains, to facilitate intercourse between all
parts of the country, and to bind and connect us together. He would
also effectually protect our manufactories. We had given, at least,
an implied pledge to do so, by the course of administration. He would
afford them protection, not so much for the sake of the manufacturers
themselves, as for the general interest. We should thus have our wants
supplied, when foreign resources are cut off, and we should also lay
the basis of a system of taxation, to be resorted to when the revenue
from imports is stopped by war. Such, Mr. Chairman, is a rapid sketch
of the policy which it seems to me it becomes us to pursue. It is for
you now to decide, whether we shall draw wisdom from the past, or,
neglecting the lessons of recent experience, we shall go on headlong
without foresight, meriting and receiving the reproaches of the
community. I trust, sir, notwithstanding the unpromising appearances
sometimes presenting themselves, during the present session, we
shall yet do our duty. I appeal to the friends around me, with whom
I have been associated for years in public life; who nobly, manfully
vindicated the national character by a war, waged by a young people,
unskilled in arms, single-handed, against a veteran power――a war
which the nation has emerged from, covered with laurels; let us now
do something to ameliorate the internal condition of the country;
let us show that objects of domestic, no less than those of foreign
policy, receive our attention; let us fulfil the just expectations
of the public, whose eyes are anxiously directed towards this session
of congress; let us, by a liberal and enlightened policy, entitle
ourselves, upon our return home, to that best of all rewards, the
grateful exclamation, ‘well done, thou good and faithful servant.’