[IN our biographical sketch, we have mentioned, that Mr. Clay,
having left the senate of the United States in 1811, was the
same year elected to the house of representatives, where he took
his seat, and was chosen speaker of that body on the opening
of the session. This took place at an eventful period in our
national history. The numerous and aggravated wrongs which the
nation had sustained and endured for years, both from France and
England, but more especially from the latter, had aroused the
attention of the whole country. The celebrated orders in council,
the impressment of our seamen, and the right of searching our
vessels, claimed and exercised by Great Britain, had prepared
the people to expect that some decisive steps would be taken
by their representatives in congress. In accordance with public
sentiment, president Madison transmitted, November fourth, 1811,
a message to congress, recommending appropriate measures for
the vindication of our national honor, and the redress of our
violated rights. The political parties, however, into which
the people were divided, differed widely as to the course to
be pursued in our foreign relations. The opposition to the
administration numbered many eminent men, among whom the most
talented and troublesome was John Randolph, of Virginia; his
intellectual powers at this juncture being in full force and
vigor. The committee on foreign relations proposed an immediate
increase of the military force, and accordingly a bill passed,
to raise thirteen additional regiments for the public service.
It was the consideration of this measure, which induced Mr. Clay
to address the house, when in committee of the whole, as follows.]
Mr. Clay (the speaker) said, that when the subject of this bill was
before the house in the abstract form of a resolution, proposed by the
committee of foreign relations, it was the pleasure of the house to
discuss it whilst he was in the chair. He did not complain of this
course of proceeding; for he did not at any time wish the house, from
considerations personal to him, to depart from that mode of transacting
the public business which they thought best. He merely adverted to
the circumstance as an apology for the trouble he was about to give
the committee. He was at all times disposed to take his share of
responsibility, and under this impression, he felt that he owed it to
his constituents and to himself, before the committee rose, to submit
to their attention a few observations.
He saw with regret a diversity of opinion amongst those who had the
happiness generally to act together, in relation to the quantum of
force proposed to be raised. For his part, he thought it was too great
for peace, and he feared too small for war. He had been in favor of the
number recommended by the senate, and he would ask gentlemen, who had
preferred fifteen thousand, to take a candid and dispassionate view of
the subject. It was admitted, on all hands, that it was a force to be
raised for the purposes of war, and to be kept up and used only in the
event of war. It was further conceded, that its principal destination
would be the provinces of our enemy. By the bill which had been passed,
to complete the peace establishment, we had authorized the collection
of a force of about six thousand men, exclusive of those now in service,
which, with the twenty-five thousand provided for by this bill, will
give an aggregate of new troops of thirty-one thousand men. Experience
in military affairs, has shown, that when any given number of men is
authorized to be raised, you must, in counting upon the effective men
which it will produce, deduct one fourth or one third for desertion,
sickness, and other incidents to which raw troops are peculiarly
exposed. In measures relating to war, it is wisest, if you err at all,
to err on the side of the largest force, and you will consequently put
down your thirty-one thousand men at not more than an effective force
in the field of about twenty-one thousand. This, with the four thousand
now in service, will amount to twenty-five thousand effective men.
The secretary of war has stated, in his report, that, for the single
purpose of manning your forts and garrisons on the sea-board, twelve
thousand and six hundred men are necessary. Although the whole of that
number will not be taken from the twenty-five thousand, a portion of it,
probably, will be. We are told, that in Canada, there are between seven
and eight thousand regular troops. If it is invaded, the whole of that
force will be concentrated in Quebec, and would you attempt that almost
impregnable fortress, with less than double the force of the besieged?
Gentlemen who calculate upon volunteers as a substitute for regulars,
ought not to deceive themselves. No man appreciated higher than he
did the spirit of the country. But, although volunteers were admirably
adapted to the first operations of the war, to the making of a first
impression, he doubted their fitness for a regular siege, or for the
manning and garrisoning of forts. He understood it was a rule in
military affairs, never to leave in the rear a place of any strength
undefended. Canada is invaded; the upper part falls, and you proceed
to Quebec. It is true there would be no European army behind to be
apprehended; but the people of the country might rise; and he warned
gentlemen who imagined that the affections of the Canadians were
with us, against trusting too confidently on such a calculation, the
basis of which was treason. He concluded, therefore, that a portion
of the invading army would be distributed in the upper country, after
its conquest, amongst the places susceptible of military strength and
defence. The army, considerably reduced, sets itself down before Quebec.
Suppose it falls. Here again will be required a number of men to hold
and defend it. And if the war be prosecuted still further, and the
lower country and Halifax be assailed, he conceived it obvious, that
the whole force of twenty-five thousand men would not be too great.
The difference between those who were for fifteen thousand, and those
who were for twenty-five thousand men, appeared to him to resolve
itself into the question, merely, of a short or protracted war; a war
of vigor, or a war of languor and imbecility. If a competent force be
raised in the first instance, the war on the continent will be speedily
terminated. He was aware that it might still rage on the ocean. But
where the nation could act with unquestionable success, he was in
favor of the display of an energy correspondent to the feelings and
spirit of the country. Suppose one third of the force he had mentioned
(twenty-five thousand men) could reduce the country, say in three years,
and that the whole could accomplish the same object in one year; taking
into view the greater hazard of the repulsion and defeat of the small
force, and every other consideration, do not wisdom and true economy
equally decide in favor of the larger force, and thus prevent failure
in consequence of inadequate means? He begged gentlemen to recollect
the immense extent of the United States; our vast maritime frontier,
vulnerable in almost all its parts to predatory incursions, and he was
persuaded, they would see that a regular force, of twenty-five thousand
men, was not much too great during a period of war, if all designs of
invading the provinces of the enemy were abandoned.
Mr. Clay proceeded next to examine the nature of the force contemplated
by the bill. It was a regular army, enlisted for a limited time, raised
for the sole purpose of war, and to be disbanded on the return of peace.
Against this army, all our republican jealousies and apprehensions are
attempted to be excited. He was not the advocate of standing armies;
but the standing armies which excite most his fears, are those which
are kept up in time of peace. He confessed, he did not perceive any
real source of danger in a military force of twenty-five thousand men
in the United States, provided only for a state of war, even supposing
it to be corrupted, and its arms turned, by the ambition of its
leaders, against the freedom of the country. He saw abundant security
against the success of any such treasonable attempt. The diffusion of
political information amongst the great body of the people, constituted
a powerful safeguard. The American character has been much abused by
Europeans, whose tourists, whether on horse or foot, in verse and prose,
have united in depreciating it. It is true, that we do not exhibit as
many signal instances of scientific acquirement in this country as are
furnished in the old world; but he believed it undeniable, that the
great mass of the people possessed more intelligence than any other
people on the globe. Such a people, consisting of upwards of seven
millions, affording a physical power of about a million of men, capable
of bearing arms, and ardently devoted to liberty, could not be subdued
by an army of twenty-five thousand men. The wide extent of country over
which we are spread, was another security. In other countries, France
and England, for example, the fall of Paris or London, is the fall of
the nation. Here are no such dangerous aggregations of people. New York,
and Philadelphia, and Boston, and every city on the Atlantic, might be
subdued by an usurper, and he would have made but a small advance in
the accomplishment of his purpose. He would add a still more improbable
supposition, that the country east of the Allegany, was to submit to
the ambition of some daring chief, and he insisted that the liberty of
the union would be still unconquered. It would find successful support
from the west. We are not only in the situation just described, but
a great portion of the militia――nearly the whole, he understood, of
that of Massachusetts――have arms in their hands; and he trusted in
God, that that great object would be persevered in, until every man
in the nation could proudly shoulder the musket, which was to defend
his country and himself. A people having, besides the benefit of one
general government, other local governments in full operation, capable
of exerting and commanding great portions of the physical power, all
of which must be prostrated before our constitution is subverted.
Such a people have nothing to fear from a petty contemptible force
of twenty-five thousand regulars.
Mr. Clay proceeded, more particularly, to inquire into the object
of the force. That object he understood distinctly to be war, and war
with Great Britain. It had been supposed, by some gentlemen, improper
to discuss publicly so delicate a question. He did not feel the
impropriety. It was a subject in its nature incapable of concealment.
Even in countries where the powers of government were conducted by
a single ruler, it was almost impossible for that ruler to conceal
his intentions when he meditates war. The assembling of armies, the
strengthening of posts; all the movements preparatory to war, and which
it is impossible to disguise, unfolded the intentions of the sovereign.
Does Russia or France intend war, the intention is almost invariably
known before the war is commenced. If congress were to pass a law,
with closed doors, for raising an army for the purpose of war, its
enlistment and organization, which could not be done in secret, would
indicate the use to which it was to be applied; and we cannot suppose
England would be so blind, as not to see that she was aimed at. Nor
could she, did she apprehend, injure us more by thus knowing our
purposes, than if she were kept in ignorance of them. She may, indeed,
anticipate us, and commence the war. But that is what she is in fact
doing, and she can add but little to the injury which she is inflicting.
If she choose to declare war in form, let her do so, the responsibility
will be with her.
What are we to gain by the war? has been emphatically asked. In reply,
he would ask, what are we not to lose by peace? Commerce, character, a
nation’s best treasure, honor! If pecuniary considerations alone are to
govern, there is sufficient motive for the war. Our revenue is reduced,
by the operation of the belligerent edicts, to about six millions
of dollars, according to the secretary of the treasury’s report. The
year preceding the embargo it was sixteen. Take away the orders in
council, it will again mount up to sixteen millions. By continuing,
therefore, in peace, (if the mongrel state in which we are deserve
that denomination,) we lose annually in revenue alone ten millions
of dollars. Gentlemen will say, repeal the law of non-importation. He
contended, that, if the United States were capable of that perfidy,
the revenue would not be restored to its former state, the orders in
council continuing. Without an export trade, which those orders prevent,
inevitable ruin would ensue, if we imported as freely as we did prior
to the embargo. A nation that carries on an import trade, without an
export trade to support it, must, in the end, be as certainly bankrupt,
as the individual would be, who incurred an annual expenditure without
an income.
He had no disposition to magnify or dwell upon the catalogue of
injuries we had received from England. He could not, however, overlook
the impressment of our seamen――an aggression upon which he never
reflected, without feelings of indignation, which would not allow
him appropriate language to describe its enormity. Not content with
seizing upon all our property which falls within her rapacious grasp,
the personal rights of our countrymen――rights which forever ought to
be sacred――are trampled upon and violated. The orders in council were
pretended to have been reluctantly adopted, as a measure of retaliation.
The French decrees, their alleged basis, are revoked. England resorts
to the expedient of denying the fact of the revocation, and Sir William
Scott, in the celebrated case of Fox and others, suspends judgment
that proof may be adduced to it. At the same moment, when the British
ministry, through that judge, is thus affecting to controvert that
fact, and to place the release of our property upon its establishment,
instructions are prepared for Mr. Foster, to meet at Washington the
very revocation which they were contesting. And how does he meet it?
By fulfilling the engagement solemnly made to rescind the orders? No,
sir; but by demanding that we shall secure the introduction, into the
continent, of British manufactures!
England is said to be fighting for the world, and shall we, it is
asked, attempt to weaken her exertions? If, indeed, the aim of the
French emperor be universal dominion, (and he was willing to allow
it to the argument,) how much nobler a cause is presented to British
valor! But how is her philanthropic purpose to be achieved? By a
scrupulous observance of the rights of others, by respecting that
code of public law which she professes to vindicate, and by abstaining
from self-aggrandizement. Then would she command the sympathies of
the world. What are we required to do by those who would engage our
feelings and wishes in her behalf? To bear the actual cuffs of her
arrogance, that we may escape a chimerical French subjugation! We are
invited, conjured, to drink the potion of British poison, actually
presented to our lips, that we may avoid the imperial dose prepared
by perturbed imaginations. We are called upon to submit to debasement,
dishonor, and disgrace; to bow the neck to royal insolence, as a
course of preparation for manly resistance to gallic invasion! What
nation, what individual, was ever taught, in the schools of ignominious
submission, these patriotic lessons of freedom and independence? Let
those who contend for this humiliating doctrine, read its refutation
in the history of the very man against whose insatiable thirst of
dominion we are warned. The experience of desolated Spain, for the last
fifteen years, is worth volumes. Did she find her repose and safety
in subserviency to the will of that man? Had she boldly stood forth
and repelled the first attempt to dictate to her councils, her monarch
would not be now a miserable captive in Marseilles. Let us come home to
our own history; it was not by submission that our fathers achieved our
independence. The patriotic wisdom that placed you, Mr. Chairman, under
that canopy, penetrated the designs of a corrupt ministry, and nobly
fronted encroachment on its first appearance. It saw, beyond the petty
taxes with which it commenced, a long train of oppressive measures,
terminating in the total annihilation of liberty, and, contemptible as
they were, it did not hesitate to resist them. Take the experience of
the last four or five years, which he was sorry to say exhibited, in
appearance, at least, a different kind of spirit. He did not wish to
view the past, further than to guide us for the future. We were but
yesterday contending for the indirect trade; the right to export to
Europe the coffee and sugar of the West Indies. To-day we are asserting
our claim to the direct trade; the right to export our cotton, tobacco,
and other domestic produce, to market. Yield this point, and to-morrow
intercourse between New York and New Orleans, between the planters on
James river and Richmond, will be interdicted. For, sir, the career
of encroachment is never arrested by submission. It will advance while
there remains a single privilege on which it can operate. Gentlemen say,
that this government is unfit for any war, but a war of invasion. What,
is it not equivalent to invasion, if the mouths of our harbors and
outlets are blocked up, and we are denied egress from our own waters?
Or, when the burglar is at our door, shall we bravely sally forth and
repel his felonious entrance, or meanly skulk within the cells of the
castle?
He contended, that the real cause of British aggression was, not to
distress an enemy, but to destroy a rival. A comparative view of our
commerce with that of England and the continent, would satisfy any
one of the truth of this remark. Prior to the embargo, the balance
of trade between this country and England was between eleven and
fifteen millions of dollars in favor of England. Our consumption of
her manufactures was annually increasing, and had risen to nearly
fifty millions of dollars. We exported to her what she most wanted,
provisions and raw materials for her manufactures, and received in
return what she was most desirous to sell. Our exports to France,
Holland, Spain, and Italy, taking an average of the years 1802, 1803,
and 1804, amounted to about twelve million dollars of domestic, and
about eighteen million dollars of foreign produce. Our imports from
the same countries, amounted to about twenty-five million dollars. The
foreign produce exported, consisted chiefly of luxuries, from the West
Indies. It is apparent that this trade, the balance of which was in
favor, not of France, but of the United States, was not of very vital
consequence to the enemy of England. Would she, therefore, for the
sole purpose of depriving her adversary of this commerce, relinquish
her valuable trade with this country, exhibiting the essential balance
in her favor; nay, more, hazard the peace of the country? No, sir;
you must look for an explanation of her conduct in the jealousies
of a rival. She sickens at your prosperity, and beholds, in your
growth――your sails spread on every ocean, and your numerous seamen――the
foundations of a power which, at no very distant day, is to make her
tremble for her naval superiority. He had omitted before to notice
the loss of our seamen, if we continued in our present situation. What
would become of the one hundred thousand (for he understood there was
about that number) in the American service? Would they not leave us and
seek employment abroad, perhaps in the very country that injures us?
It is said, that the effect of the war at home, will be a change of
those who administer the government, who will be replaced by others
that will make a disgraceful peace. He did not believe it. Not a man
in the nation could really doubt the sincerity with which those in
power have sought, by all honorable and pacific means, to protect the
interests of the country. When the people saw exercised towards both
belligerents the utmost impartiality; witnessed the same equal terms
tendered to both; and beheld the government successively embracing an
accommodation with each, in exactly the same spirit of amity, he was
fully persuaded, now that war was the only alternative left to us, by
the injustice of one of the powers, that the support and confidence
of the people would remain undiminished. He was one, however, who was
prepared (and he would not believe that he was more so than any other
member of the committee) to march on in the road of his duty, at all
hazards. What! shall it be said, that our _amor patriæ_ is located at
these desks; that we pusillanimously cling to our seats here, rather
than boldly vindicate the most inestimable rights of the country?
Whilst the heroic Daviess, and his gallant associates, exposed to all
the dangers of treacherous savage warfare, are sacrificing themselves
for the good of their country, shall we shrink from our duty?
He concluded, by hoping that his remarks had tended to prove that the
quantum of the force required was not too great, that in its nature it
was free from the objections urged against it, and that the object of
its application was one imperiously called for by the present peculiar
crisis.