When the subject involved in the motion now under consideration was
depending before the other branch of the legislature, a disposition
to acquiesce in their decision was evinced. For although the committee
who reported this bill, had been raised many weeks prior to the
determination of that house, on the proposition to recharter the bank,
except the occasional reference to it of memorials and petitions, we
scarcely ever heard of it. The rejection, it is true, of a measure
brought before either branch of congress, does not absolutely preclude
the other from taking up the same proposition; but the economy of
our time, and a just deference for the opinion of others, would seem
to recommend a delicate and cautious exercise of this power. As this
subject, at the memorable period when the charter was granted, called
forth the best talents of the nation, as it has, on various occasions,
undergone the most thorough investigation, and as we can hardly expect
that it is susceptible of receiving any further elucidation, it was
to be hoped that we should have been spared useless debate. This
was the more desirable, because there are, I conceive, much superior
claims upon us, for every hour of the small portion of the session yet
remaining to us. Under the operation of these motives, I had resolved
to give a silent vote, until I felt myself bound, by the defying
manner of the arguments advanced in support of the renewal, to obey
the paramount duties I owe my country and its constitution; to make
one effort, however feeble, to avert the passage of what appears to me
a most unjustifiable law. After my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr.
Giles) had instructed and amused us, with the very able and ingenious
argument, which he delivered on yesterday, I should have still forborne
to trespass on the senate, but for the extraordinary character of his
speech. He discussed both sides of the question, with great ability and
eloquence, and certainly demonstrated, to the satisfaction of all who
heard him, both that it was constitutional and unconstitutional, highly
proper and improper, to prolong the charter of the bank. The honorable
gentleman appeared to me in the predicament in which the celebrated
orator of Virginia, Patrick Henry, is said to have been once placed.
Engaged in a most extensive and lucrative practice of the law, he
mistook, in one instance, the side of the cause in which he was
retained, and addressed the court and jury in a very masterly and
convincing speech, in behalf of his antagonist. His distracted client
came up to him, whilst he was thus employed, and, interrupting him,
bitterly exclaimed, ‘you have undone me! You have ruined me!’ ‘Never
mind, give yourself no concern,’ said the adroit advocate; and, turning
to the court and jury, continued his argument, by observing, ‘may it
please your honors, and you, gentlemen of the jury, I have been stating
to you what I presume my adversary may urge on his side. I will now
show you how fallacious his reasonings, and groundless his pretensions,
are.’ The skilful orator proceeded, satisfactorily refuted every
argument he had advanced, and gained his cause!――a success with which
I trust the exertion of my honorable friend will on this occasion be
crowned.
It has been said, by the honorable gentleman from Georgia
(Mr. Crawford), that this has been made a party question; although the
law incorporating the bank was passed prior to the formation of parties,
and when congress was not biassed by party prejudices. (Mr. Crawford
explained. He did not mean, that it had been made a party question in
the senate. His allusion was elsewhere.) I do not think it altogether
fair, to refer to the discussions in the house of representatives, as
gentlemen belonging to that body have no opportunity of defending
themselves here. It is true that this law was not the effect, but it is
no less true that it was one of the causes, of the political divisions
in this country. And if, during the agitation of the present question,
the renewal has, on one side, been opposed on party principles, let me
ask if, on the other, it has not been advocated on similar principles.
Where is the Macedonian phalanx, the opposition, in congress? I believe,
sir, I shall not incur the charge of presumptuous prophecy, when I
predict we shall not pick up from its ranks one single straggler! And
if, on this occasion, my worthy friend from Georgia has gone over into
the camp of the enemy, is it kind in him to look back upon his former
friends, and rebuke them for the fidelity with which they adhere to
their old principles?
I shall not stop to examine how far a representative is bound by the
instructions of his constituents. That is a question between the giver
and receiver of the instructions. But I must be permitted to express
my surprise at the pointed difference which has been made between the
opinions and instructions of state legislatures, and the opinions and
details of the deputations with which we have been surrounded from
Philadelphia. Whilst the resolutions of those legislatures――known,
legitimate, constitutional, and deliberative bodies――have been thrown
into the back-ground, and their interference regarded as officious;
these delegations from self-created societies, composed of nobody knows
whom, have been received by the committee, with the utmost complaisance.
Their communications have been treasured up with the greatest diligence.
Never did the Delphic priests collect with more holy care the frantic
expressions of the agitated Pythia, or expound them with more solemnity
to the astonished Grecians, than has the committee gathered the
opinions and testimonies of these deputies, and, through the gentleman
from Massachusetts, pompously detailed them to the senate! Philadelphia
has her immediate representatives, capable of expressing her wishes,
upon the floor of the other house. If it be improper for states to
obtrude upon congress their sentiments, it is much more highly so, for
the unauthorized deputies of fortuitous congregations.
The first singular feature that attracts attention in this bill,
is the new and unconstitutional veto which it establishes. The
constitution has required only, that after bills have passed the house
of representatives and the senate, they shall be presented to the
president, for his approval or rejection; and his determination is to
be made known in ten days. But this bill provides, that when all the
constitutional sanctions are obtained, and when, according to the usual
routine of legislation, it ought to be considered as a law, it is to
be submitted to a new branch of the legislature, consisting of the
president and twenty-four directors of the bank of the United States,
holding their sessions in Philadelphia; and if they please to approve
it, why then is it to become a law! And three months (the term allowed
by our law of May last, to one of the great belligerents, for revoking
his edicts, after the other shall have repealed his) are granted
them, to decide whether an act of congress shall be the law of the
land or not!――an act which is said to be indispensably necessary to
our salvation, and without the passage of which, universal distress
and bankruptcy are to pervade the country. Remember, sir, that the
honorable gentleman from Georgia, has contended that this charter is
no contract. Does it, then, become the representatives of the nation,
to leave the nation at the mercy of a corporation? Ought the impending
calamities to be left to the hazard of a contingent remedy?
This vagrant power to erect a bank, after having wandered throughout
the whole constitution in quest of some congenial spot to fasten
upon, has been at length located by the gentleman from Georgia on that
provision which authorizes congress to lay and collect taxes, &c. In
1791, the power is referred to one part of the instrument; in 1811,
to another. Sometimes it is alleged to be deducible from the power to
regulate commerce. Hard pressed here, it disappears, and shows itself
under the grant to coin money. The sagacious secretary of the treasury,
in 1791, pursued the wisest course; he has taken shelter behind general
high sounding and imposing terms. He has declared, in the preamble
to the act establishing the bank, that it will be very _conducive_ to
the successful _conducting_ of the national _finances_; will _tend_
to give _facility_ to the obtaining of loans, and will be _productive_
of considerable advantage to _trade_ and _industry_ in general. No
allusion is made to the collection of taxes. What is the nature of
this government? It is emphatically federal, vested with an aggregate
of specified powers for general purposes, conceded by existing
sovereignties, who have themselves retained what is not so conceded.
It is said that there are cases in which it must act on implied powers.
This is not controverted, but the implication must be necessary, and
obviously flow from the enumerated power with which it is allied. The
power to charter companies is not specified in the grant, and I contend
is of a nature not transferable by mere implication. It is one of
the most exalted attributes of sovereignty. In the exercise of this
gigantic power we have seen an East India Company created, which has
carried dismay, desolation, and death, throughout one of the largest
portions of the habitable world――a company which is, in itself, a
sovereignty, which has subverted empires and set up new dynasties,
and has not only made war, but war against its legitimate sovereign!
Under the influence of this power, we have seen arise a South Sea
Company, and a Mississippi Company, that distracted and convulsed all
Europe, and menaced a total overthrow of all credit and confidence,
and universal bankruptcy. Is it to be imagined that a power so vast
would have been left by the wisdom of the constitution to doubtful
inference? It has been alleged that there are many instances, in the
constitution, where powers in their nature incidental, and which would
have necessarily been vested along with the principal, are nevertheless
expressly enumerated; and the power ‘to make rules and regulations
for the government of the land and naval forces,’ which it is said is
incidental to the power to raise armies and provide a navy, is given as
an example. What does this prove? How extremely cautious the convention
were to leave as little as possible to implication. In all cases where
incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and incidental ought
to be congenial with each other, and partake of a common nature. The
incidental power ought to be strictly subordinate and limited to the
end proposed to be attained by the specified power. In other words,
under the name of accomplishing one object which is specified, the
power implied ought not to be made to embrace other objects, which
are not specified in the constitution. If, then, you could establish
a bank, to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to be expressly
restricted to the purpose of such collection and distribution. It is
mockery, worse than usurpation, to establish it for a lawful object,
and then to extend it to other objects which are not lawful. In
deducing the power to create corporations, such as I have described
it, from the power to collect taxes, the relation and condition of
principal and incident are prostrated and destroyed. The accessory is
exalted above the principal. As well might it be said, that the great
luminary of day is an accessory, a satellite, to the humblest star that
twinkles forth its feeble light in the firmament of heaven!
Suppose the constitution had been silent as to an individual
department of this government, could you, under the power to lay and
collect taxes, establish a judiciary? I presume not; but if you could
derive the power by mere implication, could you vest it with any other
authority than to enforce the collection of the revenue? A bank is made
for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the revenue,
and whilst it is engaged in this, the most inferior and subordinate
of all its functions, it is made to diffuse itself throughout society,
and to influence all the great operations of credit, circulation, and
commerce. Like the Virginia justice, you tell the man whose turkey
had been stolen, that your books of precedent furnish no form for his
case, but that you will grant him a precept to search for a cow, and
when looking for that he may possibly find his turkey! You say to this
corporation, we cannot authorize you to discount, to emit paper, to
regulate commerce, &c. No! Our book has no precedents of that kind. But
then we can authorize you to collect the revenue, and, whilst occupied
with that, you may do whatever else you please!
What is a corporation, such as the bill contemplates? It is a splendid
association of favored individuals, taken from the mass of society, and
invested with exemptions and surrounded by immunities and privileges.
The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) has said,
that the original law, establishing the bank, was justly liable to
the objection of vesting in that institution an exclusive privilege,
the faith of the government being pledged, that no other bank should
be authorized during its existence. This objection, he supposes, is
obviated by the bill under consideration; but all corporations enjoy
exclusive privileges; that is, the corporators have privileges which
no others possess; if you create fifty corporations instead of one,
you have only fifty privileged bodies instead of one. I contend, that
the states have the exclusive power to regulate contracts, to declare
the capacities and incapacities to contract, and to provide as to the
extent of responsibility of debtors to their creditors. If congress
have the power to erect an artificial body, and say it shall be
endowed with the attributes of an individual; if you can bestow on this
object of your own creation the ability to contract, may you not, in
contravention of state rights, confer upon slaves, infants, and femes
covert the ability to contract? And if you have the power to say, that
an association of individuals shall be responsible for their debts
only in a certain limited degree, what is to prevent an extension of
a similar exemption to individuals? Where is the limitation upon this
power to set up corporations. You establish one in the heart of a state,
the basis of whose capital is money. You may erect others whose capital
shall consist of land, slaves, and personal estates, and thus the whole
property within the jurisdiction of a state might be absorbed by these
political bodies. The existing bank contends that it is beyond the
power of a state to tax it, and if this pretension be well founded, it
is in the power of congress, by chartering companies, to dry up all the
sources of state revenue. Georgia has undertaken, it is true, to levy
a tax on the branch within her jurisdiction, but this law, now under a
course of litigation, is considered as invalid. The United States own
a great deal of land in the state of Ohio; can this government, for
the purpose of creating an ability to purchase it, charter a company?
Aliens are forbidden, I believe, in that state, to hold real estate;
could you, in order to multiply purchasers, confer upon them the
capacity to hold land, in derogation of the local law? I imagine this
will be hardly insisted upon; and yet there exists a more obvious
connection between the undoubted power, which is possessed by this
government, to sell its land, and the means of executing that power by
increasing the demand in the market, than there is between this bank
and the collection of a tax. This government has the power to levy
taxes, to raise armies, provide a navy, make war, regulate commerce,
coin money, &c. &c. It would not be difficult to show as intimate a
connection between a corporation, established for any purpose whatever,
and some one or other of those great powers, as there is between the
revenue and the bank of the United States.
Let us inquire into the actual participation of this bank in the
collection of the revenue. Prior to the passage of the act of 1800,
requiring the collectors of those ports of entry, at which the
principal bank, or any of its offices, are situated, to deposit with
them the custom-house bonds, it had not the smallest agency in the
collection of the duties. During almost one moiety of the period to
which the existence of this institution was limited, it was nowise
instrumental in the collection of that revenue, to which it is now
become indispensable! The collection, previous to 1800, was made
entirely by the collectors; and even at present, where there is one
port of entry, at which this bank is employed, there are eight or ten
at which the collection is made as it was before 1800. And, sir, what
_does_ this bank or its branches, where resort is had to it? It does
not adjust with the merchant the amount of duty, nor take his bond; nor,
if the bond is not paid, coerce the payment by distress or otherwise.
In fact, it has no active agency whatever in the collection. Its
operation is merely passive; that is, if the obligor, after his bond is
placed in the bank, discharges it, all is very well. Such is the mighty
aid afforded by this tax-gatherer, without which the government cannot
get along! Again, it is not pretended that the very limited assistance
which this institution does in truth render, extends to any other than
a single species of tax, that is, duties. In the collection of the
excise, the direct and other internal taxes, no aid was derived from
any bank. It is true, in the collection of those taxes, the former
did not obtain the same indulgence which the merchant receives in
paying duties. But what obliges congress to give credit at all? Could
it not demand prompt payment of the duties? And, in fact, does it not
so demand in many instances? Whether credit is given or not is a matter
merely of discretion. If it be a facility to mercantile operations
(as I presume it is) it ought to be granted. But I deny the right to
engraft upon it a bank, which you would not otherwise have the power
to erect. You cannot _create the necessity_ of a bank, and then plead
_that necessity_ for its establishment. In the administration of the
finances, the bank acts simply as a payer and receiver. The secretary
of the treasury has money in New York, and wants it in Charleston; the
bank will furnish him with a check, or bill, to make the remittance,
which any merchant would do just as well.
I will now proceed to show by fact, actual experience, not theoretic
reasoning, but by the records of the treasury themselves, that
the operations of that department may be as well conducted without
as with this bank. The delusion has consisted in the use of certain
high-sounding phrases, dexterously used on the occasion; ‘the
collection of the revenue,’ ‘the administration of the finance,’ ‘the
conducting of the fiscal affairs of the government,’ the usual language
of the advocates of the bank, extort express assent, or awe into
acquiescence, without inquiry or examination into its necessity. About
the commencement of this year there appears, by the report of the
secretary of the treasury, of the seventh of January, to have been
a little upwards of two million and four hundred thousand dollars in
the treasury of the United States; and more than one third of this
whole sum was in the vaults of local banks. In several instances, where
opportunities existed of selecting the bank, a preference has been
given to the state bank, or at least a portion of the deposits has been
made with it. In New York, for example, there were deposited with the
Manhattan bank one hundred and eighty-eight thousand and six hundred
and seventy dollars, although a branch bank is in that city. In this
district, one hundred and fifteen thousand and eighty dollars were
deposited with the bank of Columbia, although here also is a branch
bank, and yet the state banks are utterly unsafe to be trusted! If the
money, after the bonds are collected, is thus placed with these banks,
I presume there can be no difficulty in placing the bonds themselves
there, if they must be deposited with some bank for collection, which
I deny.
Again, one of the most important and complicated branches of the
treasury department, is the management of our landed system. The sales
have, in some years, amounted to upwards of half a million of dollars,
and are generally made upon credit, and yet no bank whatever is made
use of to facilitate the collection. After it is made, the amount, in
some instances, has been deposited with banks, and, according to the
secretary’s report, which I have before adverted to, the amount so
deposited, was, in January, upwards of three hundred thousand dollars,
not one cent of which was in the vaults of the bank of the United
States, or in any of its branches, but in the bank of Pennsylvania,
its branch at Pittsburgh, the Marietta bank, and the Kentucky bank.
Upon the point of responsibility, I cannot subscribe to the opinion
of the secretary of the treasury, if it is meant that the ability
to pay the amount of any deposits which the government may make,
under any exigency, is greater than that of the state banks; that the
_accountability_ of a ramified institution, whose affairs are managed
by a single head, responsible for all its members, is more simple than
that of a number of independent and unconnected establishments, I shall
not deny; but, with regard to safety, I am strongly inclined to think
it is on the side of the local banks. The corruption or misconduct of
the parent, or any of its branches, may bankrupt or destroy the whole
system, and the loss of the government in that event, will be of the
deposits made with each; whereas, in the failure of one state bank, the
loss will be confined to the deposit in the vault of that bank. It is
said to have been a part of Burr’s plan to seize on the branch bank,
at New Orleans. At that period large sums, imported from La Vera Cruz,
are alleged to have been deposited with it, and if the traitor had
accomplished the design, the bank of the United States, if not actually
bankrupt, might have been constrained to stop payment.
It is urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd), that as
this nation advances in commerce, wealth, and population, new energies
will be unfolded, new wants and exigences will arise, and hence he
infers that powers must be implied from the constitution. But, sir,
the question is, shall we stretch the instrument to embrace cases
not fairly within its scope, or shall we resort to that remedy, by
amendment, which the constitution prescribes?
Gentlemen contend, that the construction which they give to the
constitution has been acquiesced in by all parties and under all
administrations; and they rely particularly on an act which passed in
1804, for extending a branch to New Orleans; and another act of 1807,
for punishing those who should forge or utter forged paper of the bank.
With regard to the first law, passed, no doubt, upon the recommendation
of the treasury department, I would remark, that it was the extension
of a branch to a territory over which congress possesses the power of
legislation almost uncontrolled, and where, without any constitutional
impediment, charters of incorporation may be granted. As to the other
act, it was passed no less for the benefit of the community than
the bank; to protect the ignorant and unwary from counterfeit paper,
purporting to have been emitted by the bank. When gentlemen are
claiming the advantage supposed to be deducible from acquiescence,
let me inquire, what they would have had those to do, who believed
the establishment of a bank an encroachment upon state rights. Were
they to have resisted, and how? By force? Upon the change of parties
in 1800, it must be well recollected, that the greatest calamities
were predicted as a consequence of that event. Intentions were ascribed
to the new occupants of power, of violating the public faith, and
prostrating national credit. Under such circumstances, that they should
act with great circumspection was quite natural. They saw in full
operation a bank, chartered by a congress who had as much right to
judge of their constitutional powers as their successors. Had they
revoked the law which gave it existence, the institution would, in all
probability, have continued to transact business notwithstanding. The
judiciary would have been appealed to, and, from the known opinions
and predilections of the judges then composing it, they would have
pronounced the act of incorporation, as in the nature of a contract,
beyond the repealing power of any succeeding legislature. And, sir,
what a scene of confusion would such a state of things have presented;
an act of congress, which was law in the statute book, and a nullity
on the judicial records! was it not the wisest to wait the natural
dissolution of the corporation rather than accelerate that event by a
repealing law involving so many delicate considerations?
When gentlemen attempt to carry this measure upon the ground
of acquiescence or precedent, do they forget that we are not in
Westminster Hall? In courts of justice, the utility of uniform decision
exacts of the judge a conformity to the adjudication of his predecessor.
In the interpretation and administration of the law, this practice is
wise and proper, and without it, every thing depending upon the caprice
of the judge, we should have no security for our dearest rights. It is
far otherwise when applied to the source of legislation. Here no rule
exists but the constitution, and to legislate upon the ground, merely,
that our predecessors thought themselves authorized, under similar
circumstances, to legislate, is to sanctify error and perpetuate
usurpation. But if we are to be subjected to the trammels of precedent,
I claim, on the other hand, the benefit of the restrictions under which
the intelligent judge cautiously receives them. It is an established
rule, that to give to a previous adjudication any effect, the mind of
the judge who pronounced it must have been awakened to the subject,
and it must have been a deliberate opinion formed after full argument.
In technical language, it must not have been _sub silentio_. Now the
acts of 1804 and 1807, relied upon as pledges for the rechartering of
this company, passed not only without any discussions whatever of the
constitutional power of congress to establish a bank, but, I venture
to say, without a single member having had his attention drawn to this
question. I had the honor of a seat in the senate when the latter law
passed, probably voted for it, and I declare, with the utmost sincerity,
that I never once thought of that point, and I appeal confidently to
every honorable member who was then present, to say if that was not his
situation.
This doctrine of precedents, applied to the legislature, appears to
me to be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The great
advantage of our system of government over all others, is, that we
have a _written_ constitution defining its limits, and prescribing
its authorities; and that however for a time faction may convulse the
nation, and passion and party prejudice sway its functionaries, the
season of reflection will recur, when, calmly retracing their deeds,
all aberration’s from fundamental principle will be corrected. But once
substitute _practice_ for principle; the exposition of the constitution
for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall we look for
the instrument in the instrument itself! It will be as diffused and
intangible as the pretended constitution of England; and must be
sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals of congress,
and in the reports of the secretary of the treasury! What would be
our condition, if we were to take the interpretations given to that
sacred book, which is, or ought to be, the criterion of our faith,
for the book itself? We should find the holy bible buried beneath the
interpretations, glosses, and comments of councils, synods, and learned
divines, which have produced swarms of intolerant and furious sects,
partaking less of the mildness and meekness of their origin, than of a
vindictive spirit of hostility towards each other! They ought to afford
us a solemn warning to make that constitution, which we have sworn to
support, our invariable guide.
I conceive, then, sir, that we were not empowered by the constitution,
nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this bank,
and I might here rest the argument. But as there are strong objections
to the renewal on the score of expediency, and as the distresses
which will attend the dissolution of the bank have been greatly
exaggerated, I will ask for your indulgence for a few moments longer.
That some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but
most groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed
to the discontinuance of this bank. As well might you ascribe to that
cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool.
The embarrassments of commerce, the sequestrations in France, the
Danish captures; in fine, the belligerent edicts are the obvious
sources of these failures. Their immediate cause is the return of
bills upon London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable
shipments. Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those
of New York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.
The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse.
Perhaps, at last, all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for
with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation
of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions
of dollars, and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of
this bank. May not the time arrive, when the concentration of such a
vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of
any corporation, will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this
immense power wielded? By a body, that, in derogation of the great
principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is
amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners.
Suppose an attempt to subvert this government; would not the traitor
first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this
company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven tenths of its capital
are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English
subjects. We are possibly on the eve of a rupture with that nation.
Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English premier
would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of
this institution? Republics, above all other governments, ought most
seriously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves, that
the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue have produced the
downfall of almost every free government that has hitherto existed; and
yet, gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this
foreign capital! If we could have its use, without its attending abuse,
I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without
the other. Wealth is power, and, under whatsoever form it exists, its
proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic,
will have a proportionate influence. It is argued, that our possession
of this English capital gives us a great influence over the British
government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the
interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to
engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had
better, at once, exchange the condition of independent proprietors for
that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations,
according to the reasoning of the gentlemen on the other side. But let
us put aside this theory and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go
to the other side of the Atlantic and see what has been achieved for
us there, by Englishmen holding seven tenths of the capital of this
bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary
American seaman, bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the
unmanly attack upon the Chesapeake? Did it arrest the promulgation, or
has it abrogated the orders in council――those orders which have given
birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effect,
are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war? Are we quite
sure, that, on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable
to British interests? It has often been stated, and although I do not
know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact,
that this bank exercised its influence in support of Jay’s treaty; and
may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyse
the efforts of this nation against British aggression?
The duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable
stockholder in the bank of the United States. A late lord chancellor of
England, besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose the
prince of Essling, the duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries,
owned seven eighths of the capital of this bank, should we witness the
same exertions (I allude not to any made in the senate) to recharter
it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be
resounded throughout the nation?
I shall, therefore, give my most hearty assent to the motion for
striking out the first section of the bill.