Armand Jean du Plessis, Duc de Richelieu, the great French
cardinal-statesman, was born in Paris on September 5, 1585, of
a noble family, and was at first educated for the profession
of arms, but entered the Church in order to become Bishop of
Luçon in 1606. Having come up to Paris to make his way in the
world, he was appointed almoner to the young queen Anne of
Austria, and rose in 1616 to be Secretary of State for War and
for Foreign Affairs. He received the cardinal's hat in 1622,
and for a period of eighteen years, from 1624 to 1642, he was,
in everything but name, the Majesty of France. His mind was
bold, unscrupulous, remorseless, and inscrutable. Yet it was
always noble--the minister who sent so many to the scaffold
could truly say that in his vast labours he had but one
pleasure, to know that so many honest folk slept in security
while he watched night after night. He was a friend to
literature, was founder of the Academy, and was himself a
considerable author in history and theology. His greatest
work, "Testament Politique du Cardinal de Richelieu," which
was published in 1764, and in which is embodied his counsel in
statecraft, is a literary achievement of no small importance,
exhibiting as it does not only a political acumen of a very
high order but an acute faculty for literary expression.
Richelieu died on December 4, 1642.
_Retrospect_
At the time when your majesty admitted me to your counsels and confided
to me the direction of public affairs I may say with truth that the
Huguenots divided the state with your majesty, the great families
behaved as though they had no sovereign, and the governor of provinces
as if they had been sovereigns themselves. Every man took his own
audacity to be the measure of his merit, so that the most presumptious
were considered the wisest, and proved often the most fortunate. Abroad
the friendship of France was despised. At home private interests were
preferred to the general advantage. The dignity of the throne had so far
declined, through the fault of my predecessors in office, that it was
almost unrecognisable. To have continued to entrust to their hands the
helm of the state would have led to irremediable disaster; yet, on the
other hand, too swift and too great a change would have been fraught
with dangers of its own. In that emergency the wisest considered that it
was hardly possible to pass without shipwreck through the reefs and
shoals, and there were many who had foretold my fall even before your
majesty had raised me to power.
Yet, knowing what kings may do when they make good use of their power, I
was able to promise your majesty that your prudence and firmness, with
the blessing of God, would give new health to this kingdom. I promised
to devote all my labours, and all the authority with which I might be
clothed, to procuring the ruin of the Huguenot party, to humbling the
pride of the great, to reducing all your subjects to their duty, and to
elevating your majesty's name among foreign nations to its rightful
reputation.
I asked, to that end, your majesty's entire confidence, and assured you
that my policy would be the direct contrary of that of my predecessors,
inasmuch as, instead of removing the queen, your mother, from your
majesty's counsels, I would leave nothing undone to promote the closest
union between you, to the great advantage and honour of the kingdom.
The success which has followed the good intentions which it has pleased
God to give me for the administration of this state will justify, to the
ages to come, the constancy with which I have pursued this design--that
the union which exists between your majesties in nature, may be
completed also between you in grace. And if, after many years, this
purpose by the malice of your enemies, has been defeated, it is my
consolation to remember how often your majesty has been heard to say
that when I was working most for the honour of the queen, your mother,
she was conspiring for my ruin.
_Of Education_
Letters are one of the greatest ornaments of states, and their
cultivation is necessary to the commonwealth. Yet it is certain that
they should not be taught indiscriminately to every one. A nation whose
every subject should be educated would be as monstrous as a body having
eyes in every part; pride and presumption would be general, and
obedience almost disappear.
Unrestrained trade in knowledge must banish that trade in merchandise to
which states owe their wealth; ruin husbandry, the true mother and nurse
of peoples; and destroy our source of soldiery, which springs up in
rustic ignorance rather than from the forcing-ground of culture and the
sciences. It would fill France with half-taught fellows, minds formed
only to _chicane_, men who might ruin families and trouble public peace,
but could not be of any service to the state. There would be more people
capable of doubts than capable of resolving them; more intelligences
fitted to oppose than to defend the truth.
Indeed, when I consider the great number who make a profession of
teaching, and the crowds of children who are taught, I seem to see an
infinite multitude of weaklings and diseased, who, having no other
desire than to drink pure water for their healing, are urged by an
inordinate thirst to drink all that is offered them, though it is mostly
impure and often poisoned, whereby their thirst and their malady are
equally aggravated.
Two principal evils arise from the great number of colleges established
in every district: there are not sufficient worthy teachers to supply
them; and many children of little aptitude are compelled by their
parents to study. In the result, almost all the pupils leave with but a
smattering of learning, some because they have been badly taught, others
because they have been incapable of more. The remedy that I propose is
this. Let the colleges in all towns which are not of metropolitan rank
be reduced to two or three classes, sufficient to raise the young out of
gross ignorance, such as is harmful even to those who are destined for
military service or for trade. Then, before the children are determined
to any special line of life, two are three years will reveal their
dispositions and their capacities; and the more promising children, who
will then be sent on to the metropolitan colleges, will succeed far
better; for they will have minds suited for education and will be placed
in the hands of the best teachers.
Finally, let care be taken that the colleges shall not all come under
the same hands. The universities, on the one hand, the Jesuits on the
other, tend towards a monopoly of education. Let their emulation
increase their virtues and efficiency; but let neither party be deprived
of the instruction of youth; let neither secure a monopoly.
_Of the Nobility_
The nobility, which is one of the principal nerves of the state, may
contribute much to its consolidation and power, but it has been for some
time past greatly depreciated by the large number of officials whom the
misfortunes of our age have raised up to its prejudice. It must be
supported against the enterprises of people of that kind, whose wealth
and pride overwhelmed the nobles, who are rich only in courage.
But as the nobility must be defended from their oppressors, so also must
they be strictly prevented from oppressing those who are below them,
whom God has armed to labour but not to self-defence. Uncompromisingly
justice must ensure security, under shelter of your laws, to the least
and feeblest of your subjects.
Those nobles who do not serve the state are a charge upon it; and, like
a paralysed limb, are a burden where they should be a defence and a
comfort. As men of gentle birth should be well treated so long as they
deserve it, so they should be checked severely when they are found
wanting to the obligations of their birth; and I have no hesitation in
advising that those who have so degenerated from the virtues of their
fathers as to avoid the service of the crown with their swords and with
their lives, deserve to be degraded from their hereditary honours and
advantages, and should be reduced to take part in bearing the burdens of
the people.
_Of the Disorders of Justice_
It is much easier to recognise the defects of justice than to prescribe
the remedy. Certain it is that they have arrived at such a point that
they could hardly be graver; yet I know that it is your majesty's desire
that the administration of justice should be as pure as the
imperfections and corruptions of mankind will permit.
In the opinion of the great majority of the people, the sovereign remedy
consists in suppressing venality, in doing away with the hereditary
principle in judicial offices, and in giving their positions
gratuitously to men of such well-known probity and capacity that not
even envy itself can contest their merit. But as it would be difficult
to follow this counsel at any time, and is quite impossible to follow it
here and now, it is useless to propose means calculated to secure that
end.
Although it is always dangerous to hold a view which others do not
share, I must boldly say that in my opinion, in the present state of
affairs and in any that one can foresee, it is better to suffer venality
and hereditary offices to continue than to change, from top to bottom,
your majesty's judicial establishment. The present abuses are great; but
I believe that a system under which the offices of justice should be
appointed by nomination by the king would lead to even greater abuses.
The distribution of these important charges would, in effect, depend on
the favour and intrigue of the courtiers who might at the time have most
power with the king, or on whose reports he must base his nominations.
Certainly venality and heredity in this matter are evils, but they are
evils of long standing. We have only to look back to the reigns of St.
Louis, when offices were already paid for, and of the great Francis, who
erected the principle into a regular traffic, to see that so inveterate
a custom is not easily to be eradicated. Our aim should be to turn the
minds of men gently and continuously to better ways, and not to pass
suddenly from one extreme to the other. The architect whose skill is
able to correct the weakness of an ancient building, and to bring it
into some degree of symmetry without first pulling it down, deserves far
greater praise than the man who must throw it into ruins in order to
construct something entirely new. It is difficult to change the
established order without changing the hearts of those who possess it,
and it is often prudent to weaken one's remedies in order that they may
have the greater effect.
_To the Officers of Finance_
These form a class of men who are prejudicial to the state, yet are
necessary to and we can only hope to reduce their power within tolerable
limits. At present, their excesses and irregularities are intolerable;
and it is impossible that they should further increase their wealth and
their power without ruining the state, and themselves with it.
I do not advise the general confiscation of their gains, although the
excessive wealth which they amass in a short time, easily proved by the
difference between their possessions on entering office and what they
own at present, must often be the result of thefts and extortions.
Confiscation may be made, in its turn, the greatest of injustice and
violence. Yet I do not think that anyone could complain if the more
flagrant offenders were chastised. Otherwise, they will, as I have said,
ruin the kingdom, which bears on its face the marks of their frauds.
The gold with which they have gorged themselves has opened to them
alliances with the most ancient families, whose blood and character are
thereby so far debased that their representatives resemble their
ancestors no more in the generosity of their motives than they do in the
purity of their features.
I can advise nothing but a great reduction in the number of these
officials, a reform which might be easily accomplished; and the
appointment, in times to come, only of substantial men, of character and
position suitable to this responsibility. As for the plan of squeezing
these financiers like a sponge, or of making treaties and compositions
with them, it is a remedy worse than the disorder; it is as much as to
teach them that peculation is their business and their right.
_Of the People_
All statesmen agree that if the people were in too easy a condition it
would be impossible to restrain them within the limits of their duty.
Having less knowledge and cultivation than those in other ranks of the
state, they would not easily follow the rules prescribed by reason and
by law, unless bound thereto by a certain degree of necessity.
Reason does not permit us to exempt them from all taxation, lest, having
lost the symbol of their subjection, they should forget their legitimate
condition, and, being free from tribute, should think themselves free
from obedience also.
Mules accustomed to a load suffer more from a long rest than they do
from work; but, on the other hand, their work must be moderate and the
load proportionate to their strength. So it is with the taxation of the
people, which becomes unjust if it is not moderated at the point at
which it is useful to the public.
There is a sense in which the tribute which kings draw from the people
returns to the people again, in the enjoyment of peace and in the
security of their life and possessions; for these cannot be safeguarded
unless contribution be made to the state. I know of several princes who
have lost their kingdoms and their subjects by letting their strength
decay through fear of taxing them; and subjects have before now fallen
into servitude to their enemies, through wishing too much liberty under
their natural sovereign. The proportion between the burden and the
strength of those who have to support it ought to be even religiously
observed; a prince cannot be considered good if he draws more than he
ought from his subjects; yet the best princes are not always those who
never levy more than is necessary.
_Reason and Government_
Man, having been made a rational creature, ought to do nothing except by
reason; for, otherwise he acts against nature, and so against the Author
of nature. Again, the greater a man is, and the higher his position, the
more strictly is he bound to follow reason. It follows that if he is
sovereignly rational, he is bound to make reason reign; that is to say,
it is his duty to make all those who are under his authority revere and
obey reason religiously. Love is the most potent motive for obedience;
and it is impossible that subjects should not love their prince if they
know that reason is the guide of all his actions.
Since reason should be the guide of princes, passion, which is of all
things the most incompatible with reason, should be allowed no influence
on their actions. Passion can only blind them; make them take the shadow
for the substance; and win for them odium in the place of affection.
Government requires a masculine virtue and an immovable firmness; for
softness exposes those in whom it is found to the machinations of their
enemies. Though there have been notable exceptions, their softness and
their passions have generally made women unfit for rule.
_Public Interests First_
The public advantage should be the single object of the king and his
counsellors, or should at least be preferred to every private interest.
It is impossible to estimate the good which a prince and his ministers
may do if they religiously follow this principle, or to estimate the
disasters which must fall upon the state whose public interests are
ruled by private considerations. True philosophy, the Christian law, and
the art of statesmanship, unite to teach this truth.
The prosperity which Spain has enjoyed for several centuries has been
due to no other cause than that her council has consistently preferred
the interests of the state to all others, and most of the calamities
which have visited France have been due to the preference of private
advantage.
It is easy for princes to consent to the general regulations of their
state, because in making them they have only reason and justice before
their eyes, and men willingly embrace reason and justice when there are
no obstacles to turn them from the right path. But when occasions arise
for putting these regulations into practice, we do not find that princes
always show the same firmness, for then the interests of factions and of
minorities are pressed upon them; pity, sympathy, favour, and
importunities solicit them and oppose their just designs; and they have
not always strength enough to conquer themselves and to despise these
partial considerations, which ought to have no weight at all in the
affairs of the commonwealth.
It is on these occasions that they must gather up all their strength
against their weakness, and remember that God has placed them there to
safeguard the public interest.
_The Power of Kingship_
Power is one of the most necessary conditions of the greatness of kings
and of the happiness of their government, and those who have to do with
the conduct of a state should omit nothing which may enhance the
authority of their master and the respect in which he is held by all the
world.
As goodness is the object of love, power is the cause of fear; and fear,
founded in esteem and reverence, makes dutiful conduct the interest of
every subject, and warns all foreigners not to offend a prince who can
harm them if he will.
I have said that the power of which I speak must be founded on esteem,
and I will add that if it be otherwise founded it is dangerous in the
extreme. Princes are never in a more perilous position than when they
are the objects of hatred or aversion rather than of a reasonable fear.
That kingly power which causes princes to be feared with esteem and
love, includes within it different elements of power; it is a tree with
several branches, which draw their nourishment from common Stock. Thus,
the prince must be powerful by his reputation. Secondly, by a reasonable
number of soldiers, continually maintained. Thirdly, by a notable
reserve, in gold, in his coffers, ready for the unforeseen occasions
which arise when least expected. And, lastly, by the possession of the
hearts of his people. If the finances be considerately adjusted on the
principles which I have advised the people will find entire relief, and
the king will base his power on the possession of the hearts of his
subjects. They will know that they are his care, and their own interests
will lead them to love him.
The kings of old thought so highly of this foundation of kingship that
some of them held it worthier to be King of the French than King of
France. Indeed, this nation was in old time illustrious for passionate
attachment to its princes; and under the earlier kings, until Philip the
Fair, the treasure of hearts was the sole public treasure that was
maintained in this kingdom.
I know that we cannot judge of the present altogether by the past, and
that what was good in one century is not always possible in another.
Yet, though the treasure of hearts may not suffice to-day, it is quite
certain that without it the treasure of gold is almost worthless;
without that treasure of hearts we shall be bankrupt in the midst of
abundance.
_The Whole Duty of Princes_
In conclusion, as kings are obliged to do many more things as sovereigns
than they do in their private capacity, they are liable to be guilty of
far more faults by omission than those of which a private person could
be guilty by commission. Considered as men, they are subject to the same
faults as all other men; but considered as charged with the welfare of
the public, they are subject also to many duties which they cannot omit
without sin.
If princes neglect to do all that they can to rule the various orders of
their state; if they are careless in the choice of good advisers, or
despise their salutary counsels; if they fail to make their own example
a speaking voice; if they are idle in the establishment of the reign of
God, and of reason, and of justice; if they fail to protect the
innocent, to reward public services, and to chastise the guilty and
disobedient; if they are not solicitous to foresee and to provide for
the troubles which may arise, or to turn aside, by careful diplomacy,
the storms which darken the horizon; if favour rather than merit
dictates their choice of ministers for the high offices of the kingdom;
if they do not immovably establish the state in its rightful power; if
they do not on all occasions prefer public interests to private
interests; then, however upright their life may otherwise be, they will
be found far more guilty than those who actively transgress the
commandments and the laws of God. And if kings or magistrates make use
of their power to commit any injustice or violence which they cannot
commit as private persons, they commit a king's or a magistrate's sin,
which has its source in their authority, and one for which the King of
Kings will doubtless demand a searching account on the day of judgement.
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