Transcriber's Note
This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.
Italics are delimited with the '_' character as _italic_. The 'oe'
ligature is printed as separate characters.
Non-English language quotations are given as printed. Passages in Greek
are transliterated, and denoted as [Greek: Athiopas toi ...].
Footnotes have been consolidated and moved to directly follow the
paragraph where they are referenced. In the printed version, footnotes
were numbered consecutively, beginning anew with each chapter. Here,
they have been re-sequenced for uniqueness. References to those notes
in the text and the transcriber's errata are to the new numbers. There
are several footnotes that appear in other footnotes. These have been
lettered as [A], [B], [C], and follow the note containing the
reference.
In a number of places, passages are compared by placing them in
parallel columns, usually across several pages. The left hand
column is given contiguously with a wide right margin, and then the
right hand column, with a large left margin. On p. 262, four columns
are used for comparison. Each is given in turn, with no attempt to
simulate the format.
Please see the notes at the end of this text for a more detailed list
of specific issues encountered and the resolutions of each.
TRADITION
PRINCIPALLY WITH REFERENCE TO
MYTHOLOGY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS.
PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE AND COMPANY
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
TRADITION
PRINCIPALLY WITH REFERENCE TO
MYTHOLOGY AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS.
BY
LORD ARUNDELL OF WARDOUR.
LONDON:
BURNS, OATES, & COMPANY,
17 & 18 PORTMAN STREET, AND 63 PATERNOSTER ROW.
1872.
CONTENTS.
CHAP. PAGE
PREFACE, ix
MEMOIR OF COLONEL GEORGE MACDONELL, C.B., xix
I. THE LAW OF NATIONS, 1
II. THE LAW OF NATURE, 20
III. PRIMITIVE LIFE, 26
IV. CHRONOLOGY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF TRADITION, 55
V. CHRONOLOGY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SCIENCE, 72
VI. PALMER ON EGYPTIAN CHRONOLOGY, 92
VII. THE TRADITION OF THE HUMAN RACE, 105
VIII. MYTHOLOGY, 157
IX. ASSYRIAN MYTHOLOGY, 182
X. THE TRADITION OF NOAH AND THE DELUGE, 210
XI. DILUVIAN TRADITIONS IN AFRICA AND AMERICA, 242
XII. SIR JOHN LUBBOCK ON TRADITION, 283
XIII. NOAH AND THE GOLDEN AGE, 323
XIV. SIR H. MAINE ON THE LAW OF NATIONS, 338
XV. THE DECLARATION OF WAR, 386
PREFACE.
I shall have no hope of conveying to the reader, within the narrow
limits of a preface, any fuller idea of the purport of this work
than its title expresses; and as the chapters are necessarily
interdependent, I can indicate no short-cut in the perusal by which
this information can be obtained.
I venture to think that those who are interested in the special matters
referred to will find something in these pages which may attract on
account of its novelty--and some other things, new at least in their
application--_e.g._ the comparison of Boulanger's theory with the
narratives of Captain R. Burton and Catlin.
The frequent introduction and the length of the notes, must, I am
aware, give to these pages a repellent aspect, but the necessity
of bringing various points under comparison has compelled this
arrangement; and I regret to say that the argument runs through the
whole, and that almost as much matter requiring consideration will be
found in the notes and appendices as in the text.
I trust that these imperfections may not be so great as to estrange
the few, among whom only I can hope to find much sympathy, who wish
to see the true foundations of peace and order re-established in the
world, and who may therefore to some extent be indulgent towards
efforts which have for their aim and motive the attempt to erect
barriers which would render the recurrence of the evils which have
lately deluged mankind difficult, if not impossible.
There are others whom the recent scenes of horror have inspired with a
love of peace and order, or of whom it would be more true to say, that
the horrors of the late war and revolution have deepened in them the
sentiment of peace and order which they have always entertained, but
who still do not desire these things on the conditions upon which alone
they can be secured. From them I can only ask such passing examination
as may be demanded for the conscientious rejection of the evidence I
have collected, or for its adjustment with more accepted theories.
There will remain for me much ground in common with all who retain
their faith in the inspiration of Holy Writ, and who wish to see its
authority sustained against the aggressive infidelity of the day; and
even among those who reject the authority of divine revelation, there
may be still some who are wearied in the arid wastes, and who would
gladly retrace their steps to the green pastures and the abundant
streams. Among such I may perhaps expect to find friendly criticism.
At the same time, I do not disguise from myself that, in its present
mood, the world is much more anxious to be cut adrift from tradition
than to be held to its moorings; and that it will impatiently learn
that fresh facts have to be considered before its emancipation can be
declared, or before it can be let loose without the evident certainty
of shipwreck. Although the exigencies of the argument have compelled
research over a somewhat extended field of inquiry, the exploration
has no pretensions to being exhaustive, but at most suggestive; not
attempting to work the mine, or, except incidentally, to produce the
ore, but only indicating the positions in which it is likely to be
found.
In the main position of the mythological chapters, that the heroes of
mythological legend embody the reminiscences of the characters and
incidents of the biblical narrative, I do nothing more than carry on a
tradition, as the reader will see in my references to Calmet, Bryant,
Palmer, and others.[1] I should add, that I limit the full application
of De Maistre's theory to the times preceding the coming of our Lord.
[1] It has curiously happened that I have never seen the work
which, after Bryant, would probably have afforded the largest
repertory of facts--G. Stanley Faber's "Dissertation on the
Mysteries of the Cabiri;" and it is only recently, since
these pages were in print, that I have become acquainted with
Davies' "Celtic Researches" and "The Mythology and Rites of
the British Druids." The Celtic traditions respecting their
god Hu, are so important from more than one point of view,
that I cannot forbear making the following extracts from the
latter author, which I trust the reader will refer back to and
compare in chap. ix. with the Babylonian Hoa, at p. 66 with
the Chinese Yu, and at p. 262 with the African Hu.
Davies' "Celtic Researches," p. 184, says, "Though Hu Gadarn
primarily denoted the Supreme Being [compare chap. ix.], I
think his actions have a secondary reference to the history
of Noah. The following particulars are told of him in the
above-cited selection:--(1.) His branching or elevated oxen
[compare p. 205 and chap. xi.] ... at the Deluge, drew the
destroyer out of the water, so that the lake burst forth no
more [compare chap. iv.] (2.) He instructed the primitive
race in the cultivation of the earth [compare p. 239]. (3.)
He first collected and disposed them into various tribes
[compare p. 239]. (4.) He first gave laws, traditions, &c.,
and adapted verse to memorials [compare p. 239]. (5.) He
first brought the Cymry into Britain and Gaul [compare p.
66], because he would not have them possess lands by war and
contention, but of right and peace" [compare chaps. xiii. and
xv.] It is true that these traditions come to us in ballads
attributed to Welsh bards of the 13th and 14th centuries A.D.;
but, as the Rev. Mr Davies said, "that such a superstition
should have been fabricated by the bards in the middle ages of
Christianity, is a supposition utterly irreconcileable with
probability." And I think the improbability will be widely
extended if the readers will take the trouble, after perusal,
to make the references as above.
My attention was first drawn to the coincidences of mythology with
scriptural history by the late Colonel G. Macdonell.[2] Colonel
Macdonell's coincidences were founded upon a peculiar theory of his
own, and must necessarily have been exclusively upon the lines of
Hebrew derivation. There is nothing, however, in these pages drawn from
that source. I may add, for the satisfaction of Colonel Macdonell's
friends, that as Colonel Macdonell's MSS. exist, and are in the
possession of Colonel I. J. Macdonell, I have (except at p. 243, when
quoting from Boulanger,) expressly excluded the consideration of the
influence of the Hebrew upon general tradition, which, however, will
be necessary for the full discussion of the question.
[2] I have appended a short biographical notice of Colonel G.
Macdonell, which I venture to think may contain matter of
public interest.
Whatever, therefore, Colonel Macdonell may have written will remain
over and above in illustration of the tradition. But whether on the
lines of Hebrew or primeval tradition, these views will inevitably
run counter to the mythological theories now in the ascendant. These
views, indeed, have been so long relegated to darkness, and perhaps
appropriately, on account of their opposition to the prevalent solar
theories, "flouted like owls and bats" whenever they have ventured into
the daylight, that it will be with something amounting to absolute
astonishment that the learned will hear that there are people who still
entertain them: "itaque ea nolui scribere, quæ nec indocti intelligere
possent, nec docti legere curarent" (Cic. Acad. Quæs., 1. i. § 2).
I can sincerely say, however, that although my theories place me in a
position of antagonism to modern science, yet that I have written in no
spirit of hostility to science or the cause of science.
I have throughout excluded the geological argument, for the first and
sufficient reason that I am not a geologist; and secondly, by the
same right and title, that geologists, _e.g._ Sir C. Lyell, in his
"Antiquity of Man," ignores the arguments and facts to which I have
directed special attention.
Nevertheless, I find that competent witnesses have come to conclusions
not materially different from those which have been arrived at, on the
ground of history, within their own department of geology. I have more
especially in my mind the following passage from a series of papers,
"On Some Evidences of the Antiquity of Man," by the Rev. A. Weld, in
the _Month_ (1871), written with full knowledge and in a spirit of
careful and fair appreciation of the evidence. He says:--
"These evidences, such as they are, are fully treated in the work
of Sir C. Lyell, entitled 'Antiquity of Man,' which exhausted the
whole question as it stood, when the last edition was published in
the year 1863. It is worthy of note that though the conclusion at
which the geologist arrives is hesitating and suggestive, rather
than decisive, and though nothing of importance, as far as we are
aware, has been added to the geological aspect of the question
since that time--except that the reality of the discovery of human
remains has been verified, and many additional discoveries of a
similar character have been made--_still the opinion_, which was
_then new and startling, has gradually gained ground_, until we
find writers assuming as a thing that needs no further proof, that
the period of man's habitation on the earth is to be reckoned in
tens of thousands of years."--_The Month_ (May and June 1871), p.
437.
Among various works, bearing on matters contained in these pages, which
have come to hand during the course of publication, I may mention--
"The Mythology of the Aryan Nations," by the Rev. G. W. Cox, referred
to in notes at pp. 158, 165, 396.
The third edition of Sir John Lubbock's "Pre-historic Times."
Mr E. B. Tylor's "Primitive Culture," referred to in notes at pp. 41,
136, 300.
Mr St George Mivart's "Genesis of Species."
Mr F. Seebohm on "International Reform."
Sir H. S. Maine's "Village Communities."
The Archbishop of Westminster's paper, read before the Royal
Institution, "On the Dæmon of Socrates."
"Orsini's Life of the Blessed Virgin," translated by the Very Rev. Dr
Husenbeth.
"Hints and Facts on the Origin of Man," by the Very Rev. Dr P. Melia,
1872, who says (p. 59), "Considering the great length of life of
the first patriarchs, Moses must have had every information through
non-interrupted tradition. If we reflect that Shem for many years saw
Methuselah, a contemporary of Adam, and that Shem himself lived to the
time of Abraham, ... that Abraham died after the birth of Jacob, and
that Jacob saw many who were alive when Moses was born, we see that a
few generations connect Moses not only with Noah, but also with Adam."
I quote this passage as it is important to place in the foreground of
this inquiry the unassailable truth that (apart from revelation) the
historical account of the origin of the human race, to which all others
converge, is consistent with itself, and bears intrinsic evidence of
credibility.
An analogous argument with reference to Christian tradition was
sketched in a lecture by Mr Edward Lucas, and published in 1862, "On
the First Two Centuries of Christianity."
With reference to other parts of these pages, much supplemental matter
will be found in--
"Historical Illustrations of the Old Testament," by the Rev. G.
Rawlinson, M.A., Camden Prof., where, at pp. 19, 20, will be found
direct testimony to what I had conjectured from indirect evidence at
pp. 270, 271--viz., that the Polynesian islanders "have a clear and
distinct tradition of a Deluge, from which one family only, _eight in
number_, was saved in a canoe."
Also, but from a different point of view, in "Legends of Old Testament
Characters," by Rev. S. Baring Gould, M.A.
The articles in the _Tablet_ "On Arbitration instead of War," to which
I have referred in chap. xiv. at p. 380, have recently been collected
and reprinted by Lord Robert Montagu, M.P.
If I have exceeded in quotation, I must direct my readers, for the
defence of this mode of composition, from the point of view of
tradition, to a work which I trust some in this busy age still find
leisure to read, Mr Kenelm Digby's "Mores Catholici," i. 40.
I must, moreover, add a passage from the general preface to the recent
republication of Mr Disraeli's works, which I came upon too late to
introduce into the body of this book, but which I feel sure the reader,
even if he has met with it before, will not be reluctant to reperuse:--
"The sceptical effects of the discoveries of science, and the
uneasy feeling that they cannot co-exist with our old religious
convictions have their origin in the circumstance that the general
body who have suddenly become conscious of these physical truths
are not so well acquainted as is desirable with the past history
of man. Astonished by their unprepared emergence from ignorance to
a certain degree of information, their amazed intelligence takes
refuge in the theory of what is conveniently called progress, and
every step in scientific discovery seems further to remove them
from the path of primæval inspiration. But there is no fallacy
so flagrant as to suppose that the modern ages have the peculiar
privilege of scientific discovery, or that they are distinguished
as the epochs of the most illustrious inventions. On the contrary,
scientific invention has always gone on simultaneously with the
revelation of spiritual truths; and more, the greatest discoveries
are not those of modern ages. No one for a moment can pretend
that printing is so great a discovery as writing, or algebra as
language. What are the most brilliant of our chemical discoveries
compared with the invention of fire and the metals? It is a vulgar
belief that our astronomical knowledge dates only from the recent
century, when it was rescued from the monks who imprisoned Galileo;
but Hipparchus, who lived before our Divine Master, and who, among
other sublime achievements, discovered the precession of the
equinoxes, ranks with the Newtons and the Keplers; and Copernicus,
the modern father of our celestial science, avows himself, in his
famous work, as only the champion of Pythagoras, whose system he
enforces and illustrates. Even the most modish schemes of the day
on the origin of things, which captivate as much by their novelty
as their truth, may find their precursors in ancient sages; and
after a careful analysis of the blended elements of imagination and
induction which characterise the new theories, they will be found
mainly to rest on the atom of Epicurus and the monad of Thales.
Scientific, like spiritual truth, has ever from the beginning
been descending from Heaven to man. He is a being who organically
demands direct relations with his Creator, and he would not have
been so organised if his requirements could not be satisfied. We
may analyse the sun and penetrate the stars; but man is conscious
that he is made in God's own image, and in his perplexity he will
ever appeal to our Father which art in Heaven."
MEMOIR
OF
COLONEL GEORGE MACDONELL, C.B.
The following notice appeared in the _Times_, May 23, 1870--"In our
obituary column of Saturday we announced the death of Colonel George
Macdonell, C.B., at the advanced age of ninety. This officer, who
was a cadet of the ancient and loyal Scottish house of Macdonell of
Glengarry, was the son of an officer who served under the flag, and
who, as we have been told, was on the staff, of Prince Charles Edward
Stuart at the battle of Culloden, where he was severely wounded.
His son, the Colonel now deceased, was born in 1779, or early in
the following year; obtained his first commission in 1796, and was
nominated a Companion of the Bath in 1817. He saw active service in the
war in North America with the 79th Foot, and received the gold medal
for the action at Châteaugay; and had he not accepted the retirement a
few years since, he would have been, at his death, almost the senior
officer in the army holding Her Majesty's commission. The late Colonel
Macdonell, who adhered to the Roman Catholic religion professed by his
ancestors, and for which they fought so gallantly under the Stuart
banners, married, in 1820, the Hon. Laura Arundell, sister of the Lord
Arundell of Wardour, but was left a widower in May 1854." His son,
Colonel I. J. Macdonell, now commands the 71st Highlanders.
I take this opportunity of adding a few facts, not without interest,
to the above brief summary of a not uneventful life, as they
might otherwise pass unrecorded. In the sentiment of the Gaelic
saying--"Curri mi clach er do cuirn" (Wilson, "Archæol. Scot.," p.
59)--"I will add a stone to your cairn."
Colonel Macdonell's father, as stated in the above account, was wounded
at Culloden in the thigh, but was able to crawl on all-fours, after
the battle, eighteen miles, to a barn belonging to a member of the
Grant family. He there remained in concealment for six months, leaving
nature to heal the wound; but the search in the neighbourhood in time
becoming too hot, he had to decamp, and walked with a stick all the way
to Newcastle, where he was not greatly re-assured by meeting a soldier
who had just been drummed out of his regiment as a Catholic, with the
word "Papist" placarded on his back. He, however, escaped all dangers,
and reached Hull, and subsequently Versailles or St Germains, where he
remained three years, or at least till the events following the Peace
of Aix-la-Chapelle dispersed the Prince's adherents. He then returned
to England under the Act of Indemnity, entered the royal army, and
was present with General Wolfe at the taking of Quebec. If I remember
rightly, he had the good fortune to take an aide-de-camp of Montcalm's
prisoner, with important dispatches.
Colonel Macdonell's maternal uncle, Major Macdonald (Keppoch), was
taken prisoner at the battle of Falkirk. He was said to have been
the first man who drew blood in the war. By a curious revenue of
fortune, he was carried back into the enemy's ranks by the horse of
a trooper whom he had captured. He was executed at Carlisle, and the
circumstances of his execution supplied Sir Walter Scott, I believe,
with the incidents which he worked up into the narrative of MacIvor's
execution in "Waverley." His sword is in the possession of Mr P. Howard
of Corby Castle, near Carlisle.
Fortune, however, had in store another revenge; for the Duke of
Cumberland being present, many years afterwards, at a ball at Bath, by
a most unhappy selection indicated as the person with whom he wished to
dance a beautiful girl who turned out to be no other than the daughter
of Major Macdonald (afterwards married to Mr Chichester of Calverley)
the circumstances of whose execution have just been referred to. She
rose in deference to royalty, but replied, in a tone which utterly
discomfited, and put his Royal Highness to flight--"No, I will never
dance with the murderer of my father!"
With these antecedents, it is needless to add that Colonel G. Macdonell
was a warm admirer of the Stuarts, and not unnaturally extended his
sympathy and adhesion to the kindred cause of legitimacy in France;
and the one event to which he always looked forward, and confidently
predicted--the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Henri
V.--is now, if not imminent, at least "the more probable of possible
events." There was, however, a belief which somewhat conflicted in his
mind with the above anticipation--namely, his unshaken conviction that
the Dauphin did not die in the Temple. He was frequently at Holyrood
when the palace was occupied by Charles X., and he accompanied the
Duchess de Berri to the place of embarkation for her unfortunate
expedition to France. Colonel Macdonell also acted as the medium of
communication between the French Royalists and the English Government;
and on one important occasion conveyed intelligence to Lord Bathurst or
Lord Sidmouth respecting the movements of the secret societies in Spain
in 1823 some hours before it reached them by the ordinary channel.
Part of the communication was made on information supplied by the Abbé
Barruel; and in reply, Lord Sidmouth said--"Well, I remember Edmund
Burke telling me that he believed every word that Barruel had written,
and I fully accept the authority."
Colonel Macdonell was under the impression that he was unwittingly
and remotely the cause of the break up of the Ministry of "all the
talents." As this is an obscure point in history, it may be worth while
to give the following facts. The impression produced by Marengo and
Austerlitz had led to the Army Reform Bill of 1806, in which the points
discussed were almost identical with those which lately excited the
public mind. The disasters which accompanied our descent on Egypt in
1807, and the consequent evacuation of Alexandria, created considerable
discontent and re-opened the question, and as further reforms on minor
points were contemplated, suggestions from officers in the army were
invited.
Colonel Macdonell (then only lieutenant), wrote to Mr Windham, the
Secretary at War, to point out that any broken attorney might create
considerable embarrassment at any critical moment, seeing that, as
the law then stood (an Act of George I. had extended the obligation
of taking the sacrament to privates), any soldier could obtain, if
not his own, his comrade's discharge by pointing him out as a Papist.
The danger was recognised, and Mr Windham brought in a bill directed
to meet the case, but its introduction revived the larger question
of the repeal of the Tests' Acts and of the Catholic claims; and the
discussion eventuated in Lord Howick's bill, which was met by the
King's refusal, and the consequent resignation of the Ministry. This
may explain the statement (mentioned in the obituary notice in the
Times of the Marquis of Lansdowne), that he (Lord Lansdowne) could
never understand how the Ministry came to be dissolved. "He had heard
instances of men running their heads against a wall, but never of men
building up a wall against which to run their heads."[3]
[3] Sir H. Lytton Bulwer, in his "Life of Lord Palmerston," says,
i. p. 62, "There has seldom happened in this country so sudden
and unexpected a change of Ministers as that which took place
in March 1807."
It has been mentioned that Colonel Macdonell entered the army when
quite a boy; and there were few men, I fancy, living, when he died last
year, who could boast, as he could, of having served in the Duke of
York's campaign in the last century, but I am not able to state in what
regiment. He was for some time previously in Lord Darlington's regiment
of Fencibles. He was at one period in the 8th, and at another in the
50th regiment, in which latter, I think, he went out to the West Indies
and Canada.
It was in Canada, however, that his principal services were rendered,
which indeed were considerable, and have never been adequately
acknowledged.
When the Americans invaded Canada upon the declaration of war in
1812, it is hardly necessary to remind the reader that almost all our
available troops were engaged in the Peninsula, and that Canada was
pretty well left to its own resources.
Under these circumstances it will be recognised as of some importance
that Colonel Macdonell was able to raise a regiment among the
Macdonells of his clan who had settled there. But the conditions made
with him were not fulfilled, and the command of the regiment, almost
immediately after it was raised, was transferred to the command of
a Protestant and an Orangeman, which caused a mutiny which was with
difficulty suppressed. Now, it must be borne in mind that the regiment
was only raised through his personal influence with the clan, and
through that of its pastor, Bishop Macdonell, and that the adhesion
of the Catholic Macdonells went far to determine the attitude of the
French Canadians also. There were not more than 1200 regular troops in
Upper Canada during the war.[4]
[4] W. James, "Military Occurrences of Late War," i. 56, says,
1450 regular troops; Murray, "History of British America," i.
189, says, 2100 troops.
Before referring to the actions in which Colonel Macdonell was engaged,
I will add the following particulars as to the Highland settlement
which Colonel Macdonell gave me. In 1798, the submission of the
Highland chiefs to the House of Hanover having been of some standing,
and their adhesion being, moreover, cemented in a common sentiment of
abhorrence of the French Revolution, they were willingly induced to
raise regiments among their clans. This was done by Glengarry, Macleod,
and others. At the peace these regiments were disbanded, but finding
that complications of various sorts had necessarily arisen during their
absence respecting their lands and holdings at home, and, in point of
fact, that they had no homes to return to, the greater part remained
temporarily domiciled at Glasgow, the place of their disbandment. I
infer that they remained under the charge and direction of Bishop
Macdonell, who had accompanied them in their campaigns as chaplain, and
was the first Catholic priest officially recognised in the capacity of
regimental chaplain. At Glasgow (previously only served as a flying
mission), he hired a storehouse, which he opened as a chapel, but
stealthily only, as two of the congregation were always posted as a
guard at the entrance on Sunday. He found only eighteen Catholics at
Glasgow at that time, i.e., I suppose, previously to the disbandment
of the Highlanders. Through Bishop Macdonell's influence with Lord
Sidmouth--who, although a strong opponent of the Catholic claims,
always acted in his relations with him, he said, in the most honourable
and straightforward way--the emigration of the Highlanders to Canada
was shortly afterwards arranged.
Colonel Macdonell was subsequently partially reinstated in his command
of the Glengarry regiment. The important services rendered by Colonel
Macdonell in Canada, to which I have alluded, were--1. The taking
of Ogdensburg at a critical moment, on his own responsibility, and
contrary to orders, which had the effect of diverting the American
attack from Upper Canada at a moment when it was entirely undefended;
and, 2. Bringing the regiment of French Canadian militia, then
temporarily under his command, from Kingston, by a forced run down
the rapids of the St Lawrence without pilots (passing the point where
Lord Amherst lost eighty men), in time enough (he arrived the day
before, unknown to the Americans) to support De Saluberry at the
decisive action at Chateaugay. De Saluberry indeed had only 300 French
Canadians under his command, which, with the 600 brought up by Colonel
Macdonell, only made up a force of 900 (with about 100 Indians), with
which to check General Hampton's advance with some 7000 (the Americans
stated the force at 5520 infantry and 180 cavalry, James, i. 305) in
his advance on Montreal. In point of fact, Colonel Macdonell must be
considered, on any impartial review of the facts, to have won the day
(_vide infra_), yet he was not even mentioned in Sir G. Prevost's
dispatch.
Colonel Macdonell received the Companionship of the Bath for the taking
of Ogdensburg, and the gold medal for his conduct in the action at
Chateaugay.
I append the following accounts of the affairs at Ogdensburg
and Chateaugay, adding a few particulars in correction and
explanation--Alison, "History of Europe," xix. 121 (7th ed.),
says--"Shortly after Colonel M'Donnell (Macdonell), with two companies
of the Glengarry Fencibles, and two of the 8th, converted a _feigned_
attack which he was ordered to make on Fort Ogdensburg into a real one.
The assault was made under circumstances of the utmost difficulty;
deep snow impeded the assailants at every step, and the American
marksmen, from behind their defences, kept up a very heavy fire; but
the gallantry of the British overcame every obstacle, and the fort was
carried, with _eleven guns, all its stores_, and _two armed schooners_
in the harbour." The difficulties, as I have understood from Colonel
Macdonell, were not so much from the impediments of the snow, as from
the dangerous state of the St Lawrence at the time, the ice literally
waving under the tramp of his men as he passed them over (ten paces
apart). The stroke of the axe, by which they judged, told it indeed to
be only barely safe, and it had never been crossed by troops before at
that point, as it was deemed insecure, being within three miles of the
Gallops Rapids. (Among the guns were some taken from General Burgoyne.)
A fuller account of the taking of Ogdensburg may be read in Mr W.
James' "Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of the
late War between Great Britain and the United States of America," vol.
i. p. 135-141: London, 1818; he adds, "Previously to dismissing the
affair at Ogdensburg it may be right to mention that Sir G. Prevost's
secretary, or some person who had the transcribing of Major (Colonel)
Macdonnell's (Macdonell's) official letter, must have inserted by
mistake the words 'In consequence of the commands of his Excellency.'
Of this there needs no stronger proof than that Major (Colonel)
Macdonnell (Macdonell) while he was in the heat of the battle,
received a private note from Sir G. dated from 'Flint's Inn at 9
o'clock,' repeating his orders not to make the attack; and even in the
first private letter which Sir G. wrote to Major Macdonnell (Colonel
Macdonell) after being informed of his success, he could not help
qualifying his admiration of the exploit with a remark that the latter
had _rather_ exceeded his instructions--(_Note._--Both of these letters
the author has seen"), vol. i. 140. Colonel Macdonell's explanation to
me of his taking this responsibility on himself was simply that he saw
that the fate of the whole of Upper Canada depended upon it. Colonel
Macdonell had received information that 5000 American troops were
moving up in the direction of Ogdensburg, and they, in fact, came up
a week after it was taken, under General Pike; but seeing the altered
aspect of affairs, they moved off, and fell back upon Sackett's
Harbour, anticipating a similar attack at that point.
Colonel Macdonell always spoke with much emotion of the gallant conduct
of a Captain Jenkins, a young officer under his command, who, although
he had both arms shattered by two successive shots, struggled on at the
head of his men until he swooned. He survived some years, but died of
the overcharge of blood to the head consequent on the loss of his limbs.
As Ogdensburg was a frontier town on the American side of the St
Lawrence, Sir G. Prevost authorised payment for any plunder by
the troops, but Colonel Macdonell received a certificate from the
inhabitants that they had not lost a single shilling--which must be
recorded to the credit of the Glengarry Highlanders under his command.
As I have already said, although Colonel Macdonell commanded the larger
force, and by an independent command, at the action of Chateaugay, his
name is not mentioned in Sir G. Prevost's dispatch, nor in Alison,
who apparently follows the official account (xix. 131, 7th ed.) In
Alison, De Saluberry is called, by a clerical error, De Salavary--such,
after all, is fame! saith Hyperion. Although his troops, raw levies,
broke, and Colonel De Saluberry was virtually a prisoner when Colonel
Macdonell came up to the support, it was through no fault of his
disposition of his men--(Colonel Macdonell always spoke of him as an
excellent officer, who behaved on the occasion in the most noble and
intrepid manner).
The American troops at Chateaugay are variously stated at 7000 to
5700 (Alison says, "4000 effective infantry and 2000 militia, and 10
guns," xix. 131). The British, 300 French Canadian militia, under De
Saluberry; 600 under Colonel Macdonell, and some Indians, without
artillery.
A full, but, Colonel Macdonell said, inaccurate account (from
imperfect information) will be found in Mr W. James' "Military
Occurrences," above referred to.
I extract the following passages, i. 307:--"The British advanced corps,
stationed near the frontiers, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel De
Saluberry of the Canadian Fencibles, and consisted of the two flank
companies of that corps and four companies of voltigeurs, and six
flank companies of embodied militia and Chateaugay chasseurs, placed
under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell, late of
the Glengarrys, who so distinguished himself at Ogdensburg. The whole
of this force did not exceed 800 rank and file. There were also at the
post 172 Indians under Captain Lamotte." Colonel Macdonell's account
differed substantially. It has been already mentioned that he had
brought up his troops by a forced march the night before, and held
them under a separate command. I conclude with the following passage
as bearing out Colonel Macdonell's version:--"The Americans, although
they did not occupy one foot of the 'abatis,' nor Lieutenant-Colonel
De Saluberry retire one inch from the ground on which he had been
standing, celebrated this partial retiring as a retreat.... By way of
animating his little band when thus momentarily _pressed_" [Colonel
Macdonell's version was, that although the troops were driven back,
Colonel De Saluberry literally "refused to retire one inch himself,"
and virtually remained a prisoner until--] Colonel De Saluberry
ordered the bugleman to sound "the advance. This was heard by
Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell, who thinking the Colonel was in want of
support, caused his own bugles to answer, and immediately advanced with
two ['six'] of his companies. He at the same time sent ten or twelve
buglemen into the adjoining woods with orders to separate ['widely'],
and blow with all their might. This little 'ruse de guerre' led the
Americans to believe that they had more thousands than hundreds to
contend with, and deterred them from even attempting to penetrate the
'abatis.'"
For the rest of the account I must refer my readers to Mr W. James'
"History," as above; though, if a complete and accurate account of
an engagement which probably saved British Canada were ever thought
desirable, Colonel Macdonell's commentaries (MS.) on the above and the
official accounts, would afford valuable supplementary information.[5]
[5] The following corrections have been supplied to me by the
Hon. L. D.:--"Lieut.-Colonel George Macdonell was born on
the 12th August 1780, at St Johns, Newfoundland, where his
father, Captain Macdonell, was stationed. He was the second
son of Captain Macdonell (who had been one of the body-guard
of Prince Charles), by his wife, Miss Leslie of Fetternear,
Aberdeenshire. George was rated on the navy by the Admiral of
the station, who was a personal friend of Captain Macdonell,
and his name accordingly remained on the list for years, but
he never joined. I believe he entered in 1795 the regiment
raised by Lord Darlington, and afterwards served with the Duke
of York in the war in Holland. He was, I know, at one time in
the 8th infantry, for I remember Sir Greathed Harris saying
that he was always a well-remembered and honoured officer
in that regiment. He ultimately had the post of Inspecting
Field-Officer in Canada."
TRADITION
PRINCIPALLY WITH REFERENCE TO
MYTHOLOGY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS.
TRADITION
PRINCIPALLY WITH REFERENCE TO
MYTHOLOGY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
_THE LAW OF NATIONS._
The increasing number of essays, pamphlets, works, and reviews of
works on speculative subjects, with which the literature of England at
present teems, compels the conclusion that the public mind has been
greatly unsettled or strangely transformed since the days when John
Bull was the plain matter-of-fact old gentleman that Washington Irving
pleasantly described him.
Remembering the many sterling and noble qualities whimsically
associated with this practical turn of mind, it will be felt by many to
be a change for the worse. But if old English convictions, maxims, and
ways of thought have lost their meaning; if in fine it is true that the
mind of England has become unsettled, it says much for the practical
good sense of Englishmen that they should have overcome their natural
repugnances, and should so earnestly turn to the discussion of these
questions, not indeed with the true zest for speculation, but in the
practical conviction that it is in this arena that the battle of the
Constitution must be fought.
There is, as it has been truly observed,[6] "an instinctive feeling
that any speculation which affects this" (the speculation in
question being the effect of the Darwinian theory on conscience),
"must also affect, sooner or later, the practical principles and
conduct of men in their daily lives. This naturally comes much
closer to us than any question as to the comparative nearness of
our kinship to the gorilla or the orang can be expected to do. _No
great modification of opinion takes place with respect to the moral
faculties, which does not ultimately and in some degree modify the
ethical practice and political working of the society in which it
comes to prevail._"
[6] _Pall Mall Gazette_, April 12, 1871; article, "Mr Darwin on
Conscience."
There is perhaps no question which lies more at the root of political
constitutions, and which must more directly determine the conduct of
states in their relations to each other, than the question whether or
not, or in what sense, there was such a thing as natural law, _i.e._ a
law antecedent to the formation of individual political societies, and
which is common to and binding on them all.
It may be worth while, therefore, to examine whether a stricter
discrimination may not be made between things which are sometimes
confounded, viz.:--The Law of Nations and International Law, natural
law and the state of nature; and even if the attempt at discrimination
should fail in exactitude, it may yet, by opening out fresh views,
contribute light to minds of greater precision, who may thus be enabled
to hit upon the exact truth.
This view was partially exposed in an article which was inserted in
the _Tablet_, September 28, 1861,[7] entitled "International Law and
the Law of Nations," and, all things considered, I do not think that I
can better consult the interests of my readers, than by reproducing an
extract from it here, as a convenient basis of operation from which to
advance into a somewhat unexplored country:--
"It has been the fashion since Bentham's[8] time, to substitute
the phrase 'International Law' for the 'Law of Nations,' as if
they were convertible terms. The substitution, however, covers a
distinction sufficiently important.
"The 'Law of Nations' is an obligation which binds the consciences
of nations to respect the eternal principle of justice in their
relations with each other. 'International law' is the system of
rules, precedents, and maxims accumulated in recognition of the
eternal law. But as men may build a theatre or a gambling-house
upon the foundations constructed for a religious edifice, and
upon a stone consecrated for an altar, so has it been possible
for diplomacy to substitute a system of chicanery for the simple
laws which were intended to facilitate the intercourse of nations,
and with such effect as in a great number of cases to place
international law in contradiction with the law of nations--as,
for instance, when in a certain case the law of nations says that
it is wrong to invade a neighbour's territory, international law
is made to say that it is lawful to invade in such a case, because
such-and-such monarchs in past history have done so.
"Practically the effect of the substitution is, that the sentiment
of justice disappears, that wars which formerly were called unjust,
are now called inevitable, so that good men, disheartened at the
conflicting evidence of precedents, yield their sense of right
and wrong, and defer to the adjudication of diplomatists. This is
particularly satisfactory to the modern spirit which will admit
nothing to be law which is superior to, and distinct from, that
which the human intellect has determined to be law.
"But the sense of right and wrong in good men is that which gives
its whole efficacy to the law of nations. There is nothing else in
the last resort, to restrain the ambition and passion of princes,
but the reprobation of mankind--nothing but the fear of invading
that "moral territory"[9] which even bad men find it necessary
to conquer, '_dans l'ame des peuples ses voisins_.' On the other
hand, the whole mass of precedents to which diplomatists appeal,
which are rarely carefully collated with those which legists have
accumulated and digested, is nothing but a veil which thinly covers
the supremacy of might and the right of force.
"In fact, the conventional deference which is paid to them, is at
best only the hypocritical homage which force is constrained to pay
to justice before it strikes its blow.
"International law, therefore, as _accumulated in the precedents
of diplomatists_, is a parasitical growth upon that tree which has
its roots in the hearts of nations, and which may be compared to
one of those old oaks under which kings used to sit and administer
justice. It was a dream of Dodwell's that the 'law of nations was a
divine revelation made to the family preserved in the ark.' In the
grotesqueness and wildness of this theory we detect a true idea.
The law of nations is an unwritten law, tradited in the memories
of the people, or, so far as it is written, to be found in the
works of writers on public law, like Grotius, whose authorities, as
Sir J. Mackintosh remarks, are in great part, and very properly,
made up of the sayings of the poets and orators of the world, 'for
they address themselves to the general feelings and sympathies
of mankind.' It is in this that the Scriptural saying about the
people is so true--'But they will maintain the state of the world.'
And it is a just observation, that 'the people are often wrong in
their opinions, but in their sentiments rarely.' You may produce
state papers and manifestoes, written with all the dexterity of
Talleyrand, and the lying tact of Fouché, but you will not convince
the people. You have your opportunity. The Liberal press of Europe,
at this moment, may be said to be in possession of the whole field
of political literature; nevertheless, nothing will prevent its
being recorded in history,[10] that Victor Emmanuel in seizing
upon the patrimony of St Peter was a robber, and his conquest an
usurpation."
[7] This article, and perhaps four or five others on miscellaneous
subjects, written within a few weeks of the above date, were
my only contributions to the _Tablet_, at that time owned and
edited by my friend Mr J. E. Wallis, who, during some ten
or twelve eventful years, continued to uphold the standard
of Tradition, with singular ability and at great personal
sacrifice.
[8] "All that Bentham wrote on this subject ("International Law")
is comprised within a comparatively small compass (Works,
vol. ii. 535-560, iii. 200-611, ix. 58-382). But it would be
unpardonable to omit all mention of a science which he was
the means of _revolutionising_, and which, previously to his
taking it in hand, had _not even received a proper distinctive
name_."--John Hill Burton, "Benthamiana," p. 396. From
Bentham's point of view, "International Law" is the proper
distinctive name.
[9] Montalembert, _Correspondant_, Aout, 1861.
[10] C'est une des plus admirables choses de ce monde que jamais
nul empire, et nul succès n'ont pu s'assujetir l'histoire
et en imposer par elle à la posterité. Des generations de
rois issus du même sang se sont succédé pendant dix siècles
au gouvernement du même peuple, et malgré cette perpetuité
d'intérêt et de commandement, ils n'ont pu couvrir aux yeux du
monde les fautes de leurs pères et maintenir sur leur tombe le
faux éclat de leur vie.--_Lacordaire_: vid. _Correspondant_,
Nov. 1856.
I have observed that International Law is the more appropriate term
from Bentham's point of view, and as Bentham is the most redoubtable
opponent of natural right and the law of nations, I will quote him at
some length:--
"Another man says that there is an eternal and immutable rule of
right, and that that rule of right dictates so-and-so. And then
he begins giving you his sentiments upon anything that comes
uppermost; and these sentiments (you are to take it for granted)
are so many branches of the eternal rule of right.... A great
multitude of people are continually talking of the law of nature;
and they go on giving you their sentiments about what is right and
what is wrong, and these sentiments, you are to understand, are so
many chapters and sections of the law of nature. Instead of the
phrase, law of nature, you have sometimes law of reason, right
reason, natural justice, natural equity, good order. Any of them
will do equally well. This latter is most used in politics. The
three last are much more tolerable than the others, because they
do not very explicitly claim to be anything more than phrases.
They insist, but feebly, upon the being looked upon as so many
positive standards of themselves, and seem content to be taken,
upon occasion, for phrases expressive of the conformity of the
thing in question to the proper standard, whatever that may be. On
most occasions, however, it will be better to say utility--utility
is clearer, as referring more especially to pain and pleasure."
In truth, although Mr Bentham indulges a pleasant ridicule, yet the
ridicule and the thing ridiculed being eliminated, the fact that there
is a belief in a law of nature remains untouched. It is probable,
therefore, that appeals will be frequent to what is believed to be
"the eternal and immutable rule of right," "to the law of nature,"
&c., _i.e._ each and every individual, all mankind distributively, so
appeal, because there is a deep conviction among mankind, severally
and collectively, that there is this eternal and immutable rule of
right, blurred and obscured though it may be, or concealed behind a
cloud of human passion and error: and most men, moreover, will have an
instinct which will tell them when an individual is substituting his
own ideas for the eternal and immutable law,--as, for instance, when at
the conclusion of the sentence quoted, Mr Bentham seeks to substitute
his own peculiar crochet, as embodied in the word "utility" (which may
be used indifferently in the sense of the absolute or relative, the
supernatural or the natural, the immediate or the remote utility), as
synonymous with "natural justice," "natural equity," and "good order."
So, again, when Mr Bentham comes to the discussion of "International
Law," after pointing out, very properly, that whereas internal laws
have always a super-ordinate authority to enforce them, "that when
nations fall into disputes there is no such super-ordinate impartial
authority to bind them to conformity with any fixed rules," Mr Bentham
goes on to say, "though there is no distinct official authority capable
of enforcing right principles of international law, there is a power
bearing with more or less influence on the conduct of all nations, as
of all individuals, however transcendently potent they may be, this
is the power of public opinion." Public opinion! not then of public
opinion threatening coercion, for in that case we should have "a
super-ordinate impartial authority binding to conformity with fixed
rules," but public opinion as a moral expression. If, however, you take
from it the expression of right and wrong, of natural justice, and of
the eternal and immutable law; if its expression is not reprobation,
and, so to speak, a fore-judgment of the retribution of the Most High,
but only dissatisfaction or the mere pronouncement of the inutility
of the action, whatever it may be, what even with Benthamites can be
its efficacy and worth? The vanquished say to their conqueror, the
multitudes to their oppressor, this oppression is not according to
utility. Utility! he replies, useful to whom? To you! Fancy the look
of Prince Bismarck as he would reply to such an address. What are
men if you take away the notion of right and wrong but "the flies of
a summer?" How different was the expression of Napoleon after his
ill-usage of Pius VII., "J'ai frissonè les nations." Napoleon had a
conscience,[11] and in his moments of calm reflection felt in its full
force the reprobation of mankind.
[11] _Vide_ "Sentiment de Napoleon I. sur Le Christianisme,"
d'apres des temoignages recueillis par feu le Chevalier de
Beauterne. Nouvelle edition, par M. ----; Bray, Paris, 1860.
When Bentham, still speaking of public opinion, adds:--
"The power in question has, it is true, various degrees of
influence. The strong are better able to put it at defiance than
the weak. Countries which, being the most populous, are likely also
to be the strongest, carry a certain support of public opinion
with all their acts _whatever they may be_. But still it is the
only power which can be moved to good purposes in this case; and,
however high some may appear to be above it, there are in reality
none who are not more or less subject to its influence."
Here Bentham is again in imagination gathering men together like the
flies of a summer,--the force of their opinion depending on their
numbers. But what, again, is the force of all this buzzing if it is
the mere expression of "pleasure," or "pain," of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction in the masses? Conquerors may not always be relentless,
they may at times exhibit some sympathy with their fellow men; but as
a rule they are so dominated by some one idea or passion, or at best
are so absorbed in the interests of their own people, as to be deaf to
such appeals. Prince Bismarck's sentiments towards France during the
late war are pretty well known; but it is said that after the conflict
was over, and when France was in the throes of its terrible internecine
conflict, he was asked, "What is your Excellency's opinion of the
present state of France?" he replied, "Das ist mit ganz wurst," which
is equivalent to "I don't care two straws about it."[12] How are men
of this stamp to be affected by any exclamations of pleasure or pain?
If on the contrary it is the voice of reprobation which they hear, and
if in their case the saying "vox populi vox Dei" is felt to have its
full application, there is then a public opinion expressed which is
calculated to strike the conscience and inspire terror, and that is
quite another matter.
[12] _Neue Freie Presse_ of Vienna. _Pall Mall Gazette_, May 4,
1871.
De Tocqueville, from his own point of view, puts the argument in favour
of natural justice very forcibly, and in a certain construction would
express the identical truth for which I contend.
"I hold it to be an impious and an execrable maxim that,
politically speaking, a people has a right to do whatever it
pleases; and yet I have asserted that all authority originates in
the will of the majority. Am I, then, in contradiction with myself?
A general law which bears the name of Justice has been made and
sanctioned, not only by a majority of this or that people, but by
a majority of mankind. The rights of every people are consequently
confined within the limits of what is just. A nation may be
considered in the light of a jury which is empowered to represent
society at large, and to apply the great general law of justice.
Ought such a jury, which represents society, to have more power
than the society in which the laws it applies originate."--_M. de
Tocqueville's "Democracy in America_," ii. 151.
Although M. de Tocqueville's view does not go to the full length of
the argument, still, regarded in this light, the voice of the majority
of mankind, or of any large masses of mankind, has a very different
significance from what it bears in the writings of Bentham.
Let us now consider the doctrines of Bentham in their more recent
exposition.
The _Pall Mall Gazette_, Oct. 6, 1870, says:--
"Laws have been described as definitions of pre-existing rights,
relations between man and man, reflections of divine ordinances,
anything but what they really are,--forms of organised constraint.
It says little for the assumed clear-headedness of Englishmen, that
they have very generally preferred the ornate jargon of Hooker, to
the accurate and intelligible account of law and government which
forms the basis of Bentham's juridical system."
It says much, however, for their strong political sense and sagacity.
If this is the true and only description of law, it is tantamount to
saying that law is force and force is law; in other words, that the
commands of a legitimate government need not be regarded when it is
weak, but that the enactments of power must always be obeyed, however
it is acquired, and whether its decrees are in accordance with right
or contrary to justice. It is a ready justification for tyranny,
equally sanctioning the "lettres de cachet" of the ancient regime, and
the proscriptions of the Convention, equally at hand for the National
Assembly at Versailles, or for the Commune at Paris. But however much
it may be disguised, it is the only alternative definition of law, when
once you say that law is not of divine ordinance and tradition. If no
regard is to be had to the definition of right, but the term law is to
be applied to any adequate act of repression, there is in truth nothing
but force. Yet why should force adequate to its purpose seek to cloak
itself in the forms of law? I suppose the question must have been put
and answered before; but the answer can only be because law is felt to
import a totally different set of ideas from force.
It is necessary, more especially now that the utilitarian theory is
dominant, to enter a protest according to the turn the argument may
take, but in the end nothing more can be said than was said by Cicero
in the century before our Lord:--
"Est enim unum jus, quo devincta est hominum societas, et quod lex
constituit una; quæ lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi:
quam qui ignorat is est injustus, sive est illa scripta uspiam,
sive nusquam. Quod si justitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus
institutisque populorum, et si, ut iidem dicunt utilitate omnia
metienda sunt, negliget leges, easque perrumpit, si poterit, is,
qui sibi eam rem fructuosam putabit fore. Ita fit, ut nulla sit
omnino justitia; si neque naturâ est, eaque propter utilitatem
constituitur, utilitate alia convellitur."--_De Legibus_, i. 15.
It is only upon this construction that the Law of Nations can be said
to exist, as "there is no superordinate authority to enforce it." It
is accordingly asserted that the law of nations is not really law.
But is not this only when it is regarded from the point of view of
"organised constraint?"[13] If it is regarded as a divine ordinance,
or even as under the divine sanction, then it is law in a much higher
degree than simple internal or municipal law, for it more immediately
and directly depends upon this sanction; and hence nations may more
confidently appeal to heaven for the redress of wrong _here below_
than individuals--seeing that, as Bossuet somewhere says, God rewards
and chastises nations in this world, since it is not according to His
divine dispensation to reward them corporately in the next.
[13] "Utiles esse autem opiniones has quis neget, quum intelligat
quam multa firmentur jure jurando, quantæ salutis sint
f[oe]derum religiones? quam multos divini supplicii metus
a scelere revocaverit? quamque sancta sit societas civium
inter ipsos diis immortalibus interpositis tum judicibus tum
testibus?"--Cicero, _De Legibus_, ii. 7.
More recently, however, the extraordinary successes and subversions
which we have witnessed during this last year, have brought the _Pall
Mall Gazette_ face to face with problems pressing for immediate and
anxious settlement; and in a series of articles it has discussed the
question of the law of nations with much depth and earnestness.
I there observe phrases which I can hardly distinguish from those I
have just employed. Combating Mr Mill's view, the writer says:--
"Nobody knows better than he that International Law is not really
law, and why it is not law; but he seems to have jumped to the
conclusion that it is therefore the same thing as morality....
There cannot, in truth, be any closer analogy than that which
we drew the other day between the law of nations and the law of
honour, and between public war and private duelling." [This is
upon an assumption that there is nothing "essentially immoral
in the code of honour," as "to a great extent it coincided with
morality."] "But it differed from simple morality in that its
precepts were enforced, not by general disapprobation, but by
a challenge to the offender by anybody who supposed himself to
be aggrieved by the offence. The possible result always was,
that the champion of the law might himself be shot, and this was
the weakness of the system. But this is exactly the weakness of
international law, and the _original idea_ at the _basis_ both of
_public war_ and of private duelling was precisely the same,--_that
God Almighty somehow interposed_ in favour of the combatant _who
had the juster cause_. There is clear historical evidence that
the feuds which became duels were supposed to be fought out under
divine supervision, _just as battles_ were believed to be decided
by the God of battles."
I believe that if history could be re-written from this point of view
that many startling revelations would be brought to light. It is
with reluctance that I turn from the points upon which I approach to
agreement with the writer, to those upon which we fundamentally differ.
And here I must remark, that "the accurate and intelligible account
of law and government which forms the basis of Bentham's juridical
system"[14] (_supra_, p. 9), is not distinguishable from, and in any
case ultimately depends upon, his theory of utility as a foundation,
or, as his later disciples say, a "standard" of morals. Such a standard
is the negation of all morality; and if it ever came to stand alone
every notion of morals would be obliterated, because, being open to
every interpretation, and incapable of supplying any definite rule
itself, it would abrogate every other, and under a plausible form
abandon mankind to its lusts and passions.
[14] "From _utility_, then, we may denominate a principle that
may serve to preside over and govern, as it were, such
arrangements as shall be made of the several institutions, or
combinations of institutions, that compose the matter of this
science." Bentham's "Fragment on Government," xliii., and at
p. 45, the principle of utility is declared "all-sufficient,"
... that "principle which furnishes us with that reason, which
alone depends not upon any higher reason, but which is itself
the _sole and all-sufficient reason_ for _every point_ of
practice whatsoever."
In the _Pall Mall Gazette_, April 12, 1871, an article entitled
"Mr Darwin on Conscience," discusses Benthamism with reference to
Darwinism. There is a fitness in this which does not immediately appear.
The writer says:--
"What is called the question of the moral sense is really two:
how the moral faculty is acquired, and how it is regulated. Why
do we obey conscience or feel pain in disobeying it? And why does
conscience prescribe _one kind_ of actions and condemn another
kind? To put it more technically, there is the question of the
subjective existence of conscience, and there is the question of
its objective prescriptions."
I will avail myself of this distinction, and, setting aside the
questions referring to the "subjective existence of conscience," I
will ask attention only to "its objective prescriptions." Assuming,
then, the operations of conscience in the individual man, there will
necessarily also have been in the course of history some outward
expression of this inward feeling in maxims, precepts, and laws, if not
also reminiscences of primeval revelations and divine commands.
It will be true, therefore, to say, without touching the deeper
question of the foundation of morals, that there has been a tradition
of morals which cannot but have had its influence in all ages upon
the "social feelings" in which, according to the _Pall Mall Gazette_,
"it will always be necessary to lay the basis of conscience." Now
is this tradition of morals identical with utilitarian precept? If
the tradition of morals is identical with "the greatest happiness
principle," then that principle was no discovery of Bentham's,[15]
neither can Benthamism be regarded as "the new application of an old
principle." Bentham in that case simply informed mankind that they had
been talking prose all their lives without knowing it! Benthamism,
however, in point of fact, is felt as a new principle precisely in so
far as it discards the old morality. The question which I ask is, how
does it account for these old notions of morality obtaining among
mankind? How is it that mankind has so long and so persistently,
both in their notion of what was good and their sense of what was
evil, departed from the line of their true interests, as disclosed
in the utilitarian philosophy? If the history of man is what the
Scriptures tell us it was, the manner in which this has come about is
sufficiently explained; and there is no mystery as to the notion of
sin, the necessity of expiation, the restraints and limitations of
natural desires, the excellence of contemplation, and the obligation
of sacrifices and prayers. Now, if the history of mankind is not to be
invoked in explanation, it is difficult to see how these notions should
not conflict with any theory and plan of life based on a principle of
utility.[16] It is not unnatural, therefore, that the utilitarians
should turn to Darwinism and other such kindred systems for the
solution of their difficulties.
[15] Bentham speaks of his enunciation of "the greatest happiness
principle" in the following terms:--"Throughout the whole
horizon of morals and of politics, the consequences were
glorious and vast. It might be said without danger of
exaggeration, that they who sat in darkness had seen a great
light." With reference to this Lord Macaulay says, "We blamed
the utilitarians for claiming the credit of a discovery,
when they had merely stolen that morality (the morality of
the gospel) and spoiled it in the stealing. They have taken
the precept of Christ _and left the motive_, and they demand
the praise of a most wonderful and beneficial invention,
when all they have done has been to make a most useful maxim
useless _by separating it from its sanction. On religious
principles_ it is true that every individual will best promote
his own happiness by promoting the happiness of others. _But
if religious considerations be left out of the question it
is not true._ If we do not reason on the supposition of a
future state, where is the motive? If we do reason on that
supposition, where is the discovery?"--_Vide Lord Macaulay's
Essays on "Westminster Reviewer's Defence of Mill," and
"The Utilitarian Theory of Government" in Lord Macaulay's
"Miscellaneous Writings._"
[16] There was a way in which the argument was formerly stated
by utilitarians which was much more plausible, but which
I observe is now seldom if ever resorted to by the modern
exponents of this theory. The _Pall Mall Gazette_, April 12,
1871, says: "The now prevailing doctrine" that there is no
absolute standard of right and wrong, but "that the right and
wrong of an action or a motive depend upon the influence of
the action, or the motive upon the general good." The argument
to which I refer is thus stated by Mr W. O. Manning in his
"Commentaries on the Law of Nations," 1839:--"Everything
around us proves that God designed the happiness of His
creatures. It is the will of God that man should be happy.
To ascertain the will of God regarding any action, we have,
therefore, to consider the tendency of that action to promote
or diminish human happiness," p. 59. It is perfectly true
that man was created by God for happiness, and that ultimate
happiness, if he does not forfeit it, is the end to which
he is still destined. It is moreover true that even in this
world he may enjoy a conditional and comparative happiness.
How it is that this happiness cannot be complete and perfect
here below is precisely the secret which tradition reveals to
him. It is important, from the point of view of happiness,
both for individuals and nations, that the truth of this
revelation should be ascertained, and that the conditions
and limitations within which happiness is possible should
be known, otherwise life will be consumed in chimerical
pursuits of the unattainable, and in the case of nations will
be certain to end, at some time or another, in catastrophes
such as we have recently witnessed in Paris. In an enlarged
sense it is therefore true to say that the divine will has
regard to utility; but the view has this implied condition,
that what we regard as utility should in the first place be
conformable to what is directly or indirectly known to be the
divine precept and command; and, on the other hand, if no
advertence is made to revelation or the tradition of the human
race, what is called utility, however large and disinterested
the speculation may be, it can never be more than the view of
an individual or of a section of mankind, which it is highly
probable that other individuals and sections of mankind,
looking at the same facts, from a different point of view,
will see reason to contradict.
The _Pall Mall Gazette_, April 12, 1871, says:--
"Between Mr Darwin and utilitarians, as utilitarians, there is
no such quarrel as he would appear to suppose. The narrowest
utilitarian could say little more than Mr Darwin says (ii.
393):--'As all men desire their own happiness, praise or blame is
bestowed on actions and motives according as they tend to this end;
and as happiness is an essential part of the general good, the
greatest happiness principle indirectly serves as a nearly safe
standard of right and wrong.'"
Now, there is nothing in this reiteration of Benthamism which has not
been thrice refuted by Lord Macaulay in the Essays above referred to. I
append an extract more exactly to the point.[17]
[17] If "the magnificent principle" is thus stated, "mankind ought
to pursue their greatest happiness," it must be borne in
mind that there are persons whose interests are opposed to
the greatest happiness of mankind. Lord Macaulay's opponent
replies, "ought is not predicable of such persons; for the
word ought has no meaning unless it be used in reference to
some interest." Lord Macaulay replied, "that interest was
synonymous with greatest happiness; and that, therefore,
IF the word _ought_ has no meaning unless used with
reference to interest, then, to say that mankind ought to
pursue their greatest happiness, is simply to say that the
greatest happiness is the greatest happiness; that every
individual pursues his own happiness; that either what he
thinks his happiness must coincide with the greatest happiness
of society or not; that if what he thinks his happiness
coincides with the greatest happiness of society, he will
attempt to promote the greatest happiness of society whether
he ever heard of the "greatest happiness principle" or not;
and that, by the admission of the Westminster Reviewer,
IF _his_ happiness _is inconsistent with_ the
greatest happiness of society, there is no reason why he
should promote the greatest happiness of society. Now, that
there are individuals who think _that_ for their happiness
which is not for the greatest happiness of society, is
evident.... The question is not whether men have _some_
motives for promoting the greatest happiness, but whether
the _stronger_ motives be those which impel them to promote
the greatest happiness."--_Lord Macaulay's "Miscellaneous
Writings," Utilitarian Theory of Government_, pp. 177-9.
I refer to it because it will be interesting to see how the argument
looks in its application to Darwinism.
It will be seen that if the conditions of unlimited enjoyment anywhere
existed, Lord Macaulay's strictures would lose something of their
force. If, indeed, there was superabundance and superfluity of
everything for all in this life, then anything which conduces to the
satisfaction of the individual would add to, or at least would not
detract from, the sum of happiness of all mankind. But unless you can
show this--if even the reverse of this is the truth--then "the greatest
happiness" will be in proportion to the self-abnegation of those who
possess more, or have the greatest faculties or facilities of producing
more.
Now, if there is one view more prominent than another in Mr Darwin's
work, it is embodied in the phrase to which he has given a new sense
and significance, "the struggle for existence." In the midst of this
struggle for existence, what is there in the greatest happiness
principle to bind the individual to abnegation? Why should he postpone
his certain and immediate gratification to the remote advantage of
others, or of distant and contingent advantage to himself? If, on
the other hand, he regards the transitoriness of the enjoyment, and
balances it against the fixity and eternity of the consequences, the
argument takes altogether different proportions, and the temptation to
enjoyment is inversely to the intensity of the struggle for existence.
I will take another test of Benthamism by Darwinism, which will
more exactly bring out the argument for which I contend. We have
a traditional horror of infanticide which revolts all our best
feelings and shocks our principles. But if Mr Darwin has demonstrated
this struggle for existence existing from all time; if also we are
disembarrassed from all advertence to another world; if, further,
Mr Malthus, before Mr Darwin, has shown reason to believe that
over-population is the cause of half the evils of this life, what is
there in Benthamite principles which should prevent our sacrificing
these unconscious innocents to the greatest happiness of the greatest
number? Nothing, except the horror we should excite among mankind still
imbued with the old superstitions! A person who did not hold to Mr
Malthus' views might demur; but a Malthusian, who was also a disciple
of Mr Bentham, could only hold back because his feelings were better
than his principles. A disciple of Mr Darwin's would probably stand
aloof, and would merely see in our notions an artificial interference
with the working of his theory, preventing the struggle for existence
going on according to natural laws. This seems to me to be almost said
in the same article from the _Pall Mall Gazette_, from which I have
quoted. Mr Darwin, in his "Origin of Species" (p. 249), has pointed out
that "we ought to admire the savage instinct which leads the queen-bee
to destroy her young daughters as soon as born, because this is for
the good of the community." And in his new book he says, firmly and
unmistakably (i. 73), that "if men were reared under precisely the
same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our
unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty
to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile
daughters, and no one would think of interfering." The _Pall Mall_
continues--
"If, from one point of view, this is apt to shock a _timorous_
and _unreflecting_ mind, by asserting that the most cherished of
our affections might have been, under _certain_ circumstances, a
vicious piece of self-indulgence, and its place in the scale of
morality taken by what is _now_ the most atrocious kind of crime;
nevertheless, from another point of view, such an assertion is
as reassuring as the most absolute of moralists could desire,
for it is tantamount to saying that the foundations of morality,
the distinctions of right and wrong, are deeply laid in the very
conditions of social existence; that there is, in the face of
these conditions, a positive and definite difference between the
moral and the immoral, the virtuous and the vicious, the right and
the wrong, in the actions of individuals partaking of that social
existence."
This is very well. It is so _now_, because of the traditional
sentiments and principles which still retain their force--but how long
will it continue?
I invite attention to the following passage from Mr Hepworth Dixon's
"New America" (vol. i. p. 312, 6th edition), which I must say struck me
very forcibly when I read it. He narrates a conversation which he had
with Brigham Young on the subject of incest:--"Speaking for himself,
not for the church, he (Brigham Young) said he saw _none at all_
(_i.e._ no objection at all). He added, however, that he would not do
it himself,--'my prejudices prevent me.'" Upon which Mr Hepworth Dixon
observes--
"This _remnant_ of an old feeling brought from the Gentile world,
_and this alone_, would seem to prevent the saints (Mormons) from
rushing into the higher forms of incest. How long will these
Gentile sentiments remain in force? 'You will find here,' said
elder Stenhouse to me, talking on another subject, 'polygamists of
the third generation. When these boys and girls grow up and marry,
you will have in these valleys the _true feeling_ of patriarchal
life. The _old world is about us yet_, and we are always thinking
of what people may say in the Scottish hills and the Midland
shires.'"
Here, and in the previous extract, we seem to catch glimpses of what
the morality of the future is likely to be, at any rate in such matters
as infanticide and incest, if old notions are to be discarded, and
men are left, in each generation, to no higher rule than their own
individual calculation as to pleasure and pain, or to the prevailing
sense or determination of the community as to what the conditions of
utility may permit.
The nineteenth century is now verging on its decline, and of it, too,
may we say that it has been better than its principles. Yet, in spite
of its philanthropy, and its aspirations for good, the destructive
principles which it has nursed are rapidly gaining on its instincts:
and if we may not truly at this moment paint its glories, as they have
been depicted, I think by Alexandre Dumas, as "the livery of heroism,
turned up with assassination and incest," is the time very remote when
the description will apply?