OF TYRANNY.
Sect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a
right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no
body can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one
has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for
his own private separate advantage. When the governor, however intitled,
makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions
are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people,
but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any
other irregular passion.
Sect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it
comes from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king
will make it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to the
parliament, 1603, tells them thus,
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I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole
commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions, to any
particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and
weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly
felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a
tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point
of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping
tyrant, is this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth
think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of
his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king
doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the
procuring of the wealth and property of his people.
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And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words:
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The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the
fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and
so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom;
and expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just
king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made
to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable
thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after
the deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat,
and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the
earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a settled
kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as
soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws.
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And a little after,
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Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad
to bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that
persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them
and the commonwealth.
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Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes
the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that
one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public,
the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will
and appetite.
Sect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to
monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that:
for wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of
the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to
other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the
arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it; there it
presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or
many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at
Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome was
nothing better.
Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be
transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the
power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his
command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not,
ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be
opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another.
This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority
to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a
robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ,
notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal
authority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should
not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I
would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother,
because he has the greatest part of his father’s estate, should thereby
have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that
a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a
right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor
neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches,
exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from
being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which
the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great
aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more
a right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a
king than a constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has
more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of
his brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of his education,
employment, and counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right
and wrong.
Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be
resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but
imagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all
polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but
anarchy and confusion.
Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but
to unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other
case, draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so
no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,
Sect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the
law is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still
free from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial
censure or condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal
acts of any inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he
will, by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people,
dissolve the government, and leave them to that defence which belongs to
every one in the state of nature: for of such things who can tell what
the end will be? and a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd
example. In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him
from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, whilst the government
stands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than which there cannot
be a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person not
being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able
by his single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the
people, should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be
willing to do it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that
may happen sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well
recompensed by the peace of the public, and security of the government,
in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of
danger: it being safer for the body, that some few private men should be
sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the republic should
be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.
Sect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king’s
person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted,
who use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which
the law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the
king’s writ to arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king;
and yet he that has it cannot break open a man’s house to do it, nor
execute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain
places, though this commission have no such exception in it; but they
are the limitations of the law, which if any one transgress, the king’s
commission excuses him not: for the king’s authority being given him
only by the law, he cannot impower any one to act against the law, or
justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the commission, or command
of any magistrate, where he has no authority, being as void and
insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between the
one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority so far,
and to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the
commission, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and
against the laws there can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such
resistance, the king’s person and authority are still both secured, and
so no danger to governor or government.
Sect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the
chief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness
of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every
slight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the
injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the
law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where
a man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be
accounted hostile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an
appeal; and it is such force alone, that puts him that uses it into a
state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a sword in
his hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps I have not
twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another I
deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to
restore me, when I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the
possession of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The mischief
this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than
the other perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really did me
any); and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as hurt
the other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain; because the one using
force, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the
law to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The
law could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable;
which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who
had put himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my
destruction. But in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may
have the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100
pounds that way.
Sect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be
maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by
law, be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even
in such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight
occasions, disturb the government: for if it reach no farther than some
private men’s cases, though they have a right to defend themselves, and
to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the
right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest, wherein they
are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one, or a few oppressed
men to disturb the government, where the body of the people do not think
themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent
to overturn a well settled state; the people being as little apt to
follow the one, as the other.
Sect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the
majority of the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted
only on some few, but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences
seem to threaten all; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that
their laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in
danger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from
resisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell. This is an
inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments whatsoever, when
the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of
their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put
themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so
easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really
means the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their
laws together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father
of a family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of
them.
Sect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and
actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of
prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the
prince’s hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to
the end for which it was given: if the people shall find the ministers
and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured,
or laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppose them: if they see
several experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand
favoured, (tho’ publicly proclaimed against) which is readiest to
introduce it; and the operators in it supported, as much as may be; and
when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked the better: if a
long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way; how can a
man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, which
way things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he
could from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying
him, and the rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always
steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of
men and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way
for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the wind,
weather, and other circumstances would let him?