OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said;
if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the
greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why
will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and
controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that
though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of
it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others:
for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater
part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the
property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes
him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears
and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out,
and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united,
or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there
are many things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the
law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet
men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of
study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the
application of it to their particular cases.
Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according
to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and
executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves,
passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much
heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to
make them too remiss in other men’s.
Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to
back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution,
They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are
able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times
makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who
attempt it.
Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state
of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are
quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find
any number of men live any time together in this state. The
inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and
uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established
laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property.
It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of
punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it
amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by
them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original
right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as
of the governments and societies themselves.
Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of
innocent delights, a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of
himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which
law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one
community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And
were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there
would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate
from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements
combine into smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish
the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he
joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society,
and incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of
mankind.
Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the
preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be
regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation
of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of
the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of
nature.
Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and
engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the
execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he
thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law
thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to
enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of
others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole
strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in
providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the
society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the
other members of the society do the like.
Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the
equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature,
into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the
legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only
with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his
liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to
change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the
society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to
extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every
one’s property, by providing against those three defects above
mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so
whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is
bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to
the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright
judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the
force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or
abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community
from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end,
but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.