CHAPTER. VII.

OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.

Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment,

it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of

necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as

well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy

it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to

that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between

master and servant came to be added: and though all these might, and

commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the

master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each

of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall

see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of

these.

Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man

and woman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in

one another’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet

it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of

interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection,

but also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be

nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for

themselves.

Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not

barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; thisconjunction

betwixt male and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long

as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who

are to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift

and provide for themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker

hath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures

steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the

conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of

copulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the

young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but

concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can

contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer:

because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her

numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as

more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance

of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family,

which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by

the joint care of male and female. The same is to be observed in all

birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock

from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing

food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are

able to use their wing, and provide for themselves.

Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why

the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than

other creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and

de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth,

long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents

help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due

to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care

for those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal

society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young

being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation

returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at

liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again

to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the

great Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay

up for the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made

it necessary, that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than

of male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might

be encouraged, and their interest better united, to make provision and

lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy

and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb.

Sect. 81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal

bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals;

yet it would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where

procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for,

may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time,

or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts,

there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of

it, that it should always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no

restraint of any positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be

perpetual.

Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common

concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes

have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last

determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally

falls to the man’s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this

reaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves

the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her

peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than

she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an

absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate

from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that

contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs

or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such

separation fall to the father or mother’s lot, as such contract does

determine.

Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under

politic government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil

magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either naturally

necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and

assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy

that may arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise,

and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally

belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between man

and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where

the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of

matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of

conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to

that state. Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without

it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance

and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might

be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in

that society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up

of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being

necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it

is made.

Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct

rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so

largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any

thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a

politic society.

Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to

those of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant

to another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he

undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though

this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the

ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary

power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract

between them. But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar

name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the

right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power

of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and

with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state

of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be

considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the

preservation of property.

Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these

subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united

under the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it

may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little

commonwealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power

and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the

absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered

and short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that

the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited

power, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are

in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and

his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his

family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of

them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as

he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family,

who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a

family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly

political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political

society itself consists.

Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect

freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges

of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in

the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property,

that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts

of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in

others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself,

in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires

it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having

in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto,

punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only

is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this

natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all

cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law

established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular

member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled

standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men

having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules,

decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that

society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences

which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties

as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and

who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into

one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to,

with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish

offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no

such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature,

each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner;

which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.

Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what

punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think

worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is

the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any

injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it,

(which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation

of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is

possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and

is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to

punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own

private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given

up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the

magistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his

force, for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever

he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being

made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original

of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to

judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when

committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional

judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far

injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ

all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.

Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one

society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature,

and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or

civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the

state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body

politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins

himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for

hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative

thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall

require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own

decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of

a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to

determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may

happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the

legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are

any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power

to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.

Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men

is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with

civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the

end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies

of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being

judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every

one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy

that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;*

where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to,

for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are

still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in

respect of those who are under his dominion.

(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the

same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto

all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless

there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of

reason, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i.

sect. 16.)

Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and

executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no

appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with

authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be

expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the

prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or

Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature,

with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind: for

where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge

to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right

betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under

all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the

subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the

ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and

according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his

property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not

only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were

degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a

liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all

the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being

in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and

armed with power.

(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e.

such as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by

growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining

some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject

thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by

them the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be

procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they

might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek

their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it

was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be

withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him

to determine his own right, and according to his own determination

proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards

himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that

strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common

consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without

which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him

to be lord or judge over another, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s blood, and

corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of

this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would

have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not

probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion

shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and

the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what

the protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their

countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and

security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is

grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon,

may easily see.

Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of

the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide

any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the

subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks

necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to

society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether

this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as

we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more

than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may

and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying

one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage;

and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them,

but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked,

what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the

violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can

scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only

to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there

must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security:

but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such

circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is

right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or

injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently

the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of

nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one,

should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain

all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made

licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that

they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or

foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.

Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s

understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive,

that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil

society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against

any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in

the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to

take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in

civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only

they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall

be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this

discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency

amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as

to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of

their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without

any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and

wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade

us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing

innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another

stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the

government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the

preservation of* property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think

themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in

collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you

please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with

other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the

legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority;

avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of

superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the

miscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be

exempted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit,

and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any

harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state

of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless

any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the

same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of

anarchy as to affirm.

(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed,

it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of

goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were

to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very

inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did

indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that

to live by one man’s will, became the cause of all men’s misery. This

constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty

beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl.

Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore

over-rule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)

Second Treatise of Government · 第 7 / 19 章