the chain of influences. Such a procedure has certainly great historical
value, provided it does not make us ignore the fundamental fact, that
the human mind possesses an independent individuality, and, acting on
its own initiative, can gradually evolve out of itself, truths which may
have been anticipated by other minds ages ago. No idea can seize a
people's soul unless, in some sense, it is the people's own. External
influences may wake it up from its deep unconscious slumber; but they
cannot, so to speak, create it out of nothing.
Much has been written about the origin of Persian Ṣūfīism; and, in
almost all cases, explorers of this most interesting field of research
have exercised their ingenuity in discovering the various channels
through which the basic ideas of Ṣūfīism might have travelled from one
place to another. They seem completely to have ignored the principle,
that the full significance of a phenomenon in the intellectual evolution
of a people, can only be comprehended in the light of those pre-existing
intellectual, political, and social conditions which alone make its
existence inevitable. Von Kremer and Dozy derive Persian Ṣūfīism from
the Indian Vedanta; Merx and Mr. Nicholson derive it from Neo-Platonism;
while Professor Browne once regarded it as Aryan reaction against an
unemotional semitic religion. It appears to me, however, that these
theories have been worked out under the influence of a notion of
causation which is essentially false. That a fixed quantity A is the
cause of, or produces another fixed quantity B, is a proposition which,
though convenient for scientific purposes, is apt to damage all inquiry,
in so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions
lying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an
historical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due
to the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other
forces of a different character that tended to split up the political
unity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as
the cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have
assimilated, as it actually did to a certain extent, the so-called
cause, is a procedure that no logic would justify. Let us, therefore, in
the light of a truer theory of causation, enumerate the principal
political, social, and intellectual conditions of Islamic life about the
end of the 8{th} and the first half of the 9{th} century when, properly
speaking, the Ṣūfī ideal of life came into existence, to be soon
followed by a philosophical justification of that ideal.--
(1). When we study the history of the time, we find it to be a time of
more or less political unrest. The latter half of the 8{th} century
presents, besides the political revolution which resulted in the
overthrow of the Umayyads (749 A.D.), persecutions of Zendīks, and
revolts of Persian heretics (Sindbāh 755–6; Ustādhīs 766–8; the veiled
prophet of Ḵẖurāsān 777–80) who, working on the credulity of the
people, cloaked, like Lamennais in our own times, political projects
under the guise of religious ideas. Later on in the beginning of the
9{th} century we find the sons of Hārūn (Ma’mūn and Amīn) engaged in a
terrible conflict for political supremacy; and still later, we see the
Golden Age of Islamic literature seriously disturbed by the persistent
revolt of the Mazdakite Bābak (816–838). The early years of Ma’mun's
reign present another social phenomenon of great political
significance--the S̱ẖu‘ūbiyya controversy (815), which progresses with
the rise and establishment of independent Persian families, the Tāhirīd
(820), the Ṣaffārīd (868), and the Sāmānīd Dynasty (874). It is,
therefore, the combined force of these and other conditions of a similar
nature that contributed to drive away spirits of devotional character
from the scene of continual unrest to the blissful peace of an
ever-deepening contemplative life. The semitic character of the life and
thought of these early Muhammadan ascetics is gradually followed by a
large hearted pantheism of a more or less Aryan stamp, the development
of which, in fact, runs parallel to the slowly progressing political
independence of Persia.
(2). _The Sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism_ which found an
early expression in the poems of Bas̱ẖs̱ẖār ibn Burd--the blind
Persian Sceptic who deified fire, and scoffed at all non-Persian modes
of thought. The germs of Scepticism latent in Rationalism ultimately
necessitated an appeal to a super-intellectual source of knowledge which
asserted itself in the Risāla of Al-Qus̱ẖairī (986). In our own times
the negative results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason drove Jacobi and
Schleiermacher to base faith on the feeling of the reality of the ideal;
and to the 19{th} century sceptic Wordsworth uncovered that mysterious
state of mind "in which we grow all spirit and see into the life of
things".
(3). The unemotional piety of the various schools of Islam--the Ḥanafite
(Abu Ḥanīfa d. 767), the S̱ẖāfiite (Al-S̱ẖāfi‘ī d. 820), the Mālikite
(Al-Mālik d. 795), and the anthropomorphic Ḥambalite (Ibn Ḥambal d.
855)--the bitterest enemy of independent thought--which ruled the masses
after the death of Al-Ma’mūn.
(4). The religious discussions among the representatives of various
creeds encouraged by Al-Ma’mūn, and especially the bitter theological
controversy between the As̱ẖ‘arites, and the advocates of Rationalism
which tended not only to confine religion within the narrow limits of
schools, but also stirred up the spirit to rise above all petty
sectarian wrangling.
(5). The gradual softening of religious fervency due to the
rationalistic tendency of the early ‘Abbāsid period, and the rapid
growth of wealth which tended to produce moral laxity and indifference
to religious life in the upper circles of Islam.
(6). The presence of Christianity as a working ideal of life. It was,
however, principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than
his religious ideas, that exercised the greatest fascination over the
minds of early Islamic Saints whose complete unworldliness, though
extremely charming in itself, is, I believe, quite contrary to the
spirit of Islam.
Such was principally the environment of Ṣūfīism, and it is to the
combined action of the above condition that we should look for the
origin and development of Ṣūfīistic ideas. Given these condition and the
Persian mind with an almost innate tendency towards monism, the whole
phenomenon of the birth and growth of Ṣūfīism is explained. If we now
study the principal pre-existing conditions of Neo-Platonism, we find
that similar conditions produced similar results. The barbarian raids
which were soon to reduce Emperors of the Palace to Emperors of the
Camp, assumed a more serious aspect about the middle of the third
century. Plotinus himself speaks of the political unrest of his time in
one of his letters to Flaccus.[102:1] When he looked round himself in
Alexandria, his birth place, he noticed signs of growing toleration and
indifferentism towards religious life. Later on in Rome which had
become, so to say, a pantheon of different nations, he found a similar
want of seriousness in life, a similar laxity of character in the upper
classes of society. In more learned circles philosophy was studied as a
branch of literature rather than for its own sake; and Sextus Empiricus,
provoked by Antiochus's tendency to fuse scepticism and Stoicism was
teaching the old unmixed scepticism of Pyrrho--that intellectual despair
which drove Plotinus to find truth in a revelation above thought itself.
Above all, the hard unsentimental character of Stoic morality, and the
loving piety of the followers of Christ who, undaunted by long and
fierce persecutions, were preaching the message of peace and love to the
whole Roman world, necessitated a restatement of Pagan thought in a way
that might revivify the older ideals of life, and suit the new spiritual
requirements of the people. But the ethical force of Christianity was
too great for Neo-Platonism which, on account of its more
metaphysical[103:1] character, had no message for the people at large,
and was consequently inaccessible to the rude barbarian who, being
influenced by the actual life of the persecuted Christian adopted
Christianity, and settled down to construct new empires out of the ruins
of the old. In Persia the influence of culture-contacts and
cross-fertilisation of ideas created in certain minds a vague desire to
realise a similar restatement of Islam, which gradually assimilated
Christian ideals as well as Christian Gnostic speculation, and found a
firm foundation in the Qur’ān. The flower of Greek Thought faded away
before the breath of Christianity; but the burning simoon of Ibn
Taimiyya's invective could not touch the freshness of the Persian rose.
The one was completely swept away by the flood of barbarian invasions;
the other, unaffected by the Tartar revolution, still holds its own.
[102:1] "Tidings have reached us that Valerian has been
defeated, and is now in the hands of Sapor. The threats of
Franks and Allemanni, of Goths and Persians, are alike terrible
by turns to our _degenerate_ Rome." (Plotinus to Flaccus; quoted
by Vaughan in his Half hours with Mystics, p. 63.)
[103:1] The element of ecstacy which could have appealed to some
minds was thrown into the background by the later teachers of
Neo-Platonism, so that it became a mere system of thought having
no human interest. Says Whittaker:--"The mystical ecstacy was
not found by the later teachers of the school easier to attain,
but more difficult; and the tendency became more and more to
regard it as all but unattainable on earth." Neo-Platonism, p.
101.
This extraordinary vitality of the Ṣūfī restatement of Islam, however,
is explained when we reflect on the all-embracing structure of Ṣūfīism.
The semitic formula of salvation can be briefly stated in the words,
"Transform your will",--which signifies that the Semite looks upon will
as the essence of the human soul. The Indian Vedantist, on the other
hand, teaches that all pain is due to our mistaken attitude towards
the Universe. He, therefore, commands us to transform our
understanding--implying thereby that the essential nature of man
consists in thought, not activity or will. But the Ṣūfī holds that the
mere transformation of will or understanding will not bring peace; we
should bring about the transformation of both by a complete
transformation of feeling, of which will and understanding are only
specialised forms. His message to the individual is--"Love all, and
forget your own individuality in doing good to others." Says Rūmī:--"To
win other people's hearts is the greatest pilgrimage; and one heart is
worth more than a thousand Ka‘bahs. Ka‘bah is a mere cottage of Abraham;
but the heart is the very home of God." But this formula demands a _why_
and a _how_--a metaphysical justification of the ideal in order to
satisfy the understanding; and rules of action in order to guide the
will. Ṣūfīism furnishes both. Semitic religion is a code of strict rules
of conduct; the Indian Vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of
thought. Ṣūfīism avoids their incomplete Psychology, and attempts to
synthesise both the Semitic and the Aryan formulas in the higher
category of Love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhistic idea of
Nirwāna (Fanā-Annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in
the light of this idea; on the other hand it does not disconnect itself
from Islam, and finds the justification of its view of the Universe in
the Qur’ān. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway
between the Semitic and the Aryan, assimilating ideas from both sides,
and giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole,
is more Aryan than Semitic in character. It would, therefore, be evident
that the secret of the vitality of Ṣūfīism is the complete view of human
nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and
political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its
entirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a _life_ of
self-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well.
I will now briefly indicate how Ṣūfī writers justify their views from
the Quranic standpoint. There is no historical evidence to show that the
Prophet of Arabia actually communicated certain esoteric doctrines to
‘Alī or Abū Bakr. The Ṣūfī, however, contends that the Prophet had an
esoteric teaching--"wisdom"--as distinguished from the teaching
contained in the Book, and he brings forward the following verse to
substantiate his case:--"As we have sent a prophet to you from among
yourselves who reads our verses to you, purifies you, teaches you the
Book and the _Wisdom_, and teaches you _what you did not know
before_."[107:1] He holds that "the wisdom" spoken of in the verse, is
something not incorporated in the teaching of the Book which, as the
Prophet repeatedly declared, had been taught by several prophets before
him. If, he says, the wisdom is included in the Book, the word "Wisdom"
in the verse would be redundant. It can, I think, be easily shown that
in the Qur’ān as well as in the authenticated traditions, there are
germs of Ṣūfī doctrine which, owing to the thoroughly practical genius
of the Arabs, could not develop and fructify in Arabia, but which grew
up into a distinct doctrine when they found favourable circumstances in
alien soils. The Qur’ān thus defines the Muslims:--"Those who believe in
the Unseen, establish daily prayer, and spend out of what We have given
them."[108:1] But the question arises as to the _what_ and the _where_
of the Unseen. The Qur’ān replies that the Unseen is in your own
soul--"And in the earth there are signs to those who believe, and in
yourself,--what! do you not then see!"[108:2] And again--"We are nigher
to him (man) than his own jugular vein."[108:3] Similarly the Holy Book
teaches that the essential nature of the Unseen is pure light--"God is
the light of heavens and earth."[108:4] As regards the question whether
this Primal Light is personal, the Qur’ān, in spite of many expressions
signifying personality, declares in a few words--"There is nothing like
him."[108:5]
[107:1] Sura 2, v. 146.
[108:1] Sura 2, v. 2.
[108:2] Sura 51, v. 20, 21.
[108:3] Sura 50, v. 15.
[108:4] Sura 24, v. 35.
[108:5] Sura 42, v. 9.
These are some of the chief verses out of which the various Ṣūfī
commentators develop pantheistic views of the Universe. They enumerate
the following four stages of spiritual training through which the
soul--the order or reason of the Primal Light--("Say that the soul is
the order or reason of God.")[109:1] has to pass, if it desires to rise
above the common herd, and realise its union or identity with the
ultimate source of all things:--
(1). Belief in the Unseen.
(2). Search after the Unseen. The spirit of inquiry leaves its slumber
by observing the marvellous phenomena of nature. "Look at the camel how
it is created; the skies how they are exalted; the mountains how they
are unshakeably fixed."[109:2]
(3). The knowledge of the Unseen. This comes, as we have indicated
above, by looking into the depths of our own soul.
(4). The Realisation--This results, according to the higher Ṣūfīism
from the constant practice of Justice and Charity--"Verily God bids you
do justice and good, and give to kindred (their due), and He forbids you
to sin, and do wrong, and oppress".[110:1]
[109:1] Sura 17; v. 87.
[109:2] Sura 88; v. 20.
[110:1] Sura 16; v. 92.
It must, however, be remembered that some later Ṣūfī fraternities (e.g.
Naqs̱ẖbandī) devised, or rather borrowed[110:2] from the Indian
Vedantist, other means of bringing about this Realisation. They taught,
imitating the Hindu doctrine of Kundalīnī, that there are six great
centres of light of various colours in the body of man. It is the object
of the Ṣūfī to make them move, or to use the technical word, "current"
by certain methods of meditation, and eventually to realise, amidst the
apparent diversity of colours, the fundamental colourless light which
makes everything visible, and is itself invisible. The continual
movement of these centres of light through the body, and the final
realisation of their identity, which results from putting the atoms of
the body into definite courses of motion by slow repetition of the
various names of God and other mysterious expressions, illuminates the
whole body of the Ṣūfī; and the perception of the same illumination in
the external world completely extinguishes the sense of "otherness." The
fact that these methods were known to the Persian Ṣūfīs misled Von
Kremer who ascribed the whole phenomenon of Ṣūfīism to the influence of
Vedantic ideas. Such methods of contemplation are quite unislamic in
character, and the higher Ṣūfīs do not attach any importance to them.
[110:2] Weber makes the following statement on the authority of
Lassen:--"Al-Birūnī translated Patañjalī's work into Arabic at
the beginning of the 11th century, and also, it would appear,
the Sānkhya sūtra, though the information we have as to the
contents of these works does not harmonise with the Sanskrit
originals." History of Indian Literature, p. 239.
§ II.
Aspects of Ṣūfī-Metaphysics.
Let us now return to the various schools or rather the various aspects
of Ṣūfī Metaphysics. A careful investigation of Ṣūfī literature shows
that Ṣūfīism has looked at the Ultimate Reality from three standpoints
which, in fact, do not exclude but complement each other. Some Ṣūfīs
conceive the essential nature of reality as self-conscious will, others
beauty; others again hold that Reality is essentially Thought, Light or
Knowledge. There are, therefore, three aspects of Ṣūfī thought:--
A. _Reality as Self-conscious Will._
The first in historical order is that represented by S̱ẖaqīq Balḵẖī,
Ibrāhim Adham, Rābi‘a, and others. This school conceives the ultimate
reality as "Will", and the Universe a finite activity of that will. It
is essentially monotheistic and consequently more semitic in character.
It is not the desire of Knowledge which dominates the ideal of the Ṣūfīs
of this school, but the characteristic features of their life are piety,
unworldliness, and an intense longing for God due to the consciousness
of sin. Their object is not to philosophise, but principally to work out
a certain ideal of life. From our standpoint, therefore, they are not of
much importance.
B. _Reality as Beauty._
In the beginning of the 9{th} century Ma‘rūf Karḵẖī defined Ṣūfīism
as "Apprehension of Divine realities"[113:1]--a definition which marks
the movement from Faith to Knowledge. But the method of apprehending the
ultimate reality was formally stated by Al-Qus̱ẖairī about the end of
the 10{th} century. The teachers of this school adopted the Neo-Platonic
idea of creation by intermediary agencies; and though this idea lingered
in the minds of Ṣūfī writers for a long time, yet their Pantheism led
them to abandon the Emanation theory altogether. Like Avicenna they
looked upon the ultimate Reality as "Eternal Beauty" whose very nature
consists in seeing its own "face" reflected in the Universe-mirror. The
Universe, therefore, became to them a reflected image of the "Eternal
Beauty", and not an emanation as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The
cause of creation, says Mīr Sayyid S̱ẖarīf, is the manifestation of
Beauty, and the first creation is Love. The realisation of this Beauty,
is brought about by universal love, which the innate Zoroastrian
instinct of the Persian Ṣūfī loved to define as "the Sacred Fire which
burns up everything other than God." Says Rūmī:--
"O thou pleasant madness, Love!
Thou Physician of all our ills!
Thou healer of pride,
Thou Plato and Galen of our souls!"[114:1]
[113:1] Mr. Nicholson has collected the various definitions of
Ṣūfīism. See J. R. A. S. April, 1906.
[114:1] Maṯẖnawī, Jalāl al Dīn Rūmī, with Baḥral ‘ulūm's
Commentary. Lucknow (India), 1877, p. 9.
As a direct consequence of such a view of the Universe, we have the idea
of impersonal absorption which first appears in Bāyazīd of Bistām, and
which constitutes the characteristic feature of the later development of
this school. The growth of this idea may have been influenced by Hindu
pilgrims travelling through Persia to the Buddhistic temple still
existing at Bāku.[114:2] The school became wildly pantheistic in Ḥusain
Manṣūr who, in the true spirit of the Indian Vedantist, cried out, "I am
God"--Aham Brahma asmi.
[114:2] As regards the progress of Buddhism Geiger says:--"We
know that in the period after Alexander, Buddhism was powerful
in Eastern Iran, and that it counted its confessors as far as
Tabaristan. It is especially certain that many Buddhistic
priests were found in Bactria. This state of things, which began
perhaps in the first century before Christ, lasted till the
7{th} century A.D., when the appearance of Islamism alone cut
short the development of Buddhism in Kabul and Bactria, and it
is in that period that we will have to place the rise of the
Zarathushtra legend in the form in which it is presented to us
by Daqīqī."
Civilisation of Eastern Iranians
Vol. II, p. 170.
The ultimate Reality or Eternal Beauty, according to the Ṣūfīs of this
school, is infinite in the sense that "it is absolutely free from the
limitations of beginning, end, right, left, above, and below."[115:1]
The distinction of essence and attribute does not exist in the
Infinite--"Substance and quality are really identical."[115:2] We have
indicated above that nature is the mirror of the Absolute Existence. But
according to Nasafī, there are two kinds of mirrors[115:3]--
(a). That which shows merely a reflected image--this is external nature.
(b). That which shows the real Essence--this is man who is a limitation
of the Absolute, and erroneously thinks himself to be an independent
entity.
[115:1] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 8b.
[115:2] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 10b.
[115:3] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 23b.
"O Derwish!" says Nasafī "dost thou think that thy existence is
independent of God? This is a great error."[116:1] Nasafī explains his
meaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank
realised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt
that they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what constituted the
very source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great
river, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:--
"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in
union, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the
sea-shore! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!"
[116:1] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 3b.
[116:2] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 15b.
All feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all "otherness"
is a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of
relation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great
prophet of this school is "The excellent Rūmī" as Hegel calls him. He
took up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through
the various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in
spirit that Clodd introduces the passage in his "Story of Creation". I
venture to quote this famous passage in order to show how successfully
the poet anticipates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded
as the realistic side of his Idealism.
First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things,
Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.
For years he lived as one of the plants,
Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different;
And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state,
He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,
Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants,
Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;
Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,
Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast.
Again the great creator as you know,
Drew man out of the animal into the human state.
Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.
Of his first soul he has now no remembrance,
And he will be again changed from his present soul.
(Maṯẖnawī Book IV).
It would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of Ṣūfī thought
with the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The God of Neo-Platonism is
immanent as well as transcendant. "As being the cause of all things, it
is everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it
were only "everywhere", and not also "nowhere", it would _be_ all
things."[118:1] The Ṣūfī, however, tersely says that God _is_ all things.
The Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to
matter;[118:2] but the Ṣūfīs of the school in question, regard all
empirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they
say, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine
of Impersonal immortality--"genuinely eastern in spirit"--which
distinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. "Its (Arabian Philosophy)
distinctive doctrine", says Whittaker, "of an Impersonal immortality of
the general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with
Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original."
[118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58.
[118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57.
The above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of
this mode of thought:--
(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state
of consciousness.
(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal.
(c). That the ultimate Reality is one.
Corresponding to these ideas we have:
(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet ‘Umar Ḵẖayyām
(12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:--
The joyous souls who quaff potations deep,
And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep,
Are lost at sea alike, and find no shore,
One only wakes, all others are asleep.
(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the
13{th} century.
(III). The Pluralistic reaction of Wāḥid Maḥmūd[119:1] in the 13{th}
century.
[119:1] Dabistān, Chap: 8.
Speaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is
most interesting. The history of Thought illustrates the operation of
certain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual
annals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought
invoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called
forth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led Wāḥid
Maḥmūd to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that
Reality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the
Universe is a combination of what he called "Afrād"--essential units, or
simple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with
life. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental
matter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the
kind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his
cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world
is decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe.
Wāḥid Maḥmūd succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted,
and finally stamped out of existence by S̱ẖāh ‘Abbās. It is said that
the poet Ḥāfiz of S̱ẖīrāz believed in the tenets of this sect.
C. _Reality as Light or Thought._
The third great school of Ṣūfīism conceives Reality as essentially Light
or Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or
illuminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this
school transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects
of the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in
spirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought.
Both agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates
a principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now
proceed to consider them in their historical order.
I. Reality as Light--Al-Is̱ẖrāqī.
Return to Persian Dualism.
The application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that
spirit of critical examination which began with Al-As̱ẖ‘arī, and found
its completest expression in the scepticism of Al-G̱ẖazālī. Even among
the Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as
Nazzām--whose attitude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile
submission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of
dogma--Al-G̱ẖazālī, Al-Rāzī, Abul Barakāt, and Al-Āmidī, carried on a
persistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu
Sa‘īd Ṣairāfī, Qaḍī ‘Abdal Jabbār, Abul Ma‘ālī, Abul Qāsim, and finally
the acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives,
continued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their
criticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some
of the more learned Ṣūfīs, such as Shahābal Dīn Suhrawardī, who
endeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his
refutation of Greek thought in a work entitled, "The unveiling of Greek
absurdities". The As̱ẖ‘arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not
only in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some
of its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out
fetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the
speculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-Fārābī and
Avicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in passing over
into scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism
of Greek Philosophy which led to the As̱ẖ‘arite Idealism on the one
hand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system
of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of
foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was
indispensable. The As̱ẖ‘arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma
completed the destruction; Al-Is̱ẖrāqī--the child of emancipation--came
forward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of
reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is
the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow
minded authority, asserts its right of free independent speculation. In
his philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial
expression in the writings of the Physician Al-Rāzī, Al-G̱ẖazālī, and
the Ismā‘īlia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the
philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam.
[122:1] Vol. I, p. 367.
Shaikh S̱ẖahābal Dīn Suhrawardī, known as S̱ẖaiḵẖal Is̱ẖrāq Maqtūl
was born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy
with Majd Jīlī--the teacher of the commentator Al-Rāzī--and, while
still a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world.
His great admirer Al-Malik-al-Zāhir--the son of Sultan Ṣalāḥ-al
Dīn--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his
independent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of
contemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism
which, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep
brute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan Ṣalāḥ-al Dīn, that the
S̱ẖaiḵẖ's teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary,
in the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan
consented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker
calmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised
his name for ever. Murderers have passed away, but the philosophy, the
price of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an
earnest seeker after truth.
The principal features of the founder of the Is̱ẖrāqī Philosophy are
his intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his
materials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to
the philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he
differs from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he
looks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing
escapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a
searching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its
doctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia,
according to Aristotle. But Al-Is̱ẖrāqī holds that the distinctive
attribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other
thing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define "horse" as a
neighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many
animals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to
understand the attribute "neighing", since it is found nowhere except in
the thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be
meaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian
definition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism
leads the S̱ẖaiḵẖ, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet
who defines definition, as "Summation of qualities". The S̱ẖaiḵẖ
holds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential
attributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing
defined, though they may individually exist in other things.
But let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of
his contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to
comprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy,
the student, says the S̱ẖaiḵẖ, must be thoroughly acquainted with
Aristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and Ṣūfīism. His mind
should be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that
he may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects
what intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is
untrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by "Ḏẖauq"--the
mysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge
and peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are,
however, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual
experience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and
systematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the
various aspects of the Is̱ẖrāqī Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and
Psychology.
Ontology.
The ultimate principle of all existence is "Nūr-i-Qāhir"--the Primal
Absolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual
illumination. "Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does
not stand in need of any definition."[127:1] The essence of Light,
therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute
superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no
visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in
itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that
something other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light,
therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is
other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible.
The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an
independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian
religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities
created by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of
Persia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground
of the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more
than one, assigned two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The
relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and
non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own
negation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This
Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not
change of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which
constitutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken
all things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The
number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations
of intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other
illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to
illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these
illuminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels
through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance
from the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted
the number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in
enumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal
Light are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a
partial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of
Aristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for
human thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite
variety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may
illuminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate
between the following two illuminations of the original Light:--
[127:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya--Al-Harawī's commentary on
Al-Is̱ẖrāqī's Hikmat al-Is̱ẖrāq, fol. 10a.
(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as
individual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything
other than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of
partly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one
another in the amount of lustre, which is determined by their
comparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their
being. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a
more distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows
itself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal
its own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore,
is the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the
negation of light.
(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is
capable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g.
the light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The
Accidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant
reflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has
lost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of
continuous reflection is really a softening process; successive
illuminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of
reflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely
lose their independent character, and cannot exist except in
association with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental
light--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation,
therefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of
cause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct
from its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed
cause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of
the illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental
light; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently
capable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without
affecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated
body, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of
disillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an
inactive cause.[131:1]
[131:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 11b.
It is now obvious that the S̱ẖaiḵẖ al-Is̱ẖrāq agrees with the
As̱ẖ‘arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima
Materia of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary
negation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further
agrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except
Substance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so
far as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation
with the objects of our knowledge is not merely a passive relation; the
individual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in
the act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active
illumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this
illumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the
Primal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to
us. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a
few only. The S̱ẖaiḵẖ, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive
thought, is not far from modern Humanism.
Cosmology.
All that is "not-light" is, what the Is̱ẖrāqī thinkers call, "Absolute
quantity", or "Absolute matter". It is only another aspect of the
affirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the
followers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the
transformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this
fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of
grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. The
absolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:--
(1). That which is beyond space--the obscure substance or atoms
(essences of the As̱ẖ‘arite).
(2). That which is necessarily in space--forms of darkness, e.g. weight,
smell, taste, etc.
The combination of these two particularises the Absolute matter. A
material body is forms of darkness plus obscure substance, made visible
or illuminated by the Abstract light. But what is the cause of the
various forms of darkness? These, like the forms of light, owe their
existence to the Abstract light, the different illuminations of which
cause diversity in the spheres of being. The forms which make bodies
differ from one another, do not exist in the nature of the Absolute
matter. The Absolute quantity and the Absolute matter being identical,
if these forms do exist in the essence of the Absolute matter, all
bodies would be identical in regard to the forms of darkness. This,
however, is contradicted by daily experience. The cause of the forms of
darkness, therefore, is not the Absolute matter. And as the difference
of forms cannot be assigned to any other cause, it follows that they are
due to the various illuminations of the Abstract light. Forms of light
and darkness both owe their existence to the Abstract Light. The third
element of a material body--the obscure atom or essence--is nothing but
a necessary aspect of the affirmation of light. The body as a whole,
therefore, is completely dependent on the Primal Light. The whole
Universe is really a continuous series of circles of existence, all
depending on the original Light. Those nearer to the source receive more
illumination than those more distant. All varieties of existence in each
circle, and the circles themselves, are illuminated through an infinite
number of medium-illuminations, which preserve some forms of existence
by the help of "conscious light" (as in the case of man, animal and
plant), and some without it (as in the case of minerals and primary
elements). The immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe,
is, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of
direct or indirect illuminations and rays of the Primary Light. Things
are, so to speak, fed by their respective illuminations to which they
constantly move, with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more
of the original fountain of Light. The world is an eternal drama of
love. The different planes of being are as follow:--
The Plane ┌ 1. The Plane of Intellects--the
of Primal │ parent of the heavens,
Light. │ 2. The Plane of the Soul.
└ 3. The Plane of Form.
│
│ ┌ 1. The Plane ┌ 1. The Plane of
│ │ of ideal │ the heavens.
└────┤ form. ────────────┤
│ 2. The Plane │ 2. The Plane of
│ of material └ the elements:--
└ forms:--
(a). The heavens (a). Simple elements.
(b). The elements:-- (b). Compounds:--
1. Simple elements I. Mineral kingdom.
2. Compounds:-- II. Vegetable kingdom.
I. Mineral kingdom. III. Animal kingdom.
II. Vegetable kingdom.
III. Animal kingdom.
Having briefly indicated the general nature of Being, we now proceed to
a more detailed examination of the world-process. All that is not-light
is divided into:--
(1). Eternal e.g., Intellects, Souls of heavenly bodies, heavens, simple
elements, time, motion.
(2). Contingent e.g., Compounds of various elements. The motion of the
heavens is eternal, and makes up the various cycles of the Universe. It
is due to the intense longing of the heaven-soul to receive illumination
from the source of all light. The matter of which the heavens are
constructed, is completely free from the operation of chemical
processes, incidental to the grosser forms of the not-light. Every
heaven has its own matter peculiar to it alone. Likewise the heavens
differ from one another in the direction of their motion; and the
difference is explained by the fact that the beloved, or the sustaining
illumination, is different in each case. Motion is only an aspect of
time. It is the summing up of the elements of time, which, as
externalised, is motion. The distinction of past, present, and future
is made only for the sake of convenience, and does not exist in the
nature of time.[137:1] We cannot conceive the beginning of time; for the
supposed beginning would be a point of time itself. Time and motion,
therefore, are both eternal.
[137:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 34a.
There are three primordial elements--water, earth, and wind. Fire,
according to the Is̱ẖrāqīs, is only burning wind. The combinations of
these elements, under various heavenly influences, assume various
forms--fluidity, gaseousness, solidity. This transformation of the
original elements, constitutes the process of "making and unmaking"
which pervades the entire sphere of the not-light, raising the different
forms of existence higher and higher, and bringing them nearer and
nearer to the illuminating forces. All the phenomena of nature--rain,
clouds, thunder, meteor--are the various workings of this immanent
principle of motion, and are explained by the direct or indirect
operation of the Primal Light on things, which differ from one another
in their capacity of receiving more or less illumination. The Universe,
in one word, is a petrified desire; a crystallised longing after light.
But is it eternal? The Universe is a manifestation of the illuminative
Power which constitutes the essential nature of the Primal Light. In so
far, therefore, as it is a manifestation, it is only a dependent being,
and consequently not eternal. But in another sense it is eternal. All
the different spheres of being exist by the illuminations and rays of
the Eternal light. There are some illuminations which are directly
eternal; while there are other fainter ones, the appearance of which
depends on the combination of other illuminations and rays. The
existence of these is not eternal in the same sense as the existence of
the pre-existing parent illuminations. The existence of colour, for
instance, is contingent in comparison to that of the ray, which
manifests colour when a dark body is brought before an illuminating
body. The Universe, therefore, though contingent as manifestation, is
eternal by the eternal character of its source. Those who hold the
non-eternity of the Universe argue on the assumption of the possibility
of a complete induction. Their argument proceeds in the following
manner:--
(1). Everyone of the Abyssinians is black.
⁂ All Abyssinians are black.
(2). Every motion began at a definite moment.
⁂ All motion must begin so.
But this mode of argumentation is vicious. It is quite impossible to
state the major. One cannot collect all the Abyssinians past, present,
and future, at one particular moment of time. Such a Universal,
therefore, is impossible. Hence from the examination of individual
Abyssinians, or particular instances of motion which fall within the
pale of our experience, it is rash to infer, that all Abyssinians are
black, or all motion had a beginning in time.
Psychology.
Motion and light are not concomitant in the case of bodies of a lower
order. A piece of stone, for instance, though illuminated and hence
visible, is not endowed with self-initiated movement. As we rise,
however, in the scale of being, we find higher bodies, or organisms in
which motion and light are associated together. The abstract
illumination finds its best dwelling place in man. But the question
arises whether the individual abstract illumination which we call the
human soul, did or did not exist before its physical accompaniment. The
founder of Is̱ẖrāqī Philosophy follows Avicenna in connection with this
question, and uses the same arguments to show, that the individual
abstract illuminations cannot be held to have pre-existed, as so many
units of light. The material categories of one and many cannot be
applied to the abstract illumination which, in its essential nature, is
neither one nor many; though it appears as many owing to the various
degrees of illuminational receptivity in its material accompaniments.
The relation between the abstract illumination, or soul and body, is not
that of cause and effect; the bond of union between them is love. The
body which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since
its nature does not permit a direct communication between the source of
light and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received
light to the dark solid body which, considering its attributes, stands
on the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other,
they require a medium between them, something standing midway between
light and darkness. This medium is the animal soul--a hot, fine,
transparent vapour which has its principal seat in the left cavity of
the heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because
of the partial identity of the animal soul with light that, in dark
nights, land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea-animals
leave their aquatic abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the
moon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher and higher in the
scale of being, and to receive more and more illumination which
gradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is
this ideal to be realised? By knowledge and action. It is the
transformation of both understanding and will, the union of action and
contemplation, that actualizes the highest ideal of man. Change your
attitude towards the Universe, and adopt the line of conduct
necessitated by the change. Let us briefly consider these means of
realisation:--
A. _Knowledge._ When the Abstract illumination associates itself with a
higher organism, it works out its development by the operation of
certain faculties--the powers of light, and the powers of darkness. The
former are the five external senses, and the five internal
senses--sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding, and memory;
the latter are the powers of growth, digestion, etc. But such a division
of faculties is only convenient. "One faculty can be the source of all
operations."[142:1] There is only one power in the middle of the brain,
though it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind
is a unity which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as
multiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be
distinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real
essence of man. The Philosopher of illumination appears to draw a
distinction between the active mind and the essentially inactive soul;
yet he teaches that in some mysterious way, all the various faculties
are connected with the soul.
[142:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 57b.
The most original point in his psychology of intellection, however, is
his theory of vision.[142:2] The ray of light which is supposed to come
out of the eye must be either substance or quality. If quality, it
cannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance
(visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves
either consciously, or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious
movement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver
in this case would be the ray, not man. If the movement of the ray is an
attribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be
peculiar to one direction, and not to all. The ray of light, therefore,
cannot be regarded as coming out of the eye. The followers of Aristotle
hold that in the process of vision images of objects are printed on the
eye. This view is also erroneous; since images of big things cannot be
printed on a small space. The truth is that when a thing comes before
the eye, an illumination takes place, and the mind sees the object
through that illumination. When there is no veil between the object and
the normal sight, and the mind is ready to perceive, the act of vision
must take place; since this is the law of things. "All vision is
illumination; and we see things in God". Berkley explained the
relativity of our sight-perceptions with a view to show that the
ultimate ground of all ideas is God. The Is̱ẖrāqī Philosopher has the
same object in view, though his theory of vision is not so much an
explanation of the sight-process as a new way of looking at the fact of
vision.
[142:2] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 60b.
Besides sense and reason, however, there is another source of knowledge
called "Ḏẖauq"--the inner perception which reveals non-temporal and
non-spatial planes of being. The study of philosophy, or the habit of
reflecting on pure concepts, combined with the practice of virtue, leads
to the upbringing of this mysterious sense, which corroborates and
corrects the conclusions of intellect.
B. _Action._ Man as an active being has the following motive powers:
(a). Reason or the Angelic soul--the source of intelligence,
discrimination, and love of knowledge.
(b). The beast-soul which is the source of anger, courage, dominance,
and ambition.
(c). The animal soul which is the source of lust, hunger, and sexual
passion.
The first leads to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by
reason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. The harmonious use of
all results in the virtue of justice. The possibility of spiritual
progress by virtue, shows that this world is the best possible world.
Things as existent are neither good nor bad. It is misuse or limited
standpoint that makes them so. Still the fact of evil cannot be denied.
Evil does exist; but it is far less in amount than good. It is peculiar
only to a part of the world of darkness; while there are other parts of
the Universe which are quite free from the taint of evil. The sceptic
who attributes the existence of evil to the creative agency of God,
presupposes resemblance between human and divine action, and does not
see that nothing existent is free in his sense of the word. Divine
activity cannot be regarded as the creator of evil in the same sense as
we regard some forms of human activity as the cause of evil.[145:1]
[145:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 92b.
It is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees
itself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the
nature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of
light; and the love of that world becomes more and more intense. The
stages of spiritual development are infinite, since the degrees of love
are infinite. The principal stages, however, are as follows:--
(1). The stage of "_I_". In this stage the feeling of personality is
most predominant, and the spring of human action is generally
selfishness.
(2). The stage of "_Thou art not_". Complete absorption in one's own
deep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external.
(3). The stage of "_I am not_". This stage is the necessary result of
the second.
(4). The stage of "_Thou art_". The absolute negation of "_I_", and the
affirmation of "_Thou_", which means complete resignation to the will of
God.
(5). The stage of "_I am not; and thou art not_". The complete negation
of both the terms of thought--the state of cosmic consciousness.
Each stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are
accompanied by some indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to
the spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death,
are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in
proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship
with physical organisms. The Philosopher of illumination anticipates
Leibniz's doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and holds that no
two souls can be completely similar to each other.[147:1] When the
material machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual
illumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body
determined by the experiences of the previous life; and rises higher and
higher in the different spheres of being, adopting forms peculiar to
those spheres, until it reaches its destination--the state of absolute
negation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make
up their deficiencies.[147:2] The doctrine of trans-migration cannot be
proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint; though it is a
probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All
souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which
calls back the whole Universe when this journey is over, and starts
another cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history
of the preceding cycles.
[147:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 82.
[147:2] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 87b.
Such is the philosophy of the great Persian martyr. He is, properly
speaking, the first Persian systematiser who recognises the elements of
truth in all the aspects of Persian speculation, and skilfully
synthesises them in his own system. He is a pantheist in so far as he
defines God as the sum total of all sensible and ideal existence.[148:1]
To him, unlike some of his Ṣūfī predecessors, the world is something
real, and the human soul a distinct individuality. With the orthodox
theologian, he maintains that the ultimate cause of every phenomenon,
is the absolute light whose illumination forms the very essence of the
Universe. In his psychology he follows Avicenna, but his treatment of
this branch of study is more systematic and more empirical. As an
ethical philosopher, he is a follower of Aristotle whose doctrine of the
mean he explains and illustrates with great thoroughness. Above all he
modifies and transforms the traditional Neo-Platonism, into a thoroughly
Persian system of thought which, not only approaches Plato, but also
spiritualises the old Persian Dualism. No Persian thinker is more alive
to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in
reference to his fundamental principles. He constantly appeals to
experience, and endeavours to explain even the physical phenomena in the
light of his theory of illumination. In his system objectivity, which
was completely swallowed up by the exceedingly subjective character of
extreme pantheism, claims its due again, and, having been subjected to a
detailed examination, finds a comprehensive explanation. No wonder then
that this acute thinker succeeded in founding a system of thought,
which has always exercised the greatest fascination over minds--uniting
speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. The narrow-mindedness of his
contemporaries gave him the title of "Maqtūl" (the killed one),
signifying that he was not to be regarded as "S̱ẖahīd" (Martyr); but
succeeding generations of Ṣūfīs and philosophers have always given him
the profoundest veneration.
[148:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 81b.
I may here notice a less spiritual form of the Is̱ẖrāqī mode of
thought. Nasafī[150:1] describes a phase of Ṣūfī thought which reverted
to the old materialistic dualism of Mānī. The advocates of this view
hold, that light and darkness are essential to each other. They are, in
reality, two rivers which mix with each other like oil and milk,[150:2]
out of which arises the diversity of things. The ideal of human action
is freedom from the taint of darkness; and the freedom of light from
darkness means the self-consciousness of light as light.
[150:1] Maqsadi Aqsā; fol. 21a.
[150:2] Maqsadi Aqsā; fol. 21a.
II. Reality as Thought--Al-Jīlī.
Al-Jīlī was born in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses,
and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like S̱ẖaiḵẖ Muḥy
al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced
his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and
philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his
mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a
commentary on S̱ẖaiḵẖ Muḥy al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī's al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiya,
a commentary on Bismillāh, and the famous work Insān al-Kāmil (printed
in Cairo).
Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and
attributes are given, whether it is existent actually or ideally. The
existent is of two species:--
(1). The Existent in Absoluteness or Pure existence--Pure Being--God.
(2). The existence joined with non-existence--Creation--Nature.
The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can
express it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The
intellect flying through the fathomless empty space pierces through the
veil of names and attributes, traverses the vasty sphere of time, enters
the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to
be an existence which is non-existence--a sum of contradictions.[152:1]
It has two (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life
in all future time. It has two (qualities), God and creation. It has two
(definitions), uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two names, God
and man. It has two faces, the manifested (this world) and the
unmanifested (the next world). It has two effects, necessity and
possibility. It has two points of view; from the first it is
non-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the
second it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not
itself.
[152:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 10.
Name, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the
mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is
the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named; while the named is
the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in
name only as "‘Anqā" (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which
does not exist in reality. Just as "‘Anqā" is absolutely non-existent,
so God is absolutely present, although He cannot be touched and seen.
The "‘Anqā" exists only in idea while the object of the name "Allāh"
exists in reality and can be known like "‘Anqā" only through its names
and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of
the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees
Himself. Al-Jīlī here approaches the Isma‘īlia view that we should seek
the Named through the Name.
In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three
stages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by him. He holds
that the Absolute existence or Pure Being when it leaves its
absoluteness undergoes three stages:--(1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3)
I-ness. In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and
relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step
away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free
from all manifestation, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an
external manifestation of the He-ness; or, as Hegel would say, it is the
self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name
Allāh; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to
the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that
the name Allāh is the stuff of all the perfections of the different
phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure
Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially
contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third
stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which
God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the
gloom of the Absolute Being.
In correspondence with these three stages of the absolute development,
the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case
the process of development must be the reverse; because his is the
process of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a
process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he
meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the
second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute, and in the third
stage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the
Perfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God
and his life the life of God--participates in the general life of Nature
and "sees into the life of things".
To turn now to the nature of the attribute. His views on this most
interesting question are very important, because it is here that his
doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines attribute
as an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.[155:1]
Elsewhere he says that this distinction of attribute from the underlying
reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested, because here
every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is
supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of
combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the
distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because
there is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed
how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of "Māyā". He
believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward
husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less
real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real
entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception
furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in
understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree
with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically
Hegelian doctrine--identity of thought and being. In the 37{th} chapter
of the 2{nd} volume of Insān al-Kāmil, he clearly says that idea is the
stuff of which this universe is made; thought, idea, notion is the
material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this
doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the
reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the
idea."[157:1] Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He gives
his hearty assent to the results of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_;
but, unlike him, he makes this very idea the essence of the Universe.
Kant's _Ding an sich_ to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing
behind the collection of attributes. The attributes are the real things,
the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it
is the other self of the Absolute--another which owes its existence to
the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature
is the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself.
While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being,
Al-Jīlī calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be
noted that the author's phrase, "world of attributes", which he uses for
the material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that
the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does
not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful, because it
facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at
all real. It will be understood that Al-Jīlī recognises the truth of
Empirical Idealism only tentatively, and does not admit the absoluteness
of the distinction. These remarks should not lead us to understand that
Al-Jīlī does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in
itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says
that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the
external expression of the thing in itself. The _Ding an sich_ and its
external expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really
identical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate
our understanding of the universe. If they are not identical, he says,
how could one manifest the other? In one word, he means by _Ding an
sich_, the Pure, the Absolute Being, and seeks it through its
manifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not
realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the
world of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is
brought home to us the veil is removed; we see the Essence itself
everywhere, and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature
then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are one
with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases, and the inquisitive
attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the
person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no
new information, and religion with her _role_ of supernatural authority
has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation.
[155:1] Insān al-Kāmil; Vol. I, p. 22.
[157:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. II, p. 26.
Let us now see how he classifies the different divine names and
attributes which have received expression in nature or crystallised
Divinity. His classification is as follows:--
(1). The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (Allāh, The
One, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living.)
(2). The names and attributes of God as the source of all glory (The
Great and High, The All-powerful).
(3). The names and attributes of God as all Perfection (The Creator, The
Benefactor, The First, The Last).
(4). The names and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The
Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all). Each of these names and
attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the
soul of the perfect man and Nature. How these illuminations take place,
and how they reach the soul is not explained by Al-Jīlī. His silence
about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his
views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship.
Before considering Al-Jīlī's views of particular Divine Names and
Attributes, we should note that his conception of God, implied in the
above classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While
the German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single
attribute of Power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free
from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself
God is an unchangeable unity, and that His attributes "are nothing more
than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various
appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite
intelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the
spiritual landscape."[161:1] In His absolute existence He is beyond the
limitation of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself,
when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and
attributes appear sealed on her very fabric.
[161:1] Matheson's _Aids to the Study of German Theology_, p.
43.
We now proceed to consider what he teaches about particular Divine Names
and Attributes. The first Essential Name is Allāh (Divinity) which means
the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in
that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence.
Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference
between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its _where_
is invisible; while the traces of the former are visible, itself is
invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature
is not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible, and its traces in
the form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author
illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice; but ice is
not water. The Essence is visible to the eye, (another proof of our
author's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its
attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as
they are in themselves, their shadows or effects only are known. For
instance, charity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of
giving to the poor, is known and seen. This is due to the attributes
being incorporated in the very nature of the Essence. If the expression
of the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation
from the Essence would have been possible also. But there are some other
Essential Names of God--The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The
Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness
of Cecity (the internal or the original Māyā of the Vedānta) to the
light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any
external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow
universality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall;
but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that
contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity--but a unity which
comprehends diversity, so Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the
soul of diversity.
The third movement of the Absolute Being is Simple Oneness--a step
attended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from
all particular names and attributes. The Oneness Simple takes on names
and attributes, but there is no distinction between these attributes,
one is the essence of the other. Divinity is similar to Simple Oneness,
but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even
contradictory, as generous is contradictory to revengeful.[163:1] The
third step, or as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being, has another
appellation (Mercy). The First Mercy, the author says, is the evolution
of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in
every atom of the result of His own self-diremption. Al-Jīlī makes this
point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and
God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allāh); ice or condensed
water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere he calls water the
origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This
instance leads him to guard against the error of looking upon God as
immanent in nature, or running through the sphere of material existence.
He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent
because He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self
of God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator
of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The
difference between God and man, as one may say, is that His ideas
materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that
Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the
accusation of Pantheism.
[163:1] This would seem very much like the idea of the
phenomenal Brahma of the Vedānta. The Personal Creator or the
Prajāpati of the Vedānta makes the third step of the Absolute
Being or the Noumenal Brahma. Al-Jīlī seems to admit two kinds
of Brahma--with or without qualities like the Śamkara and
Bādarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a
lowering of the Absolute Thought, which is Asat, in so far as it
is absolute, and Sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence
limited. Notwithstanding this Absolute Monism, he inclines to a
view similar to that of Rāmānuja. He seems to admit the reality
of the individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Śamkara, that
Īśwara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment
of the Higher Knowledge.
The attribute of Mercy is closely connected with the attribute of
Providence. He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in
need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name.
The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he
would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a
certain force of nature; Al-Jīlī would call it a manifestation of
Providence; but, unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate
the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing
behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself.
We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and
proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The
Arabian Prophet, says Al-Jīlī, was once questioned about the place of
God before creation. He said that God, before the creation, existed in
"‘Amā" (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal
darkness which we now proceed to examine. The investigation is
particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern
phraseology would be "_The Unconsciousness_". This single word impresses
upon us the foresightedness with which he anticipates metaphysical
doctrines of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the
reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending
movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation; it does
not stand in need of any name or quality, because it is beyond the
sphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Absolute Oneness
because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of
coming down towards manifestation. It should, however, be remembered
that when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation,
our words must not be understood as implying time; for there can be no
duration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time,
continuity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can
piece of creation intervene between God and His creation. Hence our
words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought,
should not be construed to imply time or space. The real thing is beyond
the grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be
applicable to it; because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena
cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena.
We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has
three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author
calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "When God illuminates a
certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the
dazzling splendour of that name; and "when thou calleth God, the call is
responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in
Schopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it
must not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes
on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after
he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries
out in pantheistic mood:--She was I and I was she and there was none to
separate us."[167:1]
[167:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 40.
The second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls the
illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man
receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the
power of receptivity possessed by him--a fact which classifies men
according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the
illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of
Life, and thus participate in the soul of the Universe. The effect of
this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the
magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the perfect
man receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the
sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of the
Essence--Absolute Existence.
As we have already seen, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its
absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process
of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence.
Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which
has its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is
the end of our author's spiritual ethics; _man has become perfect_, he
has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or _has learnt what
Hegel calls The Absolute Philosophy_. "He becomes the paragon of
perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the
Universe".[169:1] He is the point where Man-ness and God-ness become
one, and result in the birth of the god-man.
[169:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 48.
How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the
author does not tell us; but he says that at every stage he has a
peculiar experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or
agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _Qalb_
(heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical
diagram of the Qalb, and explains it by saying that it is the eye which
sees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It
owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind; and
becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the
ultimate realities of existence. All that the "heart", or the source of
what the Vedānta calls the Higher Knowledge, reveals is not seen by the
individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what
is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep
being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the
intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the
individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience,
according to the Ṣūfīs of this school, is not permanent; moments of
spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold,[170:1] cannot be at our command.
The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has
realised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual
realisation is over man is man and God is God. Had the experience been
permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society
overturned.
[170:1] "We cannot kindle when we will
The fire which in the heart resides".
Let us now sum up Al-Jīlī's _Doctrine of the Trinity_. We have seen the
three movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of
Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with
external manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence into
God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect
man, who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. He holds
that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe; hence in his
view, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the
continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the
god-man, the Absolute Being which has left its absoluteness, returns
into itself; and, but for the god-man, it could not have done so; for
then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through
which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which
God sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of
the Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following
verses:--
If you say that God is one, you are right; but if you say that He
is two, this is also true.
If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the
real nature of man.[171:1]
[171:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 8.
The _perfect man_, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he
receives illumination from all the Essential names, on the other hand
all Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:--
1. Independent life or existence.
2. Knowledge which is a form of life, as he proves from a verse from the
Qur’an.
3. Will--the principle of particularisation, or the manifestation of
Being. He defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God
according to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular
form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are
different names for love; the last is the love in which the lover and
the beloved, the knower and the known merge into each other, and become
identical. This form of love, he says, is the Absolute Essence; as
Christianity teaches, God is love. He guards, here, against the error of
looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the
universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of
Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined.
4. Power, which expresses itself in self-diremption i.e. creation. He
controverts S̱ẖaiḵẖ Muḥy al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī's position that the
Universe existed before the creation in the knowledge of God. He says,
this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds
that the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self
of God.
5. The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of
God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has
different names--The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The
arrangement of the Divinity, The spread of Oneness, The expression of
the Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes,
and the object of God's knowledge.
6. The Power of hearing the inaudible.
7. The Power of seeing the invisible.
8. Beauty--that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected
beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has
no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity.
9. Glory or beauty in its intensity.
10. Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore
Unlimited and Infinite.
CHAP. VI.
LATER PERSIAN THOUGHT.
Under the rude Tartar invaders of Persia, who could have no sympathy
with independent thought, there could be no progress of ideas. Ṣūfīism,
owing to its association with religion, went on systematising old and
evolving new ideas. But philosophy proper was distasteful to the Tartar.
Even the development of Islamic law suffered a check; since the Ḥanafite
law was the acme of human reason to the Tartar, and further subtleties
of legal interpretation were disagreeable to his brain. Old schools of
thought lost their solidarity, and many thinkers left their native
country to find more favourable conditions elsewhere. In the 16{th}
century we find Persian Aristotelians--Dastūr Isfahānī, Hīr Bud, Munīr,
and Kāmrān--travelling in India, where the Emperor Akbar was drawing
upon Zoroastrianism to form a new faith for himself and his courtiers,
who were mostly Persians. No great thinker, however, appeared in Persia
until the 17{th} century, when the acute Mulla Ṣadra of S̱ẖīrāz upheld
his philosophical system with all the vigour of his powerful logic. With
Mulla Ṣadra Reality is all things yet is none of them, and true
knowledge consists in the identity of the subject and the object. De
Gobineau thinks that the philosophy of Ṣadra is a mere revival of
Avicennaism. He, however, ignores the fact that Mulla Ṣadra's doctrine
of the identity of subject and object constitutes the final step which
the Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is moreover the
Philosophy of Ṣadra which is the source of the metaphysics of early
Bābism.
But the movement towards Platonism is best illustrated in Mulla Hādī of
Sabzwār who flourished in the 18{th} century, and is believed by his
countrymen to be the greatest of modern Persian thinkers. As a specimen
of comparatively recent Persian speculation, I may briefly notice here
the views of this great thinker, as set forth in his Asrār al-Ḥikam
(published in Persia). A glance at his philosophical teaching reveals
three fundamental conceptions which are indissolubly associated with the
Post-Islamic Persian thought:--
1. The idea of the Absolute Unity of the Real which is described as
"Light".
2. The idea of evolution which is dimly visible in Zoroaster's doctrine
of the destiny of the human soul, and receives further expansion and
systematisation by Persian Neo-Platonists and Ṣūfī thinkers.
3. The idea of a medium between the Absolute Real and the Not-real.
It is highly interesting to note how the Persian mind gradually got rid
of the Emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, and reached a purer notion of
Plato's Philosophy. The Arab Muhammadans of Spain, by a similar process
of elimination reached, through the same medium (Neo-Platonism) a truer
conception of the Philosophy of Aristotle--a fact which illustrates the
genius of the two races. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy
remarks that the Arabs eagerly took up the study of Aristotle simply
because Plato was not presented to them. I am, however, inclined to
think that the Arab genius was thoroughly practical; hence Plato's
philosophy would have been distasteful to them even if it had been
presented in its true light. Of the systems of Greek philosophy
Neo-Platonism, I believe, was the only one which was presented in its
completeness to the Muslim world; yet patient critical research led the
Arab from Plotinus to Aristotle, and the Persian to Plato. This is
singularly illustrated in the Philosophy of Mulla Hādī, who recognises
no Emanations, and approaches the Platonic conception of the Real. He
illustrates, moreover, how philosophical speculation in Persia, as in
all countries where Physical science either does not exist or is not
studied, is finally absorbed by religion. The "Essence", i.e. the
metaphysical cause as distinguished from the scientific cause, which
means the sum of antecedent conditions, must gradually be transformed
into "Personal Will" (cause, in a religious sense) in the absence of any
other notion of cause. And this is perhaps the deeper reason why
Persian philosophies have always ended in religion.
Let us now turn to Mulla Hādī's system of thought. He teaches that
Reason has two aspects:--(a) Theoretical, the object of which is
Philosophy and Mathematics, (b) Practical, the object of which is
Domestic Economy, Politics, etc. Philosophy proper comprises the
knowledge of the beginning of things, the end of things, and the
knowledge of the Self. It also includes the knowledge of the law of
God--which is identical with religion. In order to understand the origin
of things, we should subject to a searching analysis the various
phenomena of the Universe. Such an analysis reveals that there are three
original principles.[178:1]
(1). The Real--Light.
(2). The Shadow.
(3). The not-Real--Darkness.
[178:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 6.
The Real is absolute, and necessary as distinguished from the "Shadow",
which is relative and contingent. In its nature it is absolutely good;
and the proposition that it is good, is self-evident.[178:2] All forms
of potential existence, before they are actualised by the Real, are open
to both existence or non-existence, and the possibilities of their
existence or non-existence are exactly equal. It, therefore, follows
that the Real which actualises the potential is not itself
non-existence; since non-existence operating on non-existence cannot
produce actuality.[179:1] Mulla Hādī, in his conception of the Real as
the operator, modifies Plato's statical conception of the Universe, and,
following Aristotle, looks upon his Real as the immovable source and the
object of all motion. "All things in the Universe," he says, "love
perfection, and are moving towards their final ends--minerals towards
vegetables, vegetables towards animals, and animals towards man. And
observe how man passes through all these stages in the mother's
womb."[179:2] The mover as mover is either the source or the object of
motion or both. In any case the mover must be either movable or
immovable. The proposition that all movers must be themselves movable,
leads to infinite regress--which must stop at the immovable mover, the
source and the final object of all motion. The Real, moreover, is a pure
unity; for if there is a plurality of Reals, one would limit the other.
The Real as creator also cannot be conceived as more than one; since a
plurality of creators would mean a plurality of worlds which must be
circular touching one another, and this again implies vacuum which is
impossible.[180:1] Regarded as an essence, therefore, the Real is one.
But it is also many, from a different standpoint. It is life, power,
love; though we cannot say that these qualities inhere in it--they are
it, and it is them. Unity does not mean oneness, its essence consists in
the "dropping of all relations." Unlike the Ṣūfīs and other thinkers,
Mulla Hādī holds and tries to show that belief in multiplicity is not
inconsistent with belief in unity; since the visible "many" is nothing
more than a manifestation of the names and attributes of the Real.
These attributes are the various forms of a "Knowledge" which
constitutes the very essence of the Real. To speak, however, of the
attributes of the Real is only a verbal convenience; since "defining the
Real is applying the category of number to it"--an absurd process which
endeavours to bring the unrelated into the sphere of the related. The
Universe, with all its variety, is the shadow of the various names and
attributes of the Real or the Absolute Light. It is Reality unfolded,
the "Be", or the word of Light.[181:1] Visible multiplicity is the
illumination of Darkness, or the actualisation of Nothing. Things are
different because we see them, as it were, through glasses of different
colours--the Ideas. In this connection Hādī approvingly quotes the poet
Jāmī who has given the most beautiful poetic expression to Plato's
Doctrine of Ideas in verses which can be thus translated:--
"The ideas are glasses of various colours in which the Sun of Reality
reflects itself, and makes itself visible through them according as they
are red, yellow or blue."[181:2]
[178:2] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 8.
[179:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 8.
[179:2] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 10.
[180:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; pp. 28, 29.
[181:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 151.
[181:2] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 6.
In his Psychology he mostly follows Avicenna, but his treatment of the
subject is more thorough and systematic. He classifies the soul in the
following manner:--
The Soul
│
┌─────────┴─────┐
│ │
Heavenly Earthly
│
┌────────┼──────────┐
│ │ │
Human Animal Vegetative
Powers:--
1. Preserving the individual.
2. Perfecting the individual.
3. Perpetuating the species.
The animal soul has three powers:--
1. External senses┐ Perception.
2. Internal senses┘
3. Power of motion which includes.
(a) Voluntary motion.
(b) Involuntary motion.
The external senses are taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The
sound exists outside the ear, and not inside as some thinkers have held.
For if it does not exist outside the ear, it is not possible to perceive
its direction and distance. Hearing and sight are superior to other
senses, and sight is superior to hearing; since:--
I. The eye can perceive distant things.
II. Its perception is light, which is the best of all
attributes.
III. The construction of the eye is more complicated and
delicate than that of the ear.
IV. The perceptions of sight are things which actually exist,
while those of hearing resemble non-existence.
The internal senses are as follow:--
(1). The Common Sense--the tablet of the mind. It is like the Prime
Minister of the mind sending out five spies (external senses) to bring
in news from the external world. When we say "this white thing is
sweet", we perceive whiteness and sweetness by sight and taste
respectively, but that both the attributes exist in the same thing is
decided by the Common Sense. The line made by a falling drop, so far as
the eye is concerned, is nothing but the drop. But what is the line
which we see? To account for such a phenomenon, says Hādī, it is
necessary to postulate another sense which perceives the lengthening of
the falling drop into a line.
(2). The faculty which preserves the perceptions of the Common
Sense--images and not ideas like the memory. The judgment that whiteness
and sweetness exist in the same thing is completed by this faculty;
since, if it does not preserve the image of the subject, Common Sense
cannot perceive the predicate.
(3). The power which perceives individual ideas. The sheep thinks of the
enmity of the wolf, and runs away from him. Some forms of life lack this
power, e.g. the moth which hurls itself against the candle-flame.
(4). Memory--the preserver of ideas.
(5). The power of combining images and ideas, e.g. the winged man. When
this faculty works under the guidance of the power which perceives
individual ideas, it is called Imagination; when it works under the
control of Intellect, it is called Conception.
But it is the spirit which distinguishes man from other animals. This
essence of humanity is a "unity", not oneness. It perceives the
Universal by itself, and the particular through the external and the
internal senses. It is the shadow of the Absolute Light, and like it
manifests itself in various ways--comprehending multiplicity in its
unity. There is no necessary relation between the spirit and the body.
The former is non-temporal and non-spatial; hence it is changeless, and
has the power of judging the visible multiplicity. In sleep the spirit
uses the "ideal body" which functions like the physical body; in waking
life it uses the ordinary physical body. It follows, therefore, that the
spirit stands in need of neither, and uses both at will. Hādī does not
follow Plato in his doctrine of transmigration, the different forms of
which he refutes at length. The spirit to him is immortal, and reaches
its original home--Absolute Light--by the gradual perfection of its
faculties. The various stages of the development of reason are as
follows:--
A. Theoretical or Pure Reason--
1{st} Potential Reason.
2{nd} Perception of self-evident propositions.
3{rd} Actual Reason.
4{th} Perception of Universal concepts.
B. Practical Reason--
1{st} External Purification.
2{nd} Internal Purification.
3{rd} Formation of virtuous habits.
4{th} Union with God.
Thus the spirit rises higher and higher in the scale of being, and
finally shares in the eternity of the Absolute Light by losing itself in
its universality. "In itself non-existent, but existent in the eternal
Friend: how wonderful that it _is_ and _is not_ at the same time". But
is the spirit free to choose its course? Hādī criticises the
Rationalists for their setting up man as an independent creator of evil,
and accuses them of what he calls "veiled dualism". He holds that every
object has two sides--"bright" side, and "dark" side. Things are
combinations of light and darkness. All good flows from the side of
light; evil proceeds from darkness. Man, therefore, is both free and
determined.
But all the various lines of Persian thought once more find a synthesis
in that great religious movement of Modern Persia--Bābism or Bahāism,
which began as a S̱ẖī‘ah sect, with Mirzā ‘Alī Muḥammad Bāb of S̱ẖīrāz
(b. 1820), and became less and less Islamic in character with the
progress of orthodox persecutions. The origin of the philosophy of this
wonderful sect must be sought in the S̱ẖī‘ah sect of the S̱ẖaiḵẖīs,
the founder of which, S̱ẖaiḵẖ Aḥmad, was an enthusiastic student of
Mulla Ṣadrā's Philosophy, on which he had written several commentaries.
This sect differed from the ordinary S̱ẖī‘ahs in holding that belief in
an ever present Medium between the absent Imām (the 12{th} Head of the
Church, whose manifestation is anxiously expected by the S̱ẖī‘ahs), and
the church is a fundamental principle of the S̱ẖī‘ah religion.
S̱ẖaiḵẖ Aḥmad claimed to be such a Medium; and when, after the death
of the second S̱ẖaiḵẖī Medium--Ḥājī Kāzim, the S̱ẖaiḵẖīs were anxiously
expecting the manifestation of the new Medium, Mirzā ‘Alī Muḥammad Bāb,
who had attended the lectures of Ḥājī Kāzim at Karbalā, proclaimed
himself the expected Medium, and many S̱ẖaiḵẖīs accepted him.
The young Persian seer looks upon Reality as an essence which brooks no
distinction of substance and attribute. The first bounty or
self-expansion of the Ultimate Essence, he says, is Existence.
"Existence" is the "known", the "known" is the essence of "knowledge";
"knowledge" is "will"; and "will" is "love". Thus from Mulla Ṣadrā's
identity of the known and the knower, he passes to his conception of the
Real as Will and Love. This Primal Love, which he regards as the essence
of the Real, is the cause of the manifestation of the Universe which is
nothing more than the self-expansion of Love. The word creation, with
him, does not mean creation out of nothing; since, as the S̱ẖaiḵẖīs
maintain, the word creator is not peculiarly applicable to God alone.
The Quranic verse, that "God is the best of creators",[188:1] implies
that there are other self-manifesting beings like God.
[188:1] Sūra 23; v. 14.
After the execution of ‘Alī Muḥammad Bāb, Bahāullāh, one of his
principal disciples who were collectively called "The First Unity", took
up the mission, and proclaimed himself the originator of the new
dispensation, the absent Imām whose manifestation the Bāb had foretold.
He freed the doctrine of his master from its literalistic mysticism, and
presented it in a more perfected and systematised form. The Absolute
Reality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living
Essence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because
these are the highest conceptions known to us. The Living Essence
manifests itself through the Univere with the object of creating in
itself atoms or centres of consciousness, which as Dr. McTaggart would
say, constitute a further determination of the Hegelian Absolute. In
each of these undifferentiated, simple centres of consciousness, there
is hidden a ray of the Absolute Light itself, and the perfection of the
spirit consists in gradually actualising, by contact with the
individualising principle--matter, its emotional and intellectual
possibilities, and thus discovering its own deep being--the ray of
eternal Love which is concealed by its union with consciousness. The
essence of man, therefore, is not reason or consciousness; it is this
ray of Love--the source of all impulse to noble and unselfish action,
which constitutes the real man. The influence of Mulla Ṣadrā's doctrine
of the incorporeality of Imagination is here apparent. Reason, which
stands higher than Imagination in the scale of evolution, is not a
necessary condition, according to Mulla Ṣadrā, of immortality. In all
forms of life there is an immortal spiritual part, the ray of Eternal
Love, which has no necessary connection with self-consciousness or
reason, and survives after the death of the body. Salvation, then, which
to Buddha consists in the starving out of the mind-atoms by
extinguishing desire, to Bahāullāh lies in the discovery of the essence
of love which is hidden in the atoms of consciousness themselves.[190:1]
Both, however, agree that after death thoughts and characters of men
remain, subject to other forces of a similar character, in the spiritual
world, waiting for another opportunity to find a suitable physical
accompaniment in order to continue the process of discovery (Bahāullāh)
or destruction (Buddha). To Bahāullāh the conception of Love is higher
than the conception of Will. Schopenhauer conceived reality as Will
which was driven to objectification by a sinful bent eternally existing
in its nature. Love or Will, according to both, is present in every atom
of life; but the cause of its being there is the joy of self-expansion
in the one case, and the inexplicable evil inclination in the other. But
Schopenhauer postulates certain temporal ideas in order to account for
the objectification of the Primordial Will; Bahāullāh, as far as I can
see, does not explain the principle according to which the
self-manifestation of the Eternal Love is realised in the Universe.
[190:1] See Phelp's ‘Abbās Effendī, chapter, "Philosophy and
Psychology".
CONCLUSION.
Let us now briefly sum up the results of our survey. We have seen that
the Persian mind had to struggle against two different kinds of
Dualism--pre-Islamic Magian Dualism, and post-Islamic Greek Dualism,
though the fundamental problem of the diversity of things remains
essentially the same. The attitude of the pre-Islamic Persian thinkers
is thoroughly objective, and hence the results of their intellectual
efforts are more or less materialistic. The Pre-Islamic thinkers,
however, clearly perceived that the original Principle must be
dynamically conceived. With Zoroaster both the primary spirits are
"active", with Mānī the principle of Light is passive, and the principle
of Darkness is aggressive. But their analysis of the various elements
which constitute the Universe is ridiculously meagre; their conception
of the Universe is most defective on its statical side. There are,
therefore, two weak points in their systems:--
1. Naked Dualism.
2. Lack of analysis.
The first was remedied by Islām; the second by the introduction of Greek
Philosophy. The advent of Islām and the study of Greek philosophy,
however, checked the indigenous tendency towards monistic thought; but
these two forces contributed to change the objective attitude
characteristic of early thinkers, and aroused the slumbering
subjectivity, which eventually reached its climax in the extreme
Pantheism of some of the Ṣūfī schools. Al-Fārābī endeavoured to get rid
of the dualism between God and matter, by reducing matter to a mere
confused perception of the spirit; the As̱ẖ‘arite denied it altogether,
and maintained a thoroughgoing Idealism. The followers of Aristotle
continued to stick to their master's Prima Materia; the Ṣūfīs looked
upon the material universe as a mere illusion, or a necessary "other,"
for the self-knowledge of God. It can, however, be safely stated that
with the As̱ẖ‘arite Idealism, the Persian mind got over the foreign
dualism of God and matter, and, fortified with new philosophical
ideas, returned to the old dualism of light and darkness. The
S̱ẖaiḵẖ-al-Is̱ẖrāq combines the objective attitude of Pre-Islamic
Persian thinkers with the subjective attitude of his immediate
predecessors, and restates the Dualism of Zoroaster in a much more
philosophical and spiritualised form. His system recognises the claims
of both the subject and the object. But all these monistic systems of
thought were met by the Pluralism of Wāḥid Maḥmūd, who taught that
reality is not one, but many--primary living units which combine in
various ways, and gradually rise to perfection by passing through an
ascending scale of forms. The reaction of Wāḥid Maḥmūd was, however, an
ephemeral phenomenon. The later Sūfīs as well as philosophers proper
gradually transformed or abandoned the Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation,
and in later thinkers we see a movement through Neo-Platonism towards
real Platonism which is approached by Mulla Hādī's Philosophy. But pure
speculation and dreamy mysticism undergo a powerful check in Bābism
which, unmindful of persecution, synthesises all the inherited
philosophical and religious tendencies, and rouses the spirit to a
consciousness of the stern reality of things. Though extremely
cosmopolitan and hence quite unpatriotic in character, it has yet had a
great influence over the Persian mind. The unmystic character and the
practical tone of Bābism may have been a remote cause of the
progress of recent political reform in Persia.
ERRATA
P. 4, Note 4, l. 1, read Buudahish for Buudadisḥ.
P. 9, l. 10, read environment for environments.
P. 56, l. 1, read reaction for reation.
P. 61, l. 18, read considered for consided.
P. 73, l. 21, read full stop after dialectic.
P. 102, l. 1, read conditions for condition.
P. 123, l. 19, read predecessors for precessor.
P. 153, l. 21, read He-ness for an He-ness.
P. 166, l. 21, read a piece for pieee.
Transcriber's Notes:
Many words appear in the text with different transcription or mark-up.
They have been left as in the original.
All occurrences of e. g., i. e., B. C., A. D. and A. H. have been
replaced with e.g., i.e., B.C., A.D. and A.H. Other initials have been
left as in the original.
All ditto marks, ibid. and Sh. An. (S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya) entries replaced
with their full references.
Printed Errata has been moved to the end of the text.
The underlined letter pairs (Dh, dh, Gh, Gh, Kh, kh, Sh and sh) have
been transcribed with a macron below each letter.
The following corrections have been made to the text:
Page IX--due perhaps to semitic [original has samitic] influences,
Page CONTENTS--Reality as [original has as as] Beauty
Page 25--introduced [original has intruduced]
Page 33, footnote 33:1--Maulānā [original has Maulāna]
Page 54--necessarily [original has necssarily]
Page 54--Nazzām [original has Nazzān]
Page 57--Ismā‘īlians [original has Ismā‘īliams]
Page 61--metaphysical [original has netaphysical]
Page 63--which,[original has period] by gradually
Page 65--As̱ẖ‘arite.[original has As̱ẖ‘arīte]
Page 68, footnote 68:1--Ash‘aritenthums [original has
Ash’aritenthums]
Page 69--philosophising [original has plilosophising]
Page 69, footnote 69:1--Ash‘aritenthums [original has As‘aritenthums]
Page 74--S̱ẖahrastānī [original has Sẖahrastānī]
Page 75--As̱ẖ‘arite [original has As̱ẖ’arite]
Page 76--As̱ẖ‘arite [original has As̱ẖ‘ārite]
Page 81--seem to [original has the letter t missing] be
Page 81--Ḥikmat al-‘Ain--"Philosophy of Essence",
[original has single hyphen]
Page 85--objectively [original has objectivily]
Page 95, footnote 95:1--Commentary [original has Comentary]
Page 104--restatement [original has restatemet]
Page 105--Ka‘bahs [original has Ka‘bāhs]
Page 111--self-conscious [original has self-consious]
Page 124--the son of Sultan Ṣalāḥ [original has Ṣalā-Ṣalāḥ]-al Dīn
Page 127--visible [original has visibile]
Page 136--is motion.[original has comma] The distinction of past,
Page 142--theory of [original has theoryof]
Page 148--maintains [original has mantains]
Page 152, footnote 152:1--Insān al-Kāmil [original has Insānul Kāmul]
Page 158--identical [original has indentical]
Page 162--marks the [original has the the] first step
Page 163, footnote 163:1--Notwithstanding [original has
Nowithstanding]
Page 171, footnote 171:1--Insān al-Kāmil [original has Insānul Kāmil]
Page 180--standpoint [original has staindpoint]
Page 187--S̱ẖī‘ahs [original has S̱ẖī’ahs]