This inimical attitude should have come as no surprise to students of

either urban realities or of communism, their parricidal off-spring.

The city liberated its citizens from the bondage of the feudal labour

contract. And it acted as the supreme guarantor of the rights of

private property. It relied on its trading and economic prowess to

obtain and secure political autonomy. John of Paris, arguably one of

the first capitalist cities (at least according to Braudel), wrote:

"(The individual) had a right to property which was not with impunity

to be interfered with by superior authority - because it was acquired

by (his) own efforts" (in Georges Duby, "The age of the Cathedrals: Art

and Society, 980-1420, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1981).

Despite the fact that communism was an urban phenomenon (albeit with

rustic roots) - it abnegated these "bourgeoisie" values. Communal

ownership replaced individual property and servitude to the state

replaced individualism. In communism, feudalism was restored. Even

geographical mobility was severely curtailed, as was the case in

feudalism. The doctrine of the Communist party monopolized all modes of

thought and perception - very much as the church-condoned religious

strain did 700 years before.

Communism was characterized by tensions between party, state and the

economy - exactly as the medieval polity was plagued by conflicts

between church, king and merchants-bankers. Paradoxically, communism

was a faithful re-enactment of pre-capitalist history.

Communism should be well distinguished from Marxism. Still, it is

ironic that even Marx's "scientific materialism" has an equivalent in

the twilight times of feudalism. The eleventh and twelfth centuries

witnessed a concerted effort by medieval scholars to apply "scientific"

principles and human knowledge to the solution of social problems. The

historian R. W. Southern called this period "scientific humanism" (in

"Flesh and Stone" by Richard Sennett, London, Faber and Faber, 1994).

We mentioned John of Salisbury's "Policraticus". It was an effort to

map political functions and interactions into their human physiological

equivalents. The king, for instance, was the brain of the body politic.

Merchants and bankers were the insatiable stomach. But this apparently

simplistic analogy masked a schismatic debate. Should a person's

position in life be determined by his political affiliation and

"natural" place in the order of things - or should it be the result of

his capacities and their exercise (merit)? Do the ever changing

contents of the economic "stomach", its kaleidoscopic innovativeness,

its "permanent revolution" and its propensity to assume "irrational"

risks - adversely affect this natural order which, after all, is based

on tradition and routine? In short: is there an inherent

incompatibility between the order of the world (read: the church

doctrine) and meritocratic (democratic) capitalism? Could Thomas

Aquinas' "Summa Theologica" (the world as the body of Christ) be

reconciled with "Stadt Luft Macht Frei" ("city air liberates" - the

sign above the gates of the cities of the Hanseatic League)?

This is the eternal tension between the individual and the group.

Individualism and communism are not new to history and they have always

been in conflict. To compare the communist party to the church is a

well-worn clich‚. Both religions - the secular and the divine - were

threatened by the spirit of freedom and initiative embodied in urban

culture, commerce and finance. The order they sought to establish,

propagate and perpetuate conflicted with basic human drives and

desires. Communism was a throwback to the days before the ascent of the

urbane, capitalistic, sophisticated, incredulous, individualistic and

risqu‚ West. it sought to substitute one kind of "scientific"

determinism (the body politic of Christ) by another (the body politic

of "the Proletariat"). It failed and when it unravelled, it revealed a

landscape of toxic devastation, frozen in time, an ossified natural

order bereft of content and adherents. The post-communist countries

have to pick up where it left them, centuries ago. It is not so much a

problem of lacking infrastructure as it is an issue of pathologized

minds, not so much a matter of the body as a dysfunction of the psyche.

The historian Walter Ullman says that John of Salisbury thought (850

years ago) that "the individual's standing within society... (should

be) based upon his office or his official function ... (the greater

this function was) the more scope it had, the weightier it was, the

more rights the individual had." (Walter Ullman, "The Individual and

Society in the Middle Ages", Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,

1966). I cannot conceive of a member of the communist nomenklatura who

would not have adopted this formula wholeheartedly. If modern

capitalism can be described as "back to the future", communism was

surely "forward to the past'.

Transition in Context

By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

Also published by United Press International (UPI)

Also Read

Lessons in Transition

Is Transition Possible?

The Rip van Winkle Institutions

The Author of this Article is a Racist

The Eureka Connection

Women in Transition:

From Post Feminism to Past Femininity

Axes to Grind - The Taxonomy of Political Conflict

The Solow Paradox

Forward to the Past - Capitalism in Post-Communist Europe

Leapfrogging Transition - Technology and Post Communism

Contracting for Transition

Women in Transition

The Kleptocracies of the East

The Washington Consensus - I. The IMF

The implosion of communism was often presented - not least by Francis

Fukuyama in his celebrated "The end of History" - as the

incontrovertible victory of economic liberalism over Marxism. In truth,

the battle raged for seven decades between two strands of socialism.

Social democracy was conceived in the 19th century as a benign

alternative to the revolutionary belligerence of Marx and Engels. It

sparred with communism - the virulent and authoritarian species of

socialism that Marxism has mutated into. European history between

1946-1989 was not a clash of diametrically opposed ideologies - but an

internecine war between two competing interpretations of the same

doctrine.

Both contestants boasted a single market - the European Union and

COMECON, respectively. In both the state was heavily involved in the

economy and owned a sizable chunk of the means of production, though in

the Soviet Union and its satellites, the state was the economy.

Both sported well-developed, entrenched and all-pervasive welfarism.

Both east and west were stiflingly bureaucratic, statist, profoundly

illiberal and comprehensively regulated. Crucially, the west was

economically successful and democratic while Russia evolved into a

paranoid nightmare of inefficiency and gloom. Hence its demise.

When communism crumbled, all of Europe - east and west - experienced a

protracted and agonizing transition. Privatization, deregulation,

competition and liberalization swept across both parts of the

continent. The irony is that central and east Europe's adaptation was

more farfetched and alacritous than the west's.

The tax burden - a measure of the state's immersion in the economy -

still equals more than two fifths of gross domestic product in all

members of the European Union. The countries in transition - from

Russia to Bulgaria and from Estonia to Hungary - are way more

economically liberal today than France, Germany and even Britain - let

alone the nations of Scandinavia.

An increasingly united Europe has opted for "capitalism with a human

face" - the democratic isotope of socialism (sometimes with a touch

of corporatism). But it now faces the challenge of the Anglo-Saxon

variety of the free market. Nowhere is this ideological altercation

more evident than in the countries formerly behind the iron curtain.

Long before Enron and World.com, the tech bubble and Wall Street's

accounting frauds and pernicious conflicts of interest - transition has

exposed the raw and vulnerable nerves running through the foundations

of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Eastern Europe is a monument to the folly of

unmitigated and unbridled freemarketry.

Transition has given economists a rare chance to study capitalism and

economic policies from scratch. What's more important - free markets,

institutions, education, democracy, or capital? Central and east Europe

became a giant lab in which to peruse policies pertaining to

criminality, private property ownership, entrepreneurship,

privatization, income distribution, employment, inflation and social

welfare.

Superficially, the debate revolved around the scientific rigor and

usefulness - or lack thereof - of the "Washington Consensus". Opposing

monetary and fiscal policies, free trade versus protectionism, capital

controls and convertibility - these occupied the minds and writings of

all manner of economic and development "experts" in the first decade

after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Yet, deep underneath, transition - perhaps because it was so thoroughly

botched - taught us unforgettable lessons about markets and the way

they work, namely that "objective", "mechanical" capitalism is a mirage.

Perhaps the most important moral is that, like all other economic

processes - transition is, mostly, in the mind. Successful capitalism

requires education and experience. The blind in east Europe were led by

the one-eyed. Capitalism was presented - especially by Western

protagonists of "shock therapy" - as a deus ex machina, a panacea,

guaranteed to transport the region's derelict economies and destitute

people to the kitschy glamour of the tacky soap operas that flooded

their television screens.

Bedazzled by the alleged omnipotence and omniscience of the "invisible

hand", no one predicted the utter meltdown that ensued: the mass

unemployment, the ubiquitous poverty, the glaring abyss between new

rich and always poor, or the skyrocketing prices even as income

plummeted. Nor were the good parts of the new economic regime

understood or explained: private property, personal profit, incentives.

The dangers of transition were flippantly ignored and the peoples of

central and eastern Europe were treated as mere guinea pigs by eager

Western economists on fat retainers. Crime was allowed to hijack

important parts of the post-communist economic agenda, such as the

privatization of state assets. Kleptocracies subsumed the newborn

states. Social safety nets crumbled.

In their vainglorious attempt to pose as accurate and, thus,

"respectable", scientists, economists refused to admit that capitalism

is not merely a compendium of algorithms and formulas - but mainly a

state of mind. It is an all-encompassing, holistic, worldview, a set of

values, a code of conduct, a list of goals, aspirations, fantasies and

preferences and a catalog of moral do's and don'ts. This is where

transition, micromanaged by these "experts" failed.

The mere exposure to free markets was supposed to unleash innovation

and entrepreneurship in the long-oppressed populations of east Europe.

When this recipe bombed, the West tried to engender a stable,

share-holding, business-owning, middle class by financing small size

enterprises.

It then proceeded to strengthen and transform indigenous institutions.

None of it worked. Transition had no grassroots support and its

prescriptive - and painful - nature caused wide resentment and

obstruction.

The process of transition informed us that markets, left to their own

devices, unregulated and unharnessed, yield market failures, anomies,

crime and the misallocation of economic resources. The invisible hand

must be firmly clasped and guided by functioning and impartial

institutions, an ingrained culture of entrepreneurship and fair play,

classes of stakeholders, checks and balances and good governance on all

levels.

Wealth, behavioral standards, initiative, risk seeking - do not always

"trickle down". To get rid of central planning - more central planning

is required. The state must counteract numerous market failures ,

provide some public goods, establish and run institutions, tutor

everyone, baby-sit venture capitalists, enhance innovation, enforce

laws and standards, maintain safety, attract foreign investment, cope

with unemployment and, at times, establish and operate markets for

goods and services. This omnipresence runs against the grain of

Anglo-Saxon liberalism.

Moreover, such an expanded role of the state sits uncomfortably with

complete political liberty. That capitalism is inextricably linked to

democracy is a well-meaning fallacy - or a convenient pretext for

geopolitical power grabs. East Europe's transition stalled partly due

to political anarchy. China's transition, by comparison, is spectacular

- inflated figures notwithstanding - because it chose a gradual

approach to liberalization: first economic, then political.

Last but not least, pure, "American", capitalism and pure Marxism have

more in common than either would care to admit. Both are utopian. Both

are materialistic. Both are doctrinaire. Both believe that "it's a

jungle out there". Both seek social mobility through control of the

means of production. Both claim to be egalitarian forms of social

engineering and are civilizing, millennial, universal, missionary

pseudo-religions.

The denizens of the nether regions of central and eastern Europe have

been the victims of successive economic utopias. They fear and suspect

ideological purity. They have been conditioned by the authoritarian

breed of socialism they endured, really little more than an overblown

conspiracy theory, a persecutory delusion which invariably led to

Stalinesque paranoid backlashes. Indeed, Stalin was more representative

of communism than any other leader before or after him.

The Economist summed this semipternal mass hysteria neatly thus:

"The core idea that economic structure determines everything has been

especially pernicious ... The idea that ... rights have a deeper moral

underpinning is an illusion. Morality itself is an illusion., just

another weapon of the ruling class. As Gyorgy Lukasc put it, 'Communist

ethics makes it the highest duty to act wickedly ... This is the

greatest sacrifice revolution asks from us.' Human agency is null: we

are mere dupes of 'the system', until we repudiate it outright. What

goes for ethics also goes for history, literature, the rest of the

humanities and the social sciences. The 'late Marxist' sees them all

... not as subjects for disinterested intellectual inquiry but as forms

of social control."

Many in Europe feel that the above paragraph might as well have been

written about Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Reduced to bare-bones

materialism, it is amoral, if not immoral. It upholds natural selection

instead of ethics, prefers money to values, wealth formation to social

solidarity.

Predators everywhere - Russian oligarchs, central European cronies,

Balkan kleptocrats, east European managers - find this gratifying. All

others regard capitalism as yet another rigid and unforgiving creed,

this time imposed from Washington by the IMF and multinationals rather

as communism was enjoined from Moscow by the Kremlin.

With eight of the former communist countries about to become members of

the European Union - albeit second rate ones - transition is entering

is most fascinating phase. Exposed hitherto to American teachings and

practices, the new members are forced to adhere to a whole different

rule book - all 82,000 pages of it.

European "capitalism" is really a hybrid of the socialist and liberal

teachings of the 19th century. It emphasizes consensus, community,

solidarity, equality, stability and continuity. It places these values

above profitability, entrepreneurship, competition, individualism,

mobility, size, litigation and the use of force. Europeans firmly

believe that the workings of the market should be tampered with and

that it is the responsibility of the state to see to it that no one

gets left behind or trampled upon.

European stakeholder capitalism is paternalistic and inclusive.

Employees, employers, the government, communities and suppliers are

partners in the decision making process or privies to it. Relics of

past models of the market economy still abound in this continent:

industrial policy, Keynesian government spending, development aid,

export and production subsidies, trade protectionism, the

state-sanctioned support of nascent and infant industries. Mild

corporatism is rife and manifest in central wage bargaining.

For some countries - notably Estonia - joining the EU would translate

into a de-liberalized and re-regulated future. Others would find the

EU's brand of the market a comfortable and dimly familiar middle ground

between America's harsh prescriptions and communism's delusional model.

The EU's faceless and Kafkaesque bureaucracy in Brussels - Moscow

revisited - should prove to be a relief compared to the IMF's ruffians.

The EU is evolving into a land empire, albeit glacially. The polities

of central and eastern Europe were always constituents of empires -

reluctantly or by choice. In some ways they are better suited to form

an "ever closer union" than the more veteran members.

Eastern Advantages

By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

Also published by United Press International (UPI)

Also Read

Transition in Context

Lessons in Transition

Is Transition Possible?

Leapfrogging Transition - Technology and Post Communism

Many of the nations of central and east Europe have spent most of their

history as components of one empire or another. People in this region

are used to be at the receiving end of directives and planning from the

center. Though ostensibly fervid nationalists, they are ill at ease

with their re-founded and re-found nation-states.

The identity of the denizens of these parts is more regional than

national and evolving towards the supra-national. People are from this

or that city, or district, or village. And they aspire to become

citizens of Europe and the great experiment of the European Union. They

are only hesitantly and tentatively Macedonians, or Moldovans, or

Belarusians, or Kazakhs, or Yugoslavs.

The likes of the Czechs, the Estonians and the Slovenes are well-suited

to become constituents of a larger whole. They make better Europeans

than the British, or the Norwegians. They have survived far mightier

and more bloated bureaucracies than Brussels'. They are unsurpassed

manipulators of officialdom. In the long run, the new members stand to

benefit the most from the EU's enlargement and to form its unwaveringly

loyal core.

Not yet the full-fledged individualists of the Anglo-Saxon model of

capitalism - these nations are consensus-seeking team-players. Tutored

by centuries of occupation and hardship, they are instinctual

multilateralists. They are avid Westerners by persuasion, if not yet in

practice, or geography.

Moreover, their belated conversion to the ways of the market is an

undisguised blessing.

Though still a promise largely unfulfilled, the countries in transition

could now leapfrog whole stages of development by adopting novel

technologies and through them the expensive Western research they

embody. The East can learn from the West's mistakes and, by avoiding

them, achieve a competitive edge.

Technology is a social phenomenon with social implications. It fosters

entrepreneurship and social mobility. By allowing the countries in

transition to skip massive investments in outdated technologies - the

cellular phone, the Internet, cable TV, and the satellite become

shortcuts to prosperity.

Poverty is another invaluable advantage.

With the exception of Slovenia, Estonia, Croatia and the Czech Republic

- the population of the countries in transition is poor, sometimes

inordinately so. Looming and actual penury is a major driver of

entrepreneurship, initiative and innovation. Wealth formation and

profit seeking are motivated by indigence, both absolute and relative.

The poor seek to better their position in the world by becoming

middle-class. They invest in education, in small businesses, in

consumer products, in future generations.

The Germans - sated and affluent - are unlikely to experience a second

economic miracle. The Serbs, Albanians, Ukrainians, Poles, or Romanians

won't survive without one. The West is just discovering this truth and

is opening its gates - albeit xenophobically and intermittently - to

poorer foreigners. For what is immigration if not the importation of

ambitious indigents, certain to revitalize the EU's rich and somnolent

economies?

The countries of central and eastern Europe, thus, stand to benefit

twice.

Their own economic Renaissance is spurred on by a striving home-grown

proletariat. And they are uniquely positioned - geographically and

culturally - to export destitute go-getters to the wealthy West and to

reap the rewards of the inevitable spurt in entrepreneurship and

innovation that follows. Remittances, returning expatriates, thriving

and networked Diasporas would do more to uplift the countries of origin

than any amount of oft-misallocated multilateral aid.

This cornucopian vision is threatened from numerous sides.

Geopolitical instability, resurgent trade protectionism, dysfunctional

global capital markets and banks - can all reverse the course of a

successful transition to market economies. Still, the more pernicious

threats are from the inside: venal, delegitimized politicians, brain

drain, crumbling infrastructure, cheap foreign competition, or

inter-ethnic tensions.

Perhaps the most serious hindrance to progress would be a fanatic

emulation by the countries in transition of the European Union. An

overly generous social safety net, a sprawling bureaucracy, inane laws

and regulations about everything from the environment to the welfare of

pigs, paralyzed decision-making processes and deleterious subventions -

can all scupper progress and depress entrepreneurship and innovation.

The cautionary tale of east Germany - smothered by western red tape and

lethargy - should forewarn every new member and aspiring candidate.

They need to join the European Union in the hope of helping to reform

it from the inside. They should not succumb to the allure of German

largesse, nor acquire the French, Spanish, Greek and Portuguese

addiction to it. They cannot afford to.

Europe's Four Speeds

By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

Also published by United Press International (UPI)

Pomp and circumstance often disguise a sore lack of substance. The

three days summit of the Central European Initiative is no exception.

Held in Macedonia's drab capital, Skopje, the delegates including the

odd chief of state, discussed their economies in what was

presumptuously dubbed by them the "small Davos", after the larger and

far more important annual get together in Switzerland.

Yet the whole exercise rests on a series of politically correct

confabulations. To start with, Macedonia, the host, as well as Albania,

Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and other east European backwaters hardly

qualify for the title "central European". Mitteleuropa is not merely a

geographical designation which excludes all but two or three of the

participants. It is also a historical, cultural, and social entity

which comprises the territories of the erstwhile German and,

especially, Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) empires.

Moreover, the disparity between the countries assembled in the august

conference precludes a common label. Slovenia's GDP per capita is 7

times Macedonia's. The economies of the Czech Republic, Poland, and

Hungary are light years removed from those of Yugoslavia or even

Bulgaria.

Nor do these countries attempt real integration. While regional talk

shops, such as ASEAN and the African Union, embarked on serious efforts

to establish customs and currency zones - the countries of central and

eastern Europe have drifted apart and intentionally so. Intra-regional

trade has declined every single year since 1989. Intra-regional foreign

direct investment is almost non-existent.

Macedonia's exports to Yugoslavia, its next door neighbor, amount to

merely half its exports to the unwelcoming European Union - and are

declining. Countries from Bulgaria to Russia have shifted 50-75 percent

of their trade from their traditional COMECON partners to the European

Union and, to a lesser degree, the Middle East, the Far East and the

United States.

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