to the Zeppelin station at Nordholz that Korvettenkapitän C---- first
alluded to his life in the High Sea Fleet. "I was the gunnery officer of
the _Deutschland_ during the first two years of the war," he volunteered
as he joined me at the window of the corridor of our special car, from
which I was trying to catch a glimpse of the suburban area of stagnant
Bremerhaven; "but I transferred to the Zeppelin service as soon as I
could after the battle of Horn Reef because I felt certain--from the
depression of the men, which seemed to get worse rather than better as
time went on--that there would never be another naval battle. Although
we lost few ships (less than you did by a considerable margin, I think
I am correct in saying), yet the terrible battering we received from
only a part of the English fleet, and especially the way in which we
were utterly smothered during the short period your main battle fleet
was in action, convinced the men that they were very lucky to have got
away at all, and seemed to make them determined never to take chances
against such odds again. I knew that if we ever got them into action
again, it would have to be by tricking them--making them think they
were going out for something else--and that is why I felt sure the day
of our surface navy was over, and why I went into the Zeppelin service
to get beyond contact with the terrible dry-rot that began eating at the
hearts of the High Sea Fleet from the day they came home from the battle
of Horn Reef. What has happened since then has proved my fears were
well founded, for the men, becoming more and more suspicious every time
preparations were made to go to sea, finally refused to go out at all.
And that was the end."
Commander C---- (to give his equivalent British rank) volunteered a good
deal more about Jutland on this occasion, as well as of the strategy in
connection with those final plans which went awry through the failure
of men, but it will be best, perhaps, to let this appear in its proper
sequence in a connected account of what he told, in the course of the
several days we were thrown together, of the German naval problems
generally, and his own experiences and observations at Horn Reef in
particular.
"We were greatly disappointed when England came into the war," he said,
"but hardly dismayed. We had built all our ships on the theory that it
was the English fleet they were to fight against, and we felt confident
that we had plans that had a good chance of ultimately proving
successful. But those plans did not contemplate--either at the outset,
or at any subsequent stage of the war down to the very end--a gunnery
battle to a finish. The best proof of that fact is the way the guns were
mounted in our capital ships, with four aft and only two forward. That
meant that their _rôle_ was to inflict what damage they could in swift
attacks, and that they were expected to do their heaviest fighting while
being chased back to harbour. Since the British fleet had something like
a three-to-two advantage over us in modern capital ships, and about
two-to-one in weight of broadside, I think you will agree that this was
not only the best plan for us to follow, but practically the only one.
"I think it will hardly surprise you when I say that, up to the outbreak
of the war, we knew a great deal more about your navy than you did
about ours. To offset that--and of much greater importance--is the fact
that your knowledge of our navy and its plans during the war was far
better than ours of yours. You always seem to score in the end. But at
the outset, as I have said, we were the better informed, and, among
other things, we knew that we had better mines than you had, and (as I
think was fully demonstrated during the first two years) we had a far
better conception in advance of the possibilities of using them--both
offensively and defensively--than you had. During the first two years
and a half your mines turned out to be even worse than we had expected,
and it is an actual fact that some of the more reckless of our U-boat
commanders used to fish them up and tow them back to base to make
punchbowls of. In the last twenty months you not only had two or three
types of mine (one of them American, I think) that were better than
anything we ever had, but you were also using them on a scale, and with
an effectiveness, we had never dreamed of.
"We also thought we had a better torpedo than you had--that it would
run farther, straighter, keep depth better, and do more damage when
it struck. I still think we have something of the best of it on that
score, though at no time was our superiority so great as we reckoned.
Your torpedoes ran better than they detonated, and--especially in the
first two years--a very large number of fair hits on all classes of our
lighter craft were spoiled by 'duds.' This, I am sorry to say, was not
reported nearly so frequently during the last year and a half.
[Illustration: "HERCULES," WITH THREE V-CLASS DESTROYERS IN KIEL HARBOR]
"But it was on the torpedo that we counted to wear down the British
margin of strength in capital ships to a point where the High Sea
Fleet would have a fair chance of success in opposing it. We expected
that our submarines would take a large and steady toll of any warships
you endeavoured to blockade us with, and that they would even make the
risk of patrol greater than you would think it worth while to take.
Although we made an encouraging beginning by sinking three cruisers,
we were doomed to heavy disappointment over the U-boat as a destroyer
of warships. We failed to reckon on the almost complete immunity
the speed of destroyers, light cruisers, battle-cruisers, and even
battleships would give them from submarine attack, and we never dreamed
how terrible an enemy of the U-boat the destroyer--especially after
the invention of the depth-charge--would develop into. As for the use
of the submarine against merchant shipping, to our eternal regret we
never saw what it could do until after we had tried it. If any German
had had the imagination to have realized this in advance, so that we
could have had a fleet of a hundred and fifty U-boats ready to launch
on an unrestricted campaign against merchant shipping the day war was
declared, I think you will not deny that England would have had to
surrender within two months.
"We also made the torpedo a relatively more important feature of the
armament of all of our ships--from destroyers to battleships--than
you did. They were to be our "last ditch" defence in the event of our
being drawn into a general fleet action--just such an action, in fact,
as the battle of Horn Reef was. We knew all about your gunnery up to
the outbreak of the war, and the fact that the big-gun target practices
were only at moderate ranges--mostly under 16,000 metres--told us that
you were not expecting to engage us at greater ranges. But all the time
we were meeting with good success in shooting at ranges up to, and even
a good deal over, 20,000 metres, and so we felt sure of having all the
best of a fight at such ranges. We knew that our 11-inch guns would
greatly out-range your 12-inch (perhaps you already know that even
the 8.2-inch guns of the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ out-ranged the
12-inch guns of the _Invincible_ and _Indefatigable_ at the Falkland
battle), and we hoped they might even have the best of your 13.5's.
We also knew that our ships were better built than yours to withstand
the plunging fall of long-distance shots, and we felt sure that our
explosive was more powerful than your lyddite. I am not sure that
this proved to be the case, though there is no question that our hits
generally did more harm than yours because more of them penetrated decks
and armour.
"Feeling confident, then, of having the best of a long-range action,
our plan was, as I have said, to use the torpedo as a 'last ditch'
defence in case the English fleet tried to reduce the range to one at
which it could be sure of securing a higher percentage of hits and thus
making the greater weight of its broadside decisively felt. In such a
contingency we planned to literally fill the sea with torpedoes, on
the theory that enough of them must find their targets to damage the
enemy fleet sufficiently to force it to open out the range again, and
perhaps to cripple it to an extent that would open the way for us to
win a decisive victory. Theoretically, this plan was quite sound, for
it was based on the generally recognized fact that from three to five
torpedoes--the number varying according to the range and the interval
between the targets--launched one after the other at a line of ships
_cannot_ fail to hit at least one of them, providing, of course, that
they all run properly.
"Well, almost the identical conditions under which we had planned and
practised to run our torpedo barrage were reproduced at Horn Reef when
the British battle fleet came into action near the end of the day, but
it failed because the English Admiral anticipated it--probably because
he knew in advance, as you always seemed to know everything we were
doing or intended to do, what to expect--by turning away while still
at the extreme limit of effective torpedo range. Most of our spare
torpedoes went for almost nothing, so far as damage to the enemy was
concerned, in that 'barrage,' and it would have gone hard with us had
there been enough daylight remaining for the English fleet to have
continued the action. Its superior speed would have allowed it to make
the range whatever its commander desired, and--even before half of the
battleships of it were firing--we were absolutely crushed by sheer
weight of metal, and it would not have been long before every one of our
ships would have been incapable of replying. You will see, then, that,
in the sense that it postponed the brunt of the attack of the English
battle fleet attack until it was too late for it to be effective, our
torpedo barrage undoubtedly saved the High Sea Fleet from complete
destruction.
"Our lavish expenditure of torpedoes at that juncture, though, compelled
us to forgo the great opportunity which was now presented to us to
do your fleet heavy damage in a night action. Darkness, as you know,
goes far to equalize the difference in numbers of opposing fleets, and
makes an action very largely a series of disjointed duels between ship
and ship. In these duels the odds are all in favour of the ship with
the best system of recognition, the most powerful searchlights, and
the most effective searchlight control. We believed that we had much
the best of you in all of these particulars, and (although it was our
plan to avoid contact as far as possible on account of our shortage of
torpedoes) such encounters as could not be avoided proved this to be
true beyond any doubt. You seemed to have no star shells at all (so far
as any of our ships reported), and our searchlights were not only more
powerful than yours, but seemed also to be controlled in a way to bring
them on to the target quicker. It may be that the fact that our special
night-glasses were better than anything of the kind you had contributed
to this result. In any case, in almost every clash in the darkness it
was the German's guns which opened fire first. Practically every one
of our surviving ships reported this to have been the case, but with
those that were lost, of course, it is likely the English opened up
first. Another way in which we scored decisively in this phase of the
action was through solving the reply to your night recognition signal,
or at least a part of it. One of our cruisers managed to bluff one of
your destroyers into revealing this, and then passed it on to as many
of our own ships as she could get in touch with. We only had the first
two or three letters of the reply to your challenge, but the showing of
even these is known to have been enough to make more than one of your
destroyer commanders hesitate a few seconds in launching a torpedo,
only to realize his mistake after he had been swept with a broadside
from the secondary armament of a cruiser or battleship which left him
in a sinking condition. It was an English destroyer that hesitated at
torpedoing the _Deutschland_ until I almost blew it out of the water
with my guns, that afterwards launched a torpedo, even while it was
just about to go down, that finished the _Pommern_, the flagship of my
squadron."
Commander C----'s account of his personal observations at Jutland threw
light on a number of points that the Allied public--and even those to
whom the best information on the subject was available--were never able
to make up their mind upon.
"The English people," he said, "to judge from what I read in your
papers, always deceived themselves about two things in connection with
the battle you call Jutland. One of them was that the High Sea Fleet
came out with the purpose of offering battle to the English fleet, or at
least endeavouring to cut off and destroy its battle-cruiser squadron.
This is not the case. Quite to the contrary, indeed; it was the English
fleet that went out to catch us. We had been planning for some time a
cruiser raid on the shipping between England and Norway--which was not
so well protected then, or even for a year and a half more, as it was
the last year--and the High Sea Fleet and Von Hipper's battle-cruisers
were out to back up the raiding craft. As usual, your Intelligence
Bureau learned of this plan, and the English fleet came out to
spoil it. It was Von Hipper, not Beatty, who was surprised when the
battle-cruisers sighted each other. Beatty's surprise came a few minutes
later, when two of his ships were blown up almost before they had fired
a shot. That seemed to vindicate, right then and there, our belief in
our superior gunnery and the inferior construction of the English ships.
Unfortunately, there was nothing quite so striking occurred after that
to support that vindication. The other English battle-cruiser, and the
several armoured cruisers, sunk were destroyed as a consequence of
exposing themselves to overwhelming fire. It was the chance of finishing
off all the English battle-cruisers before the battle fleet came to
their rescue that tempted Von Scheer to follow Beatty north, and as a
consequence he was all but drawn into the general action that it was his
desire to avoid above anything else.
"The other thing that the English naval critics (although I think your
Intelligence Bureau must have had the real facts before very long)
deceived themselves and the public about was in the matter of Zeppelin
reconnaissance during, and previous to, the Horn Reef battle. They have
continued to state from that day right down to the end of the war that
it was the German airships which warned Von Scheer of the approach of
Jellicoe, and so enabled the High Sea Fleet to escape. Perhaps the most
conclusive evidence that we _did not_ have airship reconnaissance was
the fact that Von Scheer was not only drawn into action with Jellicoe,
but that he even got into a position where he could not prevent the
English ships from passing to the east of him--that is, between him
and his bases. I will hardly need to tell you that neither of these
things would have happened if we had had airships to keep us advised of
the whereabouts of your battle fleet. It was our intention to have had
Zeppelin scouts preceding us into the North Sea on this occasion--as
we always have done when practicable--but the weather conditions were
not favourable. We _did_ have Zeppelins out on the following day,
and these, I have read, were sighted by the English. But if any were
reported on the day of the battle, I can only say it was a mistake. It
is very easy to mistake a small round cloud, moving with the wind, for a
foreshortened Zeppelin, especially if you are expecting an airship to
appear in that quarter of the sky."
Of the opening phases of the Jutland battle Commander C---- did not
see a great deal personally. "We were steaming at a moderate speed,"
he said, "when Von Hipper's signal was received stating he was
engaging enemy battle-cruisers and leading them south--that is, in
the direction from which we were approaching. As there were a number
of pre-dreadnoughts in the fleet, its speed--as long as it kept
together--was limited to the speed of these. In knots we were doing
perhaps sixteen when the first signal was received, and even after
forming battle line this speed was not materially increased for some
time. I understood the reason for this when I heard that the engine-room
had been ordered to make no more smoke than was positively necessary. We
had given much attention to regulating draught, and on this occasion it
was only a few minutes before there was hardly more than a light grey
cloud issuing from every funnel the whole length of the line. The idea,
of course, was to prevent the English ships from finding out any sooner
than could be helped that they were being led into an 'ambush.' As long
as we did not increase speed it was easy to keep down the smoke, and I
am sure that the first evidence the enemy had of the presence of the
High Sea Fleet was when they saw our masts and funnels. But we saw them
before that--we saw the two great towers of smoke that went high up
into the sky when two of them blew up, and we saw the smoke from their
funnels half an hour before their topmasts came above the horizon. At
this time, although all of the ships of the High Sea Fleet were coal
burners, they were making less smoke than the four oil-burning ships of
the _Queen Elizabeth_ class, which we sighted not long after the English
battle-cruisers. As soon as we began to increase speed, of course, we
made more smoke than they did.
"The four remaining English battle-cruisers turned north as soon as
they sighted us, and I do not think the fire of the High Sea Fleet did
them much harm. They drew away from us very rapidly, of course, so that
our 'ambush' plan did not come to anything after all. A squadron of
English light cruisers, which were leading the battle-cruisers when we
first sighted them, almost fell into the trap, though, or, at any rate,
their very brave (or very foolish) action in standing on until they
were but little over 10,000 metres from the head of our line gave us
the best kind of a chance to sink the lot of them. That we did not do
this was partly due to the fact that most of the ships of our line were
still endeavouring to reach the English battle-cruisers with long-range
fire, and partly (I must admit it, though my own guns were among those
that failed to find their mark) to poor shooting. These light cruisers
did not turn until we opened fire at something over 10,000 metres; but
although all our squadron concentrated upon them during the hour and
more before the great speed they put on took them out of range, none of
them were sunk, and I am not even sure that any was badly hit.
"When the four ships of the _Queen Elizabeth_ class came into action
there was a while when they were receiving the concentrated fire of
practically the whole High Sea Fleet, and possibly some of that of our
battle-cruisers as well. Yet it did not appear that--beyond putting one
of them (which we later learned was the _Warspite_) out of control for a
while--we did them much damage. The weight of our fire seemed to affect
theirs a good deal, though, and at this stage of the fight they did not
score many hits upon those of our ships--it was upon the squadron of
_Königs_ that they seemed trying to concentrate--that they gave their
attention to. Later, when the effort to destroy several of the newly
arrived squadron of English battle-cruisers and armoured cruisers drew
a part of our fire, their heavy shells did much damage.
"The High Sea Fleet's line became considerably broken and extended in
the course of the pursuit of the English battle-cruisers and the _Queen
Elizabeths_, the swifter _Königs_ steaming out well in advance in an
effort to destroy some of the English ships before their battle fleet
came into action, and my own squadron dropping a good way astern. That
was the reason that my ship neither gave nor received much punishment
in the daylight action. It was our battle-cruisers and the more modern
battleships of the High Sea Fleet--principally the latter--which,
tricked by the bad visibility, suddenly found themselves well inside
the range of the deployed battleships of the main English fleet. I can
only say that I am thankful that I did not have to experience at first
hand the example they received of what it meant to face the full fire of
that fleet. The English shooting, which opened a little wild on account
of the mists, soon steadied down, and I have heard officers of four or
five of our ships say that it was becoming impossible to make reply with
their guns when darkness broke off the action. I have already told you
how our torpedo 'barrage'--in forcing the English fleet to sheer off
until it was too late for decisive action--saved a large part, if not
all, of our fleet from destruction. What would have happened in the
event that the attack had been pressed, no one can say. It would all
have depended upon the extent of the damage inflicted by our torpedoes.
I can only say that--as it was a contingency we had prepared for by long
practice--Jellicoe would only have been playing into our hands in taking
his whole fleet inside effective torpedo range, and I have confidence
enough in the plan to wish that he had tried it. It would have meant a
shorter war whatever happened, and, what is more, anything would have
been better for us than what did come to pass--two years of gradual
paralysis of the German navy, with a disgraceful surrender at the end.
"As I have said, we were anxious to avoid a night action on account of
our shortage of torpedoes, however much such an action would have been
to our advantage had not our supply of these been so nearly exhausted.
So we were a good deal relieved when it became apparent that the enemy
were not making any special effort to get in touch with us again after
darkness fell. As a consequence of this disinclination of both sides to
seek an engagement, such clashes as did occur were the sequel to chance
encounters in the dark, and in most cases they seem to have been broken
off by the common desire of both parties. Some of your destroyers
persisted in their attacks whenever they got in touch with one of our
ships, but we usually made them pay a very heavy price for the damage
inflicted.
"Von Scheer took the High Sea Fleet back to harbour by passing astern of
the English battle fleet, which had continued on to the south. I think
I am correct in saying that none of the capital ships of either fleet
were in action with those of the other after dark. There were two or
three brushes between cruisers and a good many between destroyers and
various classes of heavier ships. In fact, our principal difficulties
arose through running into several flotillas of destroyers which seemed
to have straggled from the squadrons to which they had been attached.
My squadron, with a division of cruisers, ran right through a flotilla
of about a dozen large English destroyers, and it would be hard to say
which had the worst of it. We lost the _Pommern_ (it would have been my
ship, the _Deutschland_, had not the line been reversed a few minutes
previously) and a cruiser, and had two other cruisers badly damaged,
one from being rammed by a little fighting-cock of a destroyer which
must have committed suicide in doing it. We sank two or three of the
destroyers by gun-fire, and left two or three more stopped and looking
about to blow up. Two of them were seen to be in collision, and there
was also a report that they were firing at each other in the mêlée, but
that was not corroborated. This fight only lasted a few minutes, and we
saw no more English ships of any kind on our way back to harbour.
"In the matter of the losses at Horn Reef, we have never had any doubt
that those of the English were much heavier than ours, even on your own
admissions. And since we inflicted those losses with a fleet of not much
over half the size of yours, we have always felt justified in claiming
the battle to have been a German victory. The _Lützow_ was our only
really serious loss, though the other battle-cruisers--especially the
_Derfflinger_ and _Seydlitz_--were of little use for many months, so
badly had they been battered by gun-fire. The battleship and cruisers
sunk were out of date, and we lost only one modern light cruiser. We may
have lost as many destroyers as you did, though yours would have footed
up to a greater tonnage, as they average larger than ours. We made a
great mistake in concealing the loss of the _Lützow_ for several days,
for, after that, the people never stopped thinking that there were other
and greater losses not announced.
"But although the English losses must have been much greater than
ours, I am not sure that they were enough greater to offset the loss
of _morale_ in the men of the German fleet. As I have said, I do not
think--unless we had tricked them into it, as we tried so hard to do at
the end--that we could ever again have got them to take their ships out
in the full knowledge that they were in for a fight to a finish with the
English battle fleet. It would have been better that they had all been
lost fighting at Horn Reef than that they should have survived to bring
upon themselves and their officers a disgrace the like of which has
never been known in naval history."
XI
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