Theories
It may be contended, however, that in thus postulating the human will as
a physical energy I have not taken into account the alternative
explanation of the facts which might be adopted or assumed. This theory
contends that it is not the will itself which causes the movement we
observe, but the cerebral activity which corresponds to it, and is its
physiological counterpart. It has frequently been pointed out before
(_cf._ Ribot, _The Diseases of the Will_, pp. 5, 6), that when we will
to move our arm, e.g., it may not be the will at all, _per se_, which
affects the movement, but the brain-state or neural activity which
accompanies the act of will. In other words, mind or will never affects
matter (as we feel it does), but it is always one portion of the body
which affects another portion--the will or state of consciousness being
merely coincidental with this observed action.
This has been one of the classical objections to the doctrine of
inter-actionism; and it must not be thought that I have failed to take
into account this alternate theory. But opposed to this view of the case
we have the facts--(1) that the state of consciousness, and not the
brain-state, is surely here the important factor; and (2) that, even
were the supposition true, this nervous action or influence must cease
at the periphery of the body; for, were this not the case, we should
already have exceeded the limits of the orthodox physiological theory,
which contends that one portion _of the body_ affects another portion
(only), and does not contend or pretend that this action may extend
beyond the surface of the body; for, if it did so extend, we should have
a nervous current without nerves--an appalling fact, and one totally
opposed to accepted physiological teaching!
In order for nervous energy or life force to exist independent of the
body (upon the functionings of which it supposedly depends), it would be
necessary for us to reconstruct the mechanistic interpretation of life,
since it would show that life is not dependent upon the body for its
existence, but might exist independently of it, which is the very point
in dispute. It cannot logically be contended, therefore, that the
energy which we here see in operation lies in the nerves or in the
brain-centres, but rather that it is a separate force, which physiology,
as taught today, cannot account for. Introspection and experiment seem
to unite in telling us that this energy is none other than the human
Will.
But if it be granted, on the other hand, that the will is a physical
energy, we immediately encounter certain difficulties which must not be
ignored. In the first place, if the will be a physical energy, it is
subject to the law of Conservation, and, consequently, must be included
within the cycle of forces which that law encompasses. Light, heat,
chemical affinity, etc., are supposed to be mutually convertible and
transmutable; and, according to the present hypothesis, Will must also
be included in this series! But every energy we know in the physical
universe is a non-intelligent energy, and, as I have pointed out
elsewhere, if we make the human will thus subject to the law of
Conservation, it seems to form a unique exception to the law. For we
know (if our consciousness tells us anything) that willing is an
intelligent act, and we should consequently have this conscious act or
intent left over in the equation. For we have, in all other cases,
purely physical energy, and in this case physical energy _plus
something_ (conscious intent). The law of Conservation tells us that one
energy is derived from another, and is converted again into another form
of physical energy, when it is expended. But if will, _ex hypothesi_ a
physical energy, is derived from another physical energy (by a process
of combustion, or what you will), we have here a case of the lesser
including the greater--of a thing giving rise to something greater and
more inclusive than itself--which is contrary to all accepted thinking.
The will, therefore, cannot be _entirely_ subject to the law of
Conservation, but appears to draw upon an additional fund or source of
energy, which is infused into it, as it were, from without. This "thing"
which is infused or super-added, this "something" which is the "plus" in
our equation, appears to be the directive element, the life element, the
sentient element--which is thus shown to lie outside the law of
Conservation, as many physicists and philosophers (Lodge, Crookes,
Bergson, etc.) have for some time past contended it must or might lie.
One significant fact, in this connection, is that while the law of
Conservation is doubtless true, so far as it goes, there is also in
operation another law, well known to physicists, called the law of the
Degradation of Energy, which asserts that energies of a higher order are
constantly being converted into energies of a lower order. This law
maintains that energies of a lower order cannot be reconverted into
energies of a higher order. All other energies are being slowly but
surely converted into heat--the lowest of all forms of energy. And this
heat is gradually being dissipated, or radiated away, into space, so
that, at some distant day, our universe will be cold and lifeless, like
the moon.
Now it is a significant fact that the single exception to this rule
consists in, and is constituted by, _life_, or vital energy, which is
constantly building lower forms of energy into higher forms. Life is
certainly the highest form of energy which we know in this world, and
all energies are below this in rank--as may readily be proved by an
appeal to the facts of nutrition and metabolism. And, as life is
constantly being added to or infused into the world (as the population
increases), it is certainly true that there is here a definite increase
of the sum-total of the highest form of energy of which we have any
knowledge. Life thus occupies not only an important but a unique
position--in that it is constructive instead of destructive; and this
fact alone should give us pause, and make us ask whether life is, in its
totality, subject to and included within the law of Conservation of
Energy.
The establishment of the fact that the human will is a definite physical
energy is of importance also, because of its bearing upon the problem of
the connection or inter-relation of mind and matter. Theories as to this
bond or connection have been propounded since the dawn of philosophy.
Aristotle and others wrote and thought deeply upon this subject. As is
well known, this question formed one of the central points of debate in
the works of Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Kant,
Hegel, Lotze, and many other philosophical writers--all of whom wrote
and speculated at length upon this subject. The theories which have been
advanced in the past are briefly as follows:[19]
_1st. Crude Materialism._--This doctrine contends that consciousness is
merely matter, or energy, or matter in motion. It is not necessary to
discuss this theory here, as it is not held today by any scientist of
the first rank.
_2nd. Epiphenomenalism._--This doctrine found its foremost champion in
Huxley. It contends that the important happenings are the
brain-changes--which are causally connected--and that our thoughts, or
corresponding states of consciousness, merely accompany the
brain-changes, just as the shadow of a horse may be said to accompany
the horse.
The objections of this doctrine are:--
(_a_) That it is just as inconceivable to believe or imagine that
brain-changes generate consciousness as it is to imagine that
consciousness generates brain-changes.
(_b_) The law of Conservation is preserved at the expense of the law of
Causality. For, if no part of the cause passed over into the effect (the
state of consciousness), the law of Causality would be violated.
(_c_) The appearance of consciousness, at some definite point in the
course of the evolution of the animal kingdom constitutes a breach of
continuity.
For these and other reasons epiphenomenalism is today held by few, if
any, philosophers.
_3rd. Psycho-Physical Parallelism._--This is the doctrine maintained by
Muensterberg and others. It contends that brain-changes and states of
consciousness are merely coincidental in point of time, and do not ever
influence each other. Their relation is that of mere coincidence or
concomitance, and not causation. The two flow along, side by side,
without in any way interfering with one another.
As regards this doctrine, it need only be pointed out that, were it
true, mind and body could never influence one another, since they are
not causally connected. Yet, if there be no connection, how is it that
they correspond so exactly?--for, as James said, "It is quite
inconceivable that consciousness should have _nothing to do_ with a
business which it so faithfully attends."
_4th. Phenomenalistic Parallelism._--This is the theory maintained by
Kant, Spinoza, and others. It maintains that both brain and
consciousness (or mind and body) are but two different expressions of
one underlying reality--just as the convex and concave surfaces of a
sphere are but two expressions of an underlying reality. As to the
nature of this reality, Kant and Herbert Spencer were content to call it
X or the unknown, while Spinoza maintained that it was God.
Analogies which are held to support this doctrine are, however,
extremely defective; but the subject is too lengthy and technical to
elucidate in detail here.
_5th. Psychical Monism._--This doctrine contends that consciousness is
the only reality--the material world being external appearance only.
Thoughts are causally connected, but not physical events. (The doctrine
is thus the exact inverse of epiphenomenalism.)
In refutation of this theory, it may be pointed out that, if
brain-changes are thus caused by, or are the outer expressions of,
thought--why not muscular changes, and in fact all physical phenomena
throughout the world everywhere? For we cannot rationally draw the line
of distinction here. Such is the logical outcome of the theory--and has,
in fact, been accepted in this form by Fechner and others.
While many philosophers are inclined to accept this view, it may be
stated that the physical scientists are, naturally, repelled by it, and
so is common sense!
_6th. Solipsism._--The contention of this theory is that nothing exists
save states of consciousness in the individual. Neither the material
world nor other minds exist, save in the mind of the individual. This
doctrine is so opposed to common sense and daily experience that it is
unnecessary to dwell upon it.
_7th. Inter-Actionism (Animism)._--Here we have the world-old notion of
soul and body existing as separate entities, influencing each other.
Mind is here supposed to influence matter, and utilize it for the
purposes of its manifestation.
That there are many facts difficult to account for on this theory cannot
be doubted. Heredity and the origin of life must be taken into account;
the "inconceivability" of the process has some weight; and the apparent
infringement of the law of Conservation of Energy is a serious
objection. Further, it may be urged, what evidence have we that
consciousness can exist apart from brain-functioning? And, it may be
said, apart from the facts offered by "psychical research," so-called,
there is no evidence, strictly speaking. Hence the importance of these
phenomena, if true. But the greatest objection to the doctrine of
inter-actionism is doubtless that drawn from the law of the Conservation
of Energy, which says that, inasmuch as mind is a non-physical energy,
inasmuch as matter cannot be affected by a non-physical cause,
brain-changes cannot result from will, or the activities of the mind.
But once prove that the human will is a physical energy, and this
objection is readily disposed of. A physical energy is doubtless quite
capable of causing all the changes within the brain which we know to
exist within it--molecular, chemical, whatever they may be. It at once
removes this classical objection to the doctrine of inter-actionism; and
at the same time virtually proves that theory correct--thus solving this
problem once and for all!
It may be pointed out, _en passant_, that philosophers and
metaphysicians have really attacked this problem from the wrong
standpoint--in their arguments concerning the relations of mind and
brain--for this is a question which might have been (and in my opinion
should have been) determined not by argument, but by _fact_. Instead of
arguing, _a priori_, as to the nature of the connection, the problem
might have been solved in the same way that all other problems are
solved, viz., by an appeal to evidence and fact. The fundamental point
made by practically all philosophers, in discussing this question, is
that brain-states and conscious states are always found together, and
that consciousness can never exist in the absence of brain. In other
words, mind cannot exist as an "independent variable" in the world; it
must always accompany a human brain.
I pass over, without comment, the fact that, according to the doctrines
of idealistic monism and psycho-physical parallelism, this independence
is virtually allowed, by the very nature of the doctrine; and shall
point out merely that, if consciousness could be proved to exist
independent of brain functioning, philosophic theories would have to be
remodelled to conform to the evidence; the _a priori_ problem could be
settled at once by an appeal to actual fact. And again this separate
existence of consciousness seems to be established by the facts of
"psychical research," which apparently show that mind can exist apart
from brain structure. This important fact once established, it would at
once alter the whole case and render inter-actionism not only a
"respectable" theory, but a proved fact.
So much for the importance of this doctrine (that the will is a physical
energy) from the point of view of philosophy, and as applied to the
question of the inter-relation of brain and mind. Now let us see if it
cannot be applied in another direction.
The present interpretation of the character and nature of the will, and
its inclusion as a physical energy, has a distinctly important bearing
upon one of the most bitterly disputed points in the whole history of
philosophy, viz., the question of the _Freedom of the Will_.
As is well known, there are two opposing views upon this subject--held
by opposite schools--the theory of Determinism, on the one hand, and of
Free Will on the other. The Libertarians assert that our wills are
free--we having power of choice in all our actions. The Determinists, on
the other hand, contend that our thoughts and actions are determined by
definite, ascertainable causes. They contend that the _feeling_ of
freedom we all experience is but illusory, and that, in reality, our
every action is inevitable--predetermined by its previous cause of
causes, and could have been predicted by an intelligence wide enough and
possessing a grasp deep enough of human nature to perceive life in all
its tendencies. Indeed, one eminent philosopher went so far as to say
that a belief in Free Will showed simple ignorance of science and a
clinging to superstition!
A great deal has been written upon this subject of Free Will in the
past; the point has been bitterly disputed for years. It may be said,
however, that, at the present day, practically all philosophers and
scientists, with few exceptions (e.g., James, Schiller, Bergson, etc.),
believe in Determinism. The arguments for that doctrine are certainly
weighty, and may be summarized, briefly, as follows:
1. _The Law of Conservation of Energy_ tells us that no energy can be
added to or abstracted from the total stock of physical energy in the
universe. If the will be a non-physical energy (as it is conceived to
be, by psychologists), it cannot affect the physical world, for if it
did the law of Conservation of Energy would be overthrown. Hence, the
will cannot affect the material world: hence, it cannot be a true cause.
2. _Biology_ contends that heredity and environment alone are capable of
explaining the actions and movements of the lower organisms, without
postulating any "will." Inasmuch as man is connected with these lower
organisms by an unbroken line of descent, why should not these factors
explain man's actions also?
3. _Physiology_ teaches that in-coming nerve stimuli give rise to
certain physical changes in the nerve cells or centres, which, in turn,
give rise to out-going (afferent) currents. There is here an arc or loop
of unbroken physical causation; and there is no "room" for
consciousness, save as an "epiphenomenon," as postulated by Huxley.
4. The _Law of Causation_ tells us that an effect must have a cause, and
that the cause must, in a certain sense, resemble the effect--since the
effect _is_, in a sense, the cause translated. But, inasmuch as the
effect is a physical event, the cause must also be physical in its
nature; hence will (supposedly a non-physical event) cannot possibly
play a part, or be a true cause.
5. _Philosophical Science_ contends that Nature is a "closed circle."
Mechanical causation holds supreme sway. Everything happens according to
law and order. If Free Will were allowed a place in the scheme of
things, chance and caprice would immediately be introduced into our
world--which could never be tolerated for a moment!
6. _Psychology_ holds that every mental state has its equivalent or
counterpart in a corresponding brain-state. But each brain-state is not
caused by the state of consciousness, but by the preceding brain-state.
Here, again, there is no room for "free will" to play any part.
(Inasmuch as we are approaching this subject from a purely scientific
point of view, the arguments drawn from sociology, ethics, and theology
need not here be discussed. The interested reader is referred to
Professor H. H. Horne's excellent little book, _Free Will and Human
Responsibility_, for an extremely clear summary of this problem.)
The reply of the Libertarian to these problems is usually somewhat as
follows:
1. The doctrine of Conservation has not been experimentally proved with
regard to the relation of mind and brain; it is only assumed. Still,
granting it to exist, all energy may, in its ultimate analysis, be
psychical, instead of physical, in its nature--the doctrine of idealism,
which is today gaining wider and wider acceptance, seeming to support
this view.
2. That man _resembles_ the lower animals does not prove that he is
_identical_ with them. On the contrary, the observed differences
constitute the very differences about which the argument rages. Further,
recent theories of organic evolution are tending to prove that interior
(spontaneous) forces play a part, as well as exterior forces.
3. If consciousness were a mere "epiphenomenon," having no "use" to the
organism, it would soon perish (if it ever appeared) according to the
law which says that all useless functions perish. But we know that, as a
matter of fact, consciousness has grown more and more complex, as
evolution has progressed.
4. The _Law of Causation_ is doubtless valid and universal; but to
assume that this is invariably physical begs the question at issue. May
there not be psychical causation? Only thorough-going materialism can
say "No" to this question; but materialism is today out of date.
5. _The Philosophy of Nature._--This is a strong argument, _a priori_,
but is subject to re-interpretation, in the light of new facts, to which
it must conform. Facts might be adduced which proved this particular
view of nature wrong. It is, in short, only a working hypothesis,
subject to revision, as new facts are adduced, tending to alter it.
6. _Psychology._--Our ignorance of the possible relation of brain and
mind is no excuse for our dogmatically asserting that no such connection
is possible. It may be a fact, though unintelligible to us. Mental
states may influence, partially at least, successive brain-states. We
cannot say. If one man asserts that they _cannot_, another may assert
that they _do_. Hence every one is at liberty to believe what he
pleases! Nothing is proved.
If, now, we glance at the preceding arguments, we find that they may be
summarized somewhat as follows:
Arguments 2, 3, 5, and 6 are practically valueless, one way or the
other. Both sides might claim a victory; none of these arguments would
settle the question.
Argument 4 is certainly valid, to a certain extent, and can only be
surmounted by assuming that a non-physical energy can affect physical
energy. But I do not think that any physicist would be inclined to admit
this. So that this argument cannot be used in support of the doctrine of
Free Will.
There remains the first argument, drawn from the law of the Conservation
of Energy. This is certainly the strongest of all (to my mind), and is,
as it stands, valid. Though idealism may maintain that all physical
energy may be, in its ultimate analysis, only psychical energy, I do not
for a moment believe that any physicist really believes this, or that
any man accepts it as a common-sense doctrine--one which can be acted
upon in daily life. It is mere philosophical sophistry and
hairsplitting, and we must believe, as a matter of fact, that physical
energy _is_ really physical, and not psychical, in its nature.
As to the first portion of this argument, although the law of
Conservation of Energy has never been shown to be invalid, when applied
to the connection of brain and mind, still, every one probably believes
that it does actually obtain, and that a brain-state cannot result in
consequence of non-physical influences any more than any other physical
event could so result. It is tacitly admitted, therefore, that the law
of Conservation holds good here also, and that will cannot affect brain,
because will is not a physical energy.
We are now in a position to see the tremendous importance of the facts
contained in the first part of this chapter. Inasmuch as theory must
follow fact; inasmuch as it has been proved experimentally that the
human will is a physical energy--this whole question of the relation of
brain and mind, of the influence of the former by the latter, and the
question of Free Will, must be remodelled in accordance with these
facts. The whole Free Will controversy is settled at one stroke (and in
favour of Free Will!), and all the books which have been written upon
this subject, and all the thought and energy which have been expended in
the past are thus shown to be so much waste-paper and wasted effort!
For, as we have seen that the whole question resolves itself into the
central problem of whether or not the law of Conservation of Energy is
valid--whether will or mind can affect brain--it will be seen that the
proof that will is a definite physical energy settles the case once and
for all. Determinism is routed; Free Will wins the day; and here again,
as usual, theory follows fact, instead of dictating what those facts
should be! At "one fell swoop" we are enabled to solve and to settle for
ever one of the most bitterly disputed points in the whole history of
philosophy and metaphysics!
This theory (might we not say, this fact?) that the will is a definite
physical energy, at least in part, is thus of great philosophic, no less
than scientific importance, if true. It even enables us to recast our
conception of the origin of the world, and of all forces, and enables
us to reconstruct--in a more or less intelligible manner--the story of
Creation, contained in the first chapter of Genesis--an account which
has been more ridiculed, perhaps, by dogmatic physicists than any other
account in the whole Bible.
Much has been written upon this subject in the past; but it must be
admitted that, from the point of view of physics, the whole difficulty
lay in conceiving the first initial impulse which started our Universe
on its endless way. All matter being but an expression of energy, all
energy being (in all probability) but the varying modes or forms of
expression of one underlying primal energy, the difficulty has been in
accounting for the origin of this primal energy--the initial "push," so
to say, which sent the Universe on its way.
Many evolutionists have admitted that, once given this initial impulse,
all might readily be accounted for. The difficulty lay in conceiving
this primal impetus.
But if Will be also a form of energy--though, as we have seen, only
partly within the law and partly beyond it--then it is conceivable that
this energy, coming from a source external to that presented by physical
nature and physical science, should have infused or imparted enough
energy (perhaps only an infinitesimal amount, enough to originate the
impetus), which, according to Haeckel and others, is all that need be
supposed, to enable us to account for the whole of organic and inorganic
nature! This _fiat_, having once gone forth, would originate, or be the
source of, the first "cosmic urge"--would, in fact, supply that impetus
which modern science has so long sought in vain!
FOOTNOTES:
[18] This explains why "every one" cannot move the board; there must be
this peculiar nervous and psychic instability in order to insure the
results.
[19] I am indebted to Dr. M'Dougall's excellent work, _Body and Mind_,
for the _data_ from which I have condensed the following summary.