Rise of Japan and Germany Compared—Renewal of Anglo-Japanese
Alliance—Japan and the Great War—Military and Naval Expansion—Japan and
China—The Twenty-one Demands—Agreement with Russia regarding
China—Lansing-Ishii Agreement—Effects of Great War on Situation in Far
East.
The rise of Japan finds a parallel in that of Germany. There are,
indeed, in the circumstances attending the development of the two
countries not a few points of resemblance. In each case the direct cause
was military success, and in each the long existence of feudalism had
the effect of rendering a naturally warlike people submissive to the
will of its rulers and responsive to the teaching of tradition. In each
loyalty to the Throne was accompanied by an exaggerated form of
patriotism, which needed only opportunity to become aggressive. In each,
again, autocratic instincts, the centralization of authority, and the
pressure of a powerful bureaucracy, combined to exalt the State at the
expense of the individual. And though the personal rule of the
Sovereign, so conspicuous in German history, was lacking in Japan, its
absence was more than compensated for by the popular belief in the
divine descent of the monarch.
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Germany should have
been chosen as the model for so many of the new institutions established
in the course of the Meiji era, or that the modern Japan which
ultimately took shape should in many of its characteristics come to bear
a still closer resemblance to the country whence so much had been
borrowed. A nation that in the process of its evolution draws upon
others so freely as Japan has done inevitably imbibes ideas which affect
its whole outlook on the world. What happened in early days, when Japan
adopted the written language, ethics, and administrative system of
China, occurred again, though in a lesser degree, when she became the
pupil of Germany in matters relating to administration, law and military
science. Thus the Constitution itself, framed, as we have seen, on a
German model, reserved all real power in important matters of State to
the Crown; while the adoption of the German system of military
organization and training increased the influence of the army and
encouraged the growth of militarism.
Describing the position acquired by Germany at the time when William II
succeeded to the Throne as King of Prussia and German Emperor, Mr. S. J.
Hill, at one time U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, in his _Impressions of the
Kaiser_, says: “The unity of the German States was secure ... and the
work of Bismarck was complete. That the Empire was an achievement of
superior military force on the part of Prussia, and in no sense a
creation of the German people, was universally understood.” His
statement is confirmed by an article which appeared in August, 1918, in
a German newspaper, the _Arbeiter Zeitung_. “It is,” it says, “to the
Monarchy, the Junkerdom and the Army that the German _bourgeoisie_ owes
the establishment of the new Empire, which was followed by so tremendous
a development of economic strength, wealth and power.”
Japan at the moment of which we are speaking had, in like manner,
achieved a unity of a kind unknown before. In the realization of her
ambition to become a great Power she had triumphantly overcome all the
difficulties inherent in the process of transition from conditions
imposed by centuries of isolation to the new circumstances of a modern
State. The work of the group of statesmen successively engaged in the
task of reconstruction was, like that of Bismarck, complete. And it was
generally acknowledged that all that had been accomplished had been done
by the Government, and not by the Japanese people.
The Government clothed with this prestige was still a Government of two
clans, which had gained their predominance by military strength, and
retained it for the same reason; the portfolios of War and the Navy,
and, with these, the control of the forces of the State, having become,
so to speak, a monopoly of Satsuma and Chōshiū clansmen, who, as heads
of these departments, were virtually independent of the Ministry of the
day. The results of the dominating influence of the two clans in the
administration, and the supremacy of German ideas in the army, had
already shown themselves in the growth of a strong military party; in a
cry for national expansion beyond existing frontiers, which seemed to
have less reason behind it than the Pan-Slavist and Pan-German racial
aspirations in Europe; in the development of the simple feudal maxims of
_Bushidō_ into what came near to being a national creed; and in the
increase of Chauvinistic writing in a section of the Press. Under these
circumstances it was not surprising if from this time forward a louder
note should be heard in diplomatic utterances, and a more aggressive
tone appear in foreign policy.
This change of attitude in matters of foreign policy may be traced in
the successive alterations that took place in the terms of the
Anglo-Japanese alliance. The original Agreement of 1902 related only to
China and Korea, the contracting parties recognizing the independence of
both States and declaring themselves “to be entirely uninfluenced by any
aggressive tendencies in either country.” When the Agreement was renewed
in August, 1905, its application was extended so as to include Eastern
Asia and India. No more is heard of the independence of Korea, but
Japan’s paramount rights in that country are recognized, subject only to
the maintenance of the principle of “equal opportunity,” this
recognition being followed three months later by the establishment of a
Japanese protectorate. In the Agreement when renewed again in 1911 all
reference to Korea disappears, that country having the year before been
annexed to Japan.
Nor was this change of attitude due entirely to a consciousness of new
power and increased prestige. In copying other countries as closely as
was done the process of imitation had been carried so far as to extend
to the adoption of principles which were not regarded with unqualified
approval even in the countries where they originated. An instance in
point is the enforcement by the Japanese Government in China of
extra-territoriality, against which, when applied to Japan by Western
Governments, it had constantly protested on the ground that the
principle was incompatible with the sovereignty of a State.
The action of Japan on the outbreak of the Great War in August, 1914, at
once dispelled all doubt which may have existed as to her participation
in it. It also showed that she had no intention of playing a purely
passive rôle. Within a fortnight after the commencement of hostilities
between Great Britain and Germany the Japanese Government presented an
ultimatum to the latter Power demanding the immediate withdrawal from
Japanese and Chinese waters of all German vessels of war, and the
evacuation by a given date of the leased territory of Kiaochow, with a
view to its eventual restoration to China. The ultimatum was followed a
week later by a declaration of war. It has been suggested that this
swift action frustrated a design on the part of Germany to remove the
leased territory from the field of hostilities by handing it back to
China for the period of the war. Both in the ultimatum and in the
declaration of war reference was made to the Anglo-Japanese alliance,
which had been renewed in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese war, and again
in 1911, when an Arbitration Treaty was in process of negotiation
between Great Britain and the United States. This marked allusion to the
alliance pointed to the conclusion that Japan’s entry into the war was
in pursuance of a special understanding between the Governments
concerned. It was, however, no secret that the acquisition of Kiaochow
by Germany had been as displeasing to Japan as the Russian occupation of
Port Arthur, nor was it unreasonable to suppose that she would welcome
the first occasion that might come to get rid of the obnoxious intruder.
The opportunity furnished by her entry into the war was promptly seized.
A strong expeditionary force, which included a contingent of British
troops, was organized, and by the first week of November the German flag
had ceased to float at Kiaochow. The Japanese occupation in the previous
month of the Caroline, Marshall and Marianne, or Ladrone, groups of
islands contributed to the elimination of Germany from the Pacific.
The war that gave Japan the excuse she needed to destroy the German
foothold in China presented her with other opportunities of
strengthening her position in the Far East. The magnitude of the
military operations in Europe absorbed all the energies of the
belligerent States which had interests in Eastern Asia. They were unable
to devote much attention to Far Eastern affairs. Japan thus acquired a
liberty of action which under other circumstances might possibly have
been denied to her.
In an article contributed in 1914 to the November number of the _Shin
Nippon_, or “New Japan,” a magazine published in Tōkiō, Marquis Ōkuma,
who was then Premier, pointed out that the tendency of the times was
such as to justify the assumption that in the distant future a few
strong nations would govern the rest of the world, and that Japan must
prepare herself to become one of these governing nations. And when
addressing the Diet in the following month he stated, in explanation of
the programme of naval and military expansion submitted to Parliament,
that in order to make Japanese diplomatic dealings more effective an
increase of force was needed. The lengths to which the Japanese
Government was prepared to go in order to render its diplomacy more
effective were disclosed when in January, 1915, the Japanese Minister in
Peking presented directly to the President of the Chinese Republic the
well-known twenty-one Demands.
Divided into several groups, the Demands in the first four included the
assent of China to whatever might afterwards be agreed upon between
Japan and Germany in regard to the German leased territory in Shantung
taken by the Japanese in the previous November; the non-alienation by
China to a third Power of any territory in that province or any island
along its coast; concessions for railway construction, and the opening
of further places for foreign trade in the same province; the extension
from twenty-five to ninety-nine years—the term of the German lease of
Kiaochow—of the terms of the former Russian leases of Port Arthur, Dalny
and the South Manchurian Railway, and of the subsequent Japanese lease
of the Antun-Mukden Railway; the control and management of the
Kirin-Changchun Railway, when completed, to be granted to Japan for the
same term of ninety-nine years; the grant of mining rights to Japan in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; the consent of Japan to be
obtained prior to permission being given to other foreigners to build
railways, or make loans for railway construction in the territories in
question, or prior to the pledging of local taxes in those territories
as security for loans made to China by a third Power; Japan to be
consulted before the employment by China in the same territories of any
political, financial, or military advisers; concessions giving Japan
practical control over the valuable coal and iron mines near Hankow
belonging to the Hanyeiping Company, which had borrowed money from
Japanese firms; and non-alienation to a third Power of any harbour, bay,
or island on the coast of China. A further fifth group of Demands
included an undertaking on the part of China to employ “influential
Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs”; to
grant to Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of
China the right of owning land—a right still withheld from foreigners in
Japan; to place the police administration of all important places in
China under joint Japanese and Chinese control, or, in lieu of this
concession, to employ a large number of Japanese in the police
departments of those places; to purchase from Japan 50 per cent, or
more, of all munitions of war needed by China, or, in lieu of this
concession, to arrange for the establishment in China of an arsenal
under the joint management of Japanese and Chinese, the material
required to be purchased from Japan; to grant further concessions for
railway construction in the interior of China; to consult Japan before
employing foreign capital for the working of mines, and the construction
of railways, harbours and dockyards in the province of Fuhkien; and to
grant to Japanese subjects the right to propagate religious doctrines in
China. This last point concerned, of course, only Buddhist missionary
propaganda, since the propagation of Shintō doctrine in a foreign
country was obviously impossible. Its inclusion in the list of demands
may seem strange in view of the religious indifference of the Japanese
people. The reasons for it may be found in the desire of the Japanese
Government to overlook no point which might serve to place Japan on a
footing of equality in all respects with Western countries, and its wish
to utilize the services of Buddhist missionaries to obtain information
about matters in the interior of China.
The startling character of these Demands, no less than the peremptory
manner in which they were made, provoked some public criticism even in
Japan, and led to enquiries from more than one foreign Government. In
the course of the negotiations which ensued at Peking the Chinese raised
objections to several points. Eventually the last-mentioned group of
Demands was withdrawn for the time being, the Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs explaining that they were never points on which his
Government had intended to insist. Some modifications, moreover, were
made in the other groups in order to meet Chinese objections. The
Demands thus revised were presented afresh in April, a time limit being
named for their acceptance, and on the 9th May the Chinese Government
yielded to the pressure and signified its consent. The various points on
which the Japanese Government insisted were finally settled on the 25th
May by the conclusion of Treaties, the exchange of Notes and the making
of Declarations, all bearing that date, as suited the convenience of
Japan.
It is difficult to reconcile the assurances repeatedly given by Japanese
statesmen as to the absence of any aggressive intentions in regard to
China with the policy represented by the Demands above mentioned. Nor is
it possible to deny that the pressure thus put upon China constituted
just such an interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring
State as the Press of Japan had been the first to denounce.
The various engagements entered into between Japan and Russia in the
years shortly following the Treaty of Portsmouth, more especially the
Agreement of 1907, to which reference has already been made, were in
themselves signs of a relaxation of the tension created by the
Russo-Japanese war. And when in 1910 the two Powers concluded the
Agreement for maintaining the _status quo_ in Manchuria, which blocked
the Knox proposal for neutralizing all railways in that region, it
became dear that they discerned the mutual advantage to be gained by
working together in the Far East. This common policy, if it may be so
called, was strengthened after the outbreak of the Great War by the
conclusion of a secret Treaty in the summer of 1916, a moment when the
war was not progressing very favourably for the Allies. By this Treaty,
signed in the Russian capital, the contracting parties recognized that
“the vital interests” of both required “the safeguarding of China from
the political domination of any third Power whatsoever having hostile
designs against Russia or Japan.” Whatever hopes may have been
entertained in either country from the closer co-operation in China
established by this Treaty were put an end to by the Russian revolution
in the spring of 1917. It is unnecessary to emphasize the important
bearing on Far Eastern affairs of this event, and of its sequel—the
military collapse of Russia. The mere fact that China was thus freed
from the danger of a combined aggression which she was powerless to
resist speaks for itself.
In the autumn of the same year, by which time America had been drawn
into the war, Japan, still intent on consolidating her position in the
Far East, entered into negotiations at Washington with the United States
in regard to the policy to be pursued by the two countries in China. The
Japanese negotiator designated as special ambassador for this purpose
was Viscount Ishii, who had recently been Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and had previously visited America in an official capacity. By the
understanding arrived at in November of that year, known as the
Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the United States Government formally
recognized, though without defining them, the special interests of Japan
in China arising out of geographical propinquity—a concession which
tended to extend the liberty of action which Japan had already acquired
as a result of the war. The reason for the conclusion of this Agreement,
as stated in the Notes exchanged on this occasion, “was in order to
silence mischievous reports” that had from time to time been circulated.
Another reason may well have been the wish to clear the ground for
American and Japanese business co-operation in China, which had been
advocated for some time in the Japanese Press, and received some measure
of support from capitalists in both countries. The idea was not welcomed
by the American community in China, and the efforts made in this
direction do not appear to have been attended with any striking success
during the continuance of the war.
In the military intervention of the Allied and Associated Powers in
Siberia Japan took a prominent part. The course of events in Russia
after the revolution caused uneasiness in Great Britain and France. When
the Bolsheviks gained control of affairs, the German and
Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, who, owing to the disintegration of
the former Russian armies had regained their liberty, and were free to
uphold German ambitions, made common cause with them; and it was felt
that there was danger of these combined forces spreading through Central
and Eastern Siberia. How best to meet this danger, and at the same time
to relieve the Czecho-Slovak troops, composed of ex-prisoners of war,
who had refused to join the Bolsheviks and were retreating along the
Trans-Siberian Railway, was a question which forced itself on the
attention of the Governments concerned. The idea of sending an
expeditionary force for this double purpose was first mooted in the
summer of 1917, but it was not until a year later that an understanding
was effected. In this military intervention six of the Allied and
Associated Powers were represented, Japan, owing to her nearness to the
scene of action, being the first to place troops on the spot.
Meanwhile, in view of the same danger and for the same objects, the
Japanese and Chinese Governments had some months before (in May, 1918)
concluded a secret military Agreement for Common Defence for the
duration of the war, by which arrangements were made for the
co-operation of Japanese and Chinese troops both in Chinese and Russian
territory. In the following September “detailed stipulations” were
attached to the Agreement. One of these provided that Chinese troops
when operating in Russian territory should be under the control of a
Japanese commander. A similar Naval Agreement was concluded at the same
time. In pursuance of the Military Agreement considerable Japanese and
Chinese forces were mobilized and employed in operations in Chinese
territory and across the Russian border.
The conspicuous services rendered by the navy of Japan throughout the
war earned the warm appreciation of her allies; the work done in
clearing the seas of predatory enemy craft, convoying troopships from
the British dominions to Europe and combating the submarine menace,
deserving, as indeed it received, the highest praise. If at times there
may have appeared to be a disposition in certain Japanese circles to
anticipate the success of German arms, and if the pro-German sympathies
of a section of the public may have seemed to assert themselves too
loudly, allowance should be made for the large extent to which German
ideas had been utilized in the making of modern Japan, and for the
natural tendency of army officers to believe in the invincibility of the
nation in whose military methods they had been trained.
The Peace Conference which assembled in Paris in January, 1919, set the
seal on Japanese ambitions. The representatives of Japan took part in
all important deliberations on a footing of recognized equality with
those of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States, while, as
one of the Great Powers composing the Supreme Council, Japan has had a
voice in the decisions that have guided the destinies of the world.