Treaty Revision—Great Britain Takes Initiative—Difficulties with China.
The year 1894 marks a memorable stage in the rise of Japan to the
position in the world she has since attained. It witnessed two events of
far-reaching importance: the revision of the Treaty between Great
Britain and Japan, which, though only the first of a series, practically
solved the long-pending question of Treaty revision; and the outbreak of
war with China. The new Treaty with Great Britain was signed on the 16th
July, and within a fortnight of its signature Japan was at war with her
continental neighbour. Both events, it may be noted in passing, had a
calming effect on parliamentary proceedings, the Diet then in existence,
though not actually in session, being the only one which lasted for the
full constitutional term of four years.
The question of the revision of the treaties with foreign Powers has
been referred to more than once in previous chapters. These treaties, as
we have seen, formed part of a series of Conventions concluded between
the years 1858 and 1869, which were framed on the same lines, while
their effect was rendered uniform by the “most-favoured-nation” clause
contained in each. As has already been pointed out, the features of the
treaties which caused dissatisfaction in Japan were the concession of
extra-territoriality, and the absence of any fixed period for their
duration. Revision being subject to the consent of both parties, it was
felt that Japan might be indefinitely deprived of tariff autonomy and
the right of exercising jurisdiction over foreigners in her own
territory. It was not unnatural that the Japanese Government, while
overlooking the many disadvantages attaching to foreign residence and
trade in what was a mere fringe of the country, should, as soon as it
became aware that the character of the treaties was different from that
of those made by Western Governments with each other, have taken an
early opportunity to protest against conditions which were regarded as
derogatory to the dignity of the nation, nor that it should have made
repeated attempts to secure their removal by negotiation with the Powers
concerned. We have seen how the failure of these efforts roused popular
feeling, supplied political agitators with a weapon used with effect in
the campaigns they directed from time to time against the Government,
and eventually led to a serious recrudescence of the anti-foreign
feeling of pre-Restoration days; so that by the time that the
Constitution came into operation Treaty revision was no longer regarded
as a mere matter of departmental policy, with which the public at large
had little concern, but had become, so to speak, a national question.
In view of the importance which this question gradually came to assume
in public affairs, affecting as it did both domestic policy and foreign
relations, it may be well, at the risk of some repetition, to give a
succinct account of the lengthy negotiations on this subject, asking the
indulgence of the reader, should he be taken over ground traversed
before.
Undeterred by the failure, already recorded, of Prince Iwakura’s mission
in 1872, the Japanese Government made another attempt two years later to
negotiate a new Treaty which would, it was hoped, be the forerunner of
others. The relations between the United States and Japan were at this
time, if anything, more friendly than those of Japan with other Powers.
This was to a great extent the natural result of circumstances. By
taking the initiative in the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse,
America had given evidence of an intention to pursue an independent
policy in regard to foreign questions. Having been the first Western
Power to appear on the scene, her influence had been the first to be
felt in Japan. Moreover, her great commercial expansion being still in
its infancy, she had fewer interests to protect in Japan than older
countries. American representatives were thus spared much of the
friction with the Japanese authorities which fell to the lot of other
foreign representatives. Influenced probably by these considerations, it
was to the United States that the Japanese Government addressed its
overtures on this occasion. They were favourably received, and a new
Treaty was negotiated with little difficulty. But the Treaty remained a
dead letter owing to the inclusion of a clause providing that it should
come into operation only when similar treaties had been concluded with
other Powers.
For several years no further steps were taken by the Japanese
Government in the matter of Treaty revision. Ministerial dissensions
and the disturbed state of the country, which culminated in the
Satsuma rebellion, called for the concentration of attention on
domestic affairs. Foreign questions, therefore, ceased for a time to
be a subject of public interest. By this time also it is probable that
the Government began to realize more clearly than before the nature of
the objections entertained by foreign Powers to the revision of their
treaties with Japan; and to understand that, so far as the point of
extra-territoriality was concerned, the unwillingness of foreign
Governments to accede to Japanese demands was based on the reasonable
ground that, until some substantial evidence of progress in the
direction, at least, of legal reforms, was forthcoming, they must
naturally hesitate to make their subjects amenable to Japanese
jurisdiction. The energy and determination with which the Japanese
Government set to work to carry out legal and judicial reforms showed
that it was alive to the necessity of meeting the objections of
foreign Powers in the direction indicated. One result of the
progressive spirit displayed was, as we have seen, the promulgation of
a Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, framed in accordance
with Western ideas, which came into operation early in 1882. In the
autumn of that year negotiations for Treaty revision were reopened,
and a preliminary conference of the representatives of Japan and the
leading Treaty Powers was held in Tōkiō. No definite result was then
reached, but the ground was cleared for subsequent discussion, which
took place four years later, the Japanese Capital being, as before,
the seat of negotiations. At this second and more formal conference,
at which no less than seventeen Treaty Powers were represented, and
which lasted from May, 1886, to June, 1887, definite progress was
made. In the end, however, negotiations were abruptly broken off by
the Japanese delegates, in consequence, as was understood at the time,
of popular dissatisfaction with the proposed employment of foreign
judges in Japanese Courts of First Instance and Courts of Appeal in
cases where foreigners were defendants. In 1889 negotiations were
again reopened in Tōkiō. The proposals then submitted by Count
(afterwards Marquis) Ōkuma, as Foreign Minister, were accepted by the
American and Russian Governments; but public feeling again showed
itself hostile to the appointment of foreign judges, even on the
reduced scale contemplated by the new proposals. The attempted
assassination of the Minister who had brought them forward once more
put a stop to negotiations, and arrangements were made for the
cancellation of the two treaties that had been concluded.
On all these occasions discussion had centred chiefly round the question
of Japanese jurisdiction over foreigners. The main difficulty had always
been the same: to reconcile the natural desire of foreign Governments to
secure such guarantees in the matter of the administration of justice as
would safeguard the surrender of extra-territorial privileges with the
equally natural wish of Japan to recover the right of jurisdiction over
foreigners in her territories. And it will be seen that even when a
compromise satisfactory to both negotiating parties had been, or was
about to be, reached, the sensitiveness of the public in Japan
concerning any point which it regarded as detrimental to Japanese
dignity prevented its acceptance by the nation.
In the following year Lord Salisbury presented to the Japanese
Government in Tōkiō proposals for Treaty revision which were based on
the results achieved during the second conference, and on the general
experience gained in the long course of negotiations. These British
proposals conceded the principle of territorial jurisdiction on the
condition that all the new Japanese Codes of Law should be in operation
before the revised Treaty came into force, and offered an increase of 3
per cent in the Customs Import Tariff. The period of duration of the
proposed Treaty and tariff was fixed at twelve years, at the end of
which time Japan would recover complete tariff autonomy. The proposed
Treaty further provided for the opening of the whole of Japan to British
trade and intercourse, and for her adhesion to the International
Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright.
This latter provision was called for by the frequent imitation of
foreign trademarks, and the issue of cheap copies of foreign
publications. In order to avoid offending Japanese susceptibilities
careful attention was given to the form in which these proposals were
framed. It might have been expected that proposals so liberal could not
fail of acceptance. The fact that they were so far in advance of the
views regarding Treaty revision entertained by the majority of foreign
Governments implied a recognition of the progress made by Japan, and
confidence in her future, which could hardly fail to be gratifying to
the Government to which they were presented. The favourable impression
they at first produced justified the hope that negotiations might result
in an agreement on this long-pending question. Again, however, popular
agitation stood in the way of a settlement. Objection was raised to the
ownership of land by foreigners, a point which had figured in all
previous schemes of Treaty revision, and the matter was quietly shelved
without ever reaching the stage of negotiations. One explanation of the
attitude assumed by Japanese Ministers at this time may be found in the
jealousy prevailing in political circles which made it difficult for any
single statesman, or party, to gain the credit of disposing of a
problem, which had defied solution for so long. Any official jealousy of
this kind which may have existed would tend to encourage agitation on
the subject irrespective of the merits of the question at issue. Another
reason likely to influence public opinion in a nation in whose character
pride is so predominant a trait may have been the feeling that it was
desirable for the country’s prestige that proposals which should furnish
the basis of the new treaties should emanate from Japan.
Treaty revision had thus become a national question in which political
parties, as well as the Press, took an active interest, and in
succeeding years the Diet was frequently the scene of animated
discussions, which caused no little embarrassment to the Government.
Fortunately for both Government and people, and for relations between
Japan and foreign Powers, the long looked-for solution came in sight in
1894. In the spring of that year negotiations were resumed by the
Japanese Government in London. The proposals then submitted to the
British Government were practically the same both in form and substance
as the previous British proposals, the chief difference lying in the
substitution of a right of lease only in place of the right of ownership
of land by British subjects. The Japanese Government had reason
subsequently to regret this alteration, for it gave rise to a
controversy, which, on being referred for arbitration to the Hague
Tribunal in 1905, was decided against Japan. The negotiations proceeded
smoothly, and ended in the signature on the 16th July of that year of a
new Treaty and Protocol, some minor matters being regulated by an
exchange of Notes. By the new Treaty arrangements consular jurisdiction
was abolished, and the whole of Japan was opened to British trade and
intercourse. It was also provided that before the new Treaty came into
operation the new Japanese Codes should have been brought into force,
and Japan should have notified her adhesion to the International
Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright. It
was also agreed between the two parties that the new Treaty should not
come into operation before the expiration of five years from the date of
signature, the object of this stipulation being to allow time for the
negotiation of similar treaties with other foreign Powers. The _ad
valorem_ duties in the tariff accompanying the agreement were
subsequently converted into specific rates by delegates of the two
Governments who met in Tōkiō for that purpose.
It is not surprising that the new Treaty should have met with scanty
approval from the British mercantile community in Japan. In the wide
areas over which the interests of the British Empire are spread it is
inevitable that there should at times be some points of divergence
between Imperial policy and local views, between the appreciation of a
situation by the Government with its wider outlook and far-reaching
responsibilities in matters of Imperial concern, and by British
communities abroad. Nor was it unnatural for British residents in the
Far East, accustomed by long experience to regard extra-territorial
privileges in Oriental countries almost as part of the British
Constitution, to view with unwillingness their surrender. But there can
be no doubt that the time had come for a concession of this kind to be
made. The progress of Japan in the thirty-six years that had elapsed
since the treaties of 1858 had been attended by evidences of stability
in administration and policy which invited the confidence as it evoked
the admiration of the world. The conditions of foreign residence in
Japan compared more than favourably with those in other countries where
there was no exemption from territorial jurisdiction. Nor in any case
would it have been right, or even, under the circumstances, possible,
from the point of the position which Japan had already attained, for
Treaty revision to be longer deferred. Subsequent events have
established the wisdom of the course taken by Great Britain. It is true
that Great Britain gained little material advantage from the agreement.
But Japan had very little to offer in return for what she received.
Circumstances precluded anything in the nature of a bargain. The opening
of the whole country—already rendered accessible to travellers, and
indirectly to merchants, by means of a passport system—was of little, if
any, benefit to British commerce, which was unlikely to diverge from the
trade routes already established. But by being the first to revise her
Treaty on terms practically identical with those she had herself offered
two years before, Great Britain showed her frank recognition of the
changed conditions resulting from the steady progress of more than
thirty years. And she thereby retained her position as the leading
Western Power in the Far East, and gained the goodwill of Japan, thus
paving the way for the future Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Lest it should be thought that in the foregoing account of Treaty
revision too much importance has been attached to it, and possibly too
close a connection traced between negotiations on this subject and the
development of Japan on Western lines, it may be well to conclude these
remarks with a quotation from a speech delivered by Viscount Chinda,
then Japanese Ambassador in London, at the Sheffield University on June
29th, 1918.
In the course of his speech Viscount Chinda said: “Perhaps no one except
a Japanese will be able to appreciate truly and fully the great
importance attached to the question of Treaty revision. For the
Japanese, however, the question was a matter of paramount importance,
connoting as it did nothing less than a national emancipation. The first
treaties of Japan with foreign Powers were signed while the nation was
still in a state of torpor from a long slumber of seclusion, and in the
circumstances amounted almost to duress.... So defective indeed were
these treaties that Japan was in effect deprived of the two essential
attributes of a Sovereign State. The redemption of her judicial and
fiscal autonomy became henceforth the dream of Japanese national
aspiration, and her policies, both foreign and domestic, ever shaped
principally with this one supreme end in view. Innovation after
innovation, often involving sacrifices of traditional sentiments, were
introduced for the purpose of assimilating the country and its
institutions to the standard of Western civilization.”
Similar language has been held by other prominent Japanese statesmen,
notably by Viscount Kato, at one time ambassador in London, and now the
leader of a powerful political party, whose experience as a Cabinet
Minister qualifies him to speak with authority on the subject.
The outbreak of war with China within a few days of the signature of the
revised British Treaty has already been mentioned. To foreign residents
in the Far East, who had opportunities of observing the relations
between Japan and China during the previous years, the event caused
little surprise. At no period of history had their relations been
cordial, except perhaps for a time in the seventh century, when China
became the model on which Japan remoulded her institutions. The Mongol
invasions of Japan in the thirteenth century had left unpleasant
memories in both countries, and relations were not improved by the
intervention of China in support of Korea when the Japanese in their
turn invaded that country. On neither side, however, was the
recollection of past hostilities allowed to stand in the way of the
customary intercourse between neighbouring Oriental States, which was
limited to the despatch at irregular intervals of complimentary
missions, and the occasional visits of Chinese traders. By the time that
Japan embarked on a policy of seclusion, in consequence of the domestic
troubles which arose in connection with the first efforts of foreign
missionary enterprise, Chinese traders had, as we have seen, established
a small centre of commerce in the south-west of Japan. There, after the
country was closed, they, and the Dutch traders, were allowed to remain,
though under conditions which deprived the privilege of much of its
value, and eventually reduced the commerce thus conducted to small and
rapidly dwindling proportions. Prior to the issue of the edict which put
an end to maritime enterprise the Japanese had shown no lack of
seafaring spirit. Even then, however, the pursuit of trade as a definite
object never seems to have attracted the nation, the visits of Japanese
vessels to the mainland of Asia being undertaken more with an eye to the
prosecution of piratical raids than the conduct of peaceful commerce.
With the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse the situation
underwent a complete change. The establishment of “treaty ports” and the
development of Japanese trade with foreign countries had the natural
effect of drawing Japan and China more closely together, though for some
years circumstances conspired to prevent the growth of more intimate
relations between the two peoples. Much of the new commercial
intercourse between them was conducted not directly between Chinese and
Japanese merchants, but indirectly through the medium of merchants of
other nationalities, who acted as the middlemen of foreign commerce in
the Far East. Incompatibility of temperament, moreover, and of ideas—the
result of a fundamental difference in conditions of national
development—acted as a barrier between the two peoples. Nor was the
state of affairs in either country such as to favour a recognition of
the common interests which pointed to the desirability of a closer
understanding. The decay of China under spiritless Manchu rule had
already begun. Resting in fancied security on the traditions of past
greatness, and unconscious of her own decadence, she was too proud to
make advances to a smaller though near neighbour, whose existence she
had hitherto found it convenient to ignore. Japan, for her part, in the
throes of a revolution which was to usher in a new order of things, was
too busy for a time to pay much attention to intercourse with China, of
whose attitude towards herself she was, nevertheless, well aware.
It was not until after the Restoration that the relations between the
two countries were placed on a formal Treaty basis. The Treaty concluded
at Peking in 1871, on the initiative of the new Japanese Government, was
framed on simple lines, something both as to form and substance being
borrowed from the treaties in existence between the two nations and
Western Powers. By the most important of its stipulations it was
arranged that the Consuls, or “administrators,” as they were termed, of
each country should exercise supervision and control over their
nationals resident therein; that these officials should endeavour to
settle amicably all disputes that might arise between the subjects of
the two countries; and that, failing a settlement in this manner, the
questions at issue should be referred to the Consuls and local
authorities for joint decision—the latter having, moreover, the right of
arrest and punishment in all criminal cases. Trade regulations and an
_ad valorem_ tariff were attached to the Treaty, but no period of
duration was mentioned.
Not long after the conclusion of this Treaty the friendly relations thus
formally established between the two countries were disturbed, as we
have seen, by the quarrel which arose out of the ill-treatment received
by natives of Loochoo in Formosa. The adoption by Japan of Western
innovations had already given offence to the Chinese Government, which
viewed with strong disapproval this departure from the traditional
policy hitherto followed by Far Eastern States. The forcible measures
taken by Japan in connection with this incident to obtain redress caused
both surprise and irritation. These feelings were intensified by the
controversy which took place a few years later over the annexation of
Loochoo by Japan. On this occasion China contented herself with making a
formal protest. No definite understanding was effected in the course of
the negotiations that ensued, and the incident was closed by China’s
tacit acquiescence in the new situation. Thenceforth, however, the
relations between the two countries assumed a character of estrangement,
which only needed the stimulus of some further dispute to ripen into
hostility.
This further cause of quarrel was supplied by Korea.