Local Risings—Satsuma Rebellion—Two-Clan Government.
When mentioning in a previous chapter the occurrence of dissensions in
the Ministry soon after the Restoration, attention was drawn to a point
of some importance—the division of feeling which existed in several of
the clans. This was most conspicuous in Satsuma, Chōshiū and Mito. Even
before the Restoration the contentions of rival parties had led in
Chōshiū to grave disorders, which had weakened that clan in its conflict
with the Tokugawa Government; while in Mito the struggle of opposing
factions, supporting, respectively, the Shōgunate, and the Court party
represented by the old Prince of Mito, had resulted in prolonged and
fierce fighting. Though in Satsuma the rivalry of individual leaders had
stopped short of open hostilities, the division of feeling was not less
marked. There, as has been pointed out, the situation was complicated by
the existence of no less than three parties—two conservative groups led,
respectively, by the old noble Shimadzu, the father of the young
ex-daimiō, and by the elder Saigō, the latter being at once the most
influential and most numerous; and a third—the party of reform—which
looked for guidance, amongst other prominent men, to Ōkubo, Kuroda,
Matsugata, Kawamura and the younger Saigō. After the Restoration the
condition of things became less unsettled in Mito, and to some extent
also in Chōshiū. But in Satsuma the division of feeling remained
unaltered, a circumstance which, added to separatist tendencies that
stood in the way of combined action, was, in the sequel, of much benefit
to the Government.
We have touched on the general and special causes which brought about,
first a rupture in the Ministry, then the earlier risings in Hizen,
Chōshiū and Higo, and lastly the Satsuma rebellion. One other reason,
not yet mentioned, was personal and clan jealousies and ambitions. What
the disaffected clans and individuals wanted was a larger share of
power. All, perhaps, over-estimated their share in the accomplishment of
the Restoration. They had, they considered, paid the piper, and they
wished to call the tune.
Ever since his retirement from office, and his withdrawal to his native
province in 1873, the elder Saigō had remained in Kagoshima, the chief
town of Satsuma. Here he had established an institution which, in order
to disguise its object, was called a “private school.” In reality it was
a military college. In its central quarters in that town, and in
branches elsewhere, the youth of the clan received a military training.
In the autumn of 1875 it was already in a flourishing condition, and in
the course of the following year there were in Kagoshima alone some
seven thousand pupils, or associates. By this time much uneasiness
prevailed. Public apprehension found free expression in the Press, which
said that the nation was divided into two parties, one being for the
Government, the other for Satsuma, and asked what could be done to
preserve peace.
The coming into force in January, 1877, of the edict, issued in the
previous year, prohibiting the wearing of swords, was followed by
Shimadzu’s resignation of the high office he held in the Ministry. In
disgust at this latest move of a Government with which he had never from
the first been in sympathy, he left Tōkiō. Not being allowed to travel
by sea, he went back to Satsuma by land, following the historic route he
and other nobles had so often taken before. The members of his retinue
carried in cotton bags the swords they were no longer allowed to wear;
and when, at the end of his journey, the gates of the _yashiki_ at
Kagoshima closed upon his palanquin, he may have realized that he had
passed for ever out of the political life in which he had at one time
played so conspicuous a rôle. In the hostilities which followed he took
no part, being content to show his disapproval of the new _régime_ by
withdrawing into a retirement from which he never again emerged.
Early in 1877 the rebellion broke out. Some excitement had been caused
in Satsuma by the rumour of a plot to murder Saigō, and the Government
thought it prudent to endeavour to remove a part at least of the stores
in the Kagoshima arsenal. The execution of this plan was prevented by
cadets of the “private school,” and an officer sent from Tōkiō in the
middle of January to arrange matters met with a hostile reception, and
was obliged to return without landing. War was now certain. A few days
later Saigō took the field, and, marching north rapidly, besieged the
castle of Kumamoto, the chief town of the province of Higo. This step is
generally held to have been fatal to his success. His proper course, it
is thought, would have been to have crossed over at once to the main
island and move straight on Tōkiō, trusting to the magic of his name to
secure fresh adherents on his way. The rebels had some advantages on
their side. Their preparations had been made; their leader was a popular
hero; and the reputation of the clan for fighting qualities was
unrivalled. So universal was the respect inspired by Satsuma swordsmen
in those days that mothers in districts further north would quiet
fractious infants by warnings of the coming of the dreaded Satsuma men,
just as women in Europe in the last century made use, for the same
purpose, of Bonaparte’s name. It was doubtful, moreover, what reliance
could be placed on the mixed force sent by the Government to encounter
the rebels. But in all other respects the Government was far better
equipped for the struggle than its opponents. It had large military
supplies, accumulated in anticipation of what was coming, besides money
and credit. It had the exclusive use of railways and telegraphs, a small
fleet, shipping facilities, and the command of the sea. The Crown, too,
was on its side, an important point, as we have seen, in Japanese
warfare; and it had the further and somewhat singular advantage of being
assisted by the co-operation in army, navy, and civil administration of
the picked men, intellectually speaking, of the rebel clan, who had
thrown in their lot with the Government, and knew the Satsuma resources
better, possibly, than the rebels themselves. One other factor in the
struggle remains to be noted—the numerous recruits who flocked to the
Imperial standard from districts which had formerly supported the
Tokugawa cause. Amongst these Aidzu clansmen were conspicuous. Filled
with hatred of their late foes in the Civil War of 1868–9, and eager to
take revenge for the disaster which had then overtaken them, they fought
with a dogged courage and tenacity, and, as swordsmen, in the close
hand-to-hand fighting which was a feature of the war, they more than
held their own against their redoubtable antagonists.
The investment of Kumamoto by the rebels gave time for the Imperial
forces to concentrate, and the relief of that place in the early summer
was the turning-point of the struggle. It closed in September of the
same year with the death of Saigō in Kagoshima, to which place he had
doubled back with a few followers through the Imperial lines. He died in
true _samurai_ fashion. Driven by shellfire from a hill fort in the
Satsuma capital, he was retiring to another part of the town, when a
bullet struck him in the thigh, inflicting a dangerous wound. He fell,
calling on a friend at his side to cut off his head, so as to avoid the
disgrace which, according to the military code of the day, would be
incurred were it to come into the hands of the enemy. His friend did as
he was asked, and made his escape with the head.
The war was a heavy drain on the Government exchequer. An official
estimate of its cost, made in 1893, placed it as high as £82,000,000, an
estimate which seems excessive. But the benefits resulting from the
dangerous crisis through which the nation had safely passed far
outweighed the sacrifice in lives and treasure. Nor is it easy to see
how they could have been gained in any other way. The suppression of the
rebellion was more than a mere victory for the Government. It meant the
triumph of a progressive policy over the mediævalism of old Japan. The
reactionary and disturbing elements in the country had been taught that
the new order of things must be accepted. The new conscript army had
dispelled all doubts of its efficiency and had demonstrated, to the
surprise of everybody, that the fighting spirit was not the inheritance
solely of the former military class, but that an army recruited from all
classes of the people was an institution on which the State could safely
depend. Moreover, the administrative organization having successfully
passed the severest test to which it could have been put, the Government
felt that it had acquired the confidence of the nation, and also of
foreign Powers, to a degree unknown before. One result, therefore, of
the rebellion was that the Government emerged from the struggle stronger
and more compact than before. To this must be added another even more
striking: the fact that the Satsuma influence in the Government remained
unimpaired in spite of recent events. This may be explained partly by
the circumstance, already noted, that the party in the rebel clan in
favour of progress had never wavered in its allegiance to the
Government, and, perhaps also, partly by the generosity shown to the
vanquished by the victors. The liberal policy, quite opposed to the
traditions and the spirit of that day, adopted by the Imperialists at
the close of the war of the Restoration was again followed after the
Satsuma rebellion. No stigma, when hostilities had ceased, attached to
the men who had fought for the clan. The temple dedicated shortly
afterwards to those who had fallen in the conflict was erected to the
common memory of all, both loyalists and rebels. From that moment,
too—though the tendency in this direction had shown itself earlier—the
administration, instead of being, as after the Restoration, a government
of the four leading clans, became frankly a government of the two clans
of Satsuma and Chōshiū, a character it retains to-day.
The leading fact which emerges from the foregoing account of events is
the grave difficulties with which the Government established after the
Restoration had to contend. One sees the contest going on between old
and new Japan, and the conflict of views which divided the men who
carried out the revolution; one notices how tenaciously, in spite of
edicts and regulations, old feudal instincts survived; and one realizes
what courage and skill were needed to enable the Ministry of reformers
to steer a middle course between those who wished to put back the hands
of the clock and those who wanted the rate of progress to be still
faster.
During the period of civil commotion, which ended with the suppression
of the Satsuma rebellion, the work of reconstruction did not stand still
altogether. To this period belong the birth of the Press and the
formation of the _Mitsu Bishi_, the earliest Japanese steamship company;
the first assembly of provincial governors, which, after the suppression
of the Satsuma rebellion, became a yearly feature of administrative
procedure; the issue of regulations which were the first step in the
revision of local administration in towns and villages; and the creation
of a High Court of Justice (_Daishinin_) and a Legislative Chamber, or
Senate (_Genrō-in_), composed of officials, that continued in existence
until 1890. The Imperial message delivered at the opening of the first
session announced the desire to establish representative government
gradually, and described the creation of the Senate as a first step in
this direction. In some respects the functions of this Chamber were more
those of an Advisory Council than a Senate of the character found in
Western Constitutions. It had no power to initiate legislation, nor to
give it final effect. But it filled a useful place as a provisional
institution in the machinery of administration. It facilitated the work
of government by drafting new laws, and by discussing and suggesting
alterations in any measures submitted for its consideration. In the
domain of foreign affairs, too, by the establishment of treaty relations
with Korea, and the conclusion of an agreement with Russia regarding
Saghalien and the Kurile islands, to which reference has already been
made, controversies of a troublesome nature were definitely settled.
With the restoration of order the work of reconstruction proceeded more
rapidly. A Stock Exchange and a Chamber of Commerce were formed in the
Capital, where also the first National Industrial Exhibition was held; a
bimetallic system of currency was introduced; while the complications
attending the double allegiance of Loochoo were put an end to by the
annexation, already recorded, of that island. A further step was also
taken in the direction of appeasing popular clamour for representative
government by the promise made in 1878 of introducing prefectural
assemblies at an early date.
It will be remembered that in its answer to the Memorials of impatient
reformers in 1873, when the first rupture in the Ministry took place,
the Government had explained that the introduction of prefectural
assemblies must necessarily precede the creation of a National
Parliament. Its attitude at that time in regard to the demands of the
advanced section of reformers, who were agitating for the establishment
forthwith of representative institutions, was clearly expressed in an
inspired article which appeared in a Tōkiō newspaper. In this it was
pointed out that outside of the official class there was very little
knowledge of public affairs, that the immediate need of the country was
education, and that the Government could work to better purpose by
increasing educational facilities through the establishment of schools
than by the hasty creation of a Representative Assembly. The definite
promise now made after the lapse of five years was in accordance with
the view then expressed as to the necessity of giving precedence to
local assemblies, and was fulfilled two years later.
It seems desirable to explain more fully how the Government directed by
the four clans which effected the Restoration became a Government of
only two of these. When referring to the concentration of administrative
authority, after the suppression of the Satsuma rebellion, in the hands
of the two clans of Satsuma and Chōshiū, mention was made of an earlier
tendency in that direction. This was in 1873, when dissensions in the
Ministry first occurred. The opposition then encountered by the
Government came from two opposite quarters—from reactionaries on the one
hand, and, on the other, from the section of advanced reformers. In each
case the jealousies and ambitions of clans and individuals played, as we
have seen, a certain part. But whereas the aim of the reactionaries
barred the door to compromise, since they were opposed to Western
innovations of any kind, all that distinguished the views of the more
eager reformers from those of the Government was the question of
expediency—in other words, the rate at which progress on modern lines,
equally the object of both, should proceed. The reactionaries relied on
force to gain their ends. They were met by force, and were crushed.
After the failure of local risings, and of the more formidable Satsuma
rebellion, it became clear that the Government was not to be deterred
from pursuing its policy of gradual reform by the open menace of armed
forces. Thenceforth, beyond the isolated attacks of fanatical assassins,
to one of which Ōkubo, one of the strongest of the new Ministers, fell a
victim in the spring of 1878, the Government had nothing to fear from
the reactionary elements in the country. There remained the weapon of
political agitation, open to all who disagreed with the Government. To
this the advanced reformers resorted.
The charge they brought against the Government of failing to fulfil the
promise regarding the creation of representative assemblies made in the
Imperial Oath was not wholly unfounded. There was, as we have seen, no
obscurity in the wording of the Imperial Oath in this respect. For a
document drawn up in a language which lacks the precision of European
tongues, the Imperial announcement was singularly clear. It has been
stated by more than one writer on Japan, who has dealt with this
question, that the Imperial Oath did not mean what it said, and that it
is a mistake to suppose that the establishment of representative
institutions was seriously contemplated at that time. There is no
reason, it is true, to credit the men to whose hands the shaping of the
new Government was committed with anything but crude ideas of what the
Imperial announcement was intended to convey; for the Oath was not a
declaration of rights, but simply a statement of intentions, of the
principles on which the new Government was to be conducted. Nor is it
likely that at a time when the feudal system was in operation any
clear-cut notions of popular rights, as they came afterwards to be
conceived, could have existed. Without doubt, too, those responsible for
the language of the Imperial Oath purposed to impose class restrictions
on the deliberative rights to be granted. This much is clear from the
character given to the deliberative element in the new administration.
What, however, is equally certain is that in a general, though vague,
way there was a hope widely entertained, and supported by the terms of
the Imperial Oath, of broadening, and, in a sense, popularizing the
basis of administration; and that the fact of representative government
and public discussion being important features of administration in
certain Western countries was well known to many leading Japanese, who
understood them to be typical of advanced conditions of progress, and
desired the early establishment of similar conditions in Japan.
From this point of view the action of the advanced reformers was not
without some justification. The Government, on the other hand, in
deciding to move cautiously in the matter of establishing representative
institutions was probably guided by the conviction that the promise in
the Imperial Oath made, as it was, in the first flush of revolutionary
enthusiasm, should not, in the interests of the country, be construed
too literally; and in the light of subsequent events the correctness of
its decision was abundantly proved.
The views on the subject of representative government held by advanced
reformers, amongst whom Tosa clansmen predominated, had, as we have
seen, received substantial recognition from those in authority. A
deliberative element had been introduced into the new administration
formed after the Restoration; and the principle, thus recognized, had
been retained throughout all subsequent administrative changes. After
the rupture in the Ministry, which took place in 1873, the Government
had again showed itself anxious to meet the wishes of the advanced
reformers, who had, meanwhile, formed in the Capital the first political
association in Japan, to which the name of “Association of Patriots”
(_Aikoku-tō_) was given. About the same time the chief Tosa leader,
Itagaki, had formed in his native province the first local political
society called the _Risshi-sha_ or “Association of men with a definite
purpose.” In the chapter on “Political Parties” in _Fifty Years of New
Japan_ this society is described as a political school similar to the
Cadet College established by the elder Saigō before the Satsuma
rebellion. Early in 1875 overtures for a reconciliation had been made by
the Ministry, and at a Conference in Ōsaka, attended by Itagaki, and by
Kido who had resigned from office on another question in the previous
year, an understanding was arrived at, both Itagaki and Kido rejoining
the Government. So far as the former was concerned, one of the
conditions of reconciliation was the creation of the Senate
(_Genrō-in_), to which reference has already been made.
The reconciliation effected with the Tosa party was of short duration.
At the assembly of prefects, already noted, which was held a few weeks
later, the question of representative government was discussed. The
opinion of the prefects was in favour of the Government’s previous
decision, announced in its answer to the memorialists in 1873, that the
establishment of prefectural assemblies must precede the creation of a
National Parliament. The prefects’ endorsement of the attitude already
adopted by the Government on this point, and the latter’s final decision
not only to withhold from the Senate the elective character desired by
the advanced reformers, but to restrict membership to officials only,
caused much dissatisfaction in the Tosa party, and in March, 1876,
Itagaki again severed his connection with the Government, to which he
did not return until several years after parliamentary government had
been established. Ever since the first rupture in the Ministry there had
been much sympathy between the Tosa party and those Hizen clansmen who
entertained similar advanced views on reform. Itagaki’s final withdrawal
from the Government led to the establishment of still closer relations.
From this moment dates the formation of a regular opposition party of
advanced Radicals, and the commencement of a vigorous political
agitation in favour of popular reforms, which continued, with intervals
of quiescence, for many years.
As the estrangement of Tosa and Hizen clansmen from the Government grew
more pronounced in the course of this agitation, the relations between
the other two more conservative, and at the same time more warlike,
clans, which supplied the military strength essential to the
administration, became naturally closer. After the suppression of the
Satsuma rebellion—which, as we have seen, in no way impaired Satsuma
influence in the Ministry—a more definite understanding in regard to
general policy was gradually evolved, with the result, already noted,
that the direction of affairs passed into the hands of Satsuma and
Chōshiū, where it still remains.