NEED FOR A RESTATEMENT OF RELIGION

Every great religion has explained itself in the form of a history and

a cosmogony. It has been felt necessary to say _Why_ and _To

what end_. Every religion has had necessarily to adopt the physical

conceptions and usually also to assume many of the moral and social

values current at the time of its foundation. It could not transcend

the philosophical phrases and attitudes that seemed then to supply the

natural frame for a faith, nor draw upon anything beyond the store of

scientific knowledge of its time. In these conditions lurked the seeds

of an ultimate decay and supersession of every religion.

But as the idea of continual change going farther and farther from

existing realities and never returning to them is a new one, each fresh

development of religion in the world so far has been proclaimed in

perfect good faith as the culminating and final truth. The suggestion

of the possibility of further restatement is an unsettling suggestion;

it seems to undermine conviction and it breaks the ranks of the

believers because there are enormous variations in the capacities of

men to recognise the same spirit under a changing shape. While some

intelligences can recognise the same God under a variety of names and

symbols without any severe strain, others cannot even detect the most

contrasted Gods one from the other, provided they wear the same mask

and title. It appears a perfectly natural and reasonable thing to many

minds to restate religion in terms of biological and psychological

necessity, while to others any variation in the phrasing of the faith

seems to be nothing less than atheistical misrepresentations of the

most damnable kind. For them God, a God still anthropomorphic enough

to have a will and purpose, to display preferences and reciprocate

emotions, to be indeed a person, must be retained until the end of

time. For others, God can be thought of as a Great First Cause, as

impersonal and inhuman as atomic structure.

It is because of the historical and philosophical commitments they

have undertaken, and because of concessions made to common human

weaknesses in regard to such once apparently minor but now vital moral

issues as property, mental activity and public veracity--rather than

of any inadequacy in their adaptation to psychological needs--that

the present discredit of recognised religions has come about. They no

longer seem even roughly truthful upon issues of fact, and they give

no imperatives over large fields of conduct in which perplexity is

prevalent. People will say: “I could be perfectly happy leading the

life of a Catholic devotee if only I could believe.” But most of the

framework of religious explanation upon which that life is sustained is

too old-fashioned and too irrelevant to admit of that thoroughness of

belief which is necessary for the devotion of intelligent people.

Great ingenuity has been shown by modern writers and thinkers in

the adaptation of venerated religious expressions to new ideas.

_Peccavi._ The word “God” is in most minds so associated with

the concept of religion that it is abandoned only with the greatest

reluctance. The word remains though the idea is continually attenuated.

He is pushed farther and farther from actuality and His definition

becomes increasingly a bundle of negations, until at last, in His

rôle of The Absolute, He becomes an entirely negative expression.

While we can speak of good, say some, we can speak of God. God is the

possibility of goodness, the good side of things. If phrases in which

the name of God is used are to be abandoned, they argue, religion will

be left speechless before many occasions.

Certainly there is something beyond the individual that is and the

world that is; on that we have already insisted as a characteristic

of all religions; that persuasion is the essence of faith and the

key to courage. But whether that is to be considered, even after the

most strenuous exercises in personification, as a greater person or

a comprehensive person is another matter. Personality is the last

vestige of anthropomorphism. The modern urge to a precise veracity is

against such concessions to traditional expression. On the other hand

there is in many fine religious minds a desire amounting almost to a

necessity for an object of devotion so individualised as to be capable

at least of a receptive consciousness even if no definite response

is conceded. One type of mind can accept a reality in itself which

another must project and dramatise before it can comprehend it and

react to it. The human soul is an intricate thing which will not endure

elucidation when that passes beyond a certain degree of harshness and

roughness. The human spirit has learnt love, devotion, obedience and

humility in relation to other personalities, and with difficulty it

takes the final step to a transcendent subordination, from which the

last shred of personality has been stripped. In matters not immediately

material, language has to work by metaphors, and though every metaphor

carries its own peculiar risks of confusion we cannot do without them.

Great intellectual tolerance is necessary, therefore--a cultivated

disposition to translate and retranslate from one metaphysical or

emotional idiom to another--if there is not to be a deplorable wastage

of moral force in our world.

Three profound differences between the mental dispositions of the

present time and those of preceding ages have to be realised if current

developments of the religious impulse are to be seen in their correct

relationship to the religious life of the past. There has been a great

advance in the analysis of psychic processes and the courage with

which men have probed into the origins of human thought and feeling.

Following upon the biological advances that have made us recognise fish

and amphibian in the bodily structure of man, have come these parallel

developments in which we see elemental fear and lust and self-love

moulded, modified and exalted, under the stress of social progress,

into intricate human motives. Our conception of sin and our treatment

of sin have been profoundly modified by this analysis. Our former sins

are seen as ignorances, inadequacies and bad habits, and the moral

conflict is robbed of three-fourths of its ego-centred melodramatic

quality. We are no longer moved to be less wicked; we are moved to

organise our conditioned reflexes and lead a life less fragmentary and

silly.

Secondly, the conception of individuality has been influenced and

relaxed by biological thought, so that we do not think so readily of

the individual _contra mundum_ as our fathers did. We begin to

realise that we are egotists by misapprehension. Nature cheats the self

to serve the purposes of the species by filling it with wants that war

against its private interests. As gut eyes are opened to these things,

we see ourselves as beings greater or less than the definitive self.

Man’s soul is no longer his own. It is, he discovers, part of a greater

being which lived before he was born and will survive him. The idea

of a survival of the definite individual with all the accidents and

idiosyncrasies of his temporal nature upon him, dissolves to nothing in

this new view of immortality.

The third of the main contrasts between modern and former thought which

have rendered the general shapes of established religion old-fashioned

and unserviceable, is a reorientation of current ideas about time.

The powerful disposition of the human mind to explain everything as

the inevitable unfolding of a past event which, so to speak, sweeps

the future helplessly before it, has been checked by a mass of subtle

criticisms. The conception of progress as a broadening and increasing

purpose, a conception which is taking hold of the human imagination

more and more firmly, turns religious life towards the future. We

think no longer of submission to the irrevocable decrees of absolute

dominion, but of participation in an adventure on behalf of a power

that gains strength and establishes itself. The history of our world,

which has been unfolded to us by science, runs counter to all the

histories on which religions have been based. There was no Creation in

the past, we begin to realise, but eternally there is creation; there

was no Fall to account for the conflict of good and evil, but a stormy

ascent. Life as we know it is a mere beginning.

It seems unavoidable that if religion is to develop unifying and

directive power in the present confusion of human affairs it must

adapt itself to this forward-looking, individuality-analysing turn

of mind; it must divest itself of its sacred histories, its gross

preoccupations, its posthumous prolongation of personal ends. The

desire for service, for subordination, for permanent effect, for an

escape from the distressful pettiness and morality of the individual

life, is the undying element in every religious system. The time has

come to strip religion right down to that, to strip it for greater

tasks than it has ever faced before. The histories and symbols that

served our fathers encumber and divide us. Sacraments and rituals

harbour disputes and waste our scanty emotions. The explanation of why

things are is an unnecessary effort in religion. The essential fact in

religion is the desire for religion and not how it came about. If you

do not want religion, no persuasions, no convictions about your place

in the universe can give it to you. The first sentence in the modern

creed must be, not “I believe” but “I give myself.”

To what? And how? To these questions we must next address ourselves.

_Chapter IV_

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