GENERAL REMARKS ON NIGHT OPERATIONS.
_Definitions._
In the Field Service Regulations, night operations are divided into
three classes—night marches, night advances, and night attacks—which
may be briefly defined as follows:—
A night march is a movement along roads, or well defined tracks, in
normal march formations, undertaken for the purpose of transferring
troops under cover of darkness to some desired point.
A night advance is stated in the Field Service Regulations to be a
forward movement of which the object “is to gain ground from which
further progress will be made in daylight, and not to deliver a
decisive assault during darkness.” During the advance the troops will
either be deployed or at any rate will move in formations which admit
of rapid deployment.
Night attacks are delivered for the purpose of gaining possession of
some point or locality which is held by the enemy or of surprising “an
ill-trained, ill-disciplined, or semi-civilised enemy.” (Field Service
Regulations.)
A night march may be a necessary prelude to either a night advance or a
night attack, but in that case the march is considered to have ended on
the arrival of the force at the position of assembly.
_Importance of Careful Preparation._
Whatever may be the nature of the operation, the most careful
preparation is essential. The success of all operations in the dark,
up to the moment of collision with the enemy at any rate, depends on
the care and thoroughness with which the preparatory arrangements have
been made, and these arrangements are just as necessary in the case
of a night march, carried out at some distance from the enemy, as in
that of a night attack. It is impossible to lay too much stress on
the importance of this preparation, no detail is too trifling to be
considered, every eventuality, whether probable or improbable, should
be thought out and provided for, and nothing must be left to chance.
The first and most important step in the preparation of any night
operation consists in obtaining accurate information concerning the
ground to be traversed and the position of the enemy. This necessitates
as close a reconnaissance as is possible, and the reconnaissance should
be made by night as well as by day. Ground presents such a different
appearance at night that it is often difficult to identify a spot which
has only been seen previously in daylight, moreover, small accidents of
the surface which may not attract attention in daytime are sometimes
sufficient to throw troops into disorder, if they come upon them
unexpectedly in the dark.
The chief points on which information is required being set forth in
the Field Service Regulations, it is unnecessary to recapitulate them
here, but the following details should be attended to as well:—
(1) The spots selected both for the position of assembly and
position of deployment must not only be places which can be
easily identified at night, but must also afford sufficient
space for the troops to form up.
(2) Both the position of obstacles, and the direction in which
they lie, must be accurately reported, and it must be noted if
their direction is constant throughout.
(3) In reporting on the enemy’s position every effort must be made
to discover the extent to which patrols are used, and the
distance beyond the line of the advanced posts to which they
penetrate.
_Plan of Operations._
The plan of operations will be based on the information gained during
the reconnaissance, and in preparing it the following maxims should be
borne in mind:—
1. It is the quality and not the number of the troops that counts.
2. The larger the force the greater the difficulty.
3. Every detachment increases the risk of failure.
Though No. 3 is undoubtedly true, yet it will often be necessary to
move in more than one column. In that case each column must be given a
separate objective; each objective must be distinct from, and situated
some distance away from, any other, and every possible precaution must
be taken to prevent an accidental collision between any two columns,
either before or after reaching their objectives.
The Field Service Regulations direct that lateral communication is to
be maintained between columns, so that the assaults may be delivered
simultaneously, and recommend the use of telephones for the purpose.
The maintenance of lateral communication is very important, but each
column commander should understand that if his column is discovered he
must press on to the assault without waiting for the others.
_The Framing of Orders for Night Operations._
The rules for framing orders are clearly laid down in the Regulations,
but, as the orders will only be communicated beforehand to those
officers who are required to make the preliminary arrangements, it is
necessary that extracts, containing those portions which are to be read
to the troops at the position of assembly, should also be prepared.
These extracts will probably have to be read in a very feeble light,
and it is, therefore, important that they should be very clearly and
legibly typewritten. Nothing is more trying than to have to try to
grasp the meaning of a blurred hektograph copy of orders by the aid of
an indifferent lamp, which probably has to be held under a coat.
In all operations which commence with a night march the selection of a
suitable starting point is important. This point should be so situated
that it is possible for the whole force to be drawn up in its order of
march before the movement begins, and a staff officer must be detailed
to ascertain that every unit is present, and in its proper place before
the column moves off. This is an obvious precaution; but, as I have
seen it neglected in South Africa, with serious results, I think it
well to lay stress on it.
_Protection During Operations._
The general principles governing the protection of forces during
operations are the same by night as by day, except that at night both
the strength of the protecting bodies and their distance from the
troops they cover will be much reduced.
In night marches small advanced and rear-guards will be employed, but
in night advances and night attacks these will be replaced by lines of
scouts at a distance varying from 50 to 100 yards, according to the
light.
To protect the flanks during a night march in close country the
Regulations advise the use of flanking piquets, posted by the advanced
guard, and withdrawn by the rear-guard. I have never seen this system
tried at night, but I doubt its success; even if the advanced guard
commander is able to identify quickly the points at which the piquets
are to be left, there will be a certain amount of delay while they are
quitting the column, and the rear-guard will be constantly delayed by
waiting for them to withdraw. Thus the rear-guard will gradually fall
further and further behind, and, unless the column is frequently halted
to allow the rear-guard to close up, the rear companies will melt away
into a long string of connecting files.
If flanking piquets are used, and it seems to be the safest plan, they
should be found by a special unit, and, having taken up their positions
before the march commences, should not be withdrawn till it is over.
In open country at all times, and in close country in the case of night
advances and night attacks, the only _moving_ protection which can
safely be given to the flanks is that afforded by scouts, who must keep
quite close to the column.
_Maintenance of Connection._
The maintenance of connection between the various portions of a force
when engaged in night operations is a matter of supreme importance.
The facility with which units go astray when connection is lost is
extraordinary, and when once they have gone astray it is often very
difficult to find them. I have myself seen a whole brigade of infantry
disappear and be lost for nearly two hours in an area which hardly
exceeded a square mile.
_Rifle Fire in Night Attacks._
It cannot be too strongly impressed upon all ranks that to fire during
a night attack is not only useless, but to use the words of General
Dragomirov, is absolutely criminal. The Regulations lay down that
rifles are not to be loaded, but the magazines are to be charged
and the cut-offs closed, and this order must be rigidly adhered to.
Personally, I am against having the magazines charged; the proper
weapon for the infantry soldier to use at night is the bayonet, and he
should be taught to rely on that alone.
_Caution Necessary in Planning Night Operations, but Resolution
Essential in their Execution._
Although it is necessary to act with caution, and to weigh well the
chances of success and failure before deciding on an offensive night
operation, yet, when once the undertaking has been commenced, it must
be carried through with the utmost resolution. It is exceedingly
unlikely that the enemy will be completely surprised, but every
second of delay between the discovery of the attacking force and the
delivery of the assault is of priceless value to the defence; it must,
therefore, be impressed upon all ranks that when the enemy opens fire
the only course open to them is to press on to the assault, and decide
the issue with the bayonet.
DEFENCE AGAINST NIGHT ATTACKS.
_Passive Defence Useless._
Unless the defenders are protected by an impenetrable obstacle, a
passive defence is suicidal. Artillery and machine guns may be laid so
as to sweep a particular area at night, but no reliance can be placed
on the effect of rifle fire unless the rifles have been mechanically
fixed.
I do not overlook the fact that instances are on record of huge losses
inflicted by rifle fire at night, but I maintain that the effect
obtained is merely a matter of chance, and any officer who puts his
trust in chance is likely to have to pay dearly for his mistake.
Every infantryman must be imbued with the idea that at night the
bayonet is the only weapon which he can trust, and that the more
promptly he uses it the better his chance of success will be. In the
dark every advantage lies with the side that takes the initiative;
numbers are of little account, for a resolute bayonet charge, delivered
by even a single piquet may, if it comes unexpectedly, demoralise and
throw into disorder a strong attacking column.
In short, when the attacking column reaches the outposts it must be
received with vigorous local counter-attacks delivered with the bayonet
by the nearest bodies of the defenders. If a counter-attack comes as a
surprise, the chances of success are all in its favour, but any success
gained must not be followed up, the outposts should be withdrawn to
their original positions, and patrols sent out to keep touch with the
retiring enemy. It is most important that all ranks should realise
that to wait to receive a charge is fatal; the only course open is to
advance boldly with the bayonet; even if the counter-attack is not
successful, the outposts will still have fulfilled their duty and have
gained a few minutes’ time for the supports and reserves to form up.