Produced by David Widger
THE PAPERS AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
VOLUME FOUR
CONSTITUTIONAL EDITION
By Abraham Lincoln
Edited by Arthur Brooks Lapsley
THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Volume Four
THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES II
LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS FOURTH DEBATE, AT CHARLESTON, SEPTEMBER 18, 1858.
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:--It will be very difficult for an audience so large
as this to hear distinctly what a speaker says, and consequently it is
important that as profound silence be preserved as possible.
While I was at the hotel to-day, an elderly gentleman called upon me to
know whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality between
the negroes and white people. While I had not proposed to myself on this
occasion to say much on that subject, yet as the question was asked me I
thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes in saying something in regard
to it. I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white
and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making
voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor
to intermarry with white people; and I will say, in addition to this, that
there is a physical difference between the white and black races which
I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of
social and political equality. And in as much as they cannot so live,
while they do remain together there must be the position of superior
and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the
superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon this occasion
I do not perceive that because the white man is to have the superior
position the negro should be denied everything. I do not understand that
because I do not want a negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want
her for a wife. My understanding is that I can just let her alone. I am
now in my fiftieth year, and I certainly never have had a black woman for
either a slave or a wife. So it seems to me quite possible for us to get
along without making either slaves or wives of negroes. I will add to this
that I have never seen, to my knowledge, a man, woman, or child who was
in favor of producing a perfect equality, social and political, between
negroes and white men. I recollect of but one distinguished instance
that I ever heard of so frequently as to be entirely satisfied of its
correctness, and that is the case of Judge Douglas's old friend Colonel
Richard M. Johnson. I will also add to the remarks I have made (for I am
not going to enter at large upon this subject), that I have never had the
least apprehension that I or my friends would marry negroes if there was
no law to keep them from it; but as Judge Douglas and his friends seem
to be in great apprehension that they might, if there were no law to keep
them from it, I give him the most solemn pledge that I will to the very
last stand by the law of this State which forbids the marrying of white
people with negroes. I will add one further word, which is this: that I do
not understand that there is any place where an alteration of the social
and political relations of the negro and the white man can be made, except
in the State Legislature,--not in the Congress of the United States; and
as I do not really apprehend the approach of any such thing myself, and
as Judge Douglas seems to be in constant horror that some such danger is
rapidly approaching, I propose as the best means to prevent it that the
Judge be kept at home, and placed in the State Legislature to fight the
measure. I do not propose dwelling longer at this time on this subject.
When Judge Trumbull, our other Senator in Congress, returned to Illinois
in the month of August, he made a speech at Chicago, in which he made what
may be called a charge against Judge Douglas, which I understand proved to
be very offensive to him. The Judge was at that time out upon one of his
speaking tours through the country, and when the news of it reached him,
as I am informed, he denounced Judge Trumbull in rather harsh terms for
having said what he did in regard to that matter. I was traveling at that
time, and speaking at the same places with Judge Douglas on subsequent
days, and when I heard of what Judge Trumbull had said of Douglas, and
what Douglas had said back again, I felt that I was in a position where
I could not remain entirely silent in regard to the matter. Consequently,
upon two or three occasions I alluded to it, and alluded to it in no other
wise than to say that in regard to the charge brought by Trumbull against
Douglas, I personally knew nothing, and sought to say nothing about it;
that I did personally know Judge Trumbull; that I believed him to be a
man of veracity; that I believed him to be a man of capacity sufficient to
know very well whether an assertion he was making, as a conclusion drawn
from a set of facts, was true or false; and as a conclusion of my own from
that, I stated it as my belief if Trumbull should ever be called upon,
he would prove everything he had said. I said this upon two or three
occasions. Upon a subsequent occasion, Judge Trumbull spoke again before
an audience at Alton, and upon that occasion not only repeated his charge
against Douglas, but arrayed the evidence he relied upon to substantiate
it. This speech was published at length; and subsequently at Jacksonville
Judge Douglas alluded to the matter. In the course of his speech, and near
the close of it, he stated in regard to myself what I will now read:
"Judge Douglas proceeded to remark that he should not hereafter occupy his
time in refuting such charges made by Trumbull, but that, Lincoln having
indorsed the character of Trumbull for veracity, he should hold him
(Lincoln) responsible for the slanders."
I have done simply what I have told you, to subject me to this invitation
to notice the charge. I now wish to say that it had not originally been my
purpose to discuss that matter at all But in-as-much as it seems to be the
wish of Judge Douglas to hold me responsible for it, then for once in
my life I will play General Jackson, and to the just extent I take the
responsibility.
I wish to say at the beginning that I will hand to the reporters that
portion of Judge Trumbull's Alton speech which was devoted to this matter,
and also that portion of Judge Douglas's speech made at Jacksonville in
answer to it. I shall thereby furnish the readers of this debate with the
complete discussion between Trumbull and Douglas. I cannot now read them,
for the reason that it would take half of my first hour to do so. I can
only make some comments upon them. Trumbull's charge is in the following
words:
"Now, the charge is, that there was a plot entered into to have a
constitution formed for Kansas, and put in force, without giving the
people an opportunity to vote upon it, and that Mr. Douglas was in the
plot."
I will state, without quoting further, for all will have an opportunity of
reading it hereafter, that Judge Trumbull brings forward what he regards
as sufficient evidence to substantiate this charge.
It will be perceived Judge Trumbull shows that Senator Bigler, upon the
floor of the Senate, had declared there had been a conference among the
senators, in which conference it was determined to have an enabling act
passed for the people of Kansas to form a constitution under, and in
this conference it was agreed among them that it was best not to have a
provision for submitting the constitution to a vote of the people after
it should be formed. He then brings forward to show, and showing, as he
deemed, that Judge Douglas reported the bill back to the Senate with that
clause stricken out. He then shows that there was a new clause inserted
into the bill, which would in its nature prevent a reference of the
constitution back for a vote of the people,--if, indeed, upon a mere
silence in the law, it could be assumed that they had the right to vote
upon it. These are the general statements that he has made.
I propose to examine the points in Judge Douglas's speech in which he
attempts to answer that speech of Judge Trumbull's. When you come to
examine Judge Douglas's speech, you will find that the first point he
makes is:
"Suppose it were true that there was such a change in the bill, and that
I struck it out,--is that a proof of a plot to force a constitution upon
them against their will?"
His striking out such a provision, if there was such a one in the bill,
he argues, does not establish the proof that it was stricken out for the
purpose of robbing the people of that right. I would say, in the first
place, that that would be a most manifest reason for it. It is true, as
Judge Douglas states, that many Territorial bills have passed without
having such a provision in them. I believe it is true, though I am not
certain, that in some instances constitutions framed under such bills
have been submitted to a vote of the people with the law silent upon the
subject; but it does not appear that they once had their enabling acts
framed with an express provision for submitting the constitution to be
framed to a vote of the people, then that they were stricken out when
Congress did not mean to alter the effect of the law. That there have been
bills which never had the provision in, I do not question; but when was
that provision taken out of one that it was in? More especially does the
evidence tend to prove the proposition that Trumbull advanced, when
we remember that the provision was stricken out of the bill almost
simultaneously with the time that Bigler says there was a conference among
certain senators, and in which it was agreed that a bill should be passed
leaving that out. Judge Douglas, in answering Trumbull, omits to attend to
the testimony of Bigler, that there was a meeting in which it was agreed
they should so frame the bill that there should be no submission of the
constitution to a vote of the people. The Judge does not notice this part
of it. If you take this as one piece of evidence, and then ascertain that
simultaneously Judge Douglas struck out a provision that did require it to
be submitted, and put the two together, I think it will make a pretty fair
show of proof that Judge Douglas did, as Trumbull says, enter into a plot
to put in force a constitution for Kansas, without giving the people any
opportunity of voting upon it.
But I must hurry on. The next proposition that Judge Douglas puts is this:
"But upon examination it turns out that the Toombs bill never did contain
a clause requiring the constitution to be submitted."
This is a mere question of fact, and can be determined by evidence. I only
want to ask this question: Why did not Judge Douglas say that these words
were not stricken out of the Toomb's bill, or this bill from which it is
alleged the provision was stricken out,--a bill which goes by the name of
Toomb's, because he originally brought it forward? I ask why, if the Judge
wanted to make a direct issue with Trumbull, did he not take the exact
proposition Trumbull made in his speech, and say it was not stricken out?
Trumbull has given the exact words that he says were in the Toomb's bill,
and he alleges that when the bill came back, they were stricken out. Judge
Douglas does not say that the words which Trumbull says were stricken
out were not so stricken out, but he says there was no provision in the
Toomb's bill to submit the constitution to a vote of the people. We see at
once that he is merely making an issue upon the meaning of the words.
He has not undertaken to say that Trumbull tells a lie about these words
being stricken out, but he is really, when pushed up to it, only taking an
issue upon the meaning of the words. Now, then, if there be any issue upon
the meaning of the words, or if there be upon the question of fact as to
whether these words were stricken out, I have before me what I suppose to
be a genuine copy of the Toomb's bill, in which it can be shown that the
words Trumbull says were in it were, in fact, originally there. If there
be any dispute upon the fact, I have got the documents here to show
they were there. If there be any controversy upon the sense of the
words,--whether these words which were stricken out really constituted a
provision for submitting the matter to a vote of the people,--as that is a
matter of argument, I think I may as well use Trumbull's own argument. He
says that the proposition is in these words:
"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified
by the people at the election for the adoption of the constitution, shall
be obligatory upon the United States and the said State of Kansas."
Now, Trumbull alleges that these last words were stricken out of the bill
when it came back, and he says this was a provision for submitting the
constitution to a vote of the people; and his argument is this:
"Would it have been possible to ratify the land propositions at the
election for the adoption of the constitution, unless such an election was
to be held?"
This is Trumbull's argument. Now, Judge Douglas does not meet the charge
at all, but he stands up and says there was no such proposition in that
bill for submitting the constitution to be framed to a vote of the people.
Trumbull admits that the language is not a direct provision for submitting
it, but it is a provision necessarily implied from another provision. He
asks you how it is possible to ratify the land proposition at the election
for the adoption of the constitution, if there was no election to be held
for the adoption of the constitution. And he goes on to show that it is
not any less a law because the provision is put in that indirect shape
than it would be if it were put directly. But I presume I have said enough
to draw attention to this point, and I pass it by also.
Another one of the points that Judge Douglas makes upon Trumbull, and at
very great length, is, that Trumbull, while the bill was pending, said in
a speech in the Senate that he supposed the constitution to be made would
have to be submitted to the people. He asks, if Trumbull thought so then,
what ground is there for anybody thinking otherwise now? Fellow-citizens,
this much may be said in reply: That bill had been in the hands of a
party to which Trumbull did not belong. It had been in the hands of the
committee at the head of which Judge Douglas stood. Trumbull perhaps had a
printed copy of the original Toomb's bill. I have not the evidence on
that point except a sort of inference I draw from the general course
of business there. What alterations, or what provisions in the way of
altering, were going on in committee, Trumbull had no means of knowing,
until the altered bill was reported back. Soon afterwards, when it was
reported back, there was a discussion over it, and perhaps Trumbull in
reading it hastily in the altered form did not perceive all the bearings
of the alterations. He was hastily borne into the debate, and it does not
follow that because there was something in it Trumbull did not perceive,
that something did not exist. More than this, is it true that what
Trumbull did can have any effect on what Douglas did? Suppose Trumbull had
been in the plot with these other men, would that let Douglas out of it?
Would it exonerate Douglas that Trumbull did n't then perceive he was in
the plot? He also asks the question: Why did n't Trumbull propose to
amend the bill, if he thought it needed any amendment? Why, I believe that
everything Judge Trumbull had proposed, particularly in connection with
this question of Kansas and Nebraska, since he had been on the floor of
the Senate, had been promptly voted down by Judge Douglas and his friends.
He had no promise that an amendment offered by him to anything on this
subject would receive the slightest consideration. Judge Trumbull did
bring to the notice of the Senate at that time the fact that there was no
provision for submitting the constitution about to be made for the people
of Kansas to a vote of the people. I believe I may venture to say that
Judge Douglas made some reply to this speech of Judge Trumbull's, but he
never noticed that part of it at all. And so the thing passed by. I think,
then, the fact that Judge Trumbull offered no amendment does not throw
much blame upon him; and if it did, it does not reach the question of fact
as to what Judge Douglas was doing. I repeat, that if Trumbull had himself
been in the plot, it would not at all relieve the others who were in it
from blame. If I should be indicted for murder, and upon the trial it
should be discovered that I had been implicated in that murder, but that
the prosecuting witness was guilty too, that would not at all touch
the question of my crime. It would be no relief to my neck that they
discovered this other man who charged the crime upon me to be guilty too.
Another one of the points Judge Douglas makes upon Judge Trumbull is, that
when he spoke in Chicago he made his charge to rest upon the fact that the
bill had the provision in it for submitting the constitution to a vote
of the people when it went into his Judge Douglas's hands, that it was
missing when he reported it to the Senate, and that in a public speech he
had subsequently said the alterations in the bill were made while it was
in committee, and that they were made in consultation between him (Judge
Douglas) and Toomb's. And Judge Douglas goes on to comment upon the fact
of Trumbull's adducing in his Alton speech the proposition that the bill
not only came back with that proposition stricken out, but with another
clause and another provision in it, saying that "until the
complete execution of this Act there shall be no election in said
Territory,"--which, Trumbull argued, was not only taking the provision
for submitting to a vote of the people out of the bill, but was adding an
affirmative one, in that it prevented the people from exercising the right
under a bill that was merely silent on the question. Now, in regard
to what he says, that Trumbull shifts the issue, that he shifts his
ground,--and I believe he uses the term that, "it being proven false, he
has changed ground," I call upon all of you, when you come to examine that
portion of Trumbull's speech (for it will make a part of mine), to examine
whether Trumbull has shifted his ground or not. I say he did not shift his
ground, but that he brought forward his original charge and the evidence
to sustain it yet more fully, but precisely as he originally made it.
Then, in addition thereto, he brought in a new piece of evidence. He
shifted no ground. He brought no new piece of evidence inconsistent with
his former testimony; but he brought a new piece, tending, as he thought,
and as I think, to prove his proposition. To illustrate: A man brings
an accusation against another, and on trial the man making the charge
introduces A and B to prove the accusation. At a second trial he
introduces the same witnesses, who tell the same story as before, and a
third witness, who tells the same thing, and in addition gives further
testimony corroborative of the charge. So with Trumbull. There was no
shifting of ground, nor inconsistency of testimony between the new piece
of evidence and what he originally introduced.
But Judge Douglas says that he himself moved to strike out that last
provision of the bill, and that on his motion it was stricken out and a
substitute inserted. That I presume is the truth. I presume it is true
that that last proposition was stricken out by Judge Douglas. Trumbull
has not said it was not; Trumbull has himself said that it was so stricken
out. He says: "I am now speaking of the bill as Judge Douglas reported
it back. It was amended somewhat in the Senate before it passed, but I am
speaking of it as he brought it back." Now, when Judge Douglas parades the
fact that the provision was stricken out of the bill when it came back, he
asserts nothing contrary to what Trumbull alleges. Trumbull has only said
that he originally put it in, not that he did not strike it out. Trumbull
says it was not in the bill when it went to the committee. When it came
back it was in, and Judge Douglas said the alterations were made by him in
consultation with Toomb's. Trumbull alleges, therefore, as his conclusion,
that Judge Douglas put it in. Then, if Douglas wants to contradict
Trumbull and call him a liar, let him say he did not put it in, and not
that he did n't take it out again. It is said that a bear is sometimes
hard enough pushed to drop a cub; and so I presume it was in this case.
I presume the truth is that Douglas put it in, and afterward took it out.
That, I take it, is the truth about it. Judge Trumbull says one thing,
Douglas says another thing, and the two don't contradict one another at
all. The question is, what did he put it in for? In the first place, what
did he take the other provision out of the bill for,--the provision which
Trumbull argued was necessary for submitting the constitution to a vote of
the people? What did he take that out for; and, having taken it out, what
did he put this in for? I say that in the run of things it is not unlikely
forces conspire to render it vastly expedient for Judge Douglas to take
that latter clause out again. The question that Trumbull has made is
that Judge Douglas put it in; and he don't meet Trumbull at all unless he
denies that.
In the clause of Judge Douglas's speech upon this subject he uses this
language toward Judge Trumbull. He says:
"He forges his evidence from beginning to end; and by falsifying the
record, he endeavors to bolster up his false charge."
Well, that is a pretty serious statement--Trumbull forges his evidence
from beginning to end. Now, upon my own authority I say that it is not
true. What is a forgery? Consider the evidence that Trumbull has brought
forward. When you come to read the speech, as you will be able to, examine
whether the evidence is a forgery from beginning to end. He had the bill
or document in his hand like that [holding up a paper]. He says that is a
copy of the Toomb's bill,--the amendment offered by Toomb's. He says that
is a copy of the bill as it was introduced and went into Judge Douglas's
hands. Now, does Judge Douglas say that is a forgery? That is one thing
Trumbull brought forward. Judge Douglas says he forged it from beginning
to end! That is the "beginning," we will say. Does Douglas say that is a
forgery? Let him say it to-day, and we will have a subsequent examination
upon this subject. Trumbull then holds up another document like this, and
says that is an exact copy of the bill as it came back in the amended form
out of Judge Douglas's hands. Does Judge Douglas say that is a forgery?
Does he say it in his general sweeping charge? Does he say so now? If he
does not, then take this Toomb's bill and the bill in the amended form,
and it only needs to compare them to see that the provision is in the one
and not in the other; it leaves the inference inevitable that it was taken
out.
But, while I am dealing with this question, let us see what Trumbull's
other evidence is. One other piece of evidence I will read. Trumbull says
there are in this original Toomb's bill these words:
"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified
by the people at the election for the adoption of the constitution, shall
be obligatory upon the United States and the said State of Kansas."
Now, if it is said that this is a forgery, we will open the paper here and
see whether it is or not. Again, Trumbull says, as he goes along, that Mr.
Bigler made the following statement in his place in the Senate, December
9, 1857:
"I was present when that subject was discussed by senators before the bill
was introduced, and the question was raised and discussed, whether the
constitution, when formed, should be submitted to a vote of the people. It
was held by those most intelligent on the subject that, in view of all the
difficulties surrounding that Territory, the danger of any experiment at
that time of a popular vote, it would be better there should be no such
provision in the Toomb's bill; and it was my understanding, in all the
intercourse I had, that the Convention would make a constitution, and send
it here, without submitting it to the popular vote."
Then Trumbull follows on:
"In speaking of this meeting again on the 21st December, 1857
[Congressional Globe, same vol., page 113], Senator Bigler said:
"'Nothing was further from my mind than to allude to any social or
confidential interview. The meeting was not of that character. Indeed, it
was semi-official, and called to promote the public good. My recollection
was clear that I left the conference under the impression that it had
been deemed best to adopt measures to admit Kansas as a State through the
agency of one popular election, and that for delegates to this Convention.
This impression was stronger because I thought the spirit of the bill
infringed upon the doctrine of non-intervention, to which I had great
aversion; but with the hope of accomplishing a great good, and as no
movement had been made in that direction in the Territory, I waived this
objection, and concluded to support the measure. I have a few items of
testimony as to the correctness of these impressions, and with their
submission I shall be content. I have before me the bill reported by
the senator from Illinois on the 7th of March, 1856, providing for the
admission of Kansas as a State, the third section of which reads as
follows:
"That the following propositions be, and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified
by the people at the election for the adoption of the constitution, shall
be obligatory upon the United States and the said State of Kansas."
The bill read in his place by the senator from Georgia on the 25th of
June, and referred to the Committee on Territories, contained the same
section word for word. Both these bills were under consideration at the
conference referred to; but, sir, when the senator from Illinois reported
the Toombs bill to the Senate with amendments, the next morning, it did
not contain that portion of the third section which indicated to the
Convention that the constitution should be approved by the people. The
words "and ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the
constitution" had been stricken out.
Now, these things Trumbull says were stated by Bigler upon the floor
of the Senate on certain days, and that they are recorded in the
Congressional Globe on certain pages. Does Judge Douglas say this is a
forgery? Does he say there is no such thing in the Congressional Globe?
What does he mean when he says Judge Trumbull forges his evidence from
beginning to end? So again he says in another place that Judge Douglas,
in his speech, December 9, 1857 (Congressional Globe, part I., page 15),
stated:
"That during the last session of Congress, I [Mr. Douglas] reported a bill
from the Committee on Territories, to authorize the people of Kansas to
assemble and form a constitution for themselves. Subsequently the senator
from Georgia [Mr. Toombs] brought forward a substitute for my bill, which,
after having been modified by him and myself in consultation, was passed
by the Senate."
Now, Trumbull says this is a quotation from a speech of Douglas, and is
recorded in the Congressional Globe. Is it a forgery? Is it there or
not? It may not be there, but I want the Judge to take these pieces of
evidence, and distinctly say they are forgeries if he dare do it.
[A voice: "He will."]
Well, sir, you had better not commit him. He gives other
quotations,--another from Judge Douglas. He says:
"I will ask the senator to show me an intimation, from any one member of
the Senate, in the whole debate on the Toombs bill, and in the Union, from
any quarter, that the constitution was not to be submitted to the
people. I will venture to say that on all sides of the chamber it was so
understood at the time. If the opponents of the bill had understood it
was not, they would have made the point on it; and if they had made it,
we should certainly have yielded to it, and put in the clause. That is a
discovery made since the President found out that it was not safe to take
it for granted that that would be done, which ought in fairness to have
been done."
Judge Trumbull says Douglas made that speech, and it is recorded. Does
Judge Douglas say it is a forgery, and was not true? Trumbull says
somewhere, and I propose to skip it, but it will be found by any one who
will read this debate, that he did distinctly bring it to the notice of
those who were engineering the bill, that it lacked that provision; and
then he goes on to give another quotation from Judge Douglas, where Judge
Trumbull uses this language:
"Judge Douglas, however, on the same day and in the same debate, probably
recollecting or being reminded of the fact that I had objected to the
Toombs bill when pending that it did not provide for a submission of the
constitution to the people, made another statement, which is to be found
in the same volume of the Globe, page 22, in which he says: 'That the bill
was silent on this subject was true, and my attention was called to that
about the time it was passed; and I took the fair construction to be, that
powers not delegated were reserved, and that of course the constitution
would be submitted to the people.'
"Whether this statement is consistent with the statement just before made,
that had the point been made it would have been yielded to, or that it was
a new discovery, you will determine."
So I say. I do not know whether Judge Douglas will dispute this, and yet
maintain his position that Trumbull's evidence "was forged from beginning
to end." I will remark that I have not got these Congressional Globes
with me. They are large books, and difficult to carry about, and if Judge
Douglas shall say that on these points where Trumbull has quoted from them
there are no such passages there, I shall not be able to prove they are
there upon this occasion, but I will have another chance. Whenever he
points out the forgery and says, "I declare that this particular thing
which Trumbull has uttered is not to be found where he says it is," then
my attention will be drawn to that, and I will arm myself for the contest,
stating now that I have not the slightest doubt on earth that I will find
every quotation just where Trumbull says it is. Then the question is, How
can Douglas call that a forgery? How can he make out that it is a forgery?
What is a forgery? It is the bringing forward something in writing or in
print purporting to be of certain effect when it is altogether untrue. If
you come forward with my note for one hundred dollars when I have never
given such a note, there is a forgery. If you come forward with a letter
purporting to be written by me which I never wrote, there is another
forgery. If you produce anything in writing or in print saying it is so
and so, the document not being genuine, a forgery has been committed. How
do you make this forgery when every piece of the evidence is genuine?
If Judge Douglas does say these documents and quotations are false and
forged, he has a full right to do so; but until he does it specifically,
we don't know how to get at him. If he does say they are false and
forged, I will then look further into it, and presume I can procure the
certificates of the proper officers that they are genuine copies. I have
no doubt each of these extracts will be found exactly where Trumbull says
it is. Then I leave it to you if Judge Douglas, in making his sweeping
charge that Judge Trumbull's evidence is forged from beginning to end,
at all meets the case,--if that is the way to get at the facts. I repeat
again, if he will point out which one is a forgery, I will carefully
examine it, and if it proves that any one of them is really a forgery,
it will not be me who will hold to it any longer. I have always wanted
to deal with everyone I meet candidly and honestly. If I have made any
assertion not warranted by facts, and it is pointed out to me, I will
withdraw it cheerfully. But I do not choose to see Judge Trumbull
calumniated, and the evidence he has brought forward branded in general
terms "a forgery from beginning to end." This is not the legal way of
meeting a charge, and I submit it to all intelligent persons, both friends
of Judge Douglas and of myself, whether it is.
The point upon Judge Douglas is this: The bill that went into his hands
had the provision in it for a submission of the constitution to the
people; and I say its language amounts to an express provision for a
submission, and that he took the provision out. He says it was known that
the bill was silent in this particular; but I say, Judge Douglas, it was
not silent when you got it. It was vocal with the declaration, when you
got it, for a submission of the constitution to the people. And now, my
direct question to Judge Douglas is, to answer why, if he deemed the bill
silent on this point, he found it necessary to strike out those particular
harmless words. If he had found the bill silent and without this
provision, he might say what he does now. If he supposes it was implied
that the constitution would be submitted to a vote of the people, how
could these two lines so encumber the statute as to make it necessary to
strike them out? How could he infer that a submission was still implied,
after its express provision had been stricken from the bill? I find the
bill vocal with the provision, while he silenced it. He took it out, and
although he took out the other provision preventing a submission to a vote
of the people, I ask, Why did you first put it in? I ask him whether he
took the original provision out, which Trumbull alleges was in the bill.
If he admits that he did take it, I ask him what he did it for. It looks
to us as if he had altered the bill. If it looks differently to him,--if
he has a different reason for his action from the one we assign him--he
can tell it. I insist upon knowing why he made the bill silent upon that
point when it was vocal before he put his hands upon it.
I was told, before my last paragraph, that my time was within three
minutes of being out. I presume it is expired now; I therefore close.
Mr. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.
FELLOW-CITIZENS: It follows as a matter of course that a half-hour answer
to a speech of an hour and a half can be but a very hurried one. I shall
only be able to touch upon a few of the points suggested by Judge Douglas,
and give them a brief attention, while I shall have to totally omit others
for the want of time.
Judge Douglas has said to you that he has not been able to get from me an
answer to the question whether I am in favor of negro citizenship. So far
as I know the Judge never asked me the question before. He shall have no
occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell him very frankly that I am not
in favor of negro citizenship. This furnishes me an occasion for saying a
few words upon the subject. I mentioned in a certain speech of mine, which
has been printed, that the Supreme Court had decided that a negro could
not possibly be made a citizen; and without saying what was my ground of
complaint in regard to that, or whether I had any ground of complaint,
Judge Douglas has from that thing manufactured nearly everything that he
ever says about my disposition to produce an equality between the negroes
and the white people. If any one will read my speech, he will find I
mentioned that as one of the points decided in the course of the Supreme
Court opinions, but I did not state what objection I had to it. But Judge
Douglas tells the people what my objection was when I did not tell them
myself. Now, my opinion is that the different States have the power to
make a negro a citizen under the Constitution of the United States if they
choose. The Dred Scott decision decides that they have not that power. If
the State of Illinois had that power, I should be opposed to the exercise
of it. That is all I have to say about it.
Judge Douglas has told me that he heard my speeches north and my speeches
south; that he had heard me at Ottawa and at Freeport in the north and
recently at Jonesboro in the south, and there was a very different cast of
sentiment in the speeches made at the different points. I will not charge
upon Judge Douglas that he wilfully misrepresents me, but I call upon
every fair-minded man to take these speeches and read them, and I dare him
to point out any difference between my speeches north and south. While I
am here perhaps I ought to say a word, if I have the time, in regard to
the latter portion of the Judge's speech, which was a sort of declamation
in reference to my having said I entertained the belief that this
government would not endure half slave and half free. I have said so, and
I did not say it without what seemed to me to be good reasons. It perhaps
would require more time than I have now to set forth these reasons in
detail; but let me ask you a few questions. Have we ever had any peace on
this slavery question? When are we to have peace upon it, if it is kept in
the position it now occupies? How are we ever to have peace upon it? That
is an important question. To be sure, if we will all stop, and allow Judge
Douglas and his friends to march on in their present career until they
plant the institution all over the nation, here and wherever else our flag
waves, and we acquiesce in it, there will be peace. But let me ask Judge
Douglas how he is going to get the people to do that? They have been
wrangling over this question for at least forty years. This was the cause
of the agitation resulting in the Missouri Compromise; this produced the
troubles at the annexation of Texas, in the acquisition of the territory
acquired in the Mexican War. Again, this was the trouble which was quieted
by the Compromise of 1850, when it was settled "forever" as both the great
political parties declared in their National Conventions. That "forever"
turned out to be just four years, when Judge Douglas himself reopened it.
When is it likely to come to an end? He introduced the Nebraska Bill in
1854 to put another end to the slavery agitation. He promised that it
would finish it all up immediately, and he has never made a speech
since, until he got into a quarrel with the President about the Lecompton
Constitution, in which he has not declared that we are just at the end of
the slavery agitation. But in one speech, I think last winter, he did
say that he did n't quite see when the end of the slavery agitation would
come. Now he tells us again that it is all over and the people of Kansas
have voted down the Lecompton Constitution. How is it over? That was only
one of the attempts at putting an end to the slavery agitation--one
of these "final settlements." Is Kansas in the Union? Has she formed
a constitution that she is likely to come in under? Is not the slavery
agitation still an open question in that Territory? Has the voting down
of that constitution put an end to all the trouble? Is that more likely to
settle it than every one of these previous attempts to settle the slavery
agitation? Now, at this day in the history of the world we can no more
foretell where the end of this slavery agitation will be than we can see
the end of the world itself. The Nebraska-Kansas Bill was introduced four
years and a half ago, and if the agitation is ever to come to an end we
may say we are four years and a half nearer the end. So, too, we can say
we are four years and a half nearer the end of the world, and we can
just as clearly see the end of the world as we can see the end of this
agitation. The Kansas settlement did not conclude it. If Kansas should
sink to-day, and leave a great vacant space in the earth's surface, this
vexed question would still be among us. I say, then, there is no way of
putting an end to the slavery agitation amongst us but to put it back upon
the basis where our fathers placed it; no way but to keep it out of our
new Territories,--to restrict it forever to the old States where it now
exists. Then the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the
course of ultimate extinction. That is one way of putting an end to the
slavery agitation.
The other way is for us to surrender and let Judge Douglas and his friends
have their way and plant slavery over all the States; cease speaking of
it as in any way a wrong; regard slavery as one of the common matters
of property, and speak of negroes as we do of our horses and cattle. But
while it drives on in its state of progress as it is now driving, and as
it has driven for the last five years, I have ventured the opinion, and
I say to-day, that we will have no end to the slavery agitation until
it takes one turn or the other. I do not mean that when it takes a turn
toward ultimate extinction it will be in a day, nor in a year, nor in two
years. I do not suppose that in the most peaceful way ultimate extinction
would occur in less than a hundred years at least; but that it will occur
in the best way for both races, in God's own good time, I have no doubt.
But, my friends, I have used up more of my time than I intended on this
point.
Now, in regard to this matter about Trumbull and myself having made a
bargain to sell out the entire Whig and Democratic parties in 1854: Judge
Douglas brings forward no evidence to sustain his charge, except
the speech Matheny is said to have made in 1856, in which he told a
cock-and-bull story of that sort, upon the same moral principles that
Judge Douglas tells it here to-day. This is the simple truth. I do not
care greatly for the story, but this is the truth of it: and I have twice
told Judge Douglas to his face that from beginning to end there is not one
word of truth in it. I have called upon him for the proof, and he does
not at all meet me as Trumbull met him upon that of which we were just
talking, by producing the record. He did n't bring the record because
there was no record for him to bring. When he asks if I am ready to
indorse Trumbull's veracity after he has broken a bargain with me, I reply
that if Trumbull had broken a bargain with me I would not be likely to
indorse his veracity; but I am ready to indorse his veracity because
neither in that thing, nor in any other, in all the years that I have
known Lyman Trumbull, have I known him to fail of his word or tell a
falsehood large or small. It is for that reason that I indorse Lyman
Trumbull.
[Mr. JAMES BROWN (Douglas postmaster): "What does Ford's History say about
him?"]
Some gentleman asks me what Ford's History says about him. My own
recollection is that Ford speaks of Trumbull in very disrespectful terms
in several portions of his book, and that he talks a great deal worse of
Judge Douglas. I refer you, sir, to the History for examination.
Judge Douglas complains at considerable length about a disposition on the
part of Trumbull and myself to attack him personally. I want to attend to
that suggestion a moment. I don't want to be unjustly accused of dealing
illiberally or unfairly with an adversary, either in court or in a
political canvass or anywhere else. I would despise myself if I supposed
myself ready to deal less liberally with an adversary than I was willing
to be treated myself. Judge Douglas in a general way, without putting it
in a direct shape, revives the old charge against me in reference to the
Mexican War. He does not take the responsibility of putting it in a very
definite form, but makes a general reference to it. That charge is more
than ten years old. He complains of Trumbull and myself because he says
we bring charges against him one or two years old. He knows, too, that
in regard to the Mexican War story the more respectable papers of his
own party throughout the State have been compelled to take it back and
acknowledge that it was a lie.
[Here Mr. LINCOLN turned to the crowd on the platform, and, selecting HON.
ORLANDO B. FICKLIN, led him forward and said:]
I do not mean to do anything with Mr. FICKLIN except to present his face
and tell you that he personally knows it to be a lie! He was a member
of Congress at the only time I was in Congress, and [FICKLIN] knows
that whenever there was an attempt to procure a vote of mine which
would indorse the origin and justice of the war, I refused to give such
indorsement and voted against it; but I never voted against the supplies
for the army, and he knows, as well as Judge Douglas, that whenever a
dollar was asked by way of compensation or otherwise for the benefit of
the soldiers I gave all the votes that FICKLIN or Douglas did, and perhaps
more.
[Mr. FICKLIN: My friends, I wish to say this in reference to the matter:
Mr. Lincoln and myself are just as good personal friends as Judge Douglas
and myself. In reference to this Mexican War, my recollection is that
when Ashmun's resolution [amendment] was offered by Mr. Ashmun of
Massachusetts, in which he declared that the Mexican War was unnecessary
and unconstitutionally commenced by the President-my recollection is that
Mr. Lincoln voted for that resolution.]
That is the truth. Now, you all remember that was a resolution censuring
the President for the manner in which the war was begun. You know they
have charged that I voted against the supplies, by which I starved the
soldiers who were out fighting the battles of their country. I say that
FICKLIN knows it is false. When that charge was brought forward by the
Chicago Times, the Springfield Register [Douglas's organ] reminded the
Times that the charge really applied to John Henry; and I do know that
John Henry is now making speeches and fiercely battling for Judge Douglas.
If the Judge now says that he offers this as a sort of setoff to what I
said to-day in reference to Trumbull's charge, then I remind him that he
made this charge before I said a word about Trumbull's. He brought this
forward at Ottawa, the first time we met face to face; and in the opening
speech that Judge Douglas made he attacked me in regard to a matter
ten years old. Is n't he a pretty man to be whining about people making
charges against him only two years old!
The Judge thinks it is altogether wrong that I should have dwelt upon this
charge of Trumbull's at all. I gave the apology for doing so in my opening
speech. Perhaps it did n't fix your attention. I said that when Judge
Douglas was speaking at place--where I spoke on the succeeding day he used
very harsh language about this charge. Two or three times afterward I said
I had confidence in Judge Trumbull's veracity and intelligence; and my own
opinion was, from what I knew of the character of Judge Trumbull, that he
would vindicate his position and prove whatever he had stated to be true.
This I repeated two or three times; and then I dropped it, without saying
anything more on the subject for weeks--perhaps a month. I passed it by
without noticing it at all till I found, at Jacksonville, Judge Douglas
in the plenitude of his power is not willing to answer Trumbull and let
me alone, but he comes out there and uses this language: "He should not
hereafter occupy his time in refuting such charges made by Trumbull but
that, Lincoln having indorsed the character of Trumbull for veracity, he
should hold him [Lincoln] responsible for the slanders." What was Lincoln
to do? Did he not do right, when he had the fit opportunity of meeting
Judge Douglas here, to tell him he was ready for the responsibility? I
ask a candid audience whether in doing thus Judge Douglas was not the
assailant rather than I? Here I meet him face to face, and say I am ready
to take the responsibility, so far as it rests on me.
Having done so I ask the attention of this audience to the question
whether I have succeeded in sustaining the charge, and whether Judge
Douglas has at all succeeded in rebutting it? You all heard me call upon
him to say which of these pieces of evidence was a forgery. Does he
say that what I present here as a copy of the original Toombs bill is a
forgery? Does he say that what I present as a copy of the bill reported by
himself is a forgery, or what is presented as a transcript from the Globe
of the quotations from Bigler's speech is a forgery? Does he say the
quotations from his own speech are forgeries? Does he say this transcript
from Trumbull's speech is a forgery?
["He didn't deny one of them."]