HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Arrival of Menschikoff at Constantinople--Demands of the Czar
--The Sultan--Occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia--Conference
of Vienna--Protest of the Porte--Turkish forces--Commencement
of hostilities.
On the 28th of February, 1853, the Russian ambassador Prince
Menschikoff arrived at Constantinople, an event celebrated with more
than eastern pomp, for he was escorted from the quay to his hotel by
upwards of 7000 Greeks, whose services had been previously retained.
Bearing the highest dignities that the Czar can confer, imperious in
his demeanor, impetuous and overbearing in his language, he was well
qualified, notwithstanding his advanced age, to deal with Orientals,
and to execute the commission entrusted to him, though he perhaps
scarcely anticipated the amount of energy latent in the Sultan’s
apparently languid character.
On the 2d March the Russian Prince, attired in the plainest
manner without a decoration of any kind, had an interview with
the Grand Vizier, and was by him referred to Fuad Effendi, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Fuad Effendi had, however, uniformly
distinguished himself by his determined opposition to the advances
of Russia: Prince Menschikoff, therefore, haughtily declined to
hold communication with him. As was expected, Fuad sent in his
resignation, and great was the consequent delight experienced at the
Russian embassy. Nor was that satisfaction altogether unfounded, for
Fuad Effendi was undoubtedly one of the ablest men in Turkey.
He was succeeded by Rifaat Pacha, a man of considerable talent, but
by no means competent to cope with the daring policy of the Czar.
Prince Menschikoff, indeed, now regarded the game as in his own
hands, for he was provided with an autograph letter from the Czar,
authorizing him to treat as a personal insult to Nicholas himself,
any hesitation on the part of the Sultan or his advisers to accept
the propositions submitted by him.
It is evident enough that Russia was at this time ill-informed as to
the feeling both of England and France on the subject of the “Eastern
question,” or she would hardly have ventured to commit herself so
far as she did in the demands addressed to Rifaat Pacha by Prince
Menschikoff, on the 19th April, 1853, of which the following is an
abstract:
“1. A definite firman securing to the Greek Church the custody of
the key of the Church of Bethlehem; of the silver star pertaining
to the altar of the Nativity; of the grotto of Gethsemane (with the
admission of the Latin priests thereto for the celebration of their
rites); the joint possession by the Greeks and the Latins of the
gardens of Bethlehem.
“2. An immediate order on the part of the government for the thorough
repair of the cupola of the temple of the Holy Sepulchre to the
satisfaction of the Greek Patriarch.
“3. A guarantee for the maintenance of the privileges of the Greek
Church in the East, and of those sanctuaries already in the exclusive
possession of that Church, or shared by it with others.”
The note containing these demands, and some others of minor
importance, was couched in rather menacing if not insolent language,
while the reply of the Porte was firm, temperate and dignified;
expressive of its readiness to do all that could be fairly demanded
of it, and concluding with a declaration of its inability to accede
to such violation of its independence and national rights as was
implied in the Russian note; appealing at the same time to the
emperor’s own sense of justice and honor.
It would be quite superfluous to introduce here all the voluminous
correspondence that ensued between the two Powers. Suffice it to
observe, that whatever might have been the concessions on the side of
the Porte, they would evidently have been met by further and still
more exorbitant demands on the part of Russia, as the intention of
that Power, from the first, was evidently to bring matters to an
open rupture. Surely for no other purpose could the ruler of a vast
territory have been suddenly called upon, as he had been not long
before at five days’ notice, to divest himself of all authority over
many millions of his subjects, and to admit, in fact, of a partition
of his empire. What the precise designs of Russia were, are clearly
shown in the following extract of a letter from Prince Lieven to
Count Nesselrode:
“Our policy,” said he, “must be to maintain a reserved and prudent
attitude, until the moment arrives for Russia to vindicate her
rights, and for the rapid action which she will be obliged to adopt.
_The war ought to take Europe by surprise (!)_ Our movements must
be prompt, so that the other powers should find it impossible to be
prepared for THE BLOW THAT WE ARE ABOUT TO STRIKE.”
The Cabinets of London and Paris having received early intimation
of what was going on, and being well satisfied that the Greek
inhabitants of Turkey needed no additional protection, speedily
concerted measures for the defence of the Ottoman empire and of their
own interests. The political correspondence now became still more
involved and prolix; but as more than mere verbal assurances were
required to satisfy the Porte of the material support of the two
great Western Powers, the combined fleets were directed to anchor in
Besika Bay.
On the 4th June, the Sultan, still desirous of avoiding the
responsibility of plunging his people into war, addressed to all
the governments of Europe a notification of the necessity he felt
himself under, of assuming a defensive attitude. This is known as
the memorable Hatti-sheriff of Gulhany, a document drawn up with
much ability, evincing considerable firmness and moderation of
tone, and reflecting great credit on Abdul-Medjid and his advisers.
For several years past, indeed, the Sultan has been quietly but
steadily introducing a series of reforms into every department of his
government, for which he has received little credit from Europe. The
strong instinct of his predecessor, Mahmoud, had already marked out
the career to be followed. It was only necessary for Abdul-Medjid to
wait till he felt himself sufficiently strong to advance. As soon
as he did, he established a sound system of national education,
took measures for guaranteeing the security of property, organized
an uniform dispensation of justice to all classes, not only at
Constantinople, but in the remotest districts, reserving exclusively
in his own hands the power of life and death. The taxes, moreover,
were assessed and levied far more equitably than before, and the
abuses which had for a long time been accumulating in numerous
offices may be now considered to be in process of abolition.
Abdul-Medjid being alive to the importance of his mission as the
regenerator of a vast empire, the moment his independence as a
sovereign potentate was menaced, he appealed to England and France,
assuring them of his readiness for immediate war in the defence of a
principle.
The occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, which took place in the
course of the summer, was preceded by a specious proclamation
announcing that it was “but a provisional measure, and that the
sole object of the Russian government was efficacious protection in
consequence of the unforeseen conduct of the Porte, unmindful of the
earnest desire for a sincere alliance manifested by the Imperial
Court since the treaty of Adrianople, and of its most strenuous
efforts to maintain, on the present occasion, the peace of Europe.”
This proclamation promptly called forth energetic explanations, both
from M. Drouyn de Lhuys and from Lord Clarendon (15th and 16th July,
1853). They both clearly set out the true history of the Czar’s
aggression, and make no concealment of their resolution to resist it.
The invasion of the Sultan’s dominions they maintained to be a just
cause for the declaration of war; but as the great Powers of the West
had already shown the necessity of avoiding bloodshed, unless as a
last resource, the Sultan felt bound to transmit to St. Petersburg
a simple protest against the insult passed upon him. Russia perhaps
mistook this moderation for feebleness.
Late in 1853 came the tedious conference of Vienna, with its notes,
its projects of notes, its despatches, its _ultimatums_ and its
_ultimatissimums_. The result was, the consumption of a vast amount
of time, foolscap, post-horses, and government messengers, the
concession to Austria of much more importance and consideration than
she was in any way entitled to, and the retention at Besika, till the
end of November, of the allied fleets, which ought to have passed
through the Bosphorus more than four months before,--on the day,
indeed, that the Russians crossed the Pruth. The “occupation” which
ensued amounted, in fact, to the tyrannical assumption by Russia of
the government of two of the finest provinces in Europe, accompanied
by such atrocious acts of tyranny, that the English and French
consuls found it incumbent upon them at once to withdraw.
Some time after the conclusion of the treaty of Adrianople, in
1828, Count Nesselrode, writing to the Grand Duke Constantine, thus
gave expression to the feelings of the government of Russia on this
subject:--
“The Turkish monarchy,” said he, “is reduced to such a state as to
exist only under the protection of Russia, and must comply in future
with her wishes.” Then, adverting to the Principalities, he says,
“The possession of these Principalities is of the less importance
to us, as without maintaining troops there, which would be attended
with considerable expense, we shall dispose of them at our pleasure,
as well during peace as in time of war. _We shall hold the keys of a
position from which it will be easy to keep the Turkish government in
check_, and the Sultan will feel that any attempt to brave us again
must end in his certain ruin.”
The protest of the Porte against the invasion of these provinces
bears date the 14th July: from that day till the end of September,
the conference at Vienna, urged chiefly by Austria, had been making
strenuous efforts to induce the Turkish government to yield to the
arrogant pretensions of Russia. No enviable position, indeed, was
that of the Sultan: beset on one side by the _friendly_ persuasions
of Francis Joseph, and on the other by the imperious summons of
Nicholas, who was actively intriguing in every direction, through
numberless astute emissaries, to give rise to a belief that the
presence of his troops in the Principalities was in conformity to the
wishes of the population themselves. On the 8th October, the Grand
Vizier (Mustapha Pacha) issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of
Constantinople, highly characteristic of the spirit of tolerance
which now animates the people of the Sultan, and indicative of a
degree of watchfulness and preparation on the part of the government
which could scarcely have been anticipated. This proclamation was
hailed with enthusiasm, and the whole nation, animated by one will,
were only too eager to be led against their aggressors, or to aid in
suppressing all attempts, on the part of the Greek population, to
adopt the inflammatory counsels of the paid emissaries of Russia.
Equal praise is due to the priests of the Greek Church, and to
the Ulemas, who turned a deaf ear to every attempt made to appeal
to the fanaticism of their several congregations. Had they acted
differently, the internecine war that would have ensued, must have
inundated every threshold with blood.
On the eve of the commencement of hostilities, the effective Turkish
forces on the Danube may be computed as follows:
Infantry 103,000
Egyptian contingent 13,000
Regular cavalry 12 regiments
Albanians and other irregulars 20,000
Artillery (guns of different calibre), 40 batteries.
Omar Pacha, the commander-in-chief, established his head-quarters
at Shumla with 50,000 troops. Alim Pacha, at Baba-Dagh, in the
Dobruscha, headed 25,000. Mustapha Pacha, with 30,000, guarded the
line of country between Sistow and Rustuck; and Ismail Pacha, with
a like number, the district between Sistow and Widdin. Thirty-five
thousand men, besides, were distributed among the garrisons of Varna,
Tirnova, Pravardin, and different small fortresses along the grim
range of the Balkan.
A reserve of 50,000 was assigned to Rifaat Pacha, who was stationed
at Sophia, an important town in Bulgaria, on the road from Belgrade
to Constantinople.
The whole of Europe--and no country more than Russia--had strangely
erred in its estimate of the Turkish army. Any man who could have
been found rash enough to have hinted at the possibility of the
Sultan’s troops standing before the “stalwart warriors” from the Don,
would have been laughed to scorn: yet almost every engagement has
shown them uniformly triumphant.
The Turkish army is divided into sections, commanded by generals
of division, each of whom has under his orders three generals of
brigade. The division consists of eleven regiments, six of infantry,
four of cavalry, and one of artillery. The available force of a
division comprises 20,980 men; _i. e._, 16,800 infantry, 2,880
cavalry, and 1,300 artillery-men. The infantry regiments are divided
into battalions, and the battalions into companies. The cavalry
regiments are divided into squadrons. The artillery regiments each
comprise three horse and nine foot batteries, numbering altogether
seventy-two heavy and four “grasshopper guns,” about of the same
calibre as those used at the battle of Buena Vista by General Taylor.
The Russian army has, for a long time past, been adopting from other
powers every improvement that could advantageously be introduced into
those docile but stolid ranks, and it was universally supposed to be
in the highest state of efficiency. Numerically, it was about equal
to the Turkish army immediately opposed to it. At the time to which
we allude, Nicholas had, in Georgia and Circassia, at least 148,000
men, commanded by the venerable Prince Woronzow, who does not enjoy a
brilliant military reputation, but still is considered an experienced
soldier, and one of the few trustworthy men in the Czar’s service.
Had this large army not been engaged in holding in check the hardy
and active hordes of Schamyl, it might possibly have been available
to threaten Constantinople; but danger from the quarter we allude
to was never very imminent, for the Turks had stationed 148,000
men, in two separate armies, on the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea,
to coöperate with Schamyl, and to observe, at the same time, the
movements of the enemy. The Turks and the Russians had, consequently,
about an equal number of troops, both upon the Danube and in Asia.
The first cartridge burnt in anger, was at the affair of Issatcha,
scarcely more than a skirmish between a handful of Egyptians and
Russians, and leading to no important results. The Russian general
would fain have confined operations--for a time at least--to such
skirmishes, from his unwillingness to risk the prestige with which
the Russians had continued hitherto to surround their arms; but this
policy accorded not with the views of Omar Pacha, who was anxious to
elevate the _morale_ of his men, and to prove to them, by the most
conclusive of all arguments, their capability to contend with those
whom they had been led to regard with so much respect.