When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to him that
Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on Vesontio,[115]
which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days'
journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought to take the
greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town
a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for war; and so
fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to afford a great
facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs almost
surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round with a pair of
compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining space,
which is not more than six hundred feet, where the river leaves a gap in
such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank
on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this
mountain, and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by forced
marches by night and day, and after having seized the town, stations a
garrison there.
Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and
provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the Gauls
and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature, of
incredible valor and practice in arms,--that ofttimes they, on
encountering them, could not bear even their countenance and the
fierceness of their eyes), so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole
army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree.
This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and
the rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives
of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And
alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it
necessary for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they
might be allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind
in order that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could
neither compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears:
but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate or deplored with
their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally
throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these
men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both
soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command
of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to
be considered less alarmed said that they did not dread the enemy, but
feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which
lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be
brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar that when he gave
orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers
would not be obedient to the command nor advance, in consequence of
their fear.
When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and summoned
to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely reprimanded them,
"particularly for supposing that it belonged to them to inquire or
conjecture either in what direction they were marching or with what
object. That Ariovistus during his [Caesar's] consulship had most
anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should
any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his
part was persuaded that when his demands were known and the fairness of
the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the Roman people's
favor. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war
upon them, what after all were they afraid of?--or why should they
despair either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial
had been made within our fathers' recollection, when on the defeat of
the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as having
deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made
lately too in Italy, during the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however,
the experience and training which they had received from us assisted in
some respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the advantages
which resolution carries with it,--inasmuch as those whom for some time
they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterwards
vanquished when well armed and flushed with success. In short, that
these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not
only in their own territories, but also in theirs [the German], have
generally vanquished, and yet cannot have been a match for our army. If
the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these,
if they made inquiries, might discover that when the Gauls had been
tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many
months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no
opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time
despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions; and was
victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though
there had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men,
not even Ariovistus himself expected that thereby our armies could be
entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a pretense about the
deficiency of supplies and the narrowness of the roads acted
presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their general's
discharge of his duty or to dictate to him. That these things were his
concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish
the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the
road, they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being
reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or advance,
he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew that in the case of all
those whose army had not been obedient to command, either upon some
mismanagement of an affair fortune had deserted them, or that upon some
crime being discovered covetousness had been clearly proved against
them. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good
fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly
set about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and
would break up his camp the next night in the fourth watch, that he
might ascertain as soon as possible whether a sense of honor and duty,
or whether fear, had more influence with them. But that if no one else
should follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he
had no misgivings, and it should be his praetorian cohort."--This legion
Caesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its valor,
placed the greatest confidence.
Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a
surprising manner, and the highest ardor and eagerness for prosecuting
the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first to return
thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having expressed
this most favorable opinion of them; and assured him that they were
quite ready to prosecute the war. Then the other legions endeavored,
through their military tribunes and the centurions of the principal
companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, saying that they had never
either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination of the
conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having accepted
their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by
Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, he
found that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead
his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he
had said he would. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his
march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only
four-and-twenty miles distant from ours.
Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to
him, saying that what he had before requested as to a conference might
now, as far as his permission went, take place, since he [Caesar] had
approached nearer; and he considered that he might now do it without
danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal, and began to think that he
was now returning to a rational state of mind, as he voluntarily
proffered that which he had previously refused to him when he requested
it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own and the
Roman people's great favors towards him, the issue would be that he
would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made known. The
fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference. Meanwhile,
as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus
demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with him to the
conference, saying that "he was afraid of being ensnared by him through
treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that he would
not come on any other condition." Caesar, as he neither wished that the
conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor
durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided that it would
be most expedient to take away from the Gallic cavalry all their horses,
and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth legion, in
which he placed the greatest confidence; in order that he might have a
body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any need for
action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth legion
said, not without a touch of humor, "that Caesar did more for them than
he had promised: he had promised to have the tenth legion in place of
his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse."
There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable
size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both camps.
Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference. Caesar
stationed the legion which he had brought with him on horseback, two
hundred paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also took their
stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that they should
confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they should bring
with them ten men each to the conference. When they were come to the
place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the
Senate's favors towards him [Ariovistus], "in that he had been styled
king, in that he had been styled friend, by the Senate,--in that very
considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance he informed
him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been bestowed in
consideration of important personal services; that he, although he had
neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the request, had obtained
these honors through the kindness and munificence of himself [Caesar] and
the Senate. He informed him, too, how old and how just were the grounds
of connection that existed between themselves [the Romans] and the AEdui,
what decrees of the Senate had been passed in their favor, and how
frequent and how honorable; how from time immemorial the AEdui had held
the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even, said Caesar, before they had
sought _our_ friendship; that it was the custom of the Roman people to
desire not only that its allies and friends should lose none of their
property, but be advanced in influence, dignity, and honor: who then
could endure that what they had brought with them to the friendship of
the Roman people should be torn from them?" He then made the same
demands which he had commissioned the ambassadors to make, that
Ariovistus should not make war either upon the AEdui or their allies;
that he should restore the hostages; that if he could not send back to
their country any part of the Germans, he should at all events suffer
none of them any more to cross the Rhine.
Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar, but expatiated
largely on his own virtues: "that he had crossed the Rhine not of his
own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls; that he had
not left home and kindred without great expectations and great rewards;
that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls themselves; that
the hostages had been given by their own good-will; that he took by
right of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed to impose on
the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls
upon him; that all the States of Gaul came to attack him, and had
encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed and beaten
by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second trial, he
was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy peace, it
was unfair to refuse the tribute which of their own free-will they had
paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman people ought to
prove to him an ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he
sought it with that expectation. But if through the Roman people the
tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be seduced
from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people no less
heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host of Germans
into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing himself, not
of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in that he did not
come without being invited, and in that he did not make war, but merely
warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people. That
never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the frontiers of the
province of Gaul. What, said he, does Caesar desire?--why come into his
[Ariovistus's] domains?--that this was his province of Gaul, just as
that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him if he were to make
an attack upon our territories, so likewise that we were unjust to
obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's saying that the AEdui had
been styled 'brethren' by the Senate, he was not so uncivilized nor so
ignorant of affairs as not to know that the AEdui in the very last war
with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to the Romans nor
received any from the Roman people in the struggles which the AEdui had
been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious
that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an
army in Gaul, was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that
unless he depart and withdraw his army from these parts, he shall regard
him not as a friend, but as a foe; and that even if he should put him to
death, he should do what would please many of the nobles and leading men
of the Roman people; he had assurance of that from themselves through
their messengers, and could purchase the favor and the friendship of
them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he would depart and resign to
him the free possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a great
reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished to be carried
on, without any trouble or risk to him."
Many things were stated by Caesar to the following effect:--"That he
could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman
people's practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies;
nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the
Roman people; that the Arverni[116] and the Ruteni[117] had been subdued
in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned
them and had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon
them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded, then was the
sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the
Senate was to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the
Romans] had conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws."
While these things were being transacted in the conference, it was
announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching
nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men and casting stones and
weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to
his men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon
upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry
would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think
proper to engage, lest after the enemy were routed it might be said that
they had been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference. When
it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what haughtiness
Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had ordered the
Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our
men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater alacrity
and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.
Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar to state that "he
wished to treat with him about those things which had been begun to be
treated of between them, but had not been concluded"; and to beg that
"he would either again appoint a day for a conference, or if he were not
willing to do that, that he would send one of his officers as an
ambassador to him." There did not appear to Caesar any good reason for
holding a conference; and the more so as the day before, the Germans
could not be restrained from casting weapons at our men. He thought he
should not without great danger send to him as ambassador one of his
Roman officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed therefore
most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius
Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose
father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C. Valerius
Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on account of his
knowledge of the Gallic language,--which Ariovistus, by long practice,
now spoke fluently,--and because in his case the Germans would have no
motive for committing violence;[118] and for his colleague, M. Mettius,
who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned them to
learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But when
Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence
of his army, "Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose of
acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast
them into chains.
The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill six
miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces past
Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design--that
he might cut off Caesar from the corn and provisions which might be
conveyed to him from the Sequani and the AEdui. For five successive days
from that day Caesar drew out his forces before the camp and put them in
battle order, that if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in battle,
an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this time
kept his army in camp, but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The
method of battle in which the Germans had practiced themselves was this:
There were six thousand horse, and as many very active and courageous
foot, one of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for
his own protection. By these men they were constantly accompanied in
their engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency
rushed forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had
fallen from his horse, they stood around him; if it was necessary to
advance farther than usual or to retreat more rapidly, so great, from
practice, was their swiftness, that supported by the manes of the horses
they could keep pace with their speed.
Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he might
not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient position
for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped, at about
six hundred paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three
lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to
be under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant
from the enemy about six hundred paces, as has been stated. Thither
Ariovistus sent light troops, about sixteen thousand men in number, with
all his cavalry; which forces were to intimidate our men and hinder them
in their fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged,
ordered two lines to drive off the enemy; the third to execute the work.
The camp being fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of the
auxiliaries, and led back the other four legions into the larger camp.
The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces from
both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew up
his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When
he found that they did not even then come out from their intrenchments,
he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent
part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle was vigorously
maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after many wounds
had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back his forces into
camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners wherefore Ariovistus did not
come to an engagement, he discovered this to be the reason--that among
the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots
and divination whether it were expedient that the battle should be
engaged in or not; that they had said that "it was not the will of
heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in battle before
the new moon."
The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for both
camps; and then drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy,
before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the number
of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that thereby
he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having
drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy.
Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp and
disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes,
Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded
their whole army with their chariots and wagons, that no hope might be
left in flight. On these they placed their women, who, with disheveled
hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to
battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.
Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a quaestor, that every
one might have them as witnesses of his valor. He himself began the
battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part
of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the
signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the
enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward that there was no time for
casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside, therefore, their javelins,
they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to
their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our
swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the
phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields and wounded the
enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left
wing and put to flight, they still pressed heavily on our men from the
right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing this, P.
Crassus the Younger, who commanded the cavalry,--as he was more
disengaged than those who were employed in the fight,--sent the third
line as a relief to our men who were in distress.
Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned their
backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river Rhine,
about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying on
their strength, endeavored to swim over, or finding boats procured their
safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who, meeting with a small
vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all
the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom
he had brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister of
King Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent thither
for that purpose by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their
two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus,
as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triple
chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the
enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less
pleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rank
in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued
from the hand of the enemy and restored to him, and that fortune had not
diminished aught of the joy and exultation of that day by his
destruction. He [Procillus] said that in his own presence the lots had
been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be
put to death by fire or be reserved for another time: that by the favor
of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius also was found and brought back
to him [Caesar].
This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had
come to the banks of that river, began to return home; when the
Ubii,[119] who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them while much
alarmed, slew a great number of them. Caesar, having concluded two very
important wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters
among the Sequani a little earlier than the season of the year required.
He appointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out in person
for hither Gaul to hold the assizes.