_October 28._
Had a letter yesterday from Mr. Elphinstone on Nazarre. It appears to be a
fine on descents, &c., of Jaghire lands. I think his opinion will be
different from Sir J. Malcolm's--the latter wishing to make the Jaghires
hereditary, or rather to give a fee simple interest to the actual
proprietor. Mr. Elphinstone, on the contrary, thinking they should be
resumed on death without heirs.
_October 29._
Read a work just published by Colonel de Lacy Evans, on the practicability
of a Russian invasion of India. The route would be first to China, across a
desert from the shores of the Caspian--from China by water up the Oxus, to
within 550 miles of Attock. The great difficulty is between the end of the
river, and the southern side of the Hindoo Koosh. This difficulty, however,
has been often surmounted, and the road is constantly travelled by
caravans.
I think it is clear that the invasion of India could not be attempted till
the third year; but when should we begin to take precautions? A Government
wholly Asiatic would not be still if the Russians took possession of China;
but ours, chained by European politics, would hardly move if they entered
Cabul.
We ought to have full information as to Cabul, Bokhara, and China.
My letter of last year directed the attaining of information; but I dare
say nothing has been done.
_October 30._
Received a Memorial from Mr. Fullerton, asking some remuneration beyond his
salary for past services. He has a claim _if we were rich_. I think he
should have 10,000 dollars. I dare say he thinks 20,000. Thoughtless
extravagance is the destruction of generosity and even of justice.
Upon the subject of the invasion of India my idea is that the thing is not
only practicable, but easy, unless we determine to act as an Asiatic Power.
On the acquisition of Khiva by the Russians we should occupy Lahore and
Cabul.[Footnote: It may be remembered that Lord Ellenborough strongly
disapproved of any occupation of Afghanistan, or interference with its
internal affairs, in 1840-42. At that time Russia had not advanced to
Khiva. It is clear that he would not have held the same opinion as to our
policy towards Afghanistan after the events of 1873-74.] It is not on the
Indus that an enemy is to be met. If we do not meet him in Cabul, at the
foot of the Hindoo Koosh, or in its passes, we had better remain in the
Sutlege. If the Russians once occupy Cabul they may remain there with the
Indus in their front, till they have organised insurrection in our rear,
and completely equipped their army. I fear there are passes from Balkh upon
Peshawur. If these could be closed and the enemy poured upon Cabul we
should know where to meet him. Now we, being at Cabul, might be cut off
from its resources by the descent of the enemy upon Peshawur.
There is some road from Roondorg through Cashmere, but I do not fear that.
The road an enemy would choose would be that by the Valley of the Cachgu.
We know nothing of these passes, nothing of the country beyond them,
nothing of the course of the Indus--but we should have full information so
as to be able to crush an advancing enemy, by making the whole country
hostile, which money would do.
To meet an invasion we must raise every regiment to 1,000 men.
168 Regiments
360 "
-----
1,008
504
------
60,480 Men, besides Artillery.
4,000 King's Inf. raised to 1,000 each Reg.
1,000 Do. four Regiments of Cavalry.
4,000 Four new Regiments.
2,000 Two new Cavalry.
Besides King's Artillery.
------
71,480
Besides the increase which would take place in the Irregular Corps,
particularly in Skinner's.
A smaller increase than this would not be sufficient; for we should require
20,000 men at Delhi, 20,000 in Lahore, and 60,000 in Cabul. I speak of
enrolled, not effectives--but with these augmentations the Regular Army
would only be
148,000 N.I.
24,000 King's.
-------
172,000
20,000 Native Cavalry.
6,000 King's.
-------
198,000
The out provisional battalions, local corps, &c., of 198,000, I do not
think above 100,000 could possibly be disposable, and there would not be
70,000 effectives. The Artillery must be very numerous. I omitted the
Company's English Regiments, about 3,000 men.
Of all nations the Russians are the least adapted for an enterprise of this
nature. They have neither medical staff nor commissariat, and the men are
without resource. A French army would be the best. I doubt the possibility
of Russia bringing more than 20,000 men to Cabul, and these could not
descend the mountains till the third year, if Cabul was occupied. What I
fear is an occupation of Khiva unknown to us. No preparation on our part--
no marching forward--so that in three or four months from leaving Khiva the
enemy might be at Cabul. I am sure we can defeat the enterprise. We ought
to defeat it before the enemy reaches the Indus. If 20,000 Russians should
reach the Indus, it will be a sharp fight.
_November 1, 1829._
A letter from the Duke. He returned the papers I sent him. He has doubts as
to the expediency of making the Commissary-General of Stores I proposed;
but he seems to have supposed I wished to do away with the Military Board.
I have explained what I meant.
He approves of my suggestions as to correspondence, but thinks every paper
must be sent home, and the collections formed here. I have explained that I
always intended every paper should be sent home, and I have told him that I
had the opinion of the clerks I consulted that the collections might be
framed in India, with a saving of time, and without diminishing the check
on the local Governments.
_November 4._
Received from Aberdeen his draft of a remonstrance to Russia, which, it
seems, must be sent at last. He has already shown it to the Duke and Peel.
There is no great substantive objection to it; but it is not very carefully
written. I shall send it to him tomorrow with many proposed alterations. In
the second box came Gaily [Footnote: H. Gaily Knight. Best known for his
works on the Normans in Sicily, and Ecclesiastical Architecture in Italy.]
Knight's letter to Aberdeen; which is a poor, flimsy production. A
peacock's feather in the hilt of a Drawcansir's sword.
_November 5._
Altered, not only verbally, but substantially, Aberdeen's paper, and sent
it to him.
Cabinet room. Read a Memorandum by Lord Heytesbury, of a conversation he
has had with the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor expects the early downfall
of the Porte--and a Revolution in France. Asks if another march to Paris
would be possible? Lord Heytesbury saw Nesselrode afterwards and told him
what the Emperor had said. Nesselrode said the Emperor always saw things
_en noir_. He had a different opinion. He did not think the Porte in
immediate danger, nor did he expect a French Revolution.
The other guarantees they talk of are further cessions in Asia,
specifically Batoum, or the occupation of Varna, or Silistria, instead of
the Principalities. The latter is worse, and the Turks will probably
consent to neither. They do not value the Principalities, and they know
Europe does.[Footnote: The Principalities, as commanding the lower course
of the Danube, were all important to Austria especially. Thus, occupation
by Russia, while it would have been felt as a menace to Central Europe,
would have left Turkey a compact state beyond the Danube.]
_November 6._
Saw Aberdeen. He is always gloomy about _divisions_. He is afraid of an
attack on Foreign Policy. He thinks the two parties will unite in that. He
hears there has been some approximation between Lord Grey [Footnote: Lord
Grey had been separated from the bulk of the Whig party since their
junction with Canning in 1827.] and Lord Holland. At the same time it is
said there is a notion of bringing in Lord Grey. I suspect this report to
have been fabricated by the Ultra-Tories to annoy the King.
He thinks the Duke is annoyed, more particularly at the King's not treating
him well, and at his Government not being well supported.
In fact, however, it is a Government which will not fall, for the King
hates the Whigs; the people do not regard them. He may like the Tories, but
he knows they cannot make a Government, and the Duke's Administration has
four-fifths of the country.
Received a letter from the Duke, telling me he had settled Colonel
McDonald's knighthood, and asking me if I should be ready to talk about
India on the 13th. I said about Batta certainly; about India I had rather
talk first to Lord Melville and him.
Wrote to the Duchess of Kent telling her a Bengal cavalry cadetship was at
her disposal for the son of Colonel Harvey.
There is a very interesting letter from an English officer at Adrianople
with respect to the state of the Russian army. It has suffered and suffers
most dreadfully.
I told Aberdeen if I had seen the account of the conversation between Lord
Heytesbury and the Emperor Nicholas before I read his proposed letter, I
should have suggested that much stress should have been laid upon the
effect the downfall of Turkey would have upon affairs in France.
Polignac seems confident he can stand. He thinks he has the Chambers. The
French behave ill in the settlement of the Greek business, and object
altogether to our man, Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg. They equally object
to Prince Frederick of Orange, and to Prince Leopold, whom Russia would
have had willingly. I wonder Aberdeen did not laugh when he was proposed.
They want to settle the thing without a Prince. I suppose they want a
Frenchman.
Aberdeen is for settling Greece as a Power into whose lap the broken parts
of Turkey may fall. He gives up Euboea. That is, the surrender of Euboea is
to be proposed to the Porte, with a frontier limited in other respects,
instead of the protocol of March 22.
The Turks who have left the Morea have no indemnity. The Turks who are in
the other parts of the new Greece remain. It is altogether a wonderful
business. These anti-revolutionary States combining to revolutionise a
rebellious province of an unoffending ally!
_November 11._
It seems the French do not like the idea of giving to the Turks the option
of an independent State with smaller limits, or of a State under
Suzeraineté with extended limits, contrary to the treaty, and sending at
the same time secret instructions to the Ambassadors to insist upon the
_entire_ independence of the new Greek State. The French seem likewise to
have been offended at the protocol having been settled between Russia and
us, before they were called in to give their opinion. No wonder. Certainly
our diplomacy has not succeeded. We have failed in all our objects.
_November 13._
Cabinet. I was first called upon to say my say upon the general Indian
question. I observed that the present prospective deficiency was one
million a year. That until we could ascertain whether that deficiency could
be diminished or done away with we were really not ourselves prepared to
come to a decision upon the future government of India; nor would
Parliament endure that the China trade should be closed upon the country
for twenty years more without first inquiring whether it was necessary. The
first question was, 'Can we make such a reduction of expenditure, or effect
such an increase in income as to enable the Government of India to go on
without any assistance direct or indirect from England?' If it can, then we
have the China trade in our hands. If it cannot, we have to decide whether
the necessary assistance shall be found by means of a continuance of the
monopoly or in some other manner.
I stated the increase of two millions in six years in the civil charges of
Bengal; that the Court had issued the strongest instructions, and the local
Government seemed to have a real intention to curtail expenditure. That I
had done something, and should do all I could, investigating every item.
Peel suggested a commission. I said that had occurred to me last year. The
Duke, however, objected to a commission as really superseding the Governor-
General and being the Government. Another objection certainly is the delay.
Difficulties would be thrown in its way, and we should at last be obliged
to decide without its final report, having thrown away our time here in
waiting for it.
I mentioned that the character of the local Government was 'disrespect and
disobedience.' That nothing but a long continuance of strict rule could
bring India into real subjection. It was this disobedience which was the
chief source of increased expenditure. It arose in a great measure from the
unequal hand which had been held over them--the indulgence of the Court of
Directors--and the great delays in the communication with India arising out
of the system of correspondence. I had endeavoured to remedy that, and
hoped to get an answer to letters within the year. It was now two years and
a half. I had likewise endeavoured to make arrangements for steam
communication by the Red Sea. I hoped to be able to send a letter to Bombay
in sixty days.
The Cabinet seemed generally to acquiesce in the expediency of only having
a Committee this year.
At first they all seemed to think the continuance of the government in the
Company a matter of course. I told them that even with the China trade the
Government could not now go on without great reductions of expenditure, and
that I hoped the Cabinet would not come to a hasty decision upon a question
involving so many important political and financial considerations. The
present system was not one of great expense, but it was one involving great
delay--and delay was expense, and not only expense but abandonment of
authority. It was in this point of view that I hoped the Cabinet would look
at the question when it came before them.
I mean to go quietly to work; but I mean, if I can, to substitute the
King's government for that of the Company. [Footnote: This was not carried
out till 1858, after the great mutiny.] I am sure that in doing so I shall
confer a great benefit upon India and effect the measure which is most
likely to retain for England the possession of India.
We afterwards spoke of the Batta question. I read Lord Wellesley's letter,
and stated the opinions of Sir J. Malcolm, Sir Archibald Campbell, and Sir
J. Nicholls.
I stated that it seemed the feeling in the army was excited more by the
apprehension of further reductions than by the establishment of the half-
Batta stations; that if concessions were made to the Bengal army, the other
armies would be discontented and further demands would be made.
The Duke said, as a soldier, and having been in India at the time, he must
say he thought the orders of 1828 [Footnote: Orders issued by Lord William
Bentinck, abolishing full batta or the larger scale of allowances to the
military at stations where half-batta only had been recognised, before the
Act of the Bengal Government allowing full batta in consideration of
officers providing themselves with quarters.--See Thornton's _British
India_, pp. 221-25.] a breach of faith--but these having been issued, he
thought we must stand to them. The general opinion was that as nothing
could be said or done till the arrival of despatches, there could be no
necessity for deciding.