Through a long series of struggles, Rome had now become mistress of
central Italy, with growing power in the north, and almost complete
subjugation of the Greek cities of the south. There were a few of the
latter, however, that still held out against the Roman influence.
Pre-eminent among these was Tarentum, and it was through a conflict with
this city that the Romans were threatened by the first important invasion
of an armed force from the east. This force came under the guidance of
Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a relative of Alexander the Great, who sought to
emulate the deeds of that great hero.
Pyrrhus was not precisely another Alexander, but he was quite the
foremost warrior of his time. Doubtless he had the aspiration to make
Epirus the centre, and himself the master, of the world. His ambition was
not to be realised; but he was able, for a time, to challenge the power
of Rome, and more cogently to threaten its overthrow than any one before
him had done, since the invasion of the Gauls, or than any one after
him was able to do, with the single exception of Hannibal, until a late
period of imperial history. The invasion of Pyrrhus, quite aside from the
personal ambitions of the invader, had the widest and most world-historic
importance, for it was a struggle of the old East against the new West--a
repetition in some sense of that earlier struggle in which the Persians
had sought to overthrow the growing power of Greece. Pyrrhus brought
with him the famed Macedonian phalanx. He was met by the Roman legion,
which, in its time, was to become even more famous, and with even better
reason. Whether for the moment phalanx or legion would have proved the
more formidable it is difficult to say, but in addition Pyrrhus brought
with him a troop of war elephants, and it was this factor, largely, which
turned the scale at first in his favour. Up to this time no elephant,
probably, had ever been landed on the peninsula of Italy, and the sight
of these beasts advancing in line of battle was enough to bring terror to
the heart of the most hardened veterans.
It is true that fifty years earlier the Macedonians had met an oriental
enemy aided by this, to them, new arm of warfare, and had easily found a
means of overcoming their adversary, and nullifying the advantage which
these great beasts were supposed to give them. Whether it was the lack
of an Alexander, or that the Romans were of less staunch fibre than the
Macedonians, or that the soldiers of Pyrrhus were more competent to meet
the Romans hand to hand than were the Persians to oppose the hosts of
Alexander--whatever the explanation, the fact remains that the elephants
of Pyrrhus turned the scale clearly in his favour in the first two great
battles in which he met the Romans on their soil. But the Romans, if
defeated, were by no means dishonoured. The classical saying of Pyrrhus
that another such victory would mean his ruin, shows that the battles
of Heraclea and Asculum were very different affairs from most of the
battles of an earlier day, in which Greek had met Persian, or even those
in which Greek met Greek. In those Grecian battles, as we have seen, the
courageous front of the one side, and the timidity of the other, often
decided the day with scarcely more than the clashing of arms, or the
chance wounding of here and there a fugitive. But here, the arbitrament
of arms in its sternest phase was necessary to decide the victory. The
Macedonians, with the fame of Alexander fresh in their minds, might scorn
at first, but soon learned to respect these new foemen of the West,
finding them, indeed, foemen worthy of their steel, and the conqueror
who remained on the field after the battle had almost as much cause for
regret over his losses as for rejoicing over his victory.
But the strangest thing of all was the way in which the vanquished Romans
met their fate and rallied from defeat, refusing to recognise their
disasters as more than momentary checks. Herein it was that the Roman
proved himself a very different person from the typical Greek, of, for
example, the best day of Athens. Instead of acknowledging defeat and
accepting or offering terms of surrender, the Romans indignantly rejected
all overtures from Pyrrhus, and set desperately to work to rehabilitate
an army and win back their laurels, declaring that they would never rest
content while the enemy remained on Italian soil; and in due time they
made their word good. Pyrrhus, indeed, for a period of two years left
Italian soil, not to return to Greece, but to go to Sicily, there to
aid the Syracusans who were beset by the Carthaginians. Recognising in
Pyrrhus a common enemy, the Carthaginians and the Romans for the first
and last time in their history formed an alliance, and the Carthaginians
did good service for the cause in defeating the fleet of Pyrrhus when
on its way back from Sicily. Beyond this, however, the land-forces of
Rome--and up to this time it was solely as a land power that Rome could
lay claim to great importance--were left to their own resources in
dealing with the Epirot enemy. This resource, however, proved in the end
quite sufficient, for in the great battle of Beneventum, in the year 275
B.C., the tables were turned on Pyrrhus and his forces were unequivocally
routed. Nothing remained for him but to return to Epirus, where local
wars also claimed his attention.
It is more than likely that in thus retreating from Italy, Pyrrhus
intended some day to return and revenge himself for his losses, but if so
the intention never became a reality, for three years later the greatest
warrior of his time was killed at Argos after a victorious siege of that
city. Meantime Rome had proved herself able to cope with the Epirot
invasion, and she was never again to be seriously threatened from that
direction.
It would probably be difficult to overestimate the value to the Roman
commonwealth of this test of skill with Pyrrhus and his famed Macedonian
phalanx in giving them confidence in themselves and in their own prowess
which should stand them in good stead in meeting those other enemies who
must needs be put down before Rome could become what she was now aspiring
to be, Mistress of the World.[a]
PYRRHUS IN ITALY
Pyrrhus was now in his thirty-eighth year. His whole life had been a
course of adventure and peril. His father, Æacides, had been king of
Epirus; and the young prince, being left an orphan at the age of five
amid the troubles which followed the death of Alexander the Great, led a
wandering and uncertain life, till, at about seventeen years of age, he
sought refuge at the court of Antigonus, the Macedonian king of Syria.
Here he formed a friendship with the king’s son, the celebrated Demetrius
Poliorcetes, and was present on the bloody field of Ipsus (301 B.C.),
which deprived Antigonus of his life, and Demetrius of his succession.
After this defeat, he was received at the magnificent court of Ptolemy
Soter, the first Macedonian king of Egypt, as a hostage for his friend
Demetrius. Here Pyrrhus found favour with Queen Berenice, who gave him
in marriage Antigone, her daughter by a former marriage, and persuaded
Ptolemy to assist him in recovering his Epirot sovereignty, where he
established himself so firmly that on the death of Cassander, he disputed
with his former friend Demetrius the succession to the throne of Macedon.
For a time he was master of the eastern provinces; but, after a seven
months’ reign, Pyrrhus was again driven across the mountains into Epirus
(287 B.C.). For the next few years he lived at peace; built Ambracia
as a new capital of his dominions, and reigned there in security and
magnificence. He was in the prime of life, handsome in person, happy in
temper, popular from his frankness and generosity, and reputed to be
a skilful soldier. But neither his nature nor his restless youth had
fitted him for the enjoyment of happy tranquillity. He had married as
his second wife the daughter of Agathocles of Syracuse; the exploits
of that remarkable man fired his soul; he remembered that Alcibiades,
that Alexander, that every Greek conqueror had looked to the West as a
new scene for enterprise and triumph; and he lent a ready ear to the
solicitations of the Italian envoys. After defeating the Romans and
Carthaginians, he might return as king of southern Italy and Sicily, and
dictate terms to the exhausted monarchs of Macedon and Asia. These had
been the dreams of less romantic persons than himself.[44]
[Sidenote: [281-280 B.C.]]
It was at the end of the year 281 B.C. that he left Epirus with a force
of about twenty thousand foot, and four thousand or five thousand horse,
together with a squadron of twenty elephants, held by the Greeks at that
time to be a necessary part of a complete armament. On the passage his
ships were scattered by a storm, but eventually they all reached Tarentum
in safety. His infantry was in part supplied by Ptolemy Ceraunus, now
king of Macedon. His cavalry were Thessalian, the best in Greece. It was
a small army for the execution of designs so vast. But he trusted to the
promises of the Lucanians and Samnites; and he also intended to make the
Tarentines into soldiers. No sooner had he landed, than this people found
how true were the words of their fellow-citizen. They had meant Pyrrhus
to fight their battles, like his kinsman, Alexander of Molossus; but he
resolved that they also should fight his battles. He shut up the theatres
and other places of public amusement; closed the democratic clubs; put
some demagogues to death, and banished others; and ordered all citizens
of military age to be drilled for the phalanx. The indolent populace
murmured, but in vain. The horse had taken a rider on his back to avenge
him on the stag, and it was no longer possible to shake him off.
With the early spring the Romans took the field. Ti. Coruncanius,
plebeian consul for the year 280, commanded against the Etrurians, with
orders to make a peace if possible. P. Valerius Lævinus, his patrician
colleague, was to march through Lucania, so as to prevent the Lucanians
from joining the king; while Æmilius, consul of the former year, was
stationed at Venusia, to hold the Samnites and Apulians in check. A
Campanian legion, composed of Mamertines, commanded by one Decius
Jubellius, an officer of their own choosing, occupied Rhegium, in order
(we may suppose) to intercept communications from Sicily.
As the king moved along the coast from Heraclea he came in view of the
Roman army, encamped on the right bank of the little river Siris. His
practised eye was at once struck by the military order of the enemy’s
camp. And when he saw them cross the broad but shallow stream in the face
of his own army, and form their line before he could close with them, he
remarked, “In war, at least, these barbarians are no way barbarous.”
And now for the first time the Roman legions had to stand the shock of
the Greek phalanx. The tactics of the two armies were wholly different.
The free order of the legions, which now fought with pila and swords, has
been described above. On the other hand, the Epirots formed two great
columns, called the phalanxes, in which each man stood close to his
fellow, so that half his body was covered by his right-hand man’s shield.
They were drawn up sixteen deep, and their long pikes, called sarissæ,
bristled so thickly in front, that the line was impenetrable unless a gap
could be made in the front ranks. They acted mechanically, by weight.
If they were once broken they were almost defenceless. Level ground,
therefore, was necessary to their effective action.
Pyrrhus had secured this last-named advantage: the plain of Heraclea was
well adapted for the regular movement of the phalanxes, as well as for
that of his cavalry and elephants. The action began by the Roman cavalry
crossing the Siris, and driving back a squadron of the Thessalian horse,
the remainder of which, with the elephants, were yet in the rear. The
main body of the Romans, inspirited by this success, followed across
the bed of the river to assail the phalanxes. But they could make no
impression on these solid masses; the principes took the place of the
hastati, and the triarii succeeded to the principes, in vain. Lævinus
then ordered up his cavalry to attack the phalanxes in flank. But
they were met by the whole body of Thessalian horse, supported by the
elephants. The Romans had never before seen these monstrous animals,
which in their ignorance they called “Lucanian oxen”: their horses would
not face them, and galloped back affrighted among the infantry. Pyrrhus
now led his whole line forward, and the rout was general. The Romans
were driven back across the Siris, and did not attempt to defend their
camp. Yet they soon rallied, and retired in good order into Apulia, where
Venusia was ready to receive them. It was now seen with what judgment the
senate had occupied that place with a large colony.
The victory of Heraclea was gained at a very heavy loss. Pyrrhus now
rightly estimated the task he had undertaken. He had a soldier’s eye.
When he visited the field of battle next day, and saw every Roman corpse
with its wounds in front, he exclaimed: “If these were my soldiers, or if
I were their general, we should conquer the world.” When he offered in
the temple of Jove at Tarentum a portion of the spoils taken after the
battle, he placed on them the following inscription:
“Those who had ne’er been vanquished yet, great Father of Olympus,
Those have I vanquished in the fight, and they have vanquished me.”
And when he was asked why he spoke thus, he answered: “Another victory
like this will send me without a man back to Epirus.”
[Illustration: ARRIVAL OF PYRRHUS AT TARENTUM]
The battle of Heraclea, however, encouraged the Greek cities of Locri and
Rhegium to throw off the Roman yoke. Locri joined Pyrrhus; but Decius
Jubellius, with his Campanian soldiers, declared themselves independent,
and seized Rhegium for themselves. But, above all, the battle of Heraclea
left the ground open for the Lucanians and Samnites to join the king; and
he advanced into Samnium to claim the fulfilment of their promises. But
as he advanced he was struck by the desolate condition of the country;
and he reproached the Italians with deceiving him. The battle which had
just been fought taught him how formidable was the foe he had to deal
with, and what he now saw, that he must trust to his own resources. He
resolved therefore to end the war at once by negotiating an advantageous
peace.
The person employed in this negotiation was Cineas, a name only less
remarkable than that of Pyrrhus himself. He was a Thessalian Greek,
famous for his eloquence, but still more famous for his diplomatic skill.
He served Pyrrhus as minister at home and ambassador abroad. “The tongue
of Cineas,” Pyrrhus used to say, “had won him more battles than his own
sword.” So quick was his perception, and so excellent his memory, that
he had hardly arrived in Rome when he could call every senator by his
name, and address every one according to his character. The terms he
had to offer were stringent; for Pyrrhus required that all Greek cities
should be left free, and that all the places that had been taken from the
Samnites, Apulians, and his other allies, should be restored. Yet the
skill of Cineas would have persuaded the senate to submit to these terms
if it had not been for one man. This was Appius Claudius the censor. He
was now in extreme old age; he had been blind for many years, and had
long ceased to take part in public affairs. But now, when he heard of the
proposed surrender, he caused himself to be conducted to the senate-house
by his four sons and his five sons-in-law, and there, with the
authoritative eloquence of an oracle, he confirmed the wavering spirits
of the fathers, and dictated the only answer worthy of Rome--that she
would not treat of peace with Pyrrhus till he had quitted the shores of
Italy. The dying patriotism of Appius covers the multitude of arbitrary
acts of which he was guilty in his censorship.
Cineas returned to Pyrrhus, baffled and without hope. He told his master,
that “to fight with the Roman people was like fighting with the hydra”;
he declared that “the city was as a temple of the gods, and the senate
an assembly of kings.” But the king resolved to try what effect might
be produced by the presence of his army in Latium. He passed rapidly
through Campania, leaving it to be plundered by the Samnites, and
advanced upon Rome by the upper or Latin road. He took the colony of
Fregellæ by storm; he received the willing submission of Anagnia, the
capital of the Hernicans, and was admitted into the impregnable citadel
of Præneste, for both the Hernicans and the Prænestines were only half
Roman citizens; they bore the burdens without enjoying the privileges,
and were therefore glad to welcome a chance of liberty. He then advanced
six miles beyond Præneste, within eighteen miles of Rome. But here his
course was stayed. There were no signs of defection among the bulk of
the Latins, or Volscians, or Campanians, who had been admitted into
the tribes and enjoyed the full honours of Roman citizenship. Ti.
Coruncanius, afterwards chief pontiff, and now consul, was himself a
Latin of Tusculum. What he had gained all might hope for.
[Illustration: PYRRHUS]
This winter is famous for the embassy of C. Fabricius, who was sent by
the senate with two other consulars to propose to Pyrrhus an interchange
of prisoners. The character and habits of Fabricius resembled those of
Curius. He lived in frugal simplicity upon his own farm, and was honoured
by his countrymen for his inflexible uprightness. He was somewhat younger
than Curius, and seems to have been less rough in manners and more
gentle in disposition. The stories are well known which tell how Pyrrhus
practised upon his cupidity by offering him gold, and upon his fears by
concealing an elephant behind the curtains of the royal tent, which, upon
a given signal, waved its trunk over his head; and how Fabricius calmly
refused the bribe, and looked with unmoved eye upon the threatening
monster. Pyrrhus, it is said, so admired the bearing of the Roman that he
wished him to enter into his service like Cineas, an offer which, to a
Roman ear, could convey nothing but insult. The king refused to give up
any Roman citizens whom he had taken, unless the senate would make peace
upon the terms proposed through Cineas: but he gave his prisoners leave
to return home in the month of December to partake in the joviality of
the _Saturnalia_, if they would pledge their word of honour to return.
His confidence was not misplaced. The prisoners used every effort to
procure peace; but the senate remained firm, and ordered every man, under
penalty of death, to return to Tarentum by the appointed day.
[Sidenote: [280-278 B.C.]]
Hostilities were renewed next year. The new consuls were P. Sulpicius for
the Patricians, and P. Decius Mus, son and grandson of those illustrious
plebeians who had devoted themselves to death beneath Vesuvius and at
Sentinum. We are ignorant of the details of the campaign till we find the
consuls strongly encamped on the hills which command the plain of Apulian
Asculum. Here Pyrrhus encountered them. After some skilful manœuvring he
drew the Romans down into the plain, where his phalanx and cavalry could
act freely. He placed the Tarentines in the centre, the Italian allies on
his left wing, and his Epirots and Macedonians in phalanx on the right;
his cavalry and elephants he kept in reserve. A second time the Roman
legions wasted their strength upon the phalanxes. Again and again they
charged that iron wall with unavailing bravery, till Pyrrhus brought up
his cavalry and elephants, as at Heraclea, and the Romans were broken.
But this time they made good their retreat to their entrenched camp, and
Pyrrhus did not think it prudent to pursue them. He had little confidence
in his Italian allies, who hated the Greeks even more than they hated
the Romans, and gave signal proof of their perfidy by plundering the
king’s camp while he was in action. The loss on both sides was heavy.
The second victory was now won; but the king’s saying was fast being
fulfilled. In these two battles he had lost many of his chief officers
and a great number of the Epirots, the only troops on whom he could rely.
He dared not advance; and when he returned to Tarentum news awaited him
which dispirited him still more. The Romans, he heard, had concluded a
defensive alliance with Carthage, so that the superiority of Tarentum at
sea would be lost; Ptolemy Ceraunus, who had promised him fresh troops
from Macedon, had been slain by the Gauls, and these barbarians were
threatening to overrun Greece.
Under these circumstances he seized the first occasion of making peace
with Rome. This was afforded early in the next year by a communication
he received from the new consuls Q. Æmilius and C. Fabricius. They sent
to give him notice that his physician or cup-bearer (the accounts vary)
had offered to take him off by poison. Pyrrhus returned his warmest
thanks, sent back all his prisoners fresh-clothed and without ransom,
and told his allies he should accept an invitation he had just received
to take the command of a Sicilian-Greek army against the Carthaginians
and Mamertines. Accordingly he sailed from Locri to Sicily, evading the
Carthaginian fleet which had been lying in wait for him. He left the
Italians to the mercy of the Romans, but Milo still kept hold of the
citadel of Tarentum, and Alexander, the king’s son, remained in garrison
at Locri.
He had been a little more than two years in Italy, for he came at the
end of the year 281 B.C. and departed early in 278: he returned towards
the close of 276, so that his stay in Sicily was about two years and a
half. The events of this period may be very briefly summed up.
[Sidenote: [278-275 B.C.]]
The Samnites and Lucanians continued a sort of partisan warfare against
Rome, in which, though the consuls were honoured with triumphs, no very
signal advantages seem to have been gained. The Romans no doubt took back
the places on the Latin road which had submitted to the king; they also
made themselves masters of Locri, and utterly destroyed the ancient city
of Croton, but they failed to take Rhegium, which was stoutly maintained
by Decius Jubellius and his Campanians against Pyrrhus and Romans
alike. Meanwhile Pyrrhus was pursuing a career of brilliant success in
Sicily. He confined the Mamertines within the walls of Messana, and in
a brilliant campaign drove the Carthaginians to the extreme west of the
island. But in an evil hour he undertook the siege of Lilybæum, a place
which the Carthaginians had made almost impregnable. He was obliged to
raise the siege and lost the confidence of his fickle Greek allies.
Before this also death had deprived him of the services of Cineas.
Left to himself, he was guilty of many harsh and arbitrary acts, which
proceeded rather from impatience and disappointment than from a cruel
or tyrannical temper. It now became clear that he could hold Sicily no
longer, and he gladly accepted a new invitation to return to Italy.
Accordingly, late in the year 276 B.C., he set sail for Tarentum. On
the passage he was intercepted by a Carthaginian fleet, and lost the
larger number of his ships; and, on landing between Rhegium and Locri,
he suffered further loss by an assault from the Campanians, who still
held the former city. Yet, once in Italy, he found himself at the head
of a large army, composed partly of his veteran Epirots, and partly
of soldiers of fortune who had followed him from Sicily. His first
act was to recover possession of Locri; and here, in extreme want of
money, he listened to evil counsellors, and plundered the rich temple
of Proserpine. The ships that were conveying the plunder were wrecked,
and Pyrrhus, conscience-stricken, restored all that was saved. But the
memory of the deed haunted him: he has recorded his belief that this
sacrilegious act was the cause of all his future misfortunes.
The consuls of the next year were L. Cornelius Lentulus and M. Curius
Dentatus. On Curius depended the fortunes of Rome. The people were much
disheartened, for pestilence was raging. The statue of Capitoline Jupiter
had been struck by lightning, and men’s hearts were filled with ominous
forebodings. When the consuls held their levy, the citizens summoned for
service did not answer to their names. Then Curius ordered the goods of
the first recusant to be sold, a sentence which was followed by the loss
of all political rights. This severe measure had its effect, and the
required legions were made up.
Lentulus marched into Lucania, Curius into Samnium. Pyrrhus chose the
latter country for the seat of war. He found Curius encamped above
Beneventum, and he resolved on a night attack, so as to surprise him
before he could be joined by his colleague. But night attacks seldom
succeed: part of the army missed its way, and it was broad daylight
before the Epirot army appeared before the camp of the consul. Curius
immediately drew out his legions, and assaulted the enemy while they were
entangled in the mountains. He had instructed his archers to shoot arrows
wrapped in burning tow at the elephants, and to this device is attributed
the victory he won. One of the females, hearing the cries of her young
one, which had been wounded in this way, rushed furiously into the ranks
of her own men. Curius now brought up the main body of his foot and
attacked the disordered phalanxes; they were broken and became helpless.
The defeat was complete: Pyrrhus fell back at once upon Tarentum, and
resolved to quit the shores of Italy, leaving Milo to hold the citadel.
But the glory of his life was ended; the two or three years that remained
of it were passed in hopeless enterprises. In storming Argos he was
killed by a tile thrown by a woman from the roof of a house. Such was the
end of this remarkable man. Like Richard I of England or Charles XII of
Sweden, he passed his life in winning battles without securing any fruits
of victory; and, like them, a life passed in the thick of danger was
ended in a petty war and by an unknown hand. His chivalric disposition
won him the admiration even of his enemies; his impetuous temper and
impatience of misfortune prevented him from securing the confidence of
his friends. Yet he left a name worthy of his great ancestry; and we part
with regret from the history of his Italian wars, for it is the most
frank and generous conflict in which Rome was ever engaged.
THE FINAL REDUCTION OF ITALY
[Sidenote: [273-272 B.C.]]
The departure of Pyrrhus left Italy at the mercy of Rome. Yet Milo,
the king’s lieutenant, still held the citadel of Tarentum, and none
of the nations who had lately joined the Epirot standard submitted
without a final struggle. The Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and other
tribes continued a kind of guerrilla warfare, for which their mountains
afforded great facilities. To put an end to this, in the year 272 B.C.,
L. Papirius Cursor the younger, and Sp. Carvilius, who had crushed the
Samnites at the close of the third war, were again elected consuls.
Papirius invested Tarentum; and while the lines were being formed, he
received the submission of the Lucanians and Bruttians.
Meanwhile Carvilius attacked the Samnites, and the scattered remnants of
that brave people saw themselves compelled to submit finally to Rome,
after a struggle of about seventy years. Thus ended what is sometimes
called the Fourth Samnite War.
The same summer witnessed the reduction of Tarentum. Papirius entered
into a secret treaty with Milo, by which the latter was to evacuate
the city and leave it to the will of the Romans. He sailed for Epirus
with all his men and stores, and Tarentum was left to itself. The
aristocratical party instantly seized the government, and made submission
to Rome. They were allowed to continue independent, on condition of
paying an annual tribute to the conqueror; but their fortifications were
razed, their arsenal dismantled, the fleet surrendered to Rome, and a
Roman garrison placed in their citadel.
The attention excited by the failure of Pyrrhus is attested by the fact
that in the year 273 B.C. Ptolemy Philadelphus, sovereign of Egypt, sent
ambassadors to Rome, and entered into alliance with Rome. Thus began a
connection with Egypt which continued unbroken to the time of Cæsar.
[Sidenote: [271-265 B.C.]]
In 271 B.C. the plebeian consul C. Genucius was sent to reduce Decius
Jubellius and the Campanian soldiers, who had made themselves lords
of Rhegium, and formed a military oligarchy in that city. The senate
formed a treaty with the Mamertine soldiery, who had occupied Messana
in the same manner, and thus detached them from alliance with their
compatriots; they also secured supplies of corn from Hiero, the new
sovereign of Syracuse. The Campanians of Rhegium being thus forsaken,
the city was taken by assault and all the soldiery put to the sword,
except the original legionaries of Jubellius, who as burgesses of Capua
possessed some of the rights of Roman citizens, and were therefore
reserved for trial before the people of Rome. Not more than three hundred
still survived out of several thousands; but they met with no mercy.
Every tribe voted that they should be first scourged and then beheaded
as traitors to the republic. Rhegium was restored to the condition of a
Greek community.
A few years later, the Salentines and Messapians in the heel of Italy
submitted to the joint forces of both consuls. Brundusium and its lands
were ceded to Rome; and about twenty years afterwards (244 B.C.) a colony
was planted there. Brundusium became the Dover of Italy, as Dyrrhachium,
on the opposite Epirot coast, became the Calais of Greece.
In the year 268 B.C. both consuls undertook the reduction of the
Picenians, who occupied the coast land between Umbria and the
Marrucinians. Their chief city, Asculum, was taken by storm. A portion
of the people was transferred to that beautiful coast between Naples and
the Silarus, where they took the name of Picentines. Soon after (266
B.C.) Sarsina, the chief city of the Umbrians, was taken, and all Umbria
submitted to Rome.
It remains to speak of Etruria. No community here was strong enough, so
far as we hear, to maintain active war against Rome; even Volsinii was
now compelled to sue for succour. The ruling aristocracy had ventured
to arm their serfs, probably for the purpose of a Roman war; but these
men had turned upon their late masters, and were now exercising a still
direr oppression than they had suffered. The senate readily gave ear to a
call for assistance from the Volsinian lords; and (in the year 265 B.C.)
Q. Fabius Gurges, son of old Fabius Maximus, invested the city. He was
slain in a sally made by the Etruscan serfs, who were, however, obliged
to surrender soon after. The Romans treated the city as lawfully gotten
booty. The old Etruscan town on the hill-top, with its polygonal walls,
was destroyed; its two thousand statues and other works of art were
transferred to Rome; a new town was founded on the low ground, which in
the modernised name of Bolsena still preserves the memory of its ancient
fame. After the fall of Volsinii, all the Etruscan communities made
formal submission; and all Italy awaited the will of the conquering city
of the Tiber.
GOVERNMENT OF THE ACQUIRED TERRITORY
[Sidenote: [265 B.C.]]
To conceive of ancient Rome as the capital of Italy in the same sense
that London is the capital of England, or Paris of France, would be a
great mistake. London and Paris are the chief cities of their respective
countries only because they are the seat of government. But the city of
ancient Rome was a great corporate body or community, holding sovereignty
over the whole of Italy, from the Macra and Rubicon southwards. The
Roman territory itself, in the first days of the Republic, consisted
(as we have seen) of twenty-one tribes or wards. Before the point at
which we have arrived, these tribes had been successively increased to
three-and-thirty. These tribes included a district beyond the Tiber
stretching somewhat farther than Veii; a portion of the Sabine and
Æquian territory beyond the Anio; with part of Latium, part of the
Volscian country, and the coast land as far as the Liris, southwards.
None but persons enrolled on the lists of these tribes had a vote in the
popular assemblies or any share in the government and legislation of the
city. The Latin cities not included in the tribes, and all the Italian
communities, were subject to Rome, but had no share in her political
franchise.
The principles on which the Italian nations were so settled as to remain
the peaceable subjects of Rome were these: first, they were broken up and
divided as much as possible; secondly, they were allowed, with little
exception, to manage their own affairs. The isolation enforced by Rome
prevented them from combining against her. The self-government granted by
Rome made them bear her supremacy with contentment.
_Prefectures; Municipalities_
The arts by which isolation was produced were put in practice at the
settlement of Latium fifty years before. The same plan was pursued with
the different Italian nations. Those which submitted with a good grace
were treated leniently. Those which resisted stubbornly were weakened
by the confiscation of their lands and by the settlement of colonies
in their principal towns. The Frentanians are the best examples of the
milder treatment; the Samnites afford the most notable instance of the
more harsh.
The work of isolation was promoted partly by the long and narrow shape
of Italy and the mountain range by which it is traversed, which make a
central government difficult, and still break it up into many states,
but partly also by a sentiment common to most of the Italian nations, as
well as to those of Greece. They regarded a man, not as one of a nation,
but as the member of a civic community. Every one regarded his first
duties as owed to his own city, and not to his nation. Their city was
their country. They addressed one another not as fellow-countrymen, but
as fellow-citizens. Rome herself was the noblest specimen of this form
of society. And the settlement which she adopted throughout Italy took
advantage of this prevailing rule, and perpetuated it.
Not only were the Italians split up into civic communities, but these
communities were themselves placed in very different conditions. The
division of the Italian communities, as established by the Roman
government, was threefold--prefectures, municipal towns, and colonies.
The prefectures did not enjoy the right of self-government, but were
under the rule of prefects or Roman governors, annually appointed; and
the inhabitants of the prefecture were registered by the Roman censor, so
as to be liable to all the burdens of Roman citizens, without enjoying
any of their privileges. This condition was called the Cærite franchise,
because the town of Cære was the first community placed in this dependent
position. Amid the terror of the Gallic invasion, Cære had afforded a
place of refuge to the sacred things, to the women and children of the
Romans, and had been rewarded by a treaty of equal alliance. But at a
later period she joined other Etruscan communities in war against Rome,
and for this reason she was reduced to the condition of a prefecture.
Capua afterwards became a notable instance of a similar change. After the
Samnite Wars she enjoyed a state of perfect equality in respect to Rome.
The troops which she supplied in virtue of the alliance between her and
Rome formed a separate legion, and were commanded by her own officers,
as in the case of Decius Jubellius. But in the Hannibalic War she joined
Hannibal; and to punish her she was degraded to the condition of a
prefecture.
At the period of which we write, the municipal towns were communities
bound to Rome by treaties of alliance, framed on a general principle
with respect to burdens and privileges. Their burdens consisted in
furnishing certain contingents of troops, which they were obliged to
provide with pay and equipments while on service. Their privileges
consisted in freedom from all other taxes, and in possessing the right
of self-government. This condition was secured by a treaty of alliance,
which, nominally at least, placed the municipal community on a footing
of equality with Rome; though sometimes this treaty was imposed by Rome
without consulting the will of the other community.[45] Thus there was,
no doubt, a considerable diversity of condition among the municipia.
Some regarded their alliance as a boon, others looked upon it as a mark
of subjection. In the former condition were Cære and Capua before they
were made prefectures; in the latter condition was Volsinii and the
Etruscan cities. The municipal towns enjoyed the civil or private rights
of Roman citizens; but none, without special grant, had any power of
obtaining the political or public rights. In some cases even the private
rights were withheld, as from the greater part of the Latin communities
after the war of 338 B.C., when the citizens of each community were for
a time forbidden to form contracts of marriage or commerce with Roman
citizens or with their neighbours. They stood to Rome and to the rest
of Italy much in the same condition as the plebeians to the patricians
before the Canuleian law. But these prohibitions were gradually and
silently removed. Municipal towns were often rewarded by a gift of the
Roman franchise, more or less completely, while those which offended
were depressed to the condition of prefectures. At length, by the Julian
and other laws (B.C. 90), all the municipal towns of Italy, as well as
the colonies, received the full Roman franchise; and hence arose the
common conception of a municipal town--that is, a community of which the
citizens are members of the whole nation, all possessing the same rights,
and subject to the same burdens, but retaining the administration of law
and government in all local matters which concern not the nation at large.
_Colonies; Free and Confederate States_
It is in the colonial towns that we must look for the chief instruments
of Roman supremacy in Italy. Directly dependent upon Rome for existence,
they served more than anything to promote that division of interests
which rendered it so difficult for any part of Italy to combine against
Rome.
When we speak or think of Roman colonies, we must dismiss all those
conceptions of colonisation which are familiar to our minds from the
practice pursued in the familiar cases of the maritime states of
modern Europe.[46] Roman colonies were not planted in new countries by
adventurers who found their old homes too narrow for their wants or their
ambition. When the Romans planted a colony (at the time we speak of and
for more than a century later), it was always within the limits of the
Italian peninsula, and within the walls of ancient cities whose obstinate
resistance made it imprudent to restore them to independence, and whose
reduced condition rendered it possible to place them in the condition of
subjects. But these colonies were not all of the same character. They
must be distinguished into two classes: the colonies of Roman citizens,
and the Latin colonies.
The colonies of Roman citizens consisted usually of three hundred men
of approved military experience, who went forth with their families to
occupy conquered cities of no great magnitude, but which were important
as military positions, being usually on the seacoast. These three hundred
families formed a sort of patrician caste, while the old inhabitants sank
into the condition formerly occupied by the plebeians at Rome. The heads
of these families retained all their rights as Roman citizens, and might
repair to Rome to vote in the popular assemblies. When in early Roman
history we hear of the revolt of a colony, the meaning seems to be that
the natives rose against the colonists and expelled them. Hence it is
that we hear of colonists being sent more than once to the same place, as
to Antium.
[Illustration: PROW OF A ROMAN WAR GALLEY
(After De Montfaucon)]
But more numerous and more important than these were the Latin colonies,
of which there were thirty in existence when Hannibal crossed the Alps.
Of these thirty no fewer than twenty-six had been founded before the
close of the year 263 B.C. The reason for the name they bore was this:
We have seen that a close connection had subsisted between Rome and the
Latin communities from the earliest times. Under the later kings Rome was
the head of Latium; and by Spurius Cassius a league was formed between
Rome and Latium, which continued with a slight interruption till the
great Latin war of 338 B.C. So long as this league lasted, Latins enjoyed
all the private rights of Roman citizens in Rome; and Romans enjoyed
all the private rights of the Latin citizens in any of the cities of
Latium. During the period of the league many colonies were sent forth, in
which the settlers consisted jointly of Romans and Latins, and were not
confined to the small number of three hundred, but usually amounted to
some thousands. But the citizens of these Latin colonies seem to have had
no rights at Rome, except such as were possessed by the allied municipal
towns. They were therefore regarded politically as communities in
alliance with Rome. After the Latin war, similar colonies still continued
to be sent forth. Indeed, these were the colonies which chiefly relieved
the poor of the Roman territory.
The rights and privileges of these Latin colonies are only known to
us as they are found at a later period of the republic under the name
Latinitas, or the Right of Latium (_Jus Latii_). This right, at the
later time we speak of, we know to have consisted in the power of
obtaining the full rights of a Roman burgess, but in a limited and
peculiar manner. Any citizen of a Latin community, whether one of the
free cities of Latium or a Latin colony, was allowed to emigrate to Rome
and be enrolled in one of the Roman tribes, on two conditions: first,
that he had held a magistracy in his native town: secondly, that he left
a representative of his family in that native town. Thus was formed that
large body of half-Roman citizens throughout Italy, who are so well known
to readers of Livy under the appellation of “the Latin name.” _Socii
et nomen Latinum_--the allies and the Latin name--was the technical
expression for all those Italian communities who were bound to supply
soldiers for her armies.
Besides the mass of the Italian communities which were in a condition
of greater or less dependence upon Rome,--the prefectures in a state of
absolute subjection, the colonies bound by ties of national feeling and
interest, the municipal towns by articles of alliance,--there remain
to be noticed, fourthly, the cities which remained wholly independent
of Rome, but bound to her by treaties of equal alliance. Of the Latin
cities, Tibur and Præneste alone were in this condition; in Campania,
most of the cities, till, after the Hannibalic War, Capua and others were
reduced to the condition of prefectures; of the Hellenic cities in the
south, Neapolis, Rhegium, and others; in Umbria, Camerium; in Etruria,
Iguvium; with all the cities of the Frentanians. But as Roman power
increased, most of these communities were reduced to the condition of
simple municipal towns.
Whatever is known of the internal constitution of these various
communities belongs to later times, when by the Julian law they all
obtained the Roman franchise, and became part and parcel of the Roman
state. There can, however, be little doubt that in the colonies a
constitution was adopted similar to that of Rome herself. The colonists
formed a kind of patriciate or aristocracy, and the heads of their
leading families constituted a senate. There were two chief magistrates,
called _duumviri_, representing the consuls, to whom (in the more
important towns) were added one or two men to fulfil the duties of censor
and quæstor. In course of time similar constitutions were introduced into
the municipal towns also.
Thus, by placing the Italian cities in every possible relation to
herself, from real independence to complete subjection, and by planting
colonies, some with full Roman rights, some with a limited power of
obtaining these rights, Rome wove her net of sovereignty over the
peninsula, and covered every part with its entangling meshes. The policy
of Rome, as has been said, may be summed up in the two words--isolation
and self-government.[c]
FOOTNOTES
[44] [Mommsen[b] thinks of Pyrrhus as “simply a military adventurer.” He
finds his dream of western empire, “analogous in greatness and boldness
to the idea which led Alexander over the Hellespont.” But he finds a vast
difference between the chances of success, seeing in the disorganised
and independent Italian states “poor material for a united realm.” In
all points the plan of the Macedonian appears as a feasible, that of the
Epirot as an impracticable, enterprise; the former as the completion of
a great historical task, the latter as a remarkable blunder. And yet we
must not forget that we look at these attempts from the viewpoint of
result not of purpose, and to his contemporaries the conquest of Italy
would have seemed easier, if less worth while, than the then apparently
impossible dream of Alexander.]
[45] Hence the distinction between _Civitates Federatæ_ and _Liberæ_.
All federate communities were free, but not all free communities were
federate.]
[46] [Roman colonies were essentially similar to the cleruchies of
Athens.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration]