merely reflective Judgement must bring with the representation
of it, subjective and, as subjective, universally valid
purposiveness--although no purposiveness of the _form_ of the
object lies (as in the case of the Beautiful) at the ground of the
judgement--the question arises “what is this subjective purposiveness?”
And how does it come to be prescribed as the norm by which a ground
for universally valid satisfaction is supplied in the mere estimation
of magnitude, even in that which is forced up to the point where our
faculty of Imagination is inadequate for the presentation of the
concept of magnitude?
In the process of combination requisite for the estimation of
magnitude, the Imagination proceeds of itself to infinity without
anything hindering it; but the Understanding guides it by means
of concepts of number, for which the Imagination must furnish the
schema. And in this procedure, as belonging to the logical estimation
of magnitude, there is indeed something objectively purposive,--in
accordance with the concept of a purpose (as all measurement is),--but
nothing purposive and pleasing for the aesthetical Judgement. There is
also in this designed purposiveness nothing which would force us to
push the magnitude of the measure, and consequently the _comprehension_
of the manifold in an intuition, to the bounds of the faculty of
Imagination, or as far as ever this can reach in its presentations.
For in the estimation of magnitude by the Understanding (Arithmetic)
we only go to a certain point whether we push the comprehension of
the units up to the number 10 (as in the decimal scale) or only up to
4 (as in the quaternary scale); the further production of magnitude
proceeds by combination or, if the quantum is given in intuition, by
apprehension, but merely by way of progression (not of comprehension)
in accordance with an assumed principle of progression. In this
mathematical estimation of magnitude the Understanding is equally
served and contented whether the Imagination chooses for unit a
magnitude that we can take in in a glance, _e.g._ a foot or rod, or a
German mile or even the earth’s diameter,--of which the apprehension
is indeed possible, but not the comprehension in an intuition of the
Imagination (not possible by _comprehensio aesthetica_, although quite
possible by _comprehensio logica_ in a concept of number). In both
cases the logical estimation of magnitude goes on without hindrance to
infinity.
But now the mind listens to the voice of Reason which, for every given
magnitude,--even for those that can never be entirely apprehended,
although (in sensible representation) they are judged as entirely
given,--requires totality. Reason consequently desires comprehension in
_one_ intuition, and so the _presentation_ of all these members of a
progressively increasing series. It does not even exempt the infinite
(space and past time) from this requirement; it rather renders it
unavoidable to think the infinite (in the judgement of common Reason)
as _entirely given_ (according to its totality).
But the infinite is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great.
Compared with it everything else (of the same kind of magnitudes) is
small. And what is most important is that to be able only to think it
as _a whole_ indicates a faculty of mind which surpasses every standard
of Sense. For [to represent it sensibly] would require a comprehension
having for unit a standard bearing a definite relation, expressible
in numbers, to the infinite; which is impossible. Nevertheless, _the
bare capability of thinking_ this infinite without contradiction
requires in the human mind a faculty itself supersensible. For it
is only by means of this faculty and its Idea of a noumenon,--which
admits of no intuition, but which yet serves as the substrate for the
intuition of the world, as a mere phenomenon,--that the infinite of
the world of sense, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude,
can be _completely_ comprehended _under_ a concept, although in the
mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of _concepts of number_
it can never be completely thought. The faculty of being able to think
the infinite of supersensible intuition as given (in its intelligible
substrate), surpasses every standard of sensibility, and is great
beyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation;
not of course in a theoretical point of view and on behalf of the
cognitive faculty, but as an extension of the mind which feels itself
able in another (practical) point of view to go beyond the limit of
sensibility.
Nature is therefore sublime in those of its phenomena, whose intuition
brings with it the Idea of their infinity. This last can only come by
the inadequacy of the greatest effort of our Imagination to estimate
the magnitude of an object. But now in mathematical estimation of
magnitude the Imagination is equal to providing a sufficient measure
for every object; because the numerical concepts of the Understanding,
by means of progression, can make any measure adequate to any given
magnitude. Therefore it must be the _aesthetical_ estimation of
magnitude in which it is felt that the effort towards comprehension
surpasses the power of the Imagination to grasp in a whole of intuition
the progressive apprehension; and at the same time is perceived the
inadequacy of this faculty, unbounded in its progress, for grasping
and using, for the estimation of magnitude, a fundamental measure
which could be made available by the Understanding with little
trouble. Now the proper unchangeable fundamental measure of nature is
its absolute whole; which, regarding nature as a phenomenon, would
be infinity comprehended. But since this fundamental measure is a
self-contradictory concept (on account of the impossibility of the
absolute totality of an endless progress), that magnitude of a natural
Object, on which the Imagination fruitlessly spends its whole faculty
of comprehension, must carry our concept of nature to a supersensible
substrate (which lies at its basis and also at the basis of our faculty
of thought). As this, however, is great beyond all standards of sense,
it makes us judge as _sublime_, not so much the object, as our own
state of mind in the estimation of it.
Therefore, just as the aesthetical Judgement in judging the Beautiful
refers the Imagination in its free play to the _Understanding_, in
order to harmonise it with the _concepts_ of the latter in general
(without any determination of them); so does the same faculty when
judging a thing as Sublime refer itself to the _Reason_ in order that
it may subjectively be in accordance with its _Ideas_ (no matter what
they are):--_i.e._ that it may produce a state of mind conformable
to them and compatible with that brought about by the influence of
definite (practical) Ideas upon feeling.
We hence see also that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind
of the [subject] judging, not in the natural Object, the judgement upon
which occasions this state. Who would call sublime, _e.g._ shapeless
mountain masses piled in wild disorder upon each other with their
pyramids of ice, or the gloomy raging sea? But the mind feels itself
elevated in its own judgement if, while contemplating them without
any reference to their form, and abandoning itself to the Imagination
and to the Reason--which although placed in combination with the
Imagination without any definite purpose, merely extends it--it yet
finds the whole power of the Imagination inadequate to its Ideas.
Examples of the mathematically Sublime of nature in mere intuition are
all the cases in which we are given, not so much a larger numerical
concept as a large unit for the measure of the Imagination (for
shortening the numerical series). A tree, [the height of] which we
estimate with reference to the height of a man, at all events gives
a standard for a mountain; and if this were a mile high, it would
serve as unit for the number expressive of the earth’s diameter, so
that the latter might be made intuitible. The earth’s diameter [would
supply a unit] for the known planetary system; this again for the
Milky Way; and the immeasurable number of milky way systems called
nebulae,--which presumably constitute a system of the same kind among
themselves--lets us expect no bounds here. Now the Sublime in the
aesthetical judging of an immeasurable whole like this lies not so much
in the greatness of the number [of units], as in the fact that in our
progress we ever arrive at yet greater units. To this the systematic
division of the universe contributes, which represents every magnitude
in nature as small in its turn; and represents our Imagination with
its entire freedom from bounds, and with it Nature, as a mere nothing
in comparison with the Ideas of Reason, if it is sought to furnish a
presentation which shall be adequate to them.
§ 27. _Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the
Sublime_
The feeling of our incapacity to attain to an Idea, _which is a law for
us_, is RESPECT. Now the Idea of the comprehension of every phenomenon
that can be given us in the intuition of a whole, is an Idea prescribed
to us by a law of Reason, which recognises no other measure, definite,
valid for every one, and invariable, than the absolute whole. But
our Imagination, even in its greatest efforts, in respect of that
comprehension, which we expect from it, of a given object in a whole of
intuition (and thus with reference to the presentation of the Idea of
Reason), exhibits its own limits and inadequacy; although at the same
time it shows that its destination is to make itself adequate to this
Idea regarded as a law. Therefore the feeling of the Sublime in nature
is respect for our own destination, which by a certain subreption we
attribute to an Object of nature (conversion of respect for the Idea of
humanity in our own subject into respect for the Object). This makes
intuitively evident the superiority of the rational determination of
our cognitive faculties to the greatest faculty of our Sensibility.
The feeling of the Sublime is therefore a feeling of pain, arising
from the want of accordance between the aesthetical estimation of
magnitude formed by the Imagination and the estimation of the same
formed by Reason. There is at the same time a pleasure thus excited,
arising from the correspondence with rational Ideas of this very
judgement of the inadequacy of our greatest faculty of Sense; in so
far as it is a law for us to strive after these Ideas. In fact it is
for us a law (of Reason), and belongs to our destination, to estimate
as small, in comparison with Ideas of Reason, everything which nature,
regarded as an object of Sense, contains that is great for us; and
that which arouses in us the feeling of this supersensible destination
agrees with that law. Now the greatest effort of the Imagination in
the presentation of the unit for the estimation of magnitude indicates
a reference to something _absolutely great_; and consequently a
reference to the law of Reason, which bids us take this alone as
the supreme measure of magnitude. Therefore the inner perception of
the inadequacy of all sensible standards for rational estimation of
magnitude indicates a correspondence with rational laws; it involves a
pain, which arouses in us the feeling of our supersensible destination,
according to which it is purposive and therefore pleasurable to find
every standard of Sensibility inadequate to the Ideas of Understanding.
The mind feels itself _moved_ in the representation of the Sublime
in nature; whilst in aesthetical judgements about the Beautiful it
is in _restful_ contemplation. This movement may (especially in
its beginnings) be compared to a vibration, _i.e._ to a quickly
alternating attraction towards, and repulsion from, the same Object.
The transcendent (towards which the Imagination is impelled in its
apprehension of intuition) is for the Imagination like an abyss in
which it fears to lose itself; but for the rational Idea of the
supersensible it is not transcendent but in conformity with law to
bring about such an effort of the Imagination, and consequently here
there is the same amount of attraction as there was of repulsion for
the mere Sensibility. But the judgement itself always remains in this
case only aesthetical, because--without having any determinate concept
of the Object at its basis--it merely represents the subjective play
of the mental powers (Imagination and Reason) as harmonious through
their very contrast. For just as Imagination and _Understanding_, in
judging of the Beautiful, generate a subjective purposiveness of the
mental powers by means of their harmony, so [here[46]] Imagination and
_Reason_ do so by means of their conflict. That is, they bring about a
feeling that we possess pure self-subsistent Reason, or a faculty for
the estimation of magnitude, whose pre-eminence can be made intuitively
evident only by the inadequacy of that faculty [Imagination] which
is itself unbounded in the presentation of magnitudes (of sensible
objects).
The measurement of a space (regarded as apprehension) is at the same
time a description of it, and thus an objective movement in the act
of Imagination and a progress. On the other hand, the comprehension
of the manifold in the unity,--not of thought but of intuition,--and
consequently the comprehension of the successively apprehended
[elements] in one glance, is a regress, which annihilates the condition
of time in this progress of the Imagination and makes _coexistence_
intuitible.[47] It is therefore (since the time-series is a condition
of the internal sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement of
the Imagination, by which it does violence to the internal sense;
this must be the more noticeable, the greater the quantum is which the
Imagination comprehends in one intuition. The effort, therefore, to
receive in one single intuition a measure for magnitudes that requires
an appreciable time to apprehend, is a kind of representation, which,
subjectively considered, is contrary to purpose: but objectively, as
requisite for the estimation of magnitude, it is purposive. Thus that
very violence which is done to the subject through the Imagination is
judged as purposive _in reference to the whole determination_ of the
mind.
The _quality_ of the feeling of the Sublime is that it is a feeling
of pain in reference to the faculty by which we judge aesthetically
of an object, which pain, however, is represented at the same time as
purposive. This is possible through the fact that the very incapacity
in question discovers the consciousness of an unlimited faculty of
the same subject, and that the mind can only judge of the latter
aesthetically by means of the former.
In the logical estimation of magnitude the impossibility of ever
arriving at absolute totality, by means of the progress of the
measurement of things of the sensible world in time and space, was
cognised as objective, _i.e._ as an impossibility of _thinking_ the
infinite as entirely given; and not as merely subjective or that there
was only an incapacity to _grasp_ it. For there we have not to do with
the degree of comprehension in an intuition, regarded as a measure,
but everything depends on a concept of number. But in aesthetical
estimation of magnitude the concept of number must disappear or be
changed, and the comprehension of the Imagination in reference to the
unit of measure (thus avoiding the concepts of a law of the successive
production of concepts of magnitude) is alone purposive for it.--If now
a magnitude almost reaches the limit of our faculty of comprehension
in an intuition, and yet the Imagination is invited by means of
numerical magnitudes (in respect of which we are conscious that our
faculty is unbounded) to aesthetical comprehension in a greater unit,
then we mentally feel ourselves confined aesthetically within bounds.
But nevertheless the pain in regard to the necessary extension of the
Imagination for accordance with that which is unbounded in our faculty
of Reason, viz. the Idea of the absolute whole, and consequently the
very unpurposiveness of the faculty of Imagination for rational Ideas
and the arousing of them, are represented as purposive. Thus it is that
the aesthetical judgement itself is subjectively purposive for the
Reason as the source of Ideas, _i.e._ as the source of an intellectual
comprehension for which all aesthetical comprehension is small; and
there accompanies the reception of an object as sublime a pleasure,
which is only possible through the medium of a pain.
B.--OF THE DYNAMICALLY SUBLIME IN NATURE
§ 28. _Of Nature regarded as Might_
_Might_ is that which is superior to great hindrances. It is called
_dominion_ if it is superior to the resistance of that which itself
possesses might. Nature considered in an aesthetical judgement as might
that has no dominion over us, is _dynamically sublime_.
If nature is to be judged by us as dynamically sublime, it must be
represented as exciting fear (although it is not true conversely
that every object which excites fear is regarded in our aesthetical
judgement as sublime). For in aesthetical judgements (without the aid
of concepts) superiority to hindrances can only be judged according
to the greatness of the resistance. Now that which we are driven to
resist is an evil, and, if we do not find our faculties a match for it,
is an object of fear. Hence nature can be regarded by the aesthetical
Judgement as might, and consequently as dynamically sublime, only so
far as it is considered an object of fear.
But we can regard an object as _fearful_, without being afraid _of_
it; viz. if we judge of it in such a way that we merely _think_ a case
in which we would wish to resist it, and yet in which all resistance
would be altogether vain. Thus the virtuous man fears God without being
afraid of Him; because to wish to resist Him and His commandments, he
thinks is a case as to which _he_ need not be anxious. But in every
such case that he thinks as not impossible, he cognises Him as fearful.
He who fears can form no judgement about the Sublime in nature; just
as he who is seduced by inclination and appetite can form no judgement
about the Beautiful. The former flies from the sight of an object which
inspires him with awe; and it is impossible to find satisfaction in
a terror that is seriously felt. Hence the pleasurableness arising
from the cessation of an uneasiness is _a state of joy_. But this, on
account of the deliverance from danger [which is involved], is a state
of joy conjoined with the resolve not to expose ourselves to the danger
again; we cannot willingly look back upon our sensations [of danger],
much less seek the occasion for them again.
Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening, rocks; clouds piled up
in the sky, moving with lightning flashes and thunder peals; volcanoes
in all their violence of destruction; hurricanes with their track
of devastation; the boundless ocean in a state of tumult; the lofty
waterfall of a mighty river, and such like; these exhibit our faculty
of resistance as insignificantly small in comparison with their might.
But the sight of them is the more attractive, the more fearful it
is, provided only that we are in security; and we readily call these
objects sublime, because they raise the energies of the soul above
their accustomed height, and discover in us a faculty of resistance of
a quite different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves
against the apparent almightiness of nature.
Now, in the immensity of nature, and in the inadequacy of our faculties
for adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetical estimation of
the magnitude of its _realm_, we find our own limitation; although at
the same time in our rational faculty we find a different, non-sensuous
standard, which has that infinity itself under it as a unit, and in
comparison with which everything in nature is small. Thus in our mind
we find a superiority to nature even in its immensity. And so also
the irresistibility of its might, while making us recognise our own
[physical[48]] impotence, considered as beings of nature, discloses
to us a faculty of judging independently of, and a superiority over,
nature; on which is based a kind of self-preservation, entirely
different from that which can be attacked and brought into danger by
external nature. Thus, humanity in our person remains unhumiliated,
though the individual might have to submit to this dominion. In this
way nature is not judged to be sublime in our aesthetical judgements,
in so far as it excites fear; but because it calls up that power in
us (which is not nature) of regarding as small the things about which
we are solicitous (goods, health, and life), and of regarding its
might (to which we are no doubt subjected in respect of these things),
as nevertheless without any dominion over us and our personality to
which we must bow where our highest fundamental propositions, and
their assertion or abandonment, are concerned. Therefore nature is
here called sublime merely because it elevates the Imagination to a
presentation of those cases in which the mind can make felt the proper
sublimity of its destination, in comparison with nature itself.
This estimation of ourselves loses nothing through the fact that
we must regard ourselves as safe in order to feel this inspiriting
satisfaction; and that hence, as there is no seriousness in the
danger, there might be also (as might seem to be the case) just as
little seriousness in the sublimity of our spiritual faculty. For
the satisfaction here concerns only the _destination_ of our faculty
which discloses itself in such a case, so far as the tendency to this
destination lies in our nature, whilst its development and exercise
remain incumbent and obligatory. And in this there is truth, however
conscious the man may be of his present actual powerlessness, when he
stretches his reflection so far.
No doubt this principle seems to be too far-fetched and too subtly
reasoned, and consequently seems to go beyond the scope of an
aesthetical judgement; but observation of men proves the opposite, and
shows that it may lie at the root of the most ordinary judgements,
although we are not always conscious of it. For what is that which is,
even to the savage, an object of the greatest admiration? It is a man
who shrinks from nothing, who fears nothing, and therefore does not
yield to danger, but rather goes to face it vigorously with the fullest
deliberation. Even in the most highly civilised state this peculiar
veneration for the soldier remains, though only under the condition
that he exhibit all the virtues of peace, gentleness, compassion, and
even a becoming care for his own person; because even by these it
is recognised that his mind is unsubdued by danger. Hence whatever
disputes there may be about the superiority of the respect which is
to be accorded them, in the comparison of a statesman and a general,
the aesthetical judgement decides for the latter. War itself, if it
is carried on with order and with a sacred respect for the rights of
citizens, has something sublime in it, and makes the disposition of the
people who carry it on thus, only the more sublime, the more numerous
are the dangers to which they are exposed, and in respect of which
they behave with courage. On the other hand, a long peace generally
brings about a predominant commercial spirit, and along with it, low
selfishness, cowardice, and effeminacy, and debases the disposition of
the people.[49]