often present to us when we speak of _infinite_ wisdom or _infinite_
intelligence, namely that the epithet _infinite_ in some way alters
the meaning of the attributes to which it is applied. But the truth is
that the word _infinite_, when applied to wisdom or knowledge or any
other intellectual or moral quality, can only properly have reference
to the number of acts of wisdom or knowledge that we suppose to have
been performed. The only sense in which we have any right to speak of
_infinite_ wisdom is that it is that which performs an infinite number
of wise acts. And so when we speak of infinite _intelligence_, we have
not the slightest warrant, either in logic or in common sense, for
supposing that such intelligence is not similar in kind to that finite
intelligence which we know in man.
To understand Kant’s attitude fully, we must also take into
consideration the great weight that he attaches to the Moral Argument
for the existence of God. The positive side of his teaching on Theism
is summed up in the following sentence (p. 388): “For the theoretical
reflective Judgement physical Teleology sufficiently proves from the
purposes of Nature an intelligent world-cause; for the practical
Judgement moral Teleology establishes it by the concept of a final
purpose, which it is forced to ascribe to creation.” That side of his
system which is akin to Agnosticism finds expression in his determined
refusal to admit anything more than this. The existence of God is for
him a “thing of faith”; and is not a fact of knowledge, strictly so
called. “Faith” he holds (p. 409) “is the moral attitude of Reason as
to belief in that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition. It
is therefore the constant principle of the mind to assume as true that
which it is necessary to presuppose as condition of the possibility of
the highest moral final purpose.” As he says elsewhere (Introduction
to Logic, ix. p. 60), “That man is morally _unbelieving_ who does not
accept that which, though _impossible_ to know, is _morally necessary_
to suppose.” And as far as he goes a Theist may agree with him, and he
has done yeoman’s service to Theism by his insistence on the absolute
impossibility of any other working hypothesis as an explanation of the
phenomena of nature. But I have endeavoured to indicate at what points
he does not seem to me to have gone as far as even his own declared
principles would justify him in going. If the existence of a Supreme
Mind be a “thing of faith,” this may with equal justice be said of the
finite minds of the men all around us; and his attempt to show that the
argument from analogy is here without foundation is not convincing.
Kant, however, in the Critique of Judgement is sadly fettered by
the chains that he himself had forged, and frequently chafes under
the restraints they impose. He indicates more than once a point of
view higher than that of the Critique of Pure Reason, from which
the phenomena of life and mind may be contemplated. He had already
hinted in that work that the supersensible substrate of the ego and
the non-ego might be identical. “Both kinds of objects differ from
each other, not internally, but only so far as the one _appears_
external to the other; possibly what is at the basis of phenomenal
matter as a thing in itself may not be so heterogeneous after all
as we imagine.”[4] This hypothesis which remains a bare undeveloped
possibility in the earlier work is put forward as a positive doctrine
in the Critique of Judgement. “There must,” says Kant, “be a ground
of the _unity_ of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of
nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains”
(Introduction, p. 13). That is to say, he maintains that to explain
the phenomena of organic life and the purposiveness of nature we must
hold that the world of sense is not disparate from and opposed to the
world of thought, but that _nature is the development of freedom_.
The connexion of nature and freedom is suggested by, nay is involved
in, the notion of natural adaptation; and although we can arrive
at no knowledge of the supersensible substrate of both, yet such a
common ground there must be. This principle is the starting-point of
the systems which followed that of Kant; and the philosophy of later
Idealism is little more than a development of the principle in its
consequences.
He approaches the same doctrine by a different path in the Critique of
the Teleological Judgement (§ 77), where he argues that the distinction
between the mechanical and the teleological working of nature, upon
which so much stress has been justly laid, depends for its validity
upon the peculiar character of our Understanding. When we give what may
be called a mechanical elucidation of any natural phenomenon, we begin
with its parts, and from what we know of them we explain the whole. But
in the case of certain objects, _e.g._ organised bodies, this cannot be
done. In their case we can only account for the parts by a reference to
the whole. Now, were it possible for us to perceive a whole before its
parts and derive the latter from the former,[5] then an organism would
be capable of being understood and would be an object of knowledge in
the strictest sense. But our Understanding is not able to do this, and
its inadequacy for such a task leads us to conceive the possibility of
an Understanding, not discursive like ours, but intuitive, for which
knowledge of the whole would precede that of the parts. “It is at
least possible to consider the material world as mere phenomenon, and
to think as its substrate something like a thing in itself (which is
not phenomenon), and to attach to this a corresponding intellectual
intuition. Thus there would be, although incognisable by us, a
supersensible real ground for nature, to which we ourselves belong”
(p. 325). Hence, although Mechanism and Technic must not be confused
and must ever stand side by side in our scientific investigation of
natural law, yet must they be regarded as coalescing in a single higher
principle incognisable by us. The ground of union is “the supersensible
substrate of nature of which we can determine nothing positively,
except that it is the being in itself of which we merely know the
phenomenon.” Thus, then, it appears that the whole force of Kant’s
main argument has proceeded upon an assumption, viz. the permanent
opposition between Sense and Understanding, which the progress of the
argument has shown to be unsound. “Kant seems,” says Goethe,[6] “to
have woven a certain element of irony into his method. For, while at
one time he seemed to be bent on limiting our faculties of knowledge in
the narrowest way, at another time he pointed, as it were with a side
gesture, beyond the limits which he himself had drawn.” The fact of
adaptation of means to ends observable in nature seems to break down
the barrier between Nature and Freedom; and if we once relinquish the
distinction between Mechanism and Technic in the operations of nature
we are led to the Idea of an absolute Being, who manifests Himself by
action which, though necessary, is yet the outcome of perfect freedom.
Kant, however, though he approaches such a position more than once,
can never be said to have risen to it. He deprecates unceasingly the
attempt to combine principles of nature with the principles of freedom
as a task beyond the modest capacity of human reason; and while
strenuously insisting on the practical force of the Moral Argument for
the Being of God, which is found in the witness of man’s conscience,
will not admit that it can in any way be regarded as strengthening the
theoretical arguments adduced by Teleology. The two lines of proof, he
holds, are quite distinct; and nothing but confusion and intellectual
disaster can result from the effort to combine them. The moral proof
stands by itself, and it needs no such crutches as the argument
from Design can offer. But, as Mr. Kennedy has pointed out in his
acute criticism[7] of the Kantian doctrine of Theism, it would not
be possible to combine a theoretical _disbelief_ in God with a frank
acceptance of the practical belief of His existence borne in upon us
by the Moral Law. Kant himself admits this: “A dogmatical _unbelief_,”
he says (p. 411), “cannot subsist together with a moral maxim dominant
in the mental attitude.” That is, though the theoretical argument be
incomplete, we cannot reject the conclusion to which it leads, for this
is confirmed by the moral necessities of conscience.
Kant’s position, then, seems to come to this, that though he never
doubts the existence of God, he has very grave doubts that He can
be theoretically known by man. _That_ He is, is certain; _what_ He
is, we cannot determine. It is a position not dissimilar to current
Agnostic doctrines; and as long as the antithesis between Sense and
Understanding, between Matter and Mind, is insisted upon as expressing
a real and abiding truth, Kant’s reasoning can hardly be refuted
with completeness. No doubt it may be urged that since the practical
and theoretical arguments both arrive at the same conclusion, the
cogency of our reasoning in the latter should confirm our trust in
the former. But true conclusions may sometimes seem to follow from
quite insufficient premises; and Kant is thus justified in demanding
that each argument shall be submitted to independent tests. I have
endeavoured to show above that he has not treated the theoretical line
of reasoning quite fairly, and that he has underestimated its force;
but its value _as an argument_ is not increased by showing that another
entirely different process of thought leads to the same result. And
that the witness of conscience affords the most powerful and convincing
argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, the source of law as of
love, is a simple matter of experience. Induction, syllogism, analogy,
do not really generate belief in God, though they may serve to justify
to reason a faith that we already possess. The poet has the truth of it:
Wer Gott nicht fühlt in sich und allen Lebenskreisen,
Dem werdet Ihr Ihn nicht beweisen mit Beweisen.
* * * * *
I give at the end of this Introduction a Glossary of the chief
philosophical terms used by Kant; I have tried to render them by the
same English equivalents all through the work, in order to preserve,
as far as may be, the exactness of expression in the original. I am
conscious that this makes the translation clumsy in many places, but
have thought it best to sacrifice elegance to precision. This course
is the more necessary to adopt, as Kant cannot be understood unless
his nice verbal distinctions be attended to. Thus _real_ means quite
a different thing from _wirklich_; _Hang_ from _Neigung_; _Rührung_
from _Affekt_ or _Leidenschaft_; _Anschauung_ from _Empfindung_
or _Wahrnehmung_; _Endzweck_ from _letzter Zweck_; _Idee_ from
_Vorstellung_; _Eigenschaft_ from _Attribut_ or _Beschaffenheit_;
_Schranke_ from _Grenze_; _überreden_ from _überzeugen_, etc. I am not
satisfied with “gratification” and “grief” as the English equivalents
for _Vergnügen_ and _Schmerz_; but it is necessary to distinguish these
words from _Lust_ and _Unlust_, and “mental pleasure,” “mental pain,”
which would nearly hit the sense, are awkward. Again, the constant
rendering of _schön_ by beautiful involves the expression “beautiful
art” instead of the more usual phrase “fine art.” _Purposive_ is an
ugly word, but it has come into use lately; and its employment enables
us to preserve the connexion between _Zweck_ and _zweckmässig_. I
have printed _Judgement_ with a capital letter when it signifies
the _faculty_, with a small initial when it signifies the _act_, of
judging. And in like manner I distinguish _Objekt_ from _Gegenstand_,
by printing the word “Object,” when it represents the former, with a
large initial.
The text I have followed is, in the main, that printed by Hartenstein;
but occasionally Rosenkranz preserves the better reading. All important
variants between the First and Second Editions have been indicated at
the foot of the page. A few notes have been added, which are enclosed
in square brackets, to distinguish them from those which formed part
of the original work. I have in general quoted Kant’s _Introduction to
Logic_ and _Critique of Practical Reason_ in Dr. Abbott’s translations.
My best thanks are due to Rev. J. H. Kennedy and Mr. F. Purser for much
valuable aid during the passage of this translation through the press.
And I am under even greater obligations to Mr. Mahaffy, who was good
enough to read through the whole of the proof; by his acute and learned
criticisms many errors have been avoided. Others I have no doubt still
remain, but for these I must be accounted alone responsible.
J. H. BERNARD.
TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,
_May 24, 1892_.
* * * * *
More than twenty-one years have passed since the first edition of this
Translation was published, and during that time much has been written,
both in Germany and in England, on the subject of Kant’s _Critique
of Judgement_. In particular, the German text has been critically
determined by the labours of Professor Windelband, whose fine edition
forms the fifth volume of Kant’s Collected Works as issued by the Royal
Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin, 1908). It will be indispensable
to future students. An excellent account of the significance, in the
Kantian system, of the _Urtheilskraft_, by Mr. R. A. C. Macmillan,
appeared in 1912; and Mr. J. C. Meredith has published recently an
English edition of the _Critique of Aesthetical Judgement_, with notes
and essays, dealing with the philosophy of art, which goes over the
ground very fully.
Some critics of my first edition took exception to the clumsiness
of the word “representation” as the equivalent of _Vorstellung_, but
I have made no change in this respect, as it seems to me (and so far
as I have observed to others who have worked on the _Critique of
Judgement_), that it is necessary to preserve in English the relation
between the noun _Vorstellung_ and the verb _vorstellen_, if Kant’s
reasoning is to be exhibited clearly. I have, however, abandoned the
attempt to preserve the word _Kritik_ in English, and have replaced it
by _Critique_ or _criticism_, throughout. The other changes that have
been made are mere corrections or emendations of faulty or obscure
renderings, with a few additional notes. I have left my original
Introduction as it was written in 1892, without attempting any fresh
examination of the problems that Kant set himself.
JOHN OSSORY.
THE PALACE, KILKENNY,
_January 6, 1914_.
GLOSSARY OF KANT’S PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
Absicht; _design_.
Achtung; _respect_.
Affekt; _affection_.
Angenehm; _pleasant_.
Anschauung; _intuition_.
Attribut; _attribute_.
Aufklärung; _enlightenment_.
Begehr; _desire_.
Begriff; _concept_.
Beschaffenheit; _constitution_ or _characteristic_.
Bestimmen; _to determine_.
Darstellen; _to present_.
Dasein; _presence_ or _being_.
Eigenschaft; _property_.
Empfindung; _sensation_.
Endzweck; _final purpose_.
Erkenntniss; _cognition_ or _knowledge_.
Erklärung; _explanation_.
Erscheinung; _phenomenon_.
Existenz; _existence_.
Fürwahrhalten; _belief_.
Gebiet; _realm_.
Gefühl; _feeling_.
Gegenstand; _object_.
Geist; _spirit_.
Geniessen; _enjoyment_.
Geschicklichkeit; _skill_.
Geschmack; _Taste_.
Gesetzmässigkeit; _conformity to law_.
Gewalt; _dominion_ or _authority_.
Glaube; _faith_.
Grenze; _bound_.
Grundsatz; _fundamental proposition_ or _principle_.
Hang; _propension_.
Idee; _Idea_.
Leidenschaft; _passion_.
Letzter Zweck; _ultimate purpose_.
Lust; _pleasure_.
Meinen; _opinion_.
Neigung; _inclination_.
Objekt; _Object_.
Prinzip; _principle_.
Real; _real_.
Reich; _kingdom_.
Reiz; _charm_.
Rührung; _emotion_.
Schein; _illusion_.
Schmerz; _grief_.
Schön; _beautiful_.
Schranke; _limit_.
Schwärmerei; _fanaticism_.
Seele; _soul_.
Ueberreden; _to persuade_.
Ueberschwänglich; _transcendent_.
Ueberzeugen; _to convince_.
Unlust; _pain_.
Urtheil; _judgement_.
Urtheilskraft; _Judgement_.
Verbindung; _combination_.
Vergnügen; _gratification_.
Verknüpfung; _connexion_.
Vermögen; _faculty_.
Vernunft; _Reason_.
Vernünftelei; _sophistry_ or _subtlety_.
Verstand; _Understanding_.
Vorstellung; _representation_.
Wahrnehmung; _perception_.
Wesen; _being_.
Willkühr; _elective will_.
Wirklich; _actual_.
Wohlgefallen; _satisfaction_.
Zufriedenheit; _contentment_.
Zweck; _purpose_.
Zweckmässig; _purposive_.
Zweckverbindung; _purposive combination_, etc.
PREFACE
We may call the faculty of cognition from principles _a priori_, _pure
Reason_, and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the
Critique of pure Reason, although by this faculty we only understand
Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name
in the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as
practical Reason, according to its special principles. That [Critique]
goes merely into our faculty of knowing things _a priori_, and busies
itself therefore only with the _cognitive faculty_ to the exclusion
of the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire; and of
the cognitive faculties it only concerns itself with _Understanding_,
according to its principles _a priori_, to the exclusion of _Judgement_
and _Reason_ (as faculties alike belonging to theoretical cognition),
because it is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty but
the Understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition _a
priori_. The Critique, then, which sifts them all, as regards the share
which each of the other faculties might pretend to have in the clear
possession of knowledge from its own peculiar root, leaves nothing but
what the _Understanding_ prescribes _a priori_ as law for nature as
the complex of phenomena (whose form also is given _a priori_). It
relegates all other pure concepts under Ideas, which are transcendent
for our theoretical faculty of cognition, but are not therefore useless
or to be dispensed with. For they serve as regulative principles;
partly to check the dangerous pretensions of Understanding, as if
(because it can furnish _a priori_ the conditions of the possibility
of all things which it can know) it had thereby confined within
these bounds the possibility of all things in general; and partly to
lead it to the consideration of nature according to a principle of
completeness, although it can never attain to this, and thus to further
the final design of all knowledge.
It was then properly the _Understanding_ which has its special realm in
the _cognitive faculty_, so far as it contains constitutive principles
of cognition _a priori_, which by the Critique, comprehensively called
the Critique of pure Reason, was to be placed in certain and sole
possession[8] against all other competitors. And so also to _Reason_,
which contains constitutive principles _a priori_ nowhere except simply
in respect of the _faculty of desire_, should be assigned its place in
the Critique of practical Reason.
Whether now the _Judgement_, which in the order of our cognitive
faculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason, has
also principles _a priori_ for itself; whether these are constitutive
or merely regulative (thus indicating no special realm); and whether
they give a rule _a priori_ to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as the
mediating link between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire
(just as the Understanding prescribes laws _a priori_ to the first,
Reason to the second); these are the questions with which the present
Critique of Judgement is concerned.
A Critique of pure Reason, _i.e._ of our faculty of judging _a priori_
according to principles, would be incomplete, if the Judgement, which
as a cognitive faculty also makes claim to such principles, were not
treated as a particular part of it; although its principles in a
system of pure Philosophy need form no particular part between the
theoretical and the practical, but can be annexed when needful to one
or both as occasion requires. For if such a system is one day to be
completed under the general name of Metaphysic (which it is possible
to achieve quite completely, and which is supremely important for the
use of Reason in every reference), the soil for the edifice must be
explored by Criticism as deep down as the foundation of the faculty of
principles independent of experience, in order that it may sink in no
part, for this would inevitably bring about the downfall of the whole.
We can easily infer from the nature of the Judgement (whose right use
is so necessarily and so universally requisite, that by the name of
sound Understanding nothing else but this faculty is meant), that it
must be attended with great difficulties to find a principle peculiar
to it; (some such it must contain _a priori_ in itself, for otherwise
it would not be set apart by the commonest Criticism as a special
cognitive faculty). This principle must not be derived _a priori_ from
concepts, for these belong to the Understanding, and Judgement is only
concerned with their application. It must, therefore, furnish of itself
a concept, through which, properly speaking, no thing is cognised,
but which only serves as a rule, though not an objective one to which
it can adapt its judgement; because for this latter another faculty
of Judgement would be requisite, in order to be able to distinguish
whether [any given case] is or is not the case for the rule.
This perplexity about a principle (whether it is subjective or
objective) presents itself mainly in those judgements that we call
aesthetical, which concern the Beautiful and the Sublime of Nature or
of Art. And, nevertheless, the critical investigation of a principle
of Judgement in these is the most important part in a Critique of
this faculty. For although they do not by themselves contribute to
the knowledge of things, yet they belong to the cognitive faculty
alone, and point to an immediate reference of this faculty to the
feeling of pleasure or pain according to some principle _a priori_;
without confusing this with what may be the determining ground of the
faculty of desire, which has its principles _a priori_ in concepts
of Reason.--In the logical judging of nature, experience exhibits a
conformity to law in things, to the understanding or to the explanation
of which the general concept of the sensible does not attain; here the
Judgement can only derive from itself a principle of the reference of
the natural thing to the unknowable supersensible (a principle which it
must only use from its own point of view for the cognition of nature).
And so, though in this case such a principle _a priori_ can and must be
applied to the _cognition_ of the beings of the world, and opens out
at the same time prospects which are advantageous for the practical
Reason, yet it has no immediate reference to the feeling of pleasure
and pain. But this reference is precisely the puzzle in the principle
of Judgement, which renders a special section for this faculty
necessary in the Critique; since the logical judging according to
concepts (from which an immediate inference can never be drawn to the
feeling of pleasure and pain) along with their critical limitation, has
at all events been capable of being appended to the theoretical part of
Philosophy.
The examination of the faculty of taste, as the aesthetical Judgement,
is not here planned in reference to the formation or the culture of
taste (for this will take its course in the future as in the past
without any such investigations), but merely in a transcendental point
of view. Hence, I trust that as regards the deficiency of the former
purpose it will be judged with indulgence, though in the latter point
of view it must be prepared for the severest scrutiny. But I hope that
the great difficulty of solving a problem so involved by nature may
serve as excuse for some hardly avoidable obscurity in its solution, if
only it be clearly established that the principle is correctly stated.
I grant that the mode of deriving the phenomena of the Judgement from
it has not all the clearness which might be rightly demanded elsewhere,
viz. in the case of cognition according to concepts; but I believe that
I have attained to it in the second part of this work.