negroes in their unions, a charge which was not true in the packing
industry. The organizers replied by launching a vigorous campaign to get
them into the unions. Then the propaganda was sent forth that the only
reason the whites were willing to take the blacks into their locals was
because the latter, being in a minority, could exert no control; that
the whites would not dare to give them a local of their own, etc. This
was met by the establishment of a negro local of miscellaneous workers
in a convenient neighborhood. Then the Jim Crow cry was raised that the
whites wanted the blacks to herd by themselves. This the organizers
answered by insisting that a free transfer system be kept up between the
white and black locals. These were affiliated with the basic
organization of the industry, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America.
But even this did not satisfy; the anti-union propaganda went on
undiminished and with tremendous effect. It is true that some
far-sighted negro intellectuals defended the unions; but they were as
men crying in the wilderness; the others prevailed. And although the
unions kept a crew of negro organizers in the field, and won many
concessions for the packing house workers, including the eight hour day,
right of collective bargaining, large increases in wages, 40 hour weekly
guarantee, retroactive pay, seniority rights, etc., they have never
succeeded in organizing the negroes.
They know little of the race problem in industry who declare that it can
be settled merely by the unions opening their doors to the negroes. It
is much more complex than that, and will require the best thought that
conscientious whites and blacks can give it. The negro has the more
difficult part to solve, in resisting the insidious efforts of
unscrupulous white employers and misguided intellectuals of his own race
to make a professional strike-breaker of him. But I am confident that he
will win out and will take his place where he belongs in the industrial
fight, side by side with the white worker.
FOOTNOTES:
[18] Senate Committee Steel Strike Hearings, page 532.
[19] In steel industry usage (followed in this book unless otherwise
noted) the term "foreigners" applies chiefly to the nationalities of the
later immigrations, including the Slavic races, Roumanians, Bulgarians,
Hungarians, Greeks, Italians and others from Eastern and Southern
Europe. These are the so-called "hunkies." The peoples of the earlier
immigrations--the English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, Germans and
Scandinavians--who speak our language, hold good jobs, and are generally
well established, are not exactly considered Americans, but they are
rarely called foreigners.
[20] The brazen frankness with which this policy was carried out is
illustrated by the following advertisement, which appeared in the
Pittsburgh _Gazette-Times_, July 15, 1909, during the big steel strike
of that time:
MEN WANTED--Tinners, catchers and helpers to work in open
shops. Syrians, Poles and Roumanians preferred. Steady
employment and good wages to men willing to work. Fare paid
and no fees charged.
[21] During the great organization drive in the Chicago packing houses
in 1917-18, this method was used for several months in the large local
union of car builders and repairmen, fully 90 per cent. of whom, born in
Eastern Europe, were supposedly non-English-speaking. As a result they
acquired such confidence in their ability to use the language that they
dropped the customary practice of translating all their business into
several languages and took to using English only.
[22] The Miners, Building Laborers and several other unions are taking
the lead in this direction and are getting good results. Negroes are
joining their ranks in considerable numbers and are proving themselves
to be excellent union men.
XII
THE COMMISSARIAT--THE STRIKE COST
THE RELIEF ORGANIZATION--RATIONS--SYSTEM OF DISTRIBUTION
--COST OF COMMISSARIAT--STEEL STRIKE RELIEF FUND--COST OF
THE STRIKE TO THE WORKERS, THE EMPLOYERS, THE PUBLIC, THE
LABOR MOVEMENT
In all strikes the problem of keeping the wolf from the door is a
pressing one. Usually it is met by the unions involved paying regular
benefits of from $5.00 to $15.00 per week to each striker. But in the
steel strike this was out of the question.[23] The tremendous number of
men on strike and the scanty funds available utterly forbade it. To have
paid such benefits would have required the impossible sum of at least
$2,000,000 per week. Therefore, the best that could be done was to
assist those families on the brink of destitution by furnishing them
free that most basic of human necessities, food. Ordinarily in strikes
the main body of men are able to take care of themselves over an
extended period. The danger point is in the poverty-stricken minority.
From them come the hunger-driven scabs who so demoralize and discourage
the men still out. Hence, to take care of this weaker element was
scientifically to strengthen the steel strike, and to make the best use
of the resources available.
The great mass of strikers and their incomplete organization making it
manifestly impossible for each union to segregate and take care of its
own members, the internationals affiliated with the National Committee
(with the two exceptions noted) pooled their strike funds and formed a
joint commissariat.[24] They then proceeded to extend relief to all
needy strikers, regardless of their trades or callings, or even
membership or non-membership in the unions. To get relief all that was
necessary was to be a steel striker and in want. This splendid
solidarity and rapid modification of trade-union tactics and
institutions to meet an emergency is probably without a parallel in
American labor annals.
The commissariat was entirely under the supervision and direction of the
National Committee. Its national headquarters was in Pittsburgh, with a
sub-district in Chicago. Goods were shipped from these two points. In
Pittsburgh they were bought and handled through the Tri-State
Co-operative Association, with National Committee employees making up
the shipments. In Chicago the same was done through the National
Co-operative Association. As Bethlehem, Birmingham, Pueblo and a few
other strike-bound towns lay beyond convenient shipping distance from
the two distributing points, the men in charge there were sent checks
and they bought their supplies locally.
The General Director of the commissariat was Robert McKechan, business
manager of the Central States Wholesale Co-operative Association. He was
paid by the Illinois Miners, District No. 2. He was ably assisted by A.
V. Craig (Ass't. Director), Enoch Martin (Auditor--also paid by Illinois
miners), Wm. Orr (Warehouse Manager), and E. G. Craig. Secretary De
Young was in charge of the Chicago sub-district. The local distributing
centres were operated altogether by National Committee local secretaries
and volunteer strike committees, with an occasional paid assistant.
All told, 45 local commissaries were set up throughout the strike zone.
This elaborate organization was created and put in motion almost over
night. Within a week after Mr. McKechan arrived in Pittsburgh, he and
officials of the National Committee had devised the commissary
system--with hardly a precedent to go by,--organized its nation-wide
machinery, and started the first shipment _en route_ to the many strike
centres. To break in this machinery, a small pro rata of provisions,
based upon the number of men on strike, was sent to each place. The
following week this was doubled, and each succeeding week it was
increased to keep pace with the growing need. It finally developed into
a huge affair. Few strikers had to be turned away for lack of food, and
these only for a short while until the necessary additional stuff could
be secured from the shipping points. Throughout the fourteen weeks it
was in operation the commissariat, despite the tremendous difficulties
it had to contend with, worked with remarkable smoothness. It was one of
the greatest achievements of the entire steel campaign.
[Illustration: JOHN FITZPATRICK _Chairman, National Committee for
Organizing Iron and Steel Workers._]
The wide extent of the relief work made it necessary to develop the most
rigid simplicity and standardization in the apportionment of food to the
strikers. Hence, only two sizes of rations could be used; one for
families of five or less, and the other for families of six or more.
These were varied from time to time, always bearing in mind the cooking
facilities of the strikers and the many food likes and dislikes of the
various nationalities. To facilitate the carrying away of the food and
to make it last the better, two commissary days were held each week, in
each locality. The rations were listed on large posters (white for
families of five or less, and green for families of six or more) which
were prominently displayed in the local commissaries in order that the
strikers could see exactly how much provisions they were entitled to.
The following are typical rations:
FAMILIES OF FIVE OR LESS
First Half Week Second Half Week
Potatoes 15 lbs. Bread 4 loaves
Bread 4 loaves Tomatoes 1 can
Tomatoes 1 can Corn 1 can
Peas 1 can Peas 1 can
Navy beans 4 lbs. Red beans 4 lbs.
Oatmeal 1 box Kraut 2 cans
Bacon 1 lb. Dry salt meat 1 lb.
Coffee 1 lb. Syrup 1 can
Milk 1 can
FAMILIES OF SIX OR MORE
First Half Week Second Half Week
Potatoes 10 lbs. Potatoes 10 lbs.
Bread 5 loaves Bread 5 loaves
Tomatoes 1 can Tomatoes 1 can
Corn 1 can Corn 1 can
Peas 1 can Peas 1 can
Navy beans 5 lbs. Kraut 2 cans
Oatmeal 2 boxes Red beans 5 lbs.
Bacon 1 lb. Dry salt meat 1 lb.
Coffee 1 lb. Milk 1 can
Milk 1 can Syrup 1 can
It was not contended that these rations were enough to sustain
completely the recipients' families; but they helped mightily. Few, if
any, went hungry. Single men in need received a half week's rations to
last the week. The greatest care was taken to have the supplies of the
best quality and in good condition. Whatever the unions gave they wanted
the strikers to understand was in the best spirit of brotherly
solidarity.[25]
The provisions were distributed strictly according to the following card
system:
1. Identification card: An applicant requesting relief would be referred
to a credentialed volunteer relief committee. If this committee deemed
the case a needy one, it would issue the striker an identification card.
This he was required to show when dealing at the commissary.
2. Record card: In addition, the relief committee would write out the
data of the case upon a record card and turn it over to the local
secretary in charge of the commissary, who would keep it on file.
3. Commissary card: When the applicant presented his identification card
at the commissary, the local secretary, referring to the record card on
file, would make him out a commissary card, white or green, accordingly
as his family was of five or less, or six or more members. This
commissary card entitled him to draw supplies.
The commissary card had a stub attached. When a striker got his first
half week's supplies, this stub would be detached and retained by the
commissary clerk. Upon his next visit the body of the card would be
taken up. Two important purposes were served by this collection of the
commissary cards--rather than having permanent cards and merely punching
them. First, the canceled cards being sent to the commissariat national
headquarters, it proved conclusively that the strikers had actually
received the provisions shipped to the district; and second, by
compelling the strikers to get new commissary cards each week, it
enabled the local secretaries to keep in close touch with those on the
relief roll.
To lighten the load upon the many inexperienced men working in the
various commissaries, a special effort was made to do as much of the
technical work as possible in the main offices of the National
Committee. Otherwise the commissariat could not possibly have succeeded.
This consideration was a prime factor in restricting the buying of
provisions to Pittsburgh, Chicago and the fewest practical number of
outlying points. It also caused the adoption of the package system, all
bulk goods, except potatoes, being prepared for delivery before leaving
the warehouses. Likewise, the local bookkeeping was simplified to the
last degree. In fact, for the most part the secretaries in charge of the
commissaries hardly needed books at all. The whole system checked itself
from the central points.
As an example of its working, let us suppose that the allotment of a
certain town was 1000 rations. Accordingly, there would be shipped to
that place exactly enough of each article to precisely cover the
allotted number of rations. Then, if the secretary simply saw to it that
he got what he was charged with and issued his supplies carefully in the
right proportions, the whole transaction would balance to a pound, with
hardly a scratch of a pen from him. The bookkeeping was all done at the
general offices. The latter's assurances that each striker had received
his proper ration and that the right number of rations had been issued
were, in the first place, the ration posters hanging on the walls of the
commissary; and in the second, the returned canceled commissary cards.
Barring an occasional slight disruption from delayed shipments, spoiled
goods, shortages, and a little carelessness here and there, the system
worked very well.
The commissariat was in operation from October 26 until January 31,
three weeks after the strike had ended. It was continued through this
extra period in order to help to their feet the destitute strikers who
had fought so nobly. Probably nothing done by the unions in the entire
campaign won them so much good will with the steel workers as this one
act.
The total cost of operating the commissariat was $348,509.42. The
significance of this figure stands out when it is reduced to a per man
basis. At the strike's start there were 365,600 men out, and at its
finish about 100,000. Considering that few serious breaks occurred until
the eighth to tenth weeks, a fair average for the whole period would be
about 250,000. Accordingly, this would give (disregarding the three
weeks after January 8) a total relief cost of a fraction less than $1.40
per man for the entire fifteen weeks of the strike, or about one day's
strike benefits of an ordinary union. Reduced to a weekly basis, it
amounts to but 9-1/3 cents for each striker. Just how unusually small
this sum is may be judged from the fact that the International Molders'
Union paid the few men it had on strike regular benefits of $9.00 per
week after the first week. The fact is that, except for a small,
impoverished minority, the steel workers made their long, hard fight
virtually upon their own resources.[26]
To help finance the commissariat the American Federation of Labor was
requested to issue a general appeal for funds, which it did. Then, to
add force to this call, the National Committee recruited and put in the
field a corps of solicitors, including among others, Anton Johannson, J.
D. Cannon, J. W. Brown, J. G. Sause, Jennie Matyas and G. A. Gerber. At
a meeting in Madison Square Garden on November 8 a collection of
$150,000 was taken up. Many local unions, notably those of Altoona, Pa.,
gave half their local treasuries and assessed their members one day's
pay each. The Marine Engineers, local 33 of New York, contributed
$10,000; the International Fur Workers' Union $20,000; the International
Ladies Garment Workers' Union, $60,000; and the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, $100,000. All these donations were highly
praiseworthy, but especially the last one mentioned, because the
organization making it is not affiliated to, nor even in good grace
with, the A. F. of L.
The total amount collected and turned over to the National Committee was
$418,141.14. This more than covered the entire cost of the commissariat,
leaving $69,631.42 to be applied to other expenses. Thus, taking them as
a whole, the co-operating international unions in the National Committee
were not required to pay a penny to the feeding of the strikers and
their families. The commissariat was a monument to the solidarity of
Labor generally with the embattled steel workers.
Naturally, the employers bitterly hated the commissaries. They sneered
at the quantity and quality of the food given out by them, and in many
places printed handbills in several languages advising the strikers to
go at once to union headquarters and demand strike benefits in cash. And
by the same token, the strikers held the commissaries in high esteem.
The foreign-born among them especially, would stand around watching
with never-ceasing wonder and enthusiasm the stream of men and women
coming forth laden with supplies. To them there was something sacred
about the food. Many of them in desperate circumstances had to be
practically compelled to accept it; not because they felt themselves
objects of charity, but because they thought others needed help worse
than they. They conceived the whole thing as a living demonstration of
the solidarity of labor. The giving of the food produced an effect upon
their morale far better than could have come from the distribution of
ten times its value in money. The commissariat enormously strengthened
the strikers. Without it the strike would have collapsed many weeks
before it did. Unions in future great walkouts will do well to study the
steel strike commissary plan.
* * * * *
Strikes, even the smallest, affect so many people in so many ways that
it is difficult under the best of circumstances to compile accurate data
upon their cost. In the case of the steel strike it is next to
impossible to do so. The great number of steel companies and the armies
of men involved; the wide scope of the strike; the condition of outlawry
in many steel districts; the fact that the strike was lost; the workers'
numerous nationalities and imperfection of organization--all these and
various other factors make it exceedingly difficult, at least at this
early date, to give more than a hint of the strike's cost.
In the steel strike, as in all others, the burden of suffering fell to
the workers' lot. To win their cause they gave freely of their lives,
liberty, blood and treasure. A poll of the National Committee local
secretaries yields the following list of strike dead:
Buffalo 2
Chicago 1
Cleveland 1
Farrell 4
Hammond 4
Newcastle 2
Pittsburgh 1
West Natrona 2
Wheeling 1
Youngstown 2
--
Total 20
The killed were all on the strikers' side, except two. The above list
properly includes Mrs. Fannie Sellins. But it does not include the
scores of scabs who, because of their own or other incompetent workers'
ineptness, were roasted, crushed to death, or torn to pieces in the
dangerous steel-making processes during the strike. Although the steel
companies were exceedingly alert in suppressing the names of these
ignoble victims to their greed, it is a well-known fact that there were
many of them. There was hardly a big mill anywhere that did not have
several to its account.
How many hundreds of strikers were seriously injured by being clubbed
and shot will never be known, because most of them, especially in
Pennsylvania, healed themselves as best they might. With good grounds
they feared that disclosing their injuries to doctors would lead to
their arrest upon charges of rioting. The number of arrested strikers
ran into the thousands. But so orderly were the strikers that few
serious charges could be brought against them. They were jailed in
droves and fined heavily mostly for minor "offenses." Except in Butler,
Pa., where a score of strikers were arrested for stopping a car of scabs
on the way to work (framed-up by the State Police) and sent to the
penitentiary, no strikers anywhere in the whole strike zone received
heavy jail sentences. Considering the terrific provocations offered the
men and the extreme eagerness with which the courts punished them, this
remarkable record is an eloquent testimonial to their orderliness.[27]
Of course, the companies did not neglect to avail themselves of the
heartless blacklist. Just now hundreds of their former employees, denied
work and forced to break up their homes and leave town, are
criss-crossing the country looking for opportunities to make new starts
in life.
As for the cost to the strikers in wages, the Philadelphia _Public
Ledger_ of January 10, two days after the strike was called off, carried
a special telegram from Pittsburgh, stating (authority not quoted) that
the wage loss in that district was $48,005,060.35, specified as
follows:
Clarksburg, W. Va. $310,000.00
Wheeling District 6,100,000.00
Donora 1,200,000.00
Steubenville dist. 2,260,000.00
Youngstown 15,500,000.00
Monessen 2,660,000.00
Brackenridge 450,000.00
New Kensington 375,000.00
McKeesport 597,869.00
Port Vue 900,000.00
Sharon-Farrell 1,250,000.00
New Castle 705,000.00
Homestead 737,840.00
Duquesne 55,030.00
Johnstown 5,712,321.35
Ellwood City 35,000.00
Butler 1,450,000.00
Aliquippa 10,000.00
Pittsburgh 5,715,000.00
Sharpsburg, AEtna 435,000.00
Vandergrift 357,000.00
Clairton 165,000.00
Rankin 375,000.00
Braddock 650,000.00
To the above, the New York _Herald_ of January 12 editorially adds an
estimate of $39,000,000 for steel districts other than Pittsburgh,
making a grand total of $87,000,000 as the strikers' wage loss. But
these figures, bearing the earmarks of Steel Trust origin, are too low.
On the basis of the minimum figures of an average of 250,000 strikers
for 90 working days (actual strike length 108 days) at $5.00 per day per
man, we arrive at a total of $112,500,000.00, or $450.00 per average
striker. Doubtless these figures are also too low, but they will serve
to indicate the tremendous sums of money the already poverty-stricken
steel workers were willing to sacrifice in order to change the
conditions which Mr. Gary so glowingly paints as ideal.
The loss to the steel companies must have been enormous. Without doubt
it runs into several hundred millions of dollars. The items going to
make up this huge bill are many and at this time impossible of accurate
estimate. There must have been not only a complete cessation of profits
during the strike period, but also a vast outlay of money to finance the
strike-breaking measures, such as maintaining scores of thousands of
gunmen to guard the plants; paying rich graft to employment offices and
detective agencies for recruiting armies of scabs, who, receiving high
strike wages, idled for weeks around the plants, shooting craps, playing
cards, pitching quoits, and absolutely refusing to work; keeping on the
payroll great staffs of office workers with nothing to do, and high paid
skilled workers doing the work of common laborers; corrupting police and
court officials to give the strikers the worst of it, etc., etc.
Besides, there should be added the cost of repairing the great injuries
done the furnaces by their sudden shutting down, this item alone
amounting to many millions of dollars. But a more important factor than
all, perhaps, in counting the cost of the strike to the companies was
the serious injury done to their wonderful producing organization by the
permanent loss of thousands of competent men who have quitted the
industry; the dislocation of many thousands more from jobs for which
they were well fitted and the substitution in their places of green men;
the lowering of the men's morale generally, due to disappointment and
bitterness at the loss of the strike, etc. We may depend upon it that
the companies, following out their policy of minimizing the strike's
effects, will so juggle their financial and tonnage statements as to
make it impossible for years to figure out what it really cost them, if
it can ever be done.
The cost to the people at large is indicated by the New York Sun, quoted
by the _Literary Digest_, January 31, 1920, as follows: