same as with all others. But while it was operating the skilled men who
had been attracted to the movement in Joliet, Donora and Cleveland
started a "top downward" movement of their own. They sent committees to
all the large rod and wire mills in the country, appealing to the
skilled men to organize. These committeemen, actual workers and
acquainted with all the old timers in the business, could do more real
organizing in a day with their tradesmen than regular organizers could
in a month. Hardly would they go into a locality, no matter how
difficult, than they would at once inspire that confidence in the
movement which is so indispensable, and which takes organizers so long
to develop. The result was a "top downward" movement working
simultaneously with the "bottom upward" drive, which produced a high
degree of organization for the rod and wire mill men.
A great weakness of the strike was the failure of many skilled workers
to participate therein. This tended directly to aid the employers, and
also to discourage the unskilled workers, who looked for their more
expert brothers to take the lead in the strike as well as in the regular
shop experiences. The explanation has been offered that this aloofness
was because the skilled men are "unorganizable." But this is a dream. In
the mills controlled by it, the Amalgamated Association (which is really
a skilled workers' union) has thousands of them in its ranks, most of
whom earn higher wages than employees of similar classes in the Trust
mills. If the proper means to organize them could have been applied, the
skilled workers would have been the leaders in the late strike, instead
of generally the scabs. The same thing done in the rod and wire mills
should have been done in all the important sections of the industry,
blast furnaces, open hearths, sheet, tin, rail, plate, tube mills, etc.
Committees of well-known skilled workers in these departments should
have been sent forth everywhere to start movements from the top to meet
the great surge coming up from the bottom. Had this been done, then Gary
with all his millions could not have broken the strike. The tie-up would
have been so complete and enduring that a settlement would have been
compulsory.
But it was impossible; the chronic lack of resources prevented it. With
the pitifully inadequate funds and men at its disposal, all the National
Committee could do was to go ahead with its general campaign, leaving
the detail and special work undone. It is certainly to be hoped that in
the next big drive this committee system will be extensively followed.
It is the solution of the skilled worker problem, and when applied
intelligently in connection with the fundamental "bottom upward"
movement, it must result in the organization of the industry.
* * * * *
In the Bethlehem Steel Company's plants the strike was not very
effective. This was due principally to the failure of previous strikes
and to general lack of organization. In Reading and in Lebanon there had
been strikes on for many weeks before the big walkout. The workers'
ranks there were already broken. In Sparrows' Point likewise several
departments had been on strike since May 3. Not more than 500 men,
principally laborers and tin mill workers, responded to the general
strike call; but they made a hard fight of it. In Steelton the men had
been very strongly organized during the war; but the error was made of
putting all the trades into one federal union. Then when the craft
unions insisted later that their men be turned over to them, the
resultant resistance of the members, and especially of the paid
officers, virtually destroyed the organization. When the strike came
only a small percentage struck, nor did they stick long.
Speaking of the strike in the main plant at Bethlehem, Secretary
Hendricks says:
The strike was called September 29, and about 75 per cent.
of the men responded. These were largely American workers.
The Machinists, which comprise about 40 per cent. of the
total workers, were the craft most involved. In the mill and
blast furnace departments, the response was among the
rollers, heaters, and highly skilled men generally, which
led to the complete shut-down of these departments. The
molders practically shut the foundries down. Electrical
workers, steamfitters, millwrights, and general repairmen
responded well. The patternmakers did not go out.
The first break came a week later. It was charged largely to the steam
engineers, who heeded the strike-breaking advice of their international
officials and returned to work. Another factor was the failure of
support from the railroad men on the inter-plant system. Had these two
bodies of men been held in line by their officers, the Bethlehem strike
would have been a success.
In the Bethlehem situation too much reliance was placed in the skilled
trades; more attention should have been given to the organization of the
real fighting force, the unskilled workers. Another mistake was to have
allowed the strikes to take place in Reading, Lebanon and Sparrows'
Point. Even a tyro could see that they had no hope of success. Those
men could easily have been held in line until the big strike, to the
enormous strengthening of the latter. The National Committee had little
to do with the Bethlehem situation before the strike, the movement
developing to a great extent independently.
Nowhere in the strike zone was there a more bitter fight than in the
Buffalo district, which was directed by organizers Thompson and
Streifler. All the important plants were affected, but the storm
centered around the Lackawanna Steel Company. This concern left nothing
undone to defeat its workers. For eight months it had prevented any
meetings from being held in Lackawanna, and then, when the workers broke
through this obstruction and crowded into the unions, it discharged
hundreds of them. This put the iron into the workers' hearts, and they
made an heroic struggle. So firm were their ranks that when the general
strike was called off on January 8, they voted to continue the fight in
Lackawanna. But this was soon seen to be hopeless.
Much company violence was used in the Lackawanna strike. The New York
State Constabulary and the company guards, of a cut with their odious
Pennsylvania brethren, slugged, shot and jailed men and women in real
Steel Trust style. Many strikers were injured, and two killed outright.
One of these, Joseph Mazurek, a native-born American, was freshly back
from the fighting in France. Lackawanna was just a little bit of an
industrial hell.[16]
As a strike measure the Lackawanna Steel Company evicted many strikers
from the company houses. In Braddock, Rankin, Homestead, Butler,
Wierton, Natrona, Bethlehem and many other places, the companies put
similar pressure upon their men, either evicting them or foreclosing the
mortgages on their half-paid-for houses. Threats of such action drove
thousands back to work, it being peculiarly terrifying to workers to
find themselves deprived of their homes in winter time. Where evictions
actually occurred the victims usually had to leave town or find crowded
quarters with other strikers. The much-lauded housing schemes of the
steel companies are merely one of a whole arsenal of weapons to crush
the independence of their workers. No employer should be permitted to
own or control the houses in which his men live.
* * * * *
The Wheeling district is noted as strong union country. The
"independent" mills therein had provided the main strength of the
Amalgamated Association for several years prior to this movement; but
the Trust mills were still unorganized. Under the guidance of National
Committee local secretary J. M. Peters, however, these men, in the mills
of Wheeling, Bellaire, Benwood and Martin's Ferry, were brought into the
unions. On September 22 they struck 100 per cent., completely closing
all the plants. They held practically solid until the first week in
December, when they broke heavily.
The immediate cause of this break merits explanation. The National
Committee, at the outset of the strike, organized a publicity
department, headed by Mr. Edwin Newdick, formerly of the National War
Labor Board. In addition to getting out strike stories for the press,
many of which were written by the well-known novelist, Mary Heaton
Vorse, this department assembled and issued in printed bulletin form
statistical information relative to the progress and effectiveness of
the strike. The steel companies, through spies in the unions,
newspapers, etc., disputed this information, telling the strikers that
they were being victimized as the mills in all districts except their
own were in full operation, and advising them to send out committees to
investigate the situation.
It was a seductive argument and many were deceived by it. Consequently,
quite generally, such committees (usually financed and chaperoned by the
local Chambers of Commerce) went forth from various localities. Of
course, they returned the sort of reports the companies wished. Much
harm was done thereby. The Steubenville district suffered from the lying
statement of such a committee, the strikers having made a winning fight
up till the time it was made public, the middle of November. But nowhere
was the effect so serious as in the Wheeling district.
The Wheeling committee was headed by one Robert Edwards, widely known
for years as an extreme radical. It visited many points in the steel
industry, taking its figures on steel production and strike conditions
from employers' sources, and completely ignoring national and local
strike officials everywhere. The ensuing report pictured the steel
industry as virtually normal. Although he had been recently expelled
from the Amalgamated Association Edwards still had great influence with
the men, and his report broke their ranks. In future general strikes
drastic disciplinary measures should be taken to forestall the
activities of such committees.
* * * * *
Of the 6500 men employed by the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. in its Pueblo
mills, 95 per cent. walked out on September 22. When the strike was
called off three and one-half months later not over 1500 of these had
returned to their jobs. Production was below 20 per cent. of normal.
Locally the tie-up was so effective that on January 9, at the biggest
labor meeting in Pueblo's history, National Committee local secretary W.
H. Young and the other organizers had to beg the men for hours to go
back to work. These officials knew that the great struggle had been
decided in the enormous steel centers of the East (Pueblo being credited
with producing only two per cent. of the nation's steel) and that it
would be madness for them to try to win the fight alone.
The heart of the Pueblo strike was opposition to the Rockefeller
Industrial Plan, in force in the mills. This worthless, tyrannical
arrangement the men could not tolerate and were determined to contest to
the end. Realizing the minor importance of the Pueblo mills in the
national strike, the men offered at the outset to waive all their
demands pending its settlement, provided the company would agree to meet
with their representatives later to take up these matters. But this was
flatly refused; it was either accept the Rockefeller Plan or fight, even
though 98 per cent. of the men had voted to abolish it.
Shortly after this incident John D. Rockefeller, Jr., gained much
favorable comment and pleasing publicity by his glowing speech about
industrial democracy and the right of collective bargaining, delivered
at the National Industrial Conference at Washington, D. C. He was hailed
as one of the country's progressive employers. But when the striking
Pueblo workers wired him, requesting that he grant them these rights, he
referred them to Mr. Welborn, President of the C. F. and I. Company,
well knowing that this gentleman would deny their plea.
The strike was markedly peaceful throughout, no one being hurt and
hardly any one arrested. But on December 28, the state militia were
suddenly brought in, ostensibly because of an attack supposed to have
been made two days previously upon Mr. F. E. Parks, manager of the
Minnequa works. The public never learned the details of this mysterious
affair which served so well to bring in the troops. Nor was the
"culprit" ever located, although large rewards were offered for his
capture.
* * * * *
The Johnstown strike was so complete that for eight weeks the great
Cambria Steel Co., despite strenuous efforts, could not put a single
department of its enormous mills into operation. Every trick was used
to break the strike. The Back-To-Work organization[17] labored
ceaselessly, holding meetings and writing and telephoning the workers to
coax or intimidate them back to their jobs. Droves of scabs were brought
in from outside points. But to no effect; the workers held fast. Then
the company embarked upon the usual Pennsylvania policy of terrorism.
I, personally, was the first to feel its weight. I was billed to speak
in Johnstown on November 7. Upon alighting from the train I was met by
two newspaper men who advised me to quit the town at once, stating that
the business men and company officials had held a meeting the night
before and organized a "Citizens' Committee," which was to break the
strike by applying "Duquesne tactics." Beginning with myself, all the
organizers were to be driven from the city. Disregarding this warning, I
started for the Labor Temple; but was again warned by the newspapermen,
and finally stopped on the street by city detectives, who told me that
it would be at the risk of my life to take a step nearer the meeting
place. I demanded protection, but it was not forthcoming. I was told to
leave.
[Illustration: STEEL TRUST NEWSPAPER PROPAGANDA Pittsburgh _Chronicle
Telegraph_, October 6, 1919.]
In the meantime, Secretary Conboy arriving upon the scene, the two of us
started to the Mayor's office to protest, when suddenly, in broad
daylight, at a main street corner in the heart of the city, a mob of
about forty men rushed us. Shouldering me away from Mr. Conboy, they
stuck guns against my ribs and took me to the depot. While there they
made a cowardly attempt to force me to sign a Back-To-Work card, which
meant to write myself down a scab. Later I was put aboard an eastbound
train. Several of the mob accompanied me to Conemaugh, a few miles out.
The same night this "Citizens' Committee," with several hundred more,
surrounded the organizers in their hotel and gave them twenty-four hours
time to leave town. The city authorities refused to stir to defend them,
and the following day organizers T. J. Conboy, Frank Hall, Frank
Butterworth, and Frank Kurowsky were compelled to go. Domenick Gelotte,
a local organizer of the miners, refused to depart and was promptly
arrested. Up to this time the strike had been perfectly peaceful. The
shut-down was so thorough that not even a picket line was necessary.
The mob perpetrating these outrages (duly praised by the newspapers as
examples of 100 per cent. Americanism) was led by W. R. Lunk, secretary
of the Y. M. C. A., and H. L. Tredennick, president of the chamber of
commerce. This pair freely stated that the strike could never be broken
by peaceful means, and that they were prepared to apply the necessary
violence, which they did. Of course, they were never arrested. Had they
been workers and engaged in a similar escapade against business men,
they would have been lucky to get off with twenty years imprisonment
apiece.
After a couple of weeks the organizers returned to Johnstown. Their
efforts at holding the men together were so fruitful that the Cambria
Company, in its own offices, organized a new mob to drive them out
again. But this time, better prepared, they stood firm. On November 29,
when the fresh deportation was to take place, Secretary Conboy demanded
that Mayor Francke give him and the others protection. He offered to
furnish the city a force of 1000 union ex-service men to preserve law
and order. This offer was refused, and the Mayor and Sheriff reluctantly
agreed to see that peace was kept. They informed the business men's mob
that there was nothing doing. It was a tense situation. Had the
threatened deportation been attempted, most serious trouble would surely
have resulted.
In the meantime numbers of the State Constabulary had been sent into
town (the city and county authorities denying responsibility for their
presence) and they terrorized the workers in their customary, brutal
way. Eventually the result sought by all this outlawry developed; a
break occurred in the ranks of the highly-paid, skilled steel workers.
Although small at first, the defection gradually spread as the weeks
rolled on, until, by January 8, about two-thirds of the men had returned
to work.
* * * * *
Considered nationally, strike sentiment continued strong until about the
middle of the third month, when a feeling of pessimism regarding the
outcome began to manifest itself among the various international
organizations. Consequently, a meeting of the National Committee was
held in Washington on December 13 and 14, to take stock of the
situation. At this meeting I submitted the following figures:
_Men on Strike_ _Men on Strike_
_District_ _Sept. 29_ _Dec. 10_
Pittsburgh 25,000 8,000
Homestead 9,000 5,500
Braddock-Rankin 15,000 8,000
Clairton 4,000 1,500
Duquesne-McKeesport 12,000 1,000
Vandergrift 4,000 1,800
Natrona-Brackenridge 5,000 1,500
New Kensington 1,100 200
Apollo 1,500 200
Leechburg 3,000 300
Donora-Monessen 12,000 10,000
Johnstown 18,000 7,000
Coatesville 4,000 500
Youngstown district 70,000 12,800
Wheeling district 15,000 3,000
Cleveland 25,000 15,000
Steubenville district 12,000 2,000
Chicago district 90,000 18,000
Buffalo 12,000 5,000
Pueblo 6,000 5,000
Birmingham 2,000 500
Bethlehem Plants (5) 20,000 2,500
------- -------
365,600 109,300
Estimated production of steel, 50 to 60 per cent. of normal
capacity.
Owing to the chaotic conditions in many steel districts, it was
exceedingly difficult at all times to get accurate statistics upon the
actual state of affairs. Those above represented the very best that the
National Committee's whole organizing force could assemble. The
officials of the Amalgamated Association strongly favored calling off
the strike, but agreed that the figures cited on the number of men still
out were conservative and within the mark. The opinion prevailed that
the strike was still effective and that it should be vigorously
continued.
On January 3 and 4, the National Committee met in Pittsburgh. At this
gathering it soon became evident that the strike was deemed hopeless,
so, according to its custom when important decisions had to be made, the
National Committee called a special meeting for January 8, all the
international organizations being notified. The situation was bad.
Reliable reports on January 8 showed the steel companies generally to
have working forces of from 70 to 80 per cent., and steel production of
from 60 to 70 per cent. of normal. Possibly 100,000 men still held out;
but it seemed merely punishing these game fighters to continue the
strike. They were being injured by it far more than was the Steel Trust.
There was no hope of a settlement, the steel companies being plainly
determined now to fight on indefinitely. Therefore, in justice to the
loyal strikers and to enable them to go back to the mills with clear
records, the meeting adopted, by a vote of ten unions to five, a
sub-committee's report providing that the strike be called off; that the
commissaries be closed as fast as conditions in the various localities
would permit, and that the campaign of education and organization of the
steel workers be continued with undiminished vigor.
At this point, wishing to have the new phase of the work go ahead with a
clean slate, I resigned my office as Secretary-Treasurer of the National
Committee. Mr. J. G. Brown was elected to fill the vacancy. The
following telegram was sent to all the strike centers, and given to the
press:
The Steel Corporations, with the active assistance of the
press, the courts, the federal troops, state police, and
many public officials, have denied steel workers their
rights of free speech, free assembly and the right to
organize, and by this arbitrary and ruthless misuse of power
have brought about a condition which has compelled the
National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers to
vote today that the active strike phase of the steel
campaign is now at an end. A vigorous campaign of education
and reorganization will be immediately begun and will not
cease until industrial justice has been achieved in the
steel industry. All steel strikers are now at liberty to
return to work pending preparations for the next big
organization movement.
John Fitzpatrick
D. J. Davis,
Edw. J. Evans,
Wm. Hannon,
Wm. Z. Foster.
The great steel strike was ended.
FOOTNOTES:
[14] Youngstown _Vindicator_, November 24, 1919.
[15] No history of the movement in the Youngstown district could be
complete without some mention of the assistance rendered the workers by
Bishop John Podea of the Roumanian Greek Catholic church, Youngstown,
and Rev. E. A. Kirby, pastor of St. Rose Roman Catholic church of
Girard, Ohio. Usually the churchmen (of all faiths) in the various steel
towns were careful not to jeopardize the fat company contributions by
helping the unions. But not these men. They realized that all true
followers of the Carpenter of Nazareth had to be on the side of the
oppressed steel workers; and throughout the entire campaign they
distinguished themselves by unstinted co-operation with the unions. The
service was never too great nor the call too often for them to respond
willingly.
[16] In connection with this matter it is interesting to note that after
the strike had ended the union men entered suits against the steel
companies for heavy damages. Up to the present writing the Lackawanna
Steel Company, realizing the indefensibility of the outrages, has made
out-of-court settlements to the extent of $22,500.
[17] These Back-To-Work organizations were formed in many steel towns;
their purpose was to recruit scabs. They were composed of company
officials, business men and "loyal" workers. The companies furnished the
wherewithal to finance them.
XI
NATIONAL AND RACIAL ELEMENTS
A MODERN BABEL--AMERICANS AS SKILLED WORKERS--FOREIGNERS AS
UNSKILLED WORKERS--LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES--THE NEGRO IN THE
STRIKE--THE RACE PROBLEM
In order to prove its charge that the purpose of the steel strike was
contrary to the spirit of our institutions, the Steel Trust's great
propaganda organization never ceased asserting, (1) that the strike was
a movement of foreigners, (2) that the Americans in the mills were
opposed to it for patriotic reasons and were taking no part therein. The
vicious press made much capital of these allegations, using them heavily
against the strike. Now let us see how much truth there was in them:
1. Unquestionably the foreign-born were in the majority among the
strikers; but how could it be otherwise in view of the fact that they
make up the bulk of the working force in the industry? The following
table, submitted to the Senate Committee by Mr. A. F. Diehl, General
Manager of the Duquesne Works of the Carnegie Steel Co., illustrates
this fact:[18]
RECAPITULATION OF NATIONALITIES, AS OF AUG. 1ST, 1919, FOR TOTAL PLANT,
DUQUESNE WORKS
_Nationality_ _Total_ _Per cent._
American 2,097 34.6
American (colored) 344 5.7
English 147 2.4
Scotch 41 .7
Welsh 28 .5
Irish 58 .9
Canadian 4 .1
German 104 1.8
French 6 .1
Swedish 79 1.3
Italian 128 2.1
Greek 23 .4
Swiss 5 .1
Norwegian 4 .1
Danish 1 .0
Hollander 1 .0
Russian 185 3.0
Lithuanian 201 3.3
Lattis 3 .0
Bohemian 3 .0
Croatian 222 3.7
Magyar 742 12.2
Slovak 930 15.3
Roumanian 7 .1
Ruthenian 82 1.3
Bulgarian 25 .4
Servian 219 3.6
Polish 246 4.0
Armenian 34 .5
Dalmatian 6 .1
Macedonian 10 .2
Hebrew 10 .2
Turkish 80 1.3
----- -----
Totals 6,075 100.0