International Seamen's Union of America
Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' International Alliance
International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen and
Oilers
International Union of Steam and Operating Engineers
International Brotherhood of Steamshovel and Dredgemen
Switchmen's Union of North America.
This group of unions, lined up to do battle with the Steel Trust,
represents the largest body of workers ever engaged in a joint movement
in any country. Their members number approximately 2,000,000, and
comprise about one-half of the entire American Federation of Labor.
So far, so good. The conference had removed the barriers in the way of
the campaign. But when it came to providing the large sums of money and
the numerous crews of organizers that were immediately and imperatively
needed to insure success, it failed dismally. The internationals
assessed themselves only $100 apiece; they furnished only a corporal's
guard of organizers to go ahead with the work; and future reinforcements
looked remote.
This was a facer. The original plan of a dashing offensive went to smash
instanter, and with it, likewise, the opportunity to organize the steel
industry. The slender resources in hand at once made necessary a
complete change of strategy. To undertake a national movement was out of
the question. The work had to be confined to the Chicago district. This
was admittedly going according to wrong principles. The steel industry
is national in scope and should be handled as such. To operate in one
district alone would expose that district to attacks, waste invaluable
time and give the employers a chance to adopt counter measures against
the whole campaign. It meant playing squarely into Mr. Gary's hands. But
there was no other way out of the difficulty.
The writer had hoped that the favorable industrial situation and the
organization of the packing industry, which had long been considered
hopeless, would have heartened the trade-union movement sufficiently for
it to attack the steel problem with the required vigor and confidence.
But such was not the case. The tradition of defeat in the steel industry
was too strong,--thirty years of failure were not so easily forgotten.
Lack of faith in themselves prevented the unions from pouring their
resources into the campaign in its early, critical days. The work in the
Chicago district was undertaken, nevertheless, with a determination to
win the hearty support of Labor by giving an actual demonstration of the
organizability of the steel workers.
During the first week of September the drive for members was opened in
the Chicago district. Monster meetings were held in South Chicago, Gary,
Indiana Harbor and Joliet--all the points that the few organizers could
cover. The inevitable happened; eager for a chance to right their
wrongs, the steel workers stormed into the unions. In Gary 749 joined at
the first meeting, Joliet enrolled 500, and other places did almost as
well. It was a stampede--exactly what was counted upon by the movers of
Resolution #29. And it could just as well have been on a national scale,
had the international unions possessed sufficient self-confidence and
given enough men and money to put the original plan into execution. In a
few weeks the unions would have been everywhere firmly intrenched; and
in a few more the entire steel industry would have been captured for
trade unionism and justice.
But now the folly of a one-district movement made itself evident. Up to
this time the steel barons, like many union leaders, apparently had
viewed the campaign with a skeptical, "It can't be done" air. But
events in Gary and elsewhere quickly dissipated their optimism. The
movement was clearly dangerous and required heroic treatment. The
employers, therefore, applying Mr. Gary's famous "Give them an extra cup
of rice" policy, ordered the basic eight hour day to go into effect on
the first of October. This meant that the steel workers were to get
thereafter time and one half after eight hours, instead of straight
time. It amounted to an increase of two hours pay per day but the actual
working hours were not changed. It was a counter stroke which the
national movement had been designed to forestall.
Although this concession really spelled a great moral victory for the
unions its practical effect was bad. Just a few months before the United
States Steel Corporation had publicly announced that, come what might,
there would be no basic eight hour day in the steel industry. Its sudden
adoption, almost over night, therefore, was a testimonial to the power
of the unions. But this the steel workers as a whole could not realize.
In the Chicago district, where the campaign was on, they understood and
gave the unions credit for the winning; but in other districts, where
nothing had been done, naturally they believed it a gift from the
companies. Had the work been going on everywhere when Mr. Gary attempted
this move, the workers would have understood his motives and joined the
unions _en masse_,--the unions would have won hands down. But with
operations confined to one district he was able to steal the credit from
the unions, partially satisfy his men, and strip the campaign of one of
its principal issues. No doubt he thought he had dealt it a mortal
blow.
IV.
FLANK ATTACKS
A SEA OF TROUBLES--THE POLICY OF ENCIRCLEMENT--TAKING THE
OUTPOSTS--ORGANIZING METHODS--FINANCIAL SYSTEMS--THE
QUESTION OF MORALE--JOHNSTOWN
Pittsburgh is the heart of America's steel industry. Its pre-eminence
derives from its splendid location for steel making. It is situated at
the point where the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers join their murky
waters to form the Ohio, this providing excellent water transportation.
Immense deposits of coal surround it; the Great Lakes, the gateway to
Minnesota's iron ore, are in easy reach; highly developed railway
facilities make the best markets convenient. In the city itself there
are only a few of the larger steel mills; but at short distances along
the banks of its three rivers, are many big steel producing centers,
including Homestead, Braddock, Rankin, McKeesport, McKees Rocks,
Duquesne, Clairton, Woodlawn, Donora, Midland, Vandergrift,
Brackenridge, New Kensington, etc. Within a radius of seventy-five miles
lie Johnstown, Youngstown, Butler, Farrell, Sharon, New Castle,
Wheeling, Mingo, Steubenville, Bellaire, Wierton and various other
important steel towns. The district contains from seventy to eighty per
cent. of the country's steel industry. The whole territory is an amazing
and bewildering network of gigantic steel mills, blast furnaces and
fabricating shops.
It was into this industrial labyrinth, the den of the Steel Trust, that
the National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers moved its
office on October 1, 1918, preparatory to beginning its work. Success in
the Chicago district had made it imperative to overcome the original
tactical blunder by extending the campaign, just as quickly as possible,
to a national scope.
The outlook was most unpromising. Even under the best of circumstances
the task of getting the enormous army of steel workers to thinking and
acting together in terms of trade unionism would be tremendous. But the
disastrous mistake of not starting the campaign soon enough and with the
proper vigor multiplied the difficulties. Unfavorable winter weather was
approaching. This was complicated by the influenza epidemic, which for
several weeks suspended all public gatherings. Then came the end of the
war. The workers had also just been given the basic eight hour day. All
these things tended to still them somewhat and to weaken their interest
in organization. What was left of this interest was almost entirely
wiped out when the mills, dependent as they were on war work, began to
slacken production. The workers became obsessed with a fear of hard
times, a timidity which was intensified by the steel companies'
discharging every one suspected of union affiliations or sympathies.
And to cap the climax, the resources of the National Committee were
still pitifully inadequate to the great task confronting it.
But worst of all, the steel companies were now on the _qui vive_. The
original plan had been conceived to take them by surprise, on the
supposition that their supreme contempt for Labor and their conceit in
their own power would blind them to the real force and extent of the
movement until it was too late to take effective counteraction. And it
would surely have worked out this way, had the program been followed.
But now the advantage of surprise, vital in all wars, industrial or
military, was lost to the unions. Wide awake and alarmed, the Steel
Trust was prepared to fight to the last ditch.
Things looked desperate. But there was no other course than to go ahead
regardless of obstacles. The word failure was eliminated from the
vocabulary of the National Committee. Preparations were made to begin
operations in the towns close to Pittsburgh. But the Steel Trust was
vigilant. It no longer placed any reliance upon its usual methods--its
welfare, old age pension, employees' stockholding, wholesale discharge,
or "extra cup of rice" policies--to hold its men in line, when a good
fighting chance to win their rights presented itself to them. It had
gained a wholesome respect for the movement and was taking no chances.
It would cut off all communication between the organizers and the men.
Consequently, its lackey-like mayors and burgesses in the threatened
towns immediately held a meeting and decided that there would be no
assemblages of steel workers in the Monongahela valley. In some places
these officials, who for the most part are steel company employees, had
the pliable local councils hurriedly adopt ordinances making it unlawful
to hold public meetings without securing sanction; in other places they
adopted the equally effective method of simply notifying the landlords
that if they dared rent their halls to the American Federation of Labor
they would have their "Sunday Club" privileges stopped. In both cases
the effect was the same--no meetings could be held. In the immediate
Pittsburgh district there had been little enough free speech and free
assembly for the trade unions before. Now it was abolished altogether.
At this time the world war was still on; our soldiers were fighting in
Europe to "make the world safe for democracy"; President Wilson was
idealistically declaiming about "the new freedom"; while right here in
our own country the trade unions, with 500,000 men in the service, were
not even allowed to hold public meetings. It was a worse condition than
kaiserism itself had ever set up. This is said advisedly, for the German
workers were at least permitted to meet when and where they pleased. The
worst they had to contend with was a policeman on their platform, who
would jot down "seditious" remarks and require the offenders to report
next day to the police. I remember with what scorn I watched this system
in Germany years ago, and how proud I felt to be an American. I was so
sure that freedom of speech and assembly were fundamental institutions
with us and that we would never tolerate such imposition. But now I have
changed my mind. In Pennsylvania, not to speak of other states, the
workers enjoy few or no more rights than prevailed under the czars. They
cannot hold meetings at all. So far are they below the status of pre-war
Germans in this respect that the comparative freedom of the latter seems
almost like an unattainable ideal. And this deprival of rights is done
in the name of law and patriotism.
In the face of such suppression of constitutional rights and in the face
of all the other staggering difficulties it was clearly impossible for
our scanty forces to capture Pittsburgh for unionism by a frontal
attack. Therefore a system of flank attacks was decided upon. This
resolved itself into a plan literally to surround the immediate
Pittsburgh district with organized posts before attacking it. The
outlying steel districts that dot the counties and states around
Pittsburgh like minor forts about a great stronghold, were first to be
won. Then the unions, with the added strength, were to make a big drive
on the citadel.
It was a far-fetched program when compared with the original; but
circumstances compelled it. An important consideration in its execution
was that it must not seem that the unions were abandoning Pittsburgh.
That was the center of the battle line; the unions had attacked there,
and now they must at least pretend to hold their ground until they were
able to begin the real attack. The morale of the organizing force and
the steel workers demanded this. So, all winter long mass meetings were
held in the Pittsburgh Labor Temple and hundreds of thousands of
leaflets were distributed in the neighboring mills to prepare the
ground for unionization in the spring. Besides, a lot of noise was made
over the suppression of free speech and free assemblage. Protest
meetings were held, committees appointed, investigations set afoot,
politicians visited, and much other more or less useless, although
spectacular, running around engaged in. These activities did not cost
much, and they camouflaged well the union program.
But the actual fight was elsewhere. During the next several months the
National Committee, with gradually increasing resources, set up
substantial organizations in steel towns all over the country except
close in to Pittsburgh, including Youngstown, East Youngstown, Warren,
Niles, Canton, Struthers, Hubbard, Massillon, Alliance, New
Philadelphia, Sharon, Farrell, New Castle, Butler, Ellwood City, New
Kensington, Leechburg, Apollo, Vandergrift, Brackenridge, Johnstown,
Coatesville, Wheeling, Benwood, Bellaire, Steubenville, Mingo,
Cleveland, Buffalo, Lackawanna, Pueblo, Birmingham, etc. Operations in
the Chicago district were intensified and extended to take in Milwaukee,
Kenosha, Waukegan, De Kalb, Peoria, Pullman, Hammond, East Chicago,
etc., while in Bethlehem the National Committee amplified the work
started a year before by the Machinists and Electrical Workers.
Much of the success in these localities was due to the thoroughly
systematic way in which the organizing work was carried on. This merits
a brief description. There were two classes of organizers in the
campaign, the floating and the stationary. Outside of a few traveling
foreign speakers, the floating organizers were those sent in by the
various international unions. They usually went about from point to
point attending to their respective sections of the newly formed local
unions, and giving such assistance to the general campaign as their
other duties permitted. The stationary organizers consisted of A. F. of
L. men, representatives of the United Mine Workers, and men hired
directly by the National Committee. They acted as local organizing
secretaries, and were the backbone of the working force. The floating
organizers were controlled mostly by their international unions; the
stationary organizers worked wholly under the direction of the National
Committee.
Everywhere the organizing system used was the same. The local secretary
was in full charge. He had an office, which served as general
headquarters. He circulated the National Committee's weekly bulletin,
consisting of a short, trenchant trade-union argument in four languages.
He built up the mass meetings, and controlled all applications for
membership. At these mass meetings and in the offices all trades were
signed up indiscriminately upon a uniform blank. But there was no "one
big union" formed. The signed applications were merely stacked away
until there was a considerable number. Then the representatives of all
the trades were assembled and the applications distributed among them.
Later these men set up their respective unions. Finally, the new unions
were drawn up locally into informal central bodies, known as Iron and
Steel Workers' councils. These were invaluable as they knit the movement
together and strengthened the weaker unions. They also inculcated the
indispensable conception of solidarity along industrial lines and
prevented irresponsible strike action by over-zealous single trades.
A highly important feature was the financial system. The handling of the
funds is always a danger point in all working class movements. More than
one strike and organizing campaign has been wrecked by loose money
methods. The National Committee spared no pains to avoid this menace.
The problem was an immense one, for there were from 100 to 125
organizers (which was what the crew finally amounted to) signing up
steel workers by the thousands all over the country; but it was solved
by the strict application of a few business principles. In the first
place the local secretaries were definitely recognized as the men in
charge and placed under heavy bonds. All the application blanks used by
them were numbered serially. They alone were authorized to sign
receipts[5] for initiation fees received. Should other organizers wish
to enroll members, as often happened at the monster mass meetings, they
were given and charged with so many receipts duly signed by the
secretaries. Later on they were required to return these receipts or
three dollars apiece for them. The effect of all this was to make one
man, and him bonded, responsible in each locality for all paper
outstanding against the National Committee. This was absolutely
essential. No system was possible without this foundation.
The next step was definitely to fasten responsibility in the transfer of
initiation fees from the local secretaries to the representatives of the
various trade unions. To do so was most important. It was accomplished
by requiring the local secretaries to exact from these men detailed
receipts, specifying not only the amounts paid and the number of
applications turned over, but also the serial number of each
application. Bulk transfer of applications was prohibited, there being
no way to identify the paper so handled.
The general effect of these regulations was to enable the National
Committee almost instantly to trace any one of the thousands of
applications continually passing through the hands of its agents. For
instance, a steel worker who had joined at an office or a mass meeting,
hearing later of the formation of his local union, would go to its
meeting, present his receipt and ask for his union card. The secretary
of the union would look up the applications which had been turned over
to him. If he could not find one to correspond with the man's receipt he
would take the matter up with the National Committee's local secretary.
The latter could not deny his own signature on the receipt; he would
have to tell what became of the application and the fee. On looking up
the matter he would find that he had turned them over to a certain
representative. Nor could the latter deny his signature on the detailed
receipt. He would have to make good.
To facilitate the work, district offices were established in Chicago
and Youngstown. Organizers and secretaries held district meetings
weekly. Local secretaries at points contiguous to these centers reported
to their respective district secretaries. All others dealt directly with
the general office of the National Committee.
It will be recalled that the co-operating unions, at the August 1-2
conference, agreed that the sum of one dollar should be deducted from
each initiation fee for organization purposes. The collection of this
money devolved upon the National Committee and presented considerable
difficulty. It was solved by a system. The local secretaries, in turning
over to the trades the applications signed up in their offices or at the
mass meetings, held out one dollar apiece on them. For the applications
secured at the meetings of the local unions they collected the dollars
due with the assistance of blank forms sent to the unions. Each week the
local secretaries sent reports to the general office of the National
Committee, specifying in detail the number of members enrolled and
turned over to the various trades, and enclosing checks to cover the
amounts on hand after local expenses were met. These reports were duly
certified by the representatives of the organizations involved, who
signed their names on them at the points where the reports referred to
the number of members turned over to their respective bodies. The whole
system worked well.
Practical labor officials who have handled mass movements understand the
great difficulties attendant upon the organization of large bodies of
workingmen. In the steel campaign these were more serious than ever
before. The tremendous number of men involved; their unfamiliarity with
the English language and total lack of union experience; the wide scope
of the operations; the complications created by a score of international
unions, each with its own corps of organizers, directly mainly from
far-distant headquarters; the chronic lack of resources; and the need
for quick action in the face of incessant attacks from the Steel
Trust--all together produced technical difficulties without precedent.
But the foregoing systems went far to solve them. And into these systems
the organizers and secretaries entered whole-heartedly. They realized
that modern labor organizations cannot depend wholly upon idealism. They
bore in mind that they were dealing with human beings and had to adopt
sound principles of responsibility, standardization and general
efficiency.
But another factor in the success of the campaign possibly even more
important than the systems employed was the splendid morale of the
organizers. A better, more loyal body of men was never gathered together
upon this continent. They knew no such word as defeat. They pressed on
with an irresistible assurance of victory born of their faith in the
practicability of the theory upon which the campaign was worked out.
[Illustration: NATIONAL COMMITTEE DELEGATES
YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO MEETING, Aug. 20, 1919.--Standing, left to
right: F. P. Hanaway, _Miners_; D. Hickey, _Miners_; C. Claherty,
_Blacksmiths_; R. J. Barr, _Machinists_; H. F. Liley, _Railway Carmen_;
R. L. Hall, _Machinists_; R. T. McCoy, _Molders_; R. W. Beattie,
_Firemen_; J. W. Morton. _Firemen_; P. A. Trant, _Amalgamated
Association_. Seated, left to right: E. Crough, J. D. Cannon, _Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers_; F. J. Hardison, _Blacksmiths_; J. Manley,
_Iron Workers_; Wm. Hannon, _Machinists_; John Fitzpatrick, _Chairman_;
Wm. Z. Foster, _Sec.-Treasurer_; C. N. Glover, _Blacksmiths_; T. C.
Cashen, _Switchmen_; D. J. Davis, _Amalgamated Association_.]