In the beginning there was neither naught nor aught,
Then there was neither sky nor atmosphere above.
Then first came darkness hid in darkness, gloom in gloom;
Next all was water, all a chaos indiscreet,
In which the One lay void, shrouded in nothingness.
Then as to the vast periods called Kalpas or ages, during which (as in
Brāhmanism) constant Universes are supposed to appear, disappear, and
re-appear:—
Let it be supposed, say Buddhist writers, that a solid rock forming a
vast cube sixteen miles high, and the same in length and breadth, were
lightly rubbed once in a hundred years with a piece of the finest cloth,
and by this slight friction reduced in countless ages to the size of a
mango-seed; that would still give you no idea of the immense duration of
a Buddhist Kalpa.
And what, in conclusion, is the existing Universe? Buddhist writers make
it consist of an infinite number of Ćakkavālas (Ćakra-vālas) or vast
circular planes, which for convenience may be called spheres. Each
sphere has thirty-one Satta-lokas (Sattva-lokas) or dwelling-places of
six classes of living beings, rising one above the other and distributed
under three world-systems, built up in successive tiers through infinite
space, below, upon, and above Mount Meru (or Sumeru)—the ideal central
point of the whole. This gigantic mythical mountain forms the mighty
base or pivot of the sphere.
First comes Hell with 136 divisions, to receive 136 varieties of
offenders, all in tiers one above the other, and lying deep under the
earth in the lower regions of the Ćakra-vāla. To be re-born in Hell
(Naraka) is the worst of all the six kinds of existence, reserved for
the worst evil-doers, and although the punishment is not eternal, its
shortest duration is for five hundred years of Hell, each day equalling
fifty years of Earth. In Brāhmanism there are twenty-one hells (Manu IV.
88-90). Buddhism originally had only eight. The most terrific (Avīći) is
for revilers of Buddha and his Law.
Above the subdivisions of Hell come the other sensuous worlds
(Kāma-lokas), thus:—(2) the world of animals; (3) that of Pretas or
ghosts; (4) that of Asuras or demons; (5) the earth, or world of men,
with concentric circles of seven seas.
Having distributed all possible places of habitation for migrating
beings under the three heads of Hell, four lower worlds, and twenty-six
heavens (described at p. 206), Buddhism holds that there are only six
forms or ways (gati) of existence through which living beings can pass,
and under which every thing that has life must be classed, and of these
the first two ways are good, the last four bad, thus:—1. Gods; 2. Men;
3. Asuras, or demons, inhabiting spaces under the earth; 4. Animals; 5.
Pretas, or ghosts, recently inhabitants of earth, and ever consumed with
hunger and thirst; 6. Beings undergoing torment in the hells.
As to the gods, bear in mind that Buddhism recognized most of the
deities of Hindūism. See p. 206.
Such gods existed in subtle corporeal forms, and, though not omnipotent,
were capable of working benefit or harm. They were subject to the
universal law of dissolution, and after death were succeeded by others,
so that there was not one Brahmā or one Ṡakra, but many successive
deities so named, and many classes of deities under them. They had no
power of effecting any person’s salvation. On the contrary, they had to
see to their own, and were inferior to the perfected man.
Moreover, to be born in the world of the gods seems not to have implied
any vast accumulation of merit, for we read of a certain frog that from
simply listening to the Buddha’s voice, while reciting the Law, was born
as a god in the Trayastriṉṡa heaven (Hardy, p. 392).
In short, the constant revolving of the wheel of life in one eternal
circle, according to fixed and immutable laws, is perhaps after all the
sum and substance of the philosophy of Buddhism. And this eternal wheel
or circle has, so to speak, six spokes representing six forms of
existence.
When any one of the six classes of beings dies, he must be born again in
some one of these same six classes, for there are no other possible ways
(gati) of life, and he cannot pass into plants, stones, and inorganic
matter, as in the Brāhmanical system (see p. 108). If he be born again
in one of the hells he is not thereby debarred from seeking salvation,
and even if he be born in heaven as a god, he must at some time or other
leave it and seek after a higher state still—that of the perfect man who
has gained Nirvāṇa and is soon to achieve the one consummation worth
living for, the one crown worth striving for—extinction of personal
existence in Pari-nirvāṇa (see pp. 138-142).
LECTURE VI.
_The Morality of Buddhism and its chief aim—Arhatship or Nirvāṇa._
The first questions suggested by the subject of this lecture will
probably be:—
How could a life of morality be inculcated by one who made all life
proceed from ignorance, and even virtuous conduct in one sense a
mistake, as leading to continuity of life, and therefore of suffering?
How could the Buddha’s first commandment be, ‘Destroy not,’ when his
ideal of perfection was destruction? How could he say, ‘be active,’ when
his theory of Karma (pp. 110, 114) made action conduce to misery?
The inconsistency is evident, but it is no less true that,
notwithstanding the doctrine that all existence entails misery, and that
all action, good or bad, leads to future births, Gautama taught that the
life of a man in higher bodily forms, or in one of the heavens, was
better than a life in lower forms, or in one of the hells, and that
neither a higher form of life nor the great aim of Nirvāṇa could be
attained without righteous action, meditation, and true knowledge.
Buddhism, indeed, as we have seen, could not hold forth as an incentive
to good behaviour any belief in a Creator rewarding and punishing his
creatures according to their works, or pardoning their sins. It could
not inculcate piety; for in true Buddhism piety was impossible; yet like
Manu (II. 6) it made morality (ṡīla) the basis of Law (Dharma); it
stimulated good conduct by its doctrine of repeated births, and by
pictures of its numerous heavens, and it deterred men from unrighteous
acts by its terrible places of torment.
Let it then be made clear from the first that Buddhism, in inculcating
morality, used no word expressive of morality, as founded on the love
and fear of God, or of sin as an offence against God.
In Buddhism the words kleṡa (kileso), ‘pain,’ and akuṡala, ‘demerit,’
take the place of ‘sin,’ and its perfect saint is said to be ‘free from
pain’ (nishkleṡa) and from demerit, not from sin in our sense. By an
unrighteous act it meant an act producing suffering and demerit of some
kind (p. 113), and it bade every man act righteously in order to escape
suffering and to accumulate merit (kuṡala), and thus work out his own
perfection—that is to say, his own self-extinction.
Doubtless Buddhism deserves credit for laying stress on right belief,
right words, right work, instead of on ceremonial rites; and on the
worship of Hindū gods; but it had its own idea of right. It urged
householders to abandon the world, or else to be diligent in serving its
monks for the working out of their own salvation; and while making
morality, meditation, and enlightenment its indispensable factors in
securing perfection, it made perfection consist in freedom from the
delusion that ‘I am;’ and in deliverance from an individual existence
inseparably bound up with misery.
Mark, too, another contradiction. It inculcated entire self-dependence
in working out this kind of perfection, and yet it set before its
disciples three guides; namely, the Buddha’s own example, the Law
(Dharma), and the example of the whole body of monks and perfected
saints (Saṅgha).
We now turn to its fuller moral system, keeping this distinct from its
philosophy and metaphysics, and freely admitting that there are in
Buddhist morality many things, true, honourable, just, pure, lovely, and
of good report.
It is fair to point out at the outset that Buddhist morality was not a
purely external matter. It divided men into the outwardly correct and
internally sincere. The mere outwardly correct Buddhists might include
monks as well as laymen, though a higher standard of profession was
expected of monks. The internally sincere were the really earnest
seekers after perfection (monks and laymen), and were divided into four
classes, representing four conditions of the inner life, lower, higher,
still higher, and highest, culminating in perfect Saintship, Arhatship,
and Nirvāṇa (p. 132).
At the same time there was not much hope of saintship except through
celibacy and monkhood; for in true Buddhism the notion of holy
family-life was almost a contradiction in terms.
Of course the Buddhist moral code soon passed beyond the eightfold path
propounded by Gautama in his first sermon (see p. 44), and Dr. Oldenberg
has shown that in the absence of a systematically arranged code, we may
still trace out amid a confusion of precepts the three leading duties of
external moral conduct (ṡīla), of internal mental concentration
(samādhi), and of acquiring true wisdom (paññā = prajñā). Compare Dr.
Wenzel’s ‘Friendly Epistle,’ 53.
The five fundamental rules of moral conduct (ṡīla), or rather,
prohibitions, were promulgated very early:—
1. Kill not any living thing. 2. Steal not. 3. Commit not adultery. 4.
Lie not. 5. Drink not strong drink. These five, having reference chiefly
to one’s neighbour, were called the fivefold law _for all classes_,
including laymen. They were taken from Brāhmanism, but in the vows of
the Sannyāsī the fifth was not included. It was Buddhism probably that
first interdicted strong drink. It prohibited too what the Brāhmans
allowed—killing for sacrificial purposes.
Five others of a more trivial character for monks (often given in a
different order, p. 78) were added:—
6. Eat no food, except at stated times. 7. Use no wreaths, ornaments, or
perfumes. 8. Use no high or broad bed, but only a mat on the ground. 9.
Abstain from dancing, singing, music, and worldly spectacles. 10. Own no
gold, or silver of any kind, and accept none (Mahā-vagga I. 56). [This
Buddhist Decalogue may be contrasted with the Mosaic Decalogue.]
All ten were binding on monks only, and for the third was then
substituted ‘be absolutely chaste.’
Sometimes not only the first five but the first eight were held to be
binding on laymen.
Another was added in later times:—Never think or say that your own
religion is the best. Never denounce the religion of others (see p. 90).
Then, although only the first half of the eightfold path (p. 44) was
said to be necessary for lay-brethren, the whole was for monks, who also
had to observe the special practices already described (p. 76).
All gambling and games of chance were prohibited (Tevijja-Sutta II).
Compare Manu IX. 221-228.
Sometimes five renunciations are named:—of wife, of children, of money,
of life, of craving for existence in future births.
Then sometimes three (sometimes four) corrupting influences (āsava =
āsrava) are enumerated—of lust (kāma), of life, of ignorance, (of
delusion.)
Most important to be got rid of are the ten fetters (saṃyojana, p. 45)
binding a man to existence:—
1. Belief in the existence of a personal self or Ego (sakkāya-diṭṭhi);
2. Doubt (vićikitsā); 3. Ceremonial practices (sīlabbata = ṡīla-vrata);
4. Lust or sensuality (kāma); 5. Anger (paṭigha); 6. Craving for life in
a material form (rūpa-rāga) either on earth or in heaven; 7. Longing for
immaterial life (arūpa-rāga) in the higher heavens; 8. Pride (māna); 9.
Self-exaltation (auddhatya); 10. Ignorance. Of these, 1, 3, and 4, with
diṭṭhi, ‘wrong belief,’ are the four constituents of Upādāna, ‘clinging
to existence’ (p. 109).
The seven jewels of the law (p. 49) are—1. the five contemplations or
reflections; 2. the four right exertions (p. 50); 3. the four paths to
supernatural power (p. 50); 4. the five moral forces (p. 50); 5. the
right use of the five organs of sense; 6. the seven limbs of knowledge
(p. 50); 7. the eightfold path (p. 44).
The five above-named reflections are—1. on the thirty-two impurities of
the body; 2. on the duty of displaying love (Maitrī) towards all beings;
3. on compassion for all who suffer; 4. on rejoicing with all who
rejoice; 5. on absolute indifference (upekshā) to joy or sorrow. These
contemplations (bhāvanā) in Buddhism take the place of prayer. The last
is the highest. The first is also a Sati-paṭṭhāna (p. 49). They must not
be confused with the meditations (Dhyānas, p. 209).
Then come six (or ten) transcendent virtues called Pāramitās, ‘leading
to the further shore,’ for Arhats. These, too, every Bodhi-sattva had to
practise before he could attain Buddhahood. They were:—1. Generosity or
giving (Dāna) to all who ask, even the sacrificing of limbs or life for
others; this is most important; 2. Virtue or moral conduct (Ṡīla); 3.
Patience or tolerance (Kshānti); 4. Fortitude or energy (Vīrya); 5.
Suppression of desire (Nekkhamma = naishkāmya), or, according to some,
profound contemplation; 6. Transcendental wisdom (Pañña = Prajñā). To
which are added—7. Truth (Satya); 8. Steadfast resolution (Adhishṭhāna);
9. Good-will or kindness (Maitra); 10. Absolute indifference or
imperturbability or apathy (Upekshā), resulting in a kind of ecstatic
quietude.
This kind of memorial tabulation in lists of 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, etc., is of
course a product of later Buddhism.