LECTURE I.
_Introductory. Buddhism in relation to Brāhmanism._
In my recent work[3] on Brāhmanism I have traced the progress of Indian
religious thought through three successive stages—called by me Vedism,
Brāhmanism, and Hindūism—the last including the three subdivisions of
Ṡaivism, Vaishṇavism, and Ṡāktism. Furthermore I have attempted to prove
that these systems are not really separated by sharp lines, but that
each almost imperceptibly shades off into the other.
I have striven also to show that a true Hindū of the orthodox school is
able quite conscientiously to accept all these developments of religious
belief. He holds that they have their authoritative exponents in the
successive bibles of the Hindū religion, namely, (1) the four
Vedas—Ṛig-veda, Yajur-veda, Sāma-veda, Atharva-veda—and the Brāhmaṇas;
(2) the Upanishads; (3) the Law-books—especially that of Manu; (4) the
Bhakti-ṡāstras, including the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahā-bhārata, the
Purāṇas—especially the Bhāgavata-purāṇa—and the Bhagavad-gītā; (5) the
Tantras.
The chief works under these five heads represent the principal periods
of religious development through which the Hindū mind has passed.
Thus, in the first place, the hymns of the Vedas and the ritualism of
the Brāhmaṇas represent physiolatry or the worship of the personified
forces of nature—a form of religion which ultimately became saturated
with sacrificial ideas and with ceremonialism and asceticism. Secondly,
the Upanishads represent the pantheistic conceptions which terminated in
philosophical Brāhmanism. Thirdly, the Law-books represent caste-rules
and domestic usages. Fourthly, the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahā-bhārata, and Purāṇas
represent the principle of personal devotion to the personal gods, Ṡiva,
Vishṇu, and their manifestations; and fifthly, the Tantras represent the
perversion of the principle of love to polluting and degrading practices
disguised under the name of religious rites. Of these five phases of the
Hindū religion probably the first three only prevailed when Buddhism
arose; but I shall try to make clear hereafter that Buddhism, as it
developed, accommodated itself to the fourth and even ultimately to the
fifth phase, admitting the Hindū gods into its own creed, while Hindūism
also received ideas from Buddhism.
At any rate it is clear that the so-called orthodox Brāhman admits all
five series of works as progressive exponents of the Hindū
system—although he scarcely likes to confess openly to any adoption of
the fifth. Hence his opinions are of necessity Protean and multiform.
The root ideas of his creed are of course Pantheistic, in the sense of
being grounded on the identification of the whole external world—which
he believes to be a mere illusory appearance—with one eternal,
impersonal, spiritual Essence; but his religion is capable of presenting
so many phases, according to the stand-point from which it is viewed,
that its pantheism appears to be continually sliding into forms of
monotheism and polytheism, and even into the lowest types of animism and
fetishism.
We must not, moreover, forget—as I have pointed out in my recent
work—that a large body of the Hindūs are unorthodox in respect of their
interpretation of the leading doctrine of true Brāhmanism.
Such unorthodox persons may be described as sectarians or dissenters.
That is to say, they dissent from the orthodox pantheistic doctrine that
all gods and men, all divine and human souls, and all material
appearances are mere illusory manifestations of one impersonal spiritual
Entity—called Ātman or Purusha or Brahman—and they believe in one
supreme personal god—either Ṡiva or Vishṇu or Kṛishṇa or Rāma—who is not
liable (as orthodox Brāhmans say he is) to lose his personality by
subjection to the universal law of dissolution and re-absorption into
the one eternal impersonal Essence, but exists in a heaven of his own,
to the bliss of which his worshippers are admitted[4].
And it must be borne in mind that these sectarians are very far from
resting their belief on the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, and Upanishads.
Their creed is based entirely on the Bhakti-ṡāstras—that is, on the
Rāmāyaṇa, Mahā-bhārata, and Purāṇas (especially on the Bhāgavata-purāṇa)
and the Bhagavad-gītā, to the exclusion of the other scriptures of
Hindūism.
Then again it must always be borne in mind that the terms ‘orthodox’ and
‘unorthodox’ have really little or no application to the great majority
of the inhabitants of India, who in truth are wholly innocent of any
theological opinions at all, and are far too apathetic to trouble
themselves about any form of religion other than that which has belonged
for centuries to their families and to the localities in which they
live, and far too ignorant and dull of intellect to be capable of
inquiring for themselves whether that religion is likely to be true or
false.
To classify the masses under any one definite denomination, either as
Pantheists or Polytheists or Monotheists, or as simple idol-worshippers,
or fetish-worshippers, would be wholly misleading.
Their faculties are so enfeebled by the debilitating effect of early
marriages, and so deadened by the drudgery of daily toil and the dire
necessity of keeping body and soul together, that they can scarcely be
said to be capable of holding any definite theological creed at all.
It would be nearer the truth to say that the religion of an ordinary
Hindū consists in observing caste-customs, local usages, and family
observances, in holding what may be called the Folk-legends of his
neighbourhood, in propitiating evil spirits and in worshipping the image
and superscription of the Empress of India, impressed on the current
coin of the country.
As a rule such a man gives himself no uneasiness whatever about his
prospects of happiness or misery in the world to come.
He is quite content to commit his interests in a future life to the care
and custody of the Brāhmans; while, if he thinks about the nature of a
Supreme Being at all, he assumes His benevolence and expects His good
will as a matter of course.
What he really troubles himself about is the necessity for securing the
present favour of the inhabitants of the unseen world, supposed to
occupy the atmosphere everywhere around him—of the good and evil demons
and spirits of the soil—generally represented by rude and grotesque
images, and artfully identified by village priests and Brāhmans with
alleged forms of Vishṇu or Ṡiva.
It follows that the mind of the ordinary Hindū, though indifferent about
all definite dogmatic religion, is steeped in the kind of religiousness
best expressed by the word {deisidaimonia}. He lives in perpetual dread
of invisible beings who are thought to be exerting their mysterious
influences above, below, around, in the immediate vicinity of his own
dwelling. The very winds which sweep across his homestead are believed
to swarm with spirits, who unless duly propitiated will blight the
produce of his fields, or bring down upon him injury, disease, and
death.
Then again, besides the orthodox and besides the sectarian Hindū and
besides the great demon-worshipping, idolatrous, and superstitious
majority, another class of the Indian community must also be taken into
account—the class of rationalists and free-thinkers. These have been
common in India from the earliest times.
First came a class of conscientious doubters, who strove to solve the
riddle of life by microscopic self-introspection and sincere searchings
after truth, and these did their best not to break with the Veda, Vedic
revelation, and the authority of the Brāhmans.
Earnestly and reverently such men applied themselves to the difficult
task of trying to answer such questions as—What am I? Whence have I
come? Whither am I going? How can I explain my consciousness of personal
existence? Have I an immaterial spirit distinct from, and independent
of, my material frame? Of what nature is the world in which I find
myself? Did an all-powerful Being create it out of nothing? or did it
evolve itself out of an eternal protoplasmic germ? or did it come
together by the combination of eternal atoms? or is it a mere illusion?
If created by a Being of infinite wisdom and love, how can I account for
the co-existence in it of good and evil, happiness and misery? Has the
Creator form, or is He formless? Has He qualities and affections, or has
He none?
It was in the effort to solve such insoluble enigmas by their own
unaided intuitions and in a manner not too subversive of traditional
dogma, that the systems of philosophy founded on the Upanishads
originated.
These have been described in my book on Brāhmanism. They were gradually
excogitated by independent thinkers, who claimed to be Brāhmans or
twice-born men, and nominally accepted the Veda with its Brāhmaṇas,
while they covertly attacked it, or at least abstained from denouncing
it as absolutely untrue. Such men tacitly submitted to sacerdotal
authority, though they really propounded a way of salvation based
entirely on self-evolved knowledge, and quite independent of all Vedic
sacrifices and sacrificing priests. The most noteworthy and orthodox of
the systems propounded by them was the Vedānta[5], which, as I have
shown, was simply spiritual Pantheism, and asserted that the one Spirit
was the only real Being in the Universe.
But the origin of the more unorthodox systems, which denied the
authority of both the Veda and the Brāhmans, must also be traced to the
influence of the Upanishads. For it is undeniable that a spirit of
atheistic infidelity grew up in India almost _pari passu_ with dogmatic
Brāhmanism, and has always been prevalent there. In fact it would be
easy to show that periodical outbursts of unbelief and agnosticism have
taken place in India very much in the same way as in Europe; but the
tendency to run into extremes has always been greater on Indian soil and
beneath the glow and glamour of Eastern skies. On the one side, a far
more unthinking respect than in any other country has been paid to the
authority of priests, who have declared their supernatural revelation to
be the very breath of God, sacrificial rites to be the sole instruments
of salvation, and themselves the sole mediators between earth and
heaven; on the other, far greater latitude than in any other country has
been conceded to infidels and atheists who have poured contempt on all
sacerdotal dogmas, have denied all supernatural revelation, have made no
secret of their disbelief in a personal God, and have maintained that
even if a Supreme Being and a spiritual world exist they are unknowable
by man and beyond the cognizance of his faculties.
We learn indeed from certain passages of the Veda (Ṛig-veda II. 12. 5;
VIII. 100. 3, 4) that even in the Vedic age some denied the existence of
the god Indra.
We know, too, that Yāska, the well-known Vedic commentator, who is
believed to have lived before the grammarian Pāṇini (probably in the
fourth century B.C.), found himself obliged to refute the sceptical
arguments of Kautsa and others who pronounced the Veda a tissue of
nonsense (Nirukta I. 15, 16).
Again, Manu—whose law-book, according to Dr. Bühler, was composed
between the second century B.C. and the second A.D., and, in my opinion,
possibly earlier—has the following remark directed against sceptics:—
‘The twice-born man who depending on rationalistic treatises
(hetu-ṡāstra) contemns the two roots of law (ṡruti and smṛiti), is to be
excommunicated (vahish-kāryaḥ) by the righteous as an atheist (nāstika)
and despiser of the Veda’ (Manu II. 11).
Furthermore, the Mahā-bhārata, a poem which contains many ancient
legends quite as ancient as those of early Buddhism, relates
(Ṡānti-parvan 1410, etc.) the story of the infidel Ćārvāka, who in the
disguise of a mendicant Brāhman uttered sentiments dangerously
heretical.
This Ćārvāka was the supposed founder of a materialistic school of
thought called Lokāyata. Rejecting all instruments of knowledge
(pramāṇa) except perception by the senses (pratyaksha), he affirmed that
the soul did not exist separately from the body, and that all the
phenomena of the world were spontaneously produced.
The following abbreviation of a passage in the Sarva-darṡana-saṅgraha[6]
will give some idea of this school’s infidel doctrines, the very name of
which (Lokāyata, ‘generally current in the world’) is an evidence of the
popularity they enjoyed:—
No heaven exists, no final liberation,
No soul, no other world, no rites of caste,
No recompense for acts; let life be spent,
In merriment[7]; let a man borrow money
And live at ease and feast on melted butter.
How can this body when reduced to dust
Revisit earth? and if a ghost can pass
To other worlds, why does not strong affection
For those he leaves behind attract him back?
Oblations, funeral rites, and sacrifices
Are a mere means of livelihood devised
By sacerdotal cunning—nothing more.
The three composers of the triple Veda
Were rogues, or evil spirits, or buffoons.
The recitation of mysterious words
And jabber of the priests is simple nonsense.
Then again, the continued prevalence of sceptical opinions may be shown
by extracts from other portions of the later literature. For example, in
the Rāmāyaṇa (II. 108) the infidel Brāhman Jāvāli gives utterance to
similar sentiments thus:—
‘The books composed by theologians, in which men are enjoined to
worship, give gifts, offer sacrifice, practise austerities, abandon the
world, are mere artifices to draw forth donations. Make up your mind
that no one exists hereafter. Have regard only to what is visible and
perceptible by the senses (pratyaksham). Cast everything beyond this
behind your back.’
Furthermore, in a parallel passage from the Vishṇu-purāṇa, it is
declared that the great Deceiver, practising illusion, beguiled other
demon-like beings to embrace many sorts of heresy; some reviling the
Vedas, others the gods, others the ceremonial of sacrifice, and others
the Brāhmans[8]. These were called Nāstikas.
Such extracts prove that the worst forms of scepticism prevailed in both
early and mediæval times. But all phases and varieties of heretical
thought were not equally offensive, and it would certainly be unfair and
misleading to place Buddhism and Jainism on the same level with the
reckless Pyrrhonism of the Ćārvākas who had no code of morality.
And indeed it was for this very reason, that when Buddhism and Jainism
began to make their presence felt in the fifth century B.C. they became
far more formidable than any other phase of scepticism.
Whether, however, Buddhism or Jainism be entitled to chronological
precedence is still an open question, about which opinions may
reasonably differ. Some hold that they were always quite distinct from
each other, and were the products of inquiry originated by two
independent thinkers, and many scholars now consider that the weight of
evidence is in favour of Jainism being a little antecedent to Buddhism.
Possibly the two systems resulted from the splitting up of one sect into
two divisions, just as the two Brāhma-Samājes of Calcutta are the
product of the Ādi-Samāj.
One point at least is certain, that notwithstanding much community of
thought between Buddhism and Jainism, Buddhism ended in gaining for
itself by far the more important position of the two. For although
Jainism has shown more tenacity of life in India, and has lingered on
there till the present day, it never gained any hold on the masses of
the population, whereas its rival, Buddhism, radiating from a central
point in Hindūstān, spread itself first over the whole of India and then
over nearly all Eastern Asia, and has played—as even its most hostile
critics must admit—an important rôle in the history of the world.
To Buddhism, therefore, we have now to direct our attention, and at the
very threshold of our inquiries we are confronted with this difficulty,
that its great popularity and its wide diffusion among many peoples have
made it most difficult to answer the question:—What is Buddhism? If it
were possible to reply to the inquiry in one word, one might perhaps say
that true Buddhism, theoretically stated, is Humanitarianism, meaning by
that term something very like the gospel of humanity preached by the
Positivist, whose doctrine is the elevation of man through man—that is,
through human intellect, human intuitions, human teaching, human
experiences, and accumulated human efforts—to the highest ideal of
perfection; and yet something very different. For the Buddhist ideal
differs toto cælo from the Positivist’s, and consists in the
renunciation of all personal existence, even to the extinction of
humanity itself. The Buddhist’s perfection is destruction (p. 123).
But such a reply would have only reference to the truest and earliest
form of Buddhism. It would cover a very minute portion of the vast area
of a subject which, as it grew, became multiform, multilateral, and
almost infinite in its ramifications.
Innumerable writers, indeed, during the past thirty years have been
attracted by the great interest of the inquiry, and have vied with each
other in their efforts to give a satisfactory account of a system whose
developments have varied in every country; while lecturers, essayists,
and the authors of magazine articles are constantly adding their
contributions to the mass of floating ideas, and too often propagate
crude and erroneous conceptions on a subject, the depths of which they
have never thoroughly fathomed.
It is to be hoped that the annexation of Upper Burma, while giving an
impulse to Pāli and Buddhistic studies, may help to throw light on some
obscure points.
Certainly Buddhism continues to be little understood by the great
majority of educated persons. Nor can any misunderstanding on such a
subject be matter of surprise, when writers of high character colour
their descriptions of it from an examination of one part of the system
only, without due regard to its other phases, and in this way either
exalt it to a far higher position than it deserves, or depreciate it
unfairly.
And Buddhism is a subject which must continue for a long time to present
the student with a boundless field of investigation. No one can bring a
proper capacity of mind to such a study, much less write about it
clearly, who has not studied the original documents both in Pāli and in
Sanskṛit, after a long course of preparation in the study of Vedism,
Brāhmanism, and Hindūism. It is a system which resembles these other
forms of Indian religious thought in the great variety of its aspects.
Starting from a very simple proposition, which can only be described as
an exaggerated truism—the truism, I mean, that all life involves sorrow,
and that all sorrow results from indulging desires which ought to be
suppressed—it has branched out into a vast number of complicated and
self-contradictory propositions and allegations. Its teaching has become
both negative and positive, agnostic and gnostic. It passes from
apparent atheism and materialism to theism, polytheism, and
spiritualism. It is under one aspect mere pessimism; under another pure
philanthropy; under another monastic communism; under another high
morality; under another a variety of materialistic philosophy; under
another simple demonology; under another a mere farrago of
superstitions, including necromancy, witchcraft, idolatry, and
fetishism. In some form or other it may be held with almost any
religion, and embraces something from almost every creed. It is founded
on philosophical Brāhmanism, has much in common with Sāṅkhya and Vedānta
ideas, is closely connected with Vaishṇavism, and in some of its phases
with both Ṡaivism and Ṡāktism, and yet is, properly speaking, opposed to
every one of these systems. It has in its moral code much common ground
with Christianity, and in its mediæval and modern developments presents
examples of forms, ceremonies, litanies, monastic communities, and
hierarchical organizations, scarcely distinguishable from those of Roman
Catholicism; and yet a greater contrast than that presented by the
essential doctrines of Buddhism and of Christianity can scarcely be
imagined. Strangest of all, Buddhism—with no God higher than the perfect
man—has no pretensions to be called a religion in the true sense of the
word, and is wholly destitute of the vivifying forces necessary to give
vitality to the dry bones of its own morality; and yet it once existed
as a real power over at least a third of the human race, and even at the
present moment claims a vast number of adherents in Asia, and not a few
sympathisers in Europe and America.
Evidently, then, any Orientalist who undertakes to give a clear and
concise account of Buddhism in the compass of a few lectures, must find
himself engaged in a very venturesome and difficult task.
Happily we are gaining acquaintance with the Southern or purest form of
Buddhism through editions and translations of the texts of the Pāli
Canon by Fausböll, Childers, Rhys Davids, Oldenberg, Morris, Trenckner,
L. Feer, etc. We owe much, too, to the works of Turnour, Hardy, Clough,
Gogerly, D’Alwis, Burnouf, Lassen, Spiegel, Weber, Koeppen, Minayeff,
Bigandet, Max Müller, Kern, Ed. Müller, E. Kuhn, Pischel, and others.
These enable us to form a fair estimate of what Buddhism was in its
early days.
But the case is different when we turn to the Northern Buddhist
Scriptures, written generally in tolerably correct Sanskṛit (with
Tibetan translations). These continue to be little studied,
notwithstanding the materials placed at our command and the good work
done, first by the distinguished ‘founder of the study of Buddhism,’
Brian Hodgson, and by Burnouf, Wassiljew, Cowell, Senart, Kern, Beal,
Foucaux, and others. In fact, the moment we pass from the Buddhism of
India, Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, to that of Nepāl, Kashmīr, Tibet,
Bhutān, Sikkim, China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Corea, and Japan, we seem to
have entered a labyrinth, the clue of which is continually slipping from
our hands.
Nor is it possible to classify the varying and often conflicting systems
in these latter countries, under the one general title of Northern
Buddhism.
For indeed the changes which religious systems undergo, even in
countries adjacent to each other, not unfrequently amount to an entire
reversal of their whole character. We may illustrate these changes by
the variations of words derived from one and the same root in
neighbouring countries. Take, for example, the German words selig,
‘blessed,’ and knabe, ‘a boy,’ which in England are represented by
‘silly’ and ‘knave.’
A similar law appears to hold good in the case of religious ideas. Their
whole character seems to change by a change of latitude and longitude.
This is even true of Christianity. Can it be maintained, for instance,
that the Christianity of modern Greece and Rome has much in common with
early Christianity, and would any casual observer believe that the
inhabitants of St. Petersburg, Berlin, Edinburgh, London, and Paris were
followers of the same religion?
It cannot therefore surprise us if Buddhism developed into apparently
contradictory systems in different countries and under varying climatic
conditions. In no two countries did it preserve the same features. Even
in India, the land of its birth, it had greatly changed during the first
ten centuries of its prevalence. So much so that had it been possible
for its founder to reappear upon earth in the fifth century after
Christ, he would have failed to recognize his own child, and would have
found that his own teaching had not escaped the operation of a law which
experience proves to be universal and inevitable.
It is easy, therefore, to understand how difficult it will be to give
any semblance of unity to my present subject. It will be impossible for
me to treat as a consistent whole a system having a perpetually varying
front and no settled form. I can only give a series of somewhat rough,
though, I hope, trustworthy outlines, as far as possible in methodical
succession.
And in the carrying out of such a design, the three objects that will at
first naturally present themselves for delineation will be three which
constitute the well-known triad of early Buddhism—that is to say, the
Buddha himself, His Law and His Order of Monks.
Hence my aim will be, in the first place, to give such a historical
account of the Buddha and of his earliest teaching as may be gathered
from his legendary biography, and from the most trustworthy parts of the
Buddhist canonical scriptures. Secondly, I shall give a brief
description of the origin and composition of those scriptures as
containing the Buddha’s ‘Law’ (Dharma); and thirdly, I shall endeavour
to explain the early constitution of the Buddha’s Order of Monks
(Saṅgha). After treating of these three preliminary topics, I shall next
describe the Law itself; that is, the philosophical doctrines of
Buddhism, its code of morality and theory of perfection, terminating in
Nirvāṇa. Lastly, I shall attempt to trace out the confused outlines of
theistic, mystical, and hierarchical Buddhism, as developed in Northern
countries, adding an account of sacred objects and places, and
contrasting the chief doctrines of Christianity. In regard to the
Buddhism of Tibet, I shall chiefly base my explanations on Koeppen’s
great work—a work never translated into English and now out of print—as
well as on my own researches during my travels through the parts of
India bordering on that country.
And here I ought to state that my explanations and descriptions will, I
fear, be wholly deficient in picturesqueness. My simple aim will be to
convey clear and correct information in unembellished language; and in
doing this, I shall often be compelled to expose myself to the reproach
contained in the expressions, _ćarvita-ćarvaṇam_, ‘chewing the chewed,’
and _pishṭa-peshaṇam_, ‘grinding the ground.’ I shall constantly be
obliged to tread on ground already well trodden.
To begin, then, with the Buddha himself.
LECTURE II.
_The Buddha as a personal Teacher._
It is much to be regretted that among all the sacred books that
constitute the Canon of the Southern Buddhists (see p. 61)—the only true
Canon of Buddhism—there is no trustworthy biography of its Founder.
For Buddhism is nothing without Buddha, just as Zoroastrianism is
nothing without Zoroaster, Confucianism nothing without Confucius,
Muhammadanism nothing without Muhammad, and I may add with all
reverence, Christianity nothing without Christ.
Indeed, no religion or religious system which has not emanated from some
one heroic central personality, or in other words, which has not had a
founder whose strongly marked personal character constituted the very
life and soul of his teaching and the chief factor in its effectiveness,
has ever had any chance of achieving world-wide acceptance, or ever
spread far beyond the place of its origin.
Hence the barest outline of primitive Buddhism must be incomplete
without some sketch of the life and character of Gautama Buddha himself.
Yet it is difficult to find any sure basis of fact on which we may
construct a fairly credible biography.
In all likelihood legendary histories of the Founder of Buddhism were
current in Nepāl and Tibet in the early centuries of our era; but
unhappily his too enthusiastic and imaginative admirers have thought it
right to testify their admiration by interweaving with the probable
facts of Gautama Buddha’s life, fables so extravagant that some modern
critical scholars have despaired of attempting to sift truth from
fiction, and have even gone to the extreme of doubting that Gautama
Buddha ever lived at all.
To believe nothing that has been recorded about him, is as unreasonable
as to accept with unquestioning faith all the miraculous circumstances
which are made to encircle him as with a halo of divine glory.
We must bear in mind that when Gautama Buddha lived—about the fifth
century B.C.—the art of writing was not common in India[9]. We may point
out, too, that in all countries, European as well as Asiatic—notably in
Greece (witness, for example, the familiar instance of Socrates)—men
have thought more of preserving the sayings of their teachers than of
recording the facts of their lives.
And we must not forget that in India—where the imaginative faculties
have always been too active, and anything like real history is
unknown—any plain matter-of-fact biography of the most heroic personage
would have few charms for any one, and little chance of gaining
acceptance anywhere.
Hence it has happened that the ballads (gāthā) and legends current about
Gautama among Northern Buddhists, bristle with the wildest fancies and
the most absurd exaggerations.
Yet it is not impossible to detect a few scattered historical facts
beneath stories, however childish, and legends, however extravagant. We
shall not at least be far wrong, if, in attempting an outline of the
Buddha’s life, we begin by asserting that intense individuality, fervid
earnestness, and severe simplicity of character, combined with singular
beauty of countenance, calm dignity of bearing, and above all, almost
superhuman persuasiveness of speech, were conspicuous in the great
Teacher.
The earliest authorities, however, never claim for him anything
extraordinary or superhuman in regard to external form. It was only in
later times that Buddhist writers pandered to the superstitions of the
people, by describing the Buddha as possessed of various miraculous
characteristics of mind and body. He is said to have been of immense
stature—according to some, eighteen feet high—and to have had on his
body thirty-two chief auspicious marks (mahā-vyañjana), regarded as
indications of a Supreme Lord and Universal Ruler, eighty secondary
marks (anu-vyañjana), besides one hundred and eight symbols on the sole
of each foot, and a halo extending for six feet round his person.
All that can be said with any degree of probability about his personal
appearance is, that he was endowed with certain qualities, which acted
like a spell, or with a kind of irresistible magnetism, on his hearers.
These must have formed, so to speak, the foundation-stone on which the
superstructure of his vast influence rested.
[Illustration: SACRED LAND OF BUDDHISM, AND SCENE OF THE BUDDHA’S
ITINERATION AND PREACHING FOR FORTY-FIVE YEARS.]
Unhappily, no authoritative Buddhist scripture gives any trustworthy
clue to the exact year of the Buddha’s birth. The traditions which refer
back his _death_ to a date corresponding to 543 B.C. are now rejected by
modern European scholars. Nor can we as yet accept as infallible the
results of the latest researches, which making use of various other
data, such as the inscriptions on coins, rocks, and columns, place his
death more than a century later. We shall not, however, be far wrong if
we assert that he was born about the year 500 B.C. at Kapila-vastu (now
Bhūila)—a town situated about half-way between Bastī and Ajūdhyā
(Ayodhyā) in the territory of Kosala (the modern Oudh, see pp. 29, 48),
about sixty miles from its capital city Ṡrāvasti (a favourite residence
of Gautama), and about one hundred miles[10] north-west of Benares, and
near the borders of the kingdom of Magadha (now Behār).
His father, named Ṡuddhodana, was a land-owner of the tribe of the
Ṡākyas (a name possibly connected with the Sanskṛit root Ṡak, ‘to be
powerful’), whose territory in the Gorakh-pur district extended from the
lower Nepalese mountains to the river Raptī in Oudh. It has been
conjectured that the Ṡākyas may have been originally a non-Āryan tribe,
connected perhaps with certain nomad immigrants from Tibet or Northern
Asia, who may have immigrated into India at various periods; but even if
this could be proved, it would have to be admitted that the Ṡākyas had
become Āryanized. It is said that the chief families claimed to be
Rājputs, tracing back their origin to Ikshvāku, the first of the Solar
race. It appears, too, that though belonging to the Kshatriya caste,
they were agriculturists, and mainly engaged in the cultivation of rice.
It is also asserted that Ṡākya families were in the habit of taking the
name of the family of the Brāhmans who were their spiritual guides and
performed religious offices for them, and that the family of Ṡuddhodana
took the name Gautama, that is, descendant of the sage Gotama. It does
not, however, seem necessary to account for the name in this manner. It
was an auspicious name, which in ancient times might have been given to
the child of any great land-owner as a proof of orthodoxy, or with the
view, perhaps, of pleasing the Brāhmans and securing their prayers and
good wishes on its behalf.
The father of the Founder of Buddhism was simply a chief of the Ṡākya
tribe—certainly not a king in our sense of the term—but rather a great
Zamīndār or landlord, whose territory was not so large in area as
Yorkshire. His name Ṡuddhodana, ‘one possessed of pure rice,’ probably
indicated the occupation and ordinary food of the peasantry inhabiting
the district belonging to him and subject to his authority. Those who
have travelled much in India must often have met great land-owners of
the Ṡuddhodana type—men to whom the title Mahā-rāja is given much as
‘Lord’ is to our aristocracy. For example, the Mahā-rāja of Darbhanga is
probably a more important personage than Gautama’s father ever was, and
his territory larger than that of Ṡuddhodana ever was.
The name Gautama (in Pāli spelt Gotama) was the personal name
corresponding to that given to all children at the name-giving ceremony.
It was not till his supposed attainment of perfect wisdom that Gautama
assumed the title of Buddha, or ‘the enlightened one.’ But from that
time forward this became his recognized title. Every other name besides
Gautama (or Gotama), and every other title except Buddha (or together,
Gautama Buddha), are simply epithets; for example, Ṡākya-muni, ‘sage of
the tribe of the Ṡākyas;’ Ṡākya-siṉha, ‘lion of the Ṡākyas;’ Ṡramaṇa
(Samano), ‘the ascetic;’ Siddhārtha, ‘one who has fulfilled the object
(of his coming);’ Sugata, ‘whose coming is auspicious;’ Tathāgata, ‘who
comes and goes as his predecessors;’ Bhagavān (Bhagavā), ‘the blessed
lord;’ Ṡāstā (Satthā), ‘the Teacher;’ Aṡaraṇa-ṡaraṇa, ‘Refuge of the
refugeless;’ Āditya-bandhu, ‘Kinsman of the Sun;’ Jina, ‘conqueror;’
Mahā-vīra, ‘great hero;’ Mahā-purusha, ‘great man;’ Ćakravartī,
‘universal monarch.’ Devout Buddhists call him ‘Lord of the World,’ ‘the
Lord,’ ‘World-honoured One,’ ‘King of the Law,’ ‘the Jewel,’ etc.; and
prefer to use the titles rather than the personal name Gautama, which is
thought too familiar.
The names of previous Buddhas, supposed to have existed in previous
ages, are given at p. 136.
Little of the story of the miraculous birth of Buddha is worthy of
repetition. Since, however, a white elephant is reckoned among the
sacred objects of Buddhism, as something rare and precious, it is worth
while mentioning the fable, that when the time came for the Bodhi-sattva
to leave the Tushita heaven (p. 120) and be born on earth as Gautama
Buddha, he descended into the womb of his mother in the form of a white
elephant. He was born under a Ṡāl tree and the god Brahmā received him
from his mother’s side. His mother, Māyā, died seven days afterwards,
and the infant was committed to her sister (Mahā-prajāpatī), a second
wife of Ṡuddhodana.
It is not related of Gautama that, as he grew up, any efforts were made
to imbue him with sacred learning; though, as a Kshatriya, he was
privileged to receive instruction in certain portions of the Veda.
Nor are we told of him that as a Kshatriya he was trained to the
profession of a soldier. It is more probable, that his love of
contemplation developed itself very early, and that from a desire to
humour this not uncommon Oriental propensity, he was allowed to pass
most of his time in the open air.
There is a well-known legend, which relates how Gautama’s relations came
in a body to his father and complained that the youth’s deficiency in
martial and athletic exercises would incapacitate him, on reaching
manhood, from taking part in warlike expeditions. This might be reckoned
among the few trustworthy historical incidents, were the story not
marred by the legendary addition, that on a day of trial being fixed,
the youth, without any previous practice, and of course to the surprise
of all present, proved his superiority in archery and in ‘the twelve
arts.’
One statement may certainly be accepted without much qualification. It
is said that Gautama was made to marry early, according to the universal
custom throughout India in the present day. No son of any respectable
person in modern times could remain unmarried at the age of sixteen or
seventeen, without, so to speak, tarnishing the family escutcheon, and
exposing the youth himself to a serious social stigma, likely to cling
to him in after-life. In ancient times marriage was equally universal,
and there is no reason to suppose that among Kshatriyas it was delayed
to a much later period of life.
No doubt, therefore, the future Buddha had at least one wife (whose name
was Yaṡodharā, though often called Rāhula-mātā, ‘Rāhula’s mother’), and
probably at least one son, named Rāhula. It is said that this son was
not born till his father was twenty-nine years of age, or not till the
time when a sense of the vanity of all human aims, and a resolution to
abandon all worldly ties, and a longing to enter upon a monastic life
had begun to take possession of his father’s mind.
The story of the four visions, which led to his final renunciation of
the world, is profusely overlaid with fanciful hyperbole, but, however
slight the basis of fact on which it may reasonably be held to rest, it
is too picturesque and interesting to be passed over without notice. I
therefore here abridge the account given in Mr. Beal’s translation of
the Chinese version of the Abhi-nishkramaṇa-sūtra, varying (for the sake
of brevity) the phraseology, but retaining the expression ‘prince’:—
One day the prince Gautama resolved to visit the gardens in the
neighbourhood of his father’s city, desiring to examine the beautiful
trees and flowers.
Then there appeared before his eyes in one of the streets the form of a
decrepid[**decrepit] old man, his skin shrivelled, his head bald, his
teeth gone, his body infirm and bent. A staff supported his tottering
limbs, as he stood right across the path of the prince’s advancing
chariot.
Seeing this aged person, Siddhārtha inquired of his charioteer:—‘What
human form is this, so miserable and so distressing, the like of which I
have never seen before?’
The charioteer replied:—‘This is what is called an old man.’
The prince again inquired:—‘And what is the exact meaning of this
expression “old”?’
The charioteer answered:—‘Old age implies the loss of bodily power,
decay of the vital functions, and failure of mind and memory. This poor
man before you is old and approaching his end.’
Then asked the prince:—‘Is this law universal?’
‘Yes,’ he replied, ‘this is the common lot of all living creatures. All
that is born must die.’
Soon afterwards another strange sight presented itself—a sick man, worn
by disease and suffering, pale and miserable, scarcely able to draw his
breath, was seen tottering on the road.
Then the prince inquired of his charioteer:—‘Who is this unhappy being?’
The charioteer replied:—‘This is a sick man, and such sickness is common
to all.’
Soon afterwards there passed before them a corpse, borne on a bier.
Then asked the prince:—‘Who is this borne onwards on his bed, covered
with strangely-coloured garments, surrounded by people weeping and
lamenting?’
‘This,’ replied the charioteer, ‘is called a dead body; he has ended his
life; he has no further beauty of form, and no desires of any kind; he
is one with the stones and the felled tree; he is like a ruined wall, or
fallen leaf; no more shall he see his father or mother, brother or
sister, or other relatives; his body is dead, and your body also must
come to this.’
Next day on his going out by a different gate there appeared advancing
with measured steps a man with a shaven crown, and monk’s robe—his right
shoulder bare, a religious staff in his right hand, and a mendicant’s
alms-bowl in his left.
‘Who is this,’ the prince inquired, ‘proceeding with slow and dignified
steps, looking neither to the right hand nor to the left, absorbed in
thought, with shaven head and garments of reddish colour?’
‘This man,’ said the charioteer, ‘devotes himself to charity, and
restrains his appetites and his bodily desires. He hurts nobody, but
does good to all, and is full of sympathy for all.’
Then the prince asked the man himself to give an account of his own
condition.
He answered:—‘I am called a homeless ascetic; I have forsaken the world,
relatives, and friends; I seek deliverance for myself and desire the
salvation of all creatures, and I do harm to none.’
After hearing these words, the prince went to his father and said, ‘I
wish to become a wandering ascetic (parivrājika) and to seek Nirvāna;
all worldly things, O king! are changeable and transitory.’
Such is an epitome of the legendary story of the ‘four visionary
appearances,’ so called because they are supposed to have been divine
visions or appearances, miraculously produced. The remainder of the
legendary life of Gautama Buddha is interesting and here and there not
without some historical value, and portions of it I now add in an
abridged form.
Very shortly after the occurrences just described, Gautama receives
intelligence of the birth of his son Rāhula. This is the first momentous
crisis of his life, and Gautama remains for a long time lost in profound
thought. He sees in his child the strongest of all fetters, binding him
to family and home. But his mind is made up. He must fly at once, or be
for ever held in bondage. Around him gather the beautiful women of his
father’s household, striving by their blandishments to divert him from
his purpose; but in vain. He seeks the chamber of his wife, and finds
her asleep with her hand on the head of his infant son. He longs for a
last embrace; but fearing to arouse her suspicions hurries away.
Outside, his favourite horse is waiting to aid his flight. He
accomplishes the first stage of what Buddhists call with pride the
Mahābhinishkramaṇa, ‘the great going forth from home;’ but not without
overcoming other still more formidable trials. For Māra, the evil deity
who tempts men to indulge their passions (see p. 120), makes himself
visible, and promises the prince all the glories of empire if he will
return to the pleasures of worldly life.
Finding all his allurements disregarded, Māra alters his method of
attack; he fills the air with mighty thunderings, and creates on the
road before the youthful fugitive’s eyes apparitions of torrents, lofty
mountains, and blazing conflagrations. But nothing alarms or deters him.
‘I would rather,’ he exclaims, ‘be torn to pieces limb by limb, or be
burnt in a fiery furnace, or be ground to pieces by a falling mountain
than forego my fixed purpose for one single instant.’
Arrived at a safe distance from his father’s territory, he exchanges
garments with a passing beggar, cuts off his own hair with a sword, and
assumes the outward aspect and character of a wandering ascetic. The
hair does not fall to the ground but is taken up to the Trayastriṉṡas
heaven (p. 120), and worshipped by the gods.
His first halting-place is Rāja-gṛiha (now Rāj-gīr), the chief city of
Magadha, which, with Kosala (Oudh, pp. 21, 48), afterwards became the
holy land of Buddhism. There he attaches himself as a disciple to two
Brāhmans named Āḷāra (in Sanskṛit Ārāḍa, with epithet Kālāpa or Kālāma)
and Uddaka (Udraka, also written Rudraka, and called Rāma-putta,
Mahā-vagga I. 6. 3), who imbue him with their own philosophical tenets
and theory of salvation. Sufficient evidence exists to warrant a belief
in this part of the story.
No place in India abounds in more interesting Buddhistic remains than
Rāja-gṛiha (about 40 miles south-east of Patnā), proving that it was one
of the most sacred places of Buddhism, consecrated by some of its most
cherished associations. Its Pāli name is Rāja-gaha. It may be
conjectured that the connexion between the metaphysics of Buddhism and
those of Brāhmanism was due to Gautama’s intercourse with the Brāhmans
of this district, and to the ideas he thus imbibed at the earliest stage
of his career.
But to resume our story. Gautama fails to find in Brāhmanical philosophy
that rest and peace for which his soul was craving when he left his
home.
Still there was another way of emancipation and union with the Universal
Soul, taught by the Brāhmans. This was the way of Tapas[11], or
self-inflicted bodily pain and austerity.
From the earliest times a favourite doctrine of Brāhmanism has been,
that self-inflicted bodily suffering is before all things efficacious
for the accumulation of religious merit, for the acquirement of
supernatural powers, and for the spirit’s release from the bondage of
transmigration and its re-absorption into the One Universal Spirit.
Among other forms of self-inflicted pain, religious devotees (Tapasvīs)
sometimes went through the process of sitting all day long unmoved
during the hottest months on a prepared platform or plot of ground,
surrounded by five fires, or by four blazing fires, with the burning sun
above their heads as a fifth[12]. Even gods (and notably Ṡiva) are
described as mortifying themselves by bodily austerities (_tapas_), so
as not to be outdone by men; for according to the theory of Hindūism,
the gods themselves might be supplanted and even ousted from their rank
and position as divinities by the omnipotence acquirable by human
devotees through a protracted endurance of severe bodily suffering.
Hence we are not surprised to find it recorded of Gautama Buddha, that
seeking in vain for rest in the teaching of Brāhmanical philosophy, and
eager to try the effect of a course of self-mortification, he wandered
forth from Rāja-gṛiha to a wood in the district of Gayā, called Uruvilvā
(or Uruvelā).
There, in company with five other ascetics, he began his celebrated
sexennial fast. Sitting down with his legs folded under him on a raised
seat in a place unsheltered from sun, wind, rain, dew, and cold, he
gradually reduced his daily allowance of food to a single grain of rice.
Then holding his breath, he harassed and macerated his body, but all in
vain. No peace of mind came, and no divine enlightenment. He became
convinced of his own folly in resorting to bodily austerity as a means
of attaining supreme enlightenment, and delivering himself from the
evils and sufferings of life.
Rousing himself, as if from a troubled dream, he took food and
nourishment in a natural way, thereby incurring the temporary
disapproval of his five companions in self-mortification. Then, when
sufficiently refreshed, he moved away to another spot in the same
district. There, under the shelter of a sacred fig-tree (Aṡvattha,
_Ficus religiosa_, known as the Pippala or Pīpal), in a village,
afterwards called Buddha-Gayā, he gave himself up to higher and higher
forms of meditation (Jhāna = Dhyāna). In this he merely conformed to the
Hindū Yoga,—a method of attaining mystic union with the Deity, which
although not then formulated into a system, was already in vogue among
the Brāhmans. There can be little doubt that the Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna (see p.
209), and Samādhi of the Yoga were resorted to, even in Gautama’s time,
as a means for the attainment of perfect spiritual illumination, as well
as of final absorption in the Deity.
In Manu VI. 72 it is said:—‘Let him purge himself from all taints
(doshān) by suppression of breath, from sin by restraints of thought
(dhāraṇābhiḥ), from sensual attachments by control, and from unspiritual
qualities by meditation (dhyānena).’
In the later work called Bhagavad-gītā (see p. 95 of this volume) it is
declared:—‘holding his body, head, and neck quite immovable, seated on a
firm seat in a pure spot with Kuṡa grass around, the devotee (Yogī)
should look only at the tip of his nose, and should meditate on the
Supreme Being’ (VI. 11, 12). Further on he is directed to meditate so
profoundly as to think about nothing whatever (VI. 25).
The very Gāyatrī or ancient Vedic prayer (Ṛig-veda III. 62. 10, see p.
78 of this volume)—which is to Hindūs what the Lord’s Prayer is to
Christians, and is still repeated by millions of our Indian
fellow-subjects at their daily devotions—was originally an act of
meditation, performed with the very object Gautama had in view—supreme
enlightenment of mind:—‘Let us meditate (Dhīmahi, root _dhyai_) on the
excellent glory of the divine vivifying Sun, may he enlighten our
understandings.’ Even the selection of a seat under an Aṡvattha tree was
in keeping with Brāhmanical ideas (see ‘Brāhmanism and Hindūism,’ p.
335).
The first result, however, of his engaging in abstract meditation, was
that he seemed to himself to be as far as ever from the emancipation
which was the one aim of his great renunciation. Why not then return to
the world? Why not indulge again in the pleasures of sense? Why not go
back to home, wife, and child? Thoughts of this kind passed through his
mind, while all his old affections and feelings seemed to revive with
tenfold intensity. Then on one particular night, during this mental
struggle, Māra, the Destroyer and personification of carnal desire,
seized his opportunity. The spirit of evil had bided his time; had
waited to assail the sage at the right moment, when protracted
self-mortification had done its work—when with exhausted strength he had
little power of resistance.
It is certainly remarkable that a great struggle between good and evil,
right and wrong, truth and error, knowledge and ignorance, light and
darkness, is recognized in all religious systems, however false. (See a
notable allusion to this in Ṡaṅkara’s Commentary to Ćhāndogya Upanishad,
p. 26, ll. 2-8.)
The legendary description of the Buddha’s temptation, and of the assault
made upon him by Māra (the deadly spirit of sensuous desire[13]), and by
all his troop of attendants, is so interesting and curious,
notwithstanding its extravagance, that I here abridge it:—
Fiends and demons swarmed about him in the form of awful monsters,
furies, vampires, hobgoblins, armed to the teeth with every implement of
destruction. Their million faces were frightful to behold, their limbs
encircled by myriads of serpents, their heads enveloped in a blaze of
fire. They surrounded the saint and assailed him in a thousand different
ways. Missiles of all kinds were hurled against him; poison and fire
were showered over him—but the poison changed into flowers, the fire
formed a halo round his head.
The baffled evil one now shifted his ground. He summoned his sixteen
enchanting daughters, and sent them to display their charms in the
presence of the youthful saint. But the resolute young ascetic was not
to be lured by their wiles. He remained calm and impassive, and with a
stern face rebuked the maidens for their boldness, forcing them to
retire discomfited and disgraced.
Other forms of temptation followed, and the debilitated ascetic’s
strength seemed to be giving way. But this was merely the crisis. After
rising to higher and higher stages of abstract meditation at the end of
a long night he shook off his foe. The victory was won, and the light of
true knowledge broke upon his mind. A legend relates that in the first
night-watch he gained a knowledge of all his previous existences; in the
second—of all present states of being; in the third—of the chain of
causes and effects (p. 102); and at the dawn of day he knew all things.
The dawn on which this remarkable struggle terminated was the birthday
of Buddhism. Gautama was at that time about thirty-five years of age. It
was then, and not till then, that his Bodhi-sattvaship (see p. 135)
ended and he gained a right to the title Buddha, ‘the Enlightened.’ No
wonder that the tree under which he sat became celebrated as ‘the tree
of knowledge and enlightenment.’ It is remarkable, too, that just as the
night on which the Buddha attained perfect enlightenment is the most
sacred night with Buddhists, so the Bodhi-tree (in familiar language,
Bo-tree) is their most sacred symbol—a symbol as dear to Buddhists as
the Cross is to Christians.
And what was this true knowledge, evolved out of a mind sublimated by
intense meditation?
This is, perhaps, the strangest point of all in this strange story. It
was after all a mere partial one-sided truth—the outcome of a single
line of thought, dwelt upon with morbid intensity, to the exclusion of
every other line of thought which might have modified and balanced it.
It was an ultra-pessimistic view of the miseries of life, and a
determination to ignore all its counterbalancing joys. It was the
doctrine that this present life is only one link in a chain of countless
transmigrations—that existence of all kinds involves suffering, and that
such suffering can only be got rid of by self-restraint and the
extinction of desires, especially of the desire for continuity of
personal existence.
For let it be made clear at the outset, that whatever may be said of the
Christian-like self-renunciation enjoined by the Buddhist code of
morality, the only self it aims at renouncing is the self of
personality, and the chief self-love it deprecates is the self-love
which consists in craving for continuous individual life.
To those who have never travelled or resided much in the East,
indulgence in such a morbid form of pessimism, under glowing skies and
amid bright surroundings, may seem almost an impossibility. But those
who know India by personal experience are aware that its climate is not
conducive to optimistic views of life, and that even in the present day
men of the Buddha type, who seek in various ways to impress their
pessimistic theories of existence on their fellow-men, are not uncommon.
In the course of my travels I frequently met ascetics who had given up
family and friends, and were leading a life of morose seclusion, and
pretended meditation, undergoing long courses of bodily mortification.
Nay, I have even seen men who, to prove their utter contempt for the
pleasures of worldly existence, and to render themselves fit for the
extinction of all personality by absorption into the Universal Soul,
have sat in one posture, or held up one arm for years, or allowed
themselves no bed but a bed of spikes, no shelter but the foliage of
trees[14]. Gautama’s course of protracted cogitation therefore had in it
nothing peculiar or original.
Nor need we doubt that certain historical facts underlie the legendary
narrative. We cannot admit with the learned Senart and Kern that the
life of Gautama was based on a mere solar myth. To us it is more
difficult not to believe than to believe that there lived in the fifth
century B.C. the youthful son of a petty Rāja or land-owner in Oudh,
distinguished from ordinary men by many remarkable qualities of mind and
body—notably by a thoughtful and contemplative disposition; that he
became impressed with a sense of the vanity of all earthly aims, and of
the suffering caused by disease and death; that he often said to
himself, ‘Life is but a troubled dream, an incubus, a nightmare,’ or,
like the Jewish sage of old, ‘All the days of man are sorrow,’ ‘Man
walketh in a vain shadow and disquieteth himself in vain;’ and that like
many other of the world’s philosophers, instead of acquiescing in the
state of things around him, and striving to make the best of them, or to
improve them, he took refuge from the troubles of life in abandoning all
its ties, renouncing all its joys, and suppressing all its affections
and desires.
And again, it is more difficult not to believe than to believe that in
such a man introspection and abstinence, protracted for many years,
induced a condition of mind favourable to ecstatic visions, which were
easily mistaken for flashes of inner enlightenment.
We know, indeed, that eleven centuries later another great thinker arose
among the Semitic races in Western Asia, who went through the same kind
of mental struggle, and that Muhammad, like Gautama, having by his long
fasts and austerities brought himself into a highly wrought condition of
the nervous system, became a fanatical believer in the reality of his
own delusions and in his own divine commission as a teacher.
But the parallel between the Buddha and Muhammad cannot be carried on
much further. And indeed, in point of fact, no two characters could be
more different. For the Buddha never claimed to be the channel of a
supernatural revelation; never represented the knowledge that burst on
his mind as springing from any but an internal source; never taught that
a divine force operating from without compelled him to communicate that
knowledge to mankind; never dreamed of propagating that knowledge to
others by compulsion, much less by the sword. On the contrary, he always
maintained that the only revelation he had received was an illumination
from within—due entirety to his own intuitions, assisted by his
reasoning powers and by severe purgatorial discipline protracted through
countless previous births in every variety of bodily form.
But how did this internal self-enlightenment[15]—the great
distinguishing feature of Buddhism—first find expression? It is said
that the first words uttered by the Buddha at the momentous crisis when
true knowledge burst upon him, were to the following effect:—
‘Through countless births have I wandered, seeking but not discovering
(anibbisan) the maker of this my mortal dwelling-house (gaha-kāraka),
and still again and again have birth and life and pain returned. But now
at length art thou discovered, thou builder of this house (of flesh). No
longer shalt thou rear a house for me. Rafters and beams are shattered
and with destruction of Desire (Taṉhā) deliverance from repeated life is
gained at last’ (Dhamma-pada 153, 154, Sumaṅgala 46).
Contrast with these first utterances of Gautama Buddha the first words
of Jesus Christ:—
‘Wist ye not that I must be about My Father’s business?’ (St. Luke ii.
49.)
The Buddha’s first exclamations, as well as the account of his
subsequent sayings and doings, are the more worthy of credit as taken
from the Southern Canon.
The Mahā-vagga (I. 1) tells us that after attaining complete
intelligence, the Buddha sat cross-legged on the ground under the
Bodhi-tree for seven days, absorbed in meditation and enjoying the bliss
of enlightenment. At the end of that period, during the first three
watches of the night, he fixed his mind on the causes of existence. Then
having thought out the law of causation (p. 102), he exclaimed: ‘When
the laws of being become manifest to the earnest thinker, his doubts
vanish, and, like the Sun, he dispels the hosts of Māra.’
Next he meditated for another seven days under a banyan tree, called the
tree of goat-herds (aja-pāla). It was there that a haughty Brāhman
accosted him with the question, ‘Who is a true Brāhman?’ and was told,
‘One free from evil and pride; self-restrained, learned, and pure.’
Then he meditated under another tree for a third period of seven days.
There the serpent (Nāga) Mućalinda (or Mućilinda) coiled his body round
the Buddha, and formed a canopy to protect him from the raging of a
storm—this being one of the trials he had to go through. When it was
over the Buddha exclaimed, ‘Happy is the seclusion of the satisfied man
(tushṭa) who has learned and seen the truth.’
A fourth period of meditation was passed under the tree Rājāyatana,
making four times seven days. May not these symbolize the four stages of
meditation (p. 209)? Later legends, however, reckon seven times seven
days.
During the whole of the interval between the first acquisition of
knowledge and the setting forth to proclaim it, the Buddha fasted, being
too elated to seek food, and only once receiving it from two merchants,
named Tapussa (Trapusha) and Bhallika. These became his first
lay-reverers (p. 89) by repeating the _double_ formula of reverence for
the Buddha and for his doctrine (the Saṅgha not being then instituted,
Mahā-v° I. 4. 5). A later legend relates that they received in return
eight of his hairs which they preserved as relics.
In connexion with the legend of a forty-nine days’ fast, I may mention
that an ancient carving of Gautama was pointed out to me at Buddha-Gayā,
which represents him as holding a bowl of rice-milk divided into
forty-nine portions, one for each day.
With these legends we may contrast the simple Gospel narrative of
Christ’s forty days’ fast in the wilderness.
The Buddha’s first resolution to come forth from his seclusion and
proclaim his gospel to mankind is of course a great epoch with all
Buddhists.
And here it should be observed, that, strictly, according to Gautama’s
own teaching he ought to have ceased from all action on arriving at
perfect enlightenment. For had he not attained the great object of his
ambition—the end of all his struggles—the goal of all his
efforts—carried on through hundreds of existences? He had, therefore, no
more lives to lead, no more misery to undergo. In short he had achieved
the summum bonum of all true Buddhists—the extinction of the fires of
passions and desires—and had only to enjoy the well-earned peace
(nirvṛiti) of complete Nirvāṇa. Yet the love of his fellow-men impelled
him to action (pravṛitti). In fact it was characteristic of a supreme
Buddha that he should belie, by his own activity and compassionate
feelings, the utter apathy and indifference to which his own doctrines
logically led (p. 128).
But he did not carry out his benevolent design without going through
another course of temptation (which it is usual to compare with the
temptation of Christ). Evil thoughts arose in his mind, and these were
suggested, according to later legends, by Māra (p. 33), thus:—‘With
great pains, blessed one, hast thou acquired this doctrine (dharma). Why
proclaim it? Beings lost in desires and lusts will not understand it.
Remain in quietude. Enjoy Nirvāṇa’ (Mahā-v° I. 5. 3).
To counteract these malevolent suggestions, the god Brahmā Sahāmpati
(Pāli Sahămpati, p. 210) presented himself and exclaimed:—‘Arise, O
spotless one, open the gate of Nirvāṇa. Arise, look down on the world
lost in suffering. Arise, wander forth, preach the doctrine.’
First the Buddha thought of his two teachers, Āḷāra and Uddaka (p. 29),
but found they were dead. Next he thought of the five ascetics whom he
had offended by his abandonment of the method of gaining true knowledge
through painful austerities. They were at that time prosecuting their
bodily mortifications at Benares in the Deer-park called Isipatana. It
was only natural that the Buddha should think of wending his way in the
first instance to Benares, even if special considerations had not drawn
him there; for that city was the great centre of Eastern thought and
life, the Indian Athens, where all peculiar doctrines were most likely
to gain a hearing.
On his way thither, Upaka, a member of the Ājīvaka sect of naked
ascetics, met him and inquired why his countenance was so bright
(pariṡuddha)? He replied, ‘I am the all-subduer, the all-wise, the
stainless, the highest teacher, the conqueror (p. 135); I go to Benares
to dissipate the world’s darkness’ (Mahā-vagga I. 6. 7).
The five ascetics (Kauṇḍinya = Koṇḍañño, Aṡvajit = Assaji, Vāshpa,
Mahānāma, and Bhadrika) were soon converted by his words, and by merely
repeating the triple formula were admitted at once to his Order of
monks. They constituted, with Gautama, the first six members of the
Saṅgha, or fraternity of men seeking release from the misery of
existence by cœnobitic monasticism.
And of what nature were Gautama Buddha’s first didactic utterances? His
first sermon, delivered in the Deer-park at Benares, is held in as much
reverence by Buddhists as the first words of Christ are by Christians.
It is called Dhamma-ćakka-ppavattana-sutta, or in Sanskṛit
Dharma-ćakra-pravartana-sūtra, ‘the discourse which set in motion the
wheel of the law,’ or ‘of the universal dominance of the true belief.’
The following is the substance of it, as given in the Mahā-vagga (I. 6.
17). It is important to note that the Buddha spoke in the vernacular of
Magadha (now called Pāli), and not to men generally, but to the first
five would-be members of his Order of monks:—
‘There are two extremes (antā), O monks (Bhikkhus), to be avoided by one
who has given up the world—a life devoted to sensual pleasures (kāma),
which is degrading, common, vulgar, ignoble, profitless; and a life
given to self-mortification (ātma-klamatha)—painful, ignoble,
profitless. There is a middle path, avoiding both extremes—the noble
eightfold path discovered by the Buddha (Tathāgata)—which leads to
insight, to wisdom, to quietude (upaṡama), to knowledge, to perfect
enlightenment (sambodhi), to final extinction of desire and suffering
(Nirvāṇa).’
So far there is nothing very explicit in the discourse. Doubtless such
precepts as ‘virtue is a mean’ and that ‘medio tutissimus ibis’ are
useful, though trite, truths; but the difficulty is to prove that the
Buddha’s eightfold path is really a middle course of the kind described;
for the most fanatical enthusiasts will always regard their own creed,
however extravagant, as moderate.
The Buddha, therefore, goes on to propound what he calls the four noble
truths (ariya-saććāni = ārya-satyāni), which are the key to his whole
doctrine. They may be stated thus:—
1. All existence—that is, existence in any form, whether on earth or in
heavenly spheres—necessarily involves pain and suffering (dukkha). 2.
All suffering is caused by lust (rāga) or craving or desire (taṉhā =
trishṇā, ‘thirst’) of three kinds—for sensual pleasure (kāma), for
wealth (vibhava), and for existence (bhava). 3. Cessation of suffering
is simultaneous with extinction of lust, craving, and desire (p. 139).
4. Extinction of lust, craving, and desire, and cessation of suffering
are accomplished by perseverance in the noble eightfold path (ariyo
aṭṭhangiko maggo), viz. right belief or views (sammā diṭṭhi), right
resolve (saṅkappo), right speech, right work (kammanto), right
livelihood (ājīvo), right exercise or training (vāyāmo = vyāyāma), right
mindfulness (sati, p. 50), right mental concentration (samādhi).