Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70785A

_Raiders move up the muddy Piva Trail to safeguard the flank of the

beachhead._]

The next morning Companies I and M held the roadblock as L and F

conducted another counterattack preceded by a half-hour artillery

preparation. Japanese resistance was stubborn and elements of Companies

I and M, and the 9th Marines eventually moved forward to assist.

Shortly after noon the enemy retired from the scene. Patrols soon

discovered the abandoned bivouac site of the Japanese _23d Infantry

Regiment_ just a few hundred yards up the trail. In the midst of this

action PFC Henry Gurke of Company M covered an enemy grenade with his

body to protect another Marine. He received a posthumous Medal of Honor

for his heroic act of self-sacrifice.

The raider regiment celebrated the Marine Corps’ birthday on 10

November by moving off the front lines and into division reserve. Other

than occasional patrols and short stints on the line, the next two

weeks were relatively quiet for the raiders. The Army’s 37th Division

began arriving at this time to reinforce the perimeter. On 23 November

the 1st Parachute Battalion came ashore and temporarily joined the

raiders, now acting as corps reserve. Two days later the 2d Raider

Battalion participated in an attack extending the perimeter several

hundred yards to the east, but it met little opposition.

On 29 November Company M of the 3d Raider Battalion reinforced the

parachutists for a predawn amphibious landing at Koiari several miles

southeast of the perimeter. This operation could have been a repeat of

the successful Tasimboko Raid, since the Marine force unexpectedly came

ashore on the edge of a large Japanese supply dump. However, the enemy

reacted quickly and pinned the Marines to the beach with heavy fire.

Landing craft attempting to extract the force were twice driven off. It

was not until evening that artillery, air, and naval gunfire support

sufficiently silenced opposition that the parachutists and raiders

could get back out to sea.

Army troops continued to pour into the enlarging perimeter. On 15

December control of the landing force passed from the I Marine

Amphibious Corps to the Army’s XIV Corps. The Americal Division

gradually replaced the 3d Marine Division, which had borne the brunt

of the fighting. For much of the month the 2d Raider Regiment served

as corps reserve, but these highly trained assault troops spent most

of their time on working parties at the airfield or carrying supplies

to the front lines. On 21 December the raiders, reinforced by the 1st

Parachute Battalion and a battalion of the 145th Infantry, assumed the

position formerly occupied by the 3d Marines. The regiment remained

there until 11 January, when an Army outfit relieved it. The raiders

boarded transports the next day and sailed to Guadalcanal.

_The Raider Legacy_

While the 2d Raider Regiment had been fighting on Bougainville, the

raiders who had participated in the New Georgia campaign had been

recuperating and training in the rear. Both the 1st and 4th Battalions

enjoyed a month of leave in New Zealand, after which they returned to

their base camps in New Caledonia. Just after Christmas 1943 Colonel

Liversedge detached and passed command of the 1st Raider Regiment to

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel D. Puller (the younger brother of “Chesty”

Puller). The regiment embarked on 21 January and arrived at Guadalcanal

three days later. In short order the 2d Raider Regiment disbanded and

folded into the 1st, with Shapley taking command of the combined unit

and Puller becoming the executive officer.

Bougainville, however, was the last combat action for any raider unit.

Events had conspired to sound the death knell of the raiders. The main

factor was the unprecedented expansion of the Corps. In late 1943

there were four divisions, with another two on the drawing boards.

Even though there were now nearly half a million Marines, there never

seemed to be enough men to create the new battalions needed for the 5th

and 6th Divisions. In addition to the usual drains like training and

transients, the Corps had committed large numbers to specialty units:

defense battalions, parachute battalions, raider battalions, barrage

balloon detachments, and many others. Since there was no prospect of

increasing the Corps beyond 500,000 men, the only way to add combat

divisions was to delete other organizations.

Another factor was the changing nature of the Pacific war. In

the desperate early days of 1942 there was a potential need for

commando-type units that could strike deep in enemy territory and keep

the Japanese off balance while the United States caught its breath.

However, there had been only one such operation and it had not been a

complete success. The development of the amphibian tractor and improved

fire support also had removed the need for the light assault units

envisioned by Holland Smith at the beginning of the war. Since then

the raiders generally had performed the same missions as any infantry

battalion. Sometimes this meant that their training and talent were

wasted, as happened on Bougainville and Pavuvu. In other cases, the

quick but lightly armed raiders suffered because they lacked the

firepower of a line outfit. The failure at Bairoko could be partially

traced to that fact. With many large-scale amphibious assaults to come

against well-defended islands, there was no foreseeable requirement for

the particular strengths of the raiders.

[Illustration: _Weary members of the 2d Raider Battalion catch a few

moments of rest in the miserable, unrelieved wetness that was the

hallmark that all troops experienced as soon as they advanced inland

from the beach in the Bougainville operation._

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70777

]

[Illustration:

From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War · 第 32 / 36 题