The movement toward Bairoko kicked off at 0800 and the 1st Raider
Battalion made contact with enemy outposts two hours later. Companies
B and D deployed into line and pushed through a series of Japanese
outguards. By noon Griffith’s men had reached the main defenses, which
consisted of four fortified lines on parallel coral ridges just a few
hundred yards from the harbor. The bunkers were mutually supporting
and well protected by coconut logs and coral. Each held a machine gun
or automatic weapon. Here the 1st Battalion’s attack ground to a halt.
Liversedge, accompanying the northern prong of his offensive, committed
the 4th Battalion in an attempt to turn the enemy flank, but it met
the same heavy resistance. The raider companies slowly worked their
way forward, and by late afternoon they had seized the first two enemy
lines. However, throughout this advance enemy 90mm mortar fire swept
the Marine units and inflicted numerous casualties.
[Illustration: THE ATTACK ON BAIROKO
NORTHERN LANDING GROUP 20 JULY
]
The southern prong of the attack was faring less well. The Army
battalion made its first contact with the enemy just 1,000 yards from
Bairoko, but the Japanese held a vital piece of high ground that
blocked the trail. With the lagoon on one side and a deep swamp on the
other, there was no room for the soldiers to maneuver to the flanks of
the enemy position. With the approval of the executive officer of the
raider regiment, the commander of the Army battalion pulled back his
lead units and used his two 81mm mortars to soften the defenses.
When news of the halt in the southern attack made it to Liversedge
at 1600, he asked the commanders of the raider battalions for their
input. Griffith and Currin checked their lines. They were running out
of water and ammunition, casualties had been heavy, and there was no
friendly fire support. Neither battalion had any fresh reserves to
commit to the fight. Moreover, a large number of men would be needed to
hand-carry the many wounded to the rear, The 4th Raiders alone had 90
litter cases. From their current positions on high ground the Marine
commanders could see the harbor just a few hundred yards away, but
continued attacks against a well-entrenched enemy with fire superiority
seemed wasteful. Not long after 1700 Liversedge issued orders for
all battalions to pull back into defensive positions for the night
in preparation for a withdrawal to Enogai and Triri the next day. He
requested air strikes to cover the latter movement.
The move back across Dragons Peninsula on 21 July went smoothly from
a tactical point of view. After failing to provide air support for
the attack, higher echelons sent 250 sorties against Bairoko to cover
the withdrawal. The Japanese did not pursue, but even so it was tough
going on the ground. Water was in short supply and everyone had to
take turns carrying litters. The column moved slowly and halted every
few hundred yards. In the afternoon rubber boats picked up most of the
wounded and ferried them to the rear. By that evening the entire force
was back in its enclaves at Enogai and Triri. PBYs made another trip
to evacuate wounded, though this time two Zero fighters damaged one of
the amphibian planes after take-off and forced it to return to Enogai
Inlet. Total American casualties were 49 killed, 200 wounded, and two
missing--the vast majority of them suffered by the raider battalions.
The failure to seize the objective and the severe American losses were
plainly the result of poor logistics and a lack of firepower. A Joint
Chiefs of Staff post mortem on the operation noted that “lightly armed
troops cannot be expected to attack fixed positions defended by heavy
automatic weapons, mortars, and heavy artillery.” Another factor of
significance, however, was the absence of surprise. The raiders had
taken Enogai against similar odds because the enemy had not expected
an attack from anywhere but the sea. Victory at Enogai provided ample
warning to the garrison at Bairoko, and the Japanese there made
themselves ready for an overland assault. The raiders might still have
won with a suicidal effort, but Bairoko was not worth it.
The 1st Raider Regiment and its assorted battalions settled into
defensive positions for the rest of July. The sole action consisted of
patrols toward Bairoko and nuisance raids from Japanese aircraft. In
early August elements of the force took up new blocking positions on
the Munda-Bairoko Trail. On 9 August they made contact with Army troops
from the Southern Landing Group. (Munda Airfield had fallen four days
earlier.) Later in the month two Army battalions moved cautiously
against Bairoko and found their way barred by only an occasional small
outpost. The main enemy force had escaped by sea and the soldiers took
control of the harbor on 24 August.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF WICKHAM