_Raiders cross one of the many rivers encountered during the New
Georgia campaign._ (_Note that two of the men are armed with Boys
.55-caliber antitank rifles._)]
The Marines departed Segi the evening of 27 June and landed at Regi
just after midnight. They rested a few hours and then moved out single
file on the narrow trail. Company O took the lead with Company P
bringing up the rear. Native scouts served as guides and the point.
The small force had not gone very far when the path disappeared into a
swamp. After three hours of tough movement, firing erupted at the end
of the column. One of the Japanese patrols known to be in the area had
stumbled upon the rear guard. The raiders killed four of the enemy and
suffered no casualties. About an hour later a Japanese force of about
20 men, possibly the same force, came up from a side trail and hit the
rear guard in the flank. After an hour of firing the enemy broke off
the action. There were no known casualties on either side, but the
five-man rear point failed to rejoin the Marine column. (They later
turned up back at Segi.)
The raiders crossed the Mohi River late in the afternoon and set up a
perimeter defense for the night. The wicked terrain and the two forced
halts convinced Currin that he would not make it to Viru in time for
D-day. Since he no longer had any working radios, he sent two native
runners to Kennedy asking him to relay a message to higher command that
the 4th Raiders would be a day late in making its attack.
After a miserable rainy night, the Marines moved out. They reached
the Choi River late in the morning. As the rear elements crossed, an
enemy force on a hill 300 yards to the battalions flank opened up with
heavy fire from machine guns and rifles. The battalion halted again as
Currin tried to determine what was transpiring. After about three hours
he knew that his rear had successfully engaged a small unit, probably
another enemy patrol, so the remainder of the force proceeded on its
way. The raiders crossed the snakelike Choi River twice more before
halting for the night at 1800. The 3d Platoon reached the perimeter at
2100. They had lost five killed and another man was wounded, but they
had counted 18 enemy dead.
It seemed likely that the enemy at Viru was now aware of the Marine
presence. Since the native scouts indicated that the area north of the
harbor was considered impassable, Currin suspected that the Japanese
would reinforce Tombe against an attack from the east. In view of that
and the losses to Brown’s unit, the colonel decided to strengthen that
wing of his assault. Captain Anthony “Cold Steel” Walker would now lead
two platoons of his Company P against Tombe. Given the difficulties
with the terrain and communications, there would be no attempt to
coordinate the two arms of the envelopment; Walker was free to attack
whenever he chose after dawn on 1 July. With the plans finalized, the
raiders settled in for another night of rain.
The battalion resumed the march early the next morning, but Walker’s
unit soon branched off on the shorter route to Tombe. During the course
of the day the main force crossed several ridges and the Viru and Tita
rivers. Everyone, to include the native bearers carrying the heavy
weapons ammunition, felt exhausted. But the worst was yet to come. In
twilight the Marines had to ford the Mango, a wide, swift river that
was at least six feet deep. They formed a human chain and somehow
managed to get everyone across without incident. The tough hills now
disappeared, but in their place was a mangrove swamp waist deep. In
the pitch darkness the men stumbled forward through the mess of water,
roots, and mud. Finally the natives brought forward bits of rotting
jungle vegetation from the banks of the Mango. With this luminescent
material on their backs, each raider could at least follow the man in
front. At the end of the swamp was a half mile climb to the top of a
ridge where the unit could rest and prepare for the attack. The nightly
rain and the struggles of hundreds of men soon made the steep slope
nearly impassable. Several hours after nightfall the battalion finally
reached level ground and the Marines huddled on the sides of the trail
until dawn.
Unbeknownst to the raiders, the amphibious portion of the assault
against Viru had taken place as previously scheduled. Although the
Navy commander in charge was aware of Currin’s message altering the
date of the land attack, he chose to order his APDs to approach the
harbor on 30 June. The Japanese 3-inch gun quickly drove them off.
Unable to contact Currin, higher headquarters then decided to land the
Army force embarked in the APDs near the same spot where the raiders
had begun their trek. The new mission was to move overland and support
the Marines, who were apparently experiencing difficulties. The
Japanese commander at Viru reported that he had repulsed an American
landing.
Both wings of the raider assault force moved out early on the morning
of 1 July. By 0845 Walker’s detachment reached the outskirts of Tombe
without being discovered. The men deployed, opened fire on the tiny
village, and then rushed forward. Most of the defenders apparently
died in the initial burst of fire. The two Marine platoons secured the
village without a single casualty and counted 13 enemy bodies. Just as
that engagement came to a close, six American aircraft appeared over
the harbor. These were not part of the original plan, but headquarters
had sent them to soften up the objective when it realized that the
raider attack would be delayed. Although this uncoordinated air support
could have resulted in disaster, it worked out well in practice. The
planes ignored Tombe and concentrated their efforts on Tetemara. The
Japanese abandoned some of their fixed defenses and moved inland,
directly into the path of the oncoming raiders.
Currins point made contact with the enemy shortly after the bombing
ceased. Company O, leading the battalion column, quickly deployed two
platoons on line astride the trail. The raiders continued forward
and destroyed Japanese outposts, but then ran into the enemy main
body, which was bolstered by several machine guns. Progress then was
painfully slow as intermittent heavy rains swept the battlefield.
Company O’s reserve platoon went into line to the left as noise
indicated that the enemy might be gathering there for a counterattack.
As the day wore on the raiders pushed the Japanese back, until the
Marine right flank rested on high ground overlooking the harbor. Currin
fed some of Company P’s machine guns into the line, then put his
remaining platoon (also from Company P) on his right flank. Demolitions
men moved forward to deal with the enemy machine guns.
In mid-afternoon a handful of Japanese launched a brief banzai attack
against the Marine left. Not long after this effort dissolved, Currin
launched Lieutenant Malcolm N. McCarthy’s Company P platoon against
the enemy’s left flank, while Company O provided a base of fire.
McCarthy’s men quickly overran the 3-inch gun and soon rolled up the
enemy line, as the remainder of the Japanese defenders withdrew toward
the northwest. The raiders had suffered 8 dead and 15 wounded, while
killing 48 of the enemy and capturing 16 machine guns and a handful of
heavier weapons.
The 4th Raiders consolidated its hold on Viru and conducted numerous
patrols over the next several days. The two Army companies landed near
Regi finally reached Tombe on 4 July. The Navy brought in more Army
units on 9 July and the Marines boarded the LCIs for Guadalcanal.
The other half of the 4th Raider Battalion (Companies N and Q)
received its baptism of fire during this same period. This unit
was under command of the battalion executive officer, Major James
R. Clark. It was assigned to assist the Army’s 2d Battalion, 103d
Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Lester E. Brown) in seizing Vangunu and
the approaches to Wickham Anchorage on 30 June. Intelligence from the
coastwatchers indicated that there were about 100 Japanese occupying
the island. The plan called for the raiders to make a predawn landing
at undefended Oloana Bay. The Army would follow them ashore after
daylight, establish a beachhead, and then deal with the enemy, thought
to be located in a village along the coast several miles to the east.
The night landing under conditions of low visibility and heavy seas
turned into a fiasco. The APDs began debarkation in the wrong spot,
their Higgins boats lost formation when they attempted to pass through
the LCIs loaded with soldiers, and the two raider companies ended up
being scattered along seven miles of coastline. When the Army units
began to land after daylight, they found just 75 Marines holding the
designated beachhead. A two-man patrol (one lieutenant each from the
raiders and the Army battalion) had been ashore since mid-June to
reconnoiter with the aid of native scouts. They provided the exact
location of the Japanese garrison, and the joint force soon headed
to the northeast toward its objective. Native scouts and the handful
of Marines led the way, with two Army companies (F and G) in trace.
The remaining raiders were to join up with their unit as soon as they
could. All but one platoon did catch up by the time the Americans
reached their line of departure a few hundred yards north of the
village.
The plan of attack was simple. The Army units passed through the
raiders on the east-west trail to assume the eastern-most position.
The entire column of files then merely faced to the right, which
placed the composite battalion on line and pointing toward the enemy
to the south. Company Q held the right flank on the bank of the
Kaeruka River. Company N in the center and Company F on the left flank
would guide on the movements of Q. Company G held back and acted as
the reserve. Within minutes of beginning the advance, the attack
ran into resistance. Japanese fire from the west bank of the river
was particularly heavy and Company Q crossed over to deal with this
threat. At the same time Company F moved to its left to skirt around
strong defenses. Company G soon moved in to fill the gap. By late
afternoon the Americans were able to clear the east bank of the river.
Lieutenant Colonel Brown ordered Company Q to disengage from the west
bank and join in the battalion’s perimeter defense at the mouth of the
river. The Marines had lost 10 dead and 21 wounded, while the Army had
suffered similarly.
[Illustration: THE NEW GEORGIA GROUP