_The 3d Raider Battalion squad pulls its boat into cover on Pavuvu and
heads inland._]
[Illustration: _As the raider skirmish line maneuvers cautiously
through the coconut groves and keeps an eye out for snipers in the
treetops, it is also wary of enemy elsewhere._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 54473
]
Halsey’s planners initially focused on New Georgia, a large island
located on the southern flank of the Slot about halfway up the Solomons
chain. By December 1942, the Japanese had managed to complete an
airstrip on New Georgia’s Munda Point. Seizure of the island would
thus remove that enemy threat and advance Allied aircraft one-third
of the way to Rabaul. However, the South Pacific command also was
worried about enemy activity in the Russell Islands, located 30 miles
northwest of Guadalcanal’s Cape Esperance. The Russells had been a
staging point for the enemy’s reinforcement and subsequent evacuation
of Guadalcanal. Strong Japanese forces there would be a thorn in the
side of an operation against New Georgia and possibly a threat to
Guadalcanal itself. Halsey thus decided to seize the Russells prior to
action elsewhere in the Solomons. As an additional benefit, American
fighter planes stationed in the Russells would be able to provide more
effective support to the eventual assault on New Georgia.
The landing force for Operation Cleanslate (the codename for the
Russells assault) consisted of the 43d Infantry Division and the 3d
Raider Battalion. The Army division would seize Banika Island while the
Marines took nearby Pavuvu. The APDs of Transdiv 12 carried the raiders
from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal in mid-February. Four days prior to
the 21 February D-day, a lieutenant and a sergeant from the raiders
scouted both objectives--they found them empty of the enemy. The 3d
Raiders thus made an unopposed landing in their first offensive action.
The 159th Infantry followed them ashore and assisted in the occupation
of the island.
The greatest challenges the Marines faced on Pavuvu were logistical
and medical. Due to the Navy’s legitimate concern about an enemy air
and naval response, the landing plan relied on a rapid offload and
quick withdrawal of the transports. The Higgins boats of the APDs were
preloaded with raider supplies, while the men went ashore in their
rubber boats. A rash of outboard motor failures played havoc with the
landing formations, and Liversedge’s after action report noted that
this could have resulted in “serious consequences.” Once ashore, the
light raiders suffered from their lack of organic transport as they
struggled to manhandle supplies from the beach to inland dumps. During
the battalion’s subsequent four-week stay on Pavuvu, the diet of
field chow and the tough tropic conditions combined to debilitate the
troops. Fully one-third developed skin problems, all men lost weight,
and several dozen eventually fell ill with malaria and other diseases.
Although it was not entirely the fault of planners, the hard-hitting
capabilities of the Marine battalion were wasted on Cleanslate. Only
the two-man scouting team had performed a mission in accordance with
the original purpose of the raiders.
In the midst of the execution of Cleanslate Halsey continued
preparations for subsequent operations in the Central Solomons. This
included repeated use of the scouting capability demonstrated in the
Russells. At the end of February a Navy lieutenant and six raiders
landed at New Georgia’s Roviana Lagoon. With the aid of coastwatchers
and natives, they spent the next three weeks collecting information
on the terrain, hydrographic conditions, and Japanese defenses. On 21
March Consolidated Catalina PBYs landed four raider patrols at New
Georgia’s Segi Point. From there they fanned out with native guides and
canoes to scout Kolombangara, Vangunu, and New Georgia. Other groups
visited these areas and Rendova over the course of the next three
months. The patrols provided valuable information that helped shape
landing plans, and the final groups emplaced small detachments near
designated beaches to act as guides for the assault forces.
During May and June the Japanese reinforced their garrisons in
the central Solomons to 11,000 men, but this number was grossly
insufficient to cover all potential landing sites on the numerous large
islands in the region. That gave Halsey’s force great flexibility. The
final plan called for several assaults, all against lightly defended
or undefended targets. On D-day the Eastern Landing Force, consisting
of the 103d Infantry, an Army regiment, and the 4th Raider Battalion,
would occupy Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, and Viru Harbor. Naval
construction units would immediately build a fighter strip at Segi
and a base for torpedo boats at Viru. The Northern Landing Group (the
1st Raider Regiment headquarters, the 1st Raider Battalion, and two
army battalions) would simultaneously go ashore at Rice Anchorage,
then attack overland to take Enogai Inlet and Bairoko Harbor. This
would cut off the Japanese barge traffic that supplied reinforcements
and logistics. The last D-day operation would be the Southern Landing
Group’s seizure of the northern end of Rendova and its outlying
islands. On D plus 4 many of these same units from the 43d Infantry
Division would conduct a shore-to-shore assault against the undefended
beaches at Zanana and Piraka on New Georgia. Planes from Segi Point and
artillery from the Rendova beachhead would render support as the Army
regiments advanced overland to capture Munda airfield. D-day was 30
June.
[Illustration: RUSSELL ISLANDS