_MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift (with riding crop) troops the line of
the 2d Raider Battalion in New Caledonia in 1943. LtCol Alan Shapley,
the battalion commander, is on Vandegrift’s left. Shapley ended
Carlson’s “Gung Ho” experiments._]
The regiment enforced a common organization among the battalions. The
result was a mixture of Edson and Carlson’s ideas. Carlson bequeathed
his fire team and squad to the raiders (and later to the Corps as a
whole). But each battalion now had a weapons company, and four rifle
companies composed of a weapons platoon and three rifle platoons.
Edson’s other imprint was the concept of a highly trained, lightly
equipped force using conventional tactics to accomplish special
missions or to fill in for a line battalion. The 1st Raider Regiment
was no guerrilla outfit. Given the changing thrust of the Pacific war,
the choice was a wise one. In the future the Marines would be attacking
Japanese forces holed up in tight perimeters or on small islands.
Guerrilla tactics provided no answer to the problem of overcoming these
strong defensive positions.
_New Georgia_
As the fighting on Guadalcanal drew to a close in early 1943, American
commanders intensified their planning for the eventual seizure of
Rabaul, the primary Japanese stronghold in the Southwest Pacific.
This major air and naval base on the eastern end of New Britain was
centrally located between New Guinea and the northwestern terminus of
the Solomons. That allowed the Japanese to shift their air and naval
support from one front to the other on short notice. Conversely,
simultaneous American advances through New Guinea and the Solomons
would threaten Rabaul from two directions. With that in mind, Admiral
William F. Halsey’s South Pacific command prepared to drive farther up
the Solomons chain, while MacArthur continued his operations along the
New Guinea coast.
[Illustration: