_Native scouts lead a combat/reconnaissance patrol of the 2d Raider
Battalion across the hills of Guadalcanal. The patrol lasted for less
than a month, during which the Marines covered 150 miles and fought
more than a dozen actions._]
Carlson vectored two of his patrols in that direction to assist, and
dispatched one platoon from the base camp. As it crossed the Metapona
to reach the main battle, Company E tangled with another enemy
group coming in the opposite direction. The more numerous Japanese
initially forced the Marines to withdraw, but Major Richard T. Washburn
reorganized his company and counterattacked the enemy as they attempted
to cross the river. The raiders inflicted significant casualties on
their opponent, but could not push through to link up with Charlie
Company. In mid-afternoon, Carlson himself led Company F toward Asamama.
[Illustration: _Maj James Roosevelt, the president’s son, served as
executive officer of the 2d Raiders during the Makin raid and commanded
the 4th Raiders after that unit was activated._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56328
]
By the time he arrived, Company C had extricated itself under covering
fire from its own 60mm mortars. Carlson called in two dive bombers
on the enemy, ordered Company E to break off its independent action,
and launched Company F in a flanking attack against the main Japanese
force. Those raiders completed the maneuver by dusk, only to find
the enemy position abandoned. The battalion assembled back at Binu
that night. There Company D reported that it had run into yet another
group of enemy and been pinned down for most of the afternoon. The
understrength unit had lost two killed and one wounded.
On 12 November Carlson led Companies B and E back to the woods at
Asamama. Throughout the day enemy messengers attempted to enter the
bivouac site under the mistaken notion that it still belonged to their
side; the raiders killed 25 of them. In the afternoon Carlson ordered
Company C to join him there. The next day he observed enemy units
moving in the vicinity, and he placed artillery and mortar fire on
five separate groups. After each such mission the raiders dealt with
Japanese survivors trying to make their way into the woods. On 14
November Carlson decided to pull back to Binu. That same day a Company
F patrol wiped out a 15-man enemy outpost that had been reported by
native scouts.
After a brief period to rest and replenish at Binu, the 2d Raiders
moved their base camp to Asamama on 15 November. During two days of
patrolling from that site, Carlson determined that the main enemy force
had departed the area. At Vandegrift’s request, the raider commander
entered the perimeter on 17 November. Vandegrift directed Carlson to
search for “Pistol Pete,” an enemy artillery piece that regularly
shelled the airfield. The battalion also was to seek out trails
circling the perimeter, and any Japanese units operating to the south.
The raiders moved forward to the Tenaru River over the next few days.
On 25 November Company A arrived from Espiritu Santo and joined the
battalion. For the next few days the 2d Raiders divided into three
combat teams of two companies apiece, with each operating from its
own patrol base. Each day they moved farther into the interior of the
island, in the area between the headwaters of the Tenaru and Lunga
rivers. Carlson remained with the center team, from which point he
could quickly reinforce either of the flank detachments.
On 30 November the battalion crossed over the steep ridgeline that
divided the valleys of the Tenaru and Lunga. Discovery of a telephone
wire led the raiders to a large bivouac site, which held an unattended
75mm mountain gun and a 37mm antitank gun. Marines removed key parts
of the weapons and scattered them down the hillside. Farther on the
advance guard entered yet another bivouac site, this one occupied
by 100 Japanese. Both sides were equally surprised, but Corporal
John Yancey charged into the group firing his automatic weapon and
calling for his squad to follow. The more numerous enemy were at a
disadvantage since their arms were stacked out of reach. The handful of
raiders routed the Japanese and killed 75. Carlson called it “the most
spectacular of any of our engagements.” For this feat Yancey earned the
first of his two Navy Crosses (the second came years later in Korea).
The next day, 1 December, a Douglas R4D Skytrain transport air-dropped
badly needed rations, as well as orders for the battalion to enter the
perimeter, Carlson asked for a few more days in the field and got it.
On 3 December he held a “Gung Ho” meeting to motivate his exhausted
men for one more effort. Then he divided the 2d Raiders in half,
sending the companies with the most field time down to Marine lines.
The rest he led up to the top of Mount Austen, where a raider patrol
had discovered a strong but abandoned Japanese position. The force had
barely reached their objective when they encountered an enemy platoon
approaching from a different direction. After a two-hour fire fight and
two attempts at a double envelopment, the Marines finally wiped out
their opponents. The result was 25 enemy dead at a cost of four wounded
Marines (one of whom died soon after). The raiders spent a tough night
on the mountain, since there was no water available and their canteens
were empty. The next day Carlson led the force down into the Marine
perimeter, but not without one last skirmish. Seven Japanese ambushed
the point and succeeded in killing four men before the raiders wiped
them out.
The long patrol of the 2d Raiders was extremely successful from a
tactical point of view. The battalion had killed 488 enemy soldiers at
a cost of 16 dead and 18 wounded. Carlson’s subsequent report praised
his guerrilla tactics, which undoubtedly played an important role in
the favorable exchange ratio. Far away from the Marine perimeter, the
Japanese became careless and allowed themselves to be surprised on a
regular basis, a phenomenon other Marine units had exploited earlier
in the campaign. Since the 2d Raiders operated exclusively in the
enemy rear, they reaped the benefit of their own stealthiness and this
Japanese weakness.
The stated casualty figures, however, did not reflect the true cost to
the Marines. During the course of the operation, the 2d Raiders had
evacuated 225 men to the rear due to severe illness, primarily malaria,
dysentery, and ringworm. Although sickness was common on Guadalcanal,
Carlson’s men became disabled at an astonishing rate due to inadequate
rations and the rough conditions, factors that had diminished
significantly by that point in the campaign for other American units.
Since only two raider companies had spent the entire month in combat,
the effect was actually worse than those numbers indicated. Companies
C and F had landed at Aola Bay with 133 officers and men each. They
entered the perimeter on 4 December with a combined total of 57
Marines, barely one-fifth their original strength. Things would have
been worse, except for the efforts of native carriers to keep the
raiders supplied. Guerrilla tactics inflicted heavy casualties on the
enemy, but at an equally high cost in friendly manpower.
Nevertheless, the 2d Raiders could hold their heads high. Vandegrift
cited them for “the consumate skill displayed in the conduct of
operations, for the training, stamina and fortitude displayed by all
members of the battalion, and for its commendable aggressive spirit and
high morale.”
[Sidebar (page 24): The Raider Training Center
The Raider Training Center got its start in late 1942, when the Major
General Commandant authorized a slight increase in the table of
organization of the newly formed 4th Raider Battalion. These additional
two officers and 26 enlisted men became the cadre for the center,
which formally came into being at Camp Pendleton, California, on 5
February 1943. The purpose of the center was to train new men up to
raider standards and thus create a pool of qualified replacements for
the battalions overseas. Prior to this, each raider unit had solicited
fresh volunteers from other organizations in rear areas and then
incorporated them directly into their ranks. Since most of these young
Marines had only rudimentary training in weapons and tactics, the
raiders had to expend considerable effort on individual instruction.
Worse still, that old system provided no means to replace casualties
during prolonged combat operations. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B.
Griffith II had been a prime proponent of the improved setup.
The course was eight weeks long. Carlson’s vision of the raiders
initially influenced the training program, probably via Lieutenant
Colonel James Roosevelt’s part in setting up the center. Their hands
were obvious in the selection of classes on guerrilla warfare and
“individual cookery.” The latter was a fetish of Carlson’s--he thought
regular infantry relied too heavily on bulky field kitchens. There
also was a week-long field problem in which the students divided into
a main body and two guerrilla bands acting as aggressors. Rubber boat
operations occupied a significant block of the schedule. Otherwise, the
course focused heavily on traditional individual skills and small unit
tactics: marksmanship, scouting, patrolling, physical conditioning,
individual combat, and so forth.
[Illustration: