One of the Japanese assaults, probably avoiding the concentrated fire
sweeping the crest, pushed along the jungle edge at the bottom of the
slope and threatened to envelop the left flank. Edson ordered Torgerson
to launch a counterattack with his two reorganized parachute companies.
These Marines advanced, checked the enemy progress, and extended the
line to prevent any recurrence. Red Mike later cited this effort as “a
decisive factor in our ultimate victory.”
At 0400 Edson asked Thomas to commit the reserve battalion to bolster
his depleted line. A company at a time, the men of the 2d Battalion,
5th Marines, filed along the top of the ridge and into place beside
those who had survived the long night. By that point the Japanese were
largely spent. Kawaguchi sent in two more attacks, but they were hit
by artillery fire as the troops assembled and never presented much of
a threat. A small band actually made it past the ridge and reached the
vicinity of the airfield; the Marines providing security there dealt
with them.
The onset of daylight brought an end to any organized effort, though
remnants of Japanese assault units were scattered through the fringing
jungle to the flanks and rear of the Marine position. Squads began the
long process of rooting out these snipers. Edson also ordered up an air
attack to strike the enemy units clinging to the southern end of the
ridge. A flight of P-400s answered the call and strafed the exposed
enemy groups. Kawaguchi admitted failure that afternoon and ordered his
tattered brigade to retreat.
The raiders and parachutists had already turned over the ridge to
other Marines that morning. The 1st Raiders had lost 135 men, the
1st Parachute Battalion another 128. Of those, 59 men were dead
or missing-in-action. Seven hundred Japanese bodies littered the
battlefield, and few of Kawaguchi’s 500 wounded would survive the
terrible trek back to the coast.
The battle was much more than a tremendous tactical victory for the
Marines. Edson and his men had turned back one of the most serious
threats the Japanese were to mount against Henderson Field. If the
raiders and parachutists had failed, the landing strip would have
fallen into enemy hands, and the lack of air cover probably would
have led to the defeat of the 1st Marine Division and the loss of
Guadalcanal. Such a reversal would have had a grave impact on the
course of the war and the future of the Corps.
Vandegrift wasted no time in recommending Edson and Bailey for Medals
of Honor. Red Mike’s citation noted his “marked degree of cool
leadership and personal courage.” At the height of the battle, with
friendly artillery shells landing just 75 yards to the front, and
enemy bullets and mortars sweeping the knoll, Edson had never taken
cover. Standing in the shallow hole that passed for a CP, he had calmly
issued orders and served as an inspiration to all who saw him. War
correspondents visiting the scene the day after the battle dubbed it
“Edson’s Ridge.”
_Matanikau_
The depleted parachutists (55 percent casualties in the campaign)
left Guadalcanal on 17 September on board the convoy that brought in
the 7th Marines. The 1st Raiders (33 percent casualties) remained,
and received precious little rest. Just six days after the battle,
Vandegrift ordered them to make a reconnaissance south of Edson’s Ridge
and destroy any Japanese stragglers. The raiders passed through their
old position, now strongly defended by the 7th Marines, and followed
the track of their beaten foe, a trail marked by abandoned weapons and
bodies. Edson made liberal use of artillery and his crew-served weapons
against the slightest sign of resistance. At a cost of three wounded,
the raiders captured a single dismantled howitzer and killed 19 enemy
soldiers. The greatest point of danger in the operation turned out to
be the return trip. As the battalion neared friendly lines, the jittery
new arrivals of the 7th Marines opened fire on the raiders. Luckily no
one was hit.
That same day Vandegrift shipped out several excess colonels and
reorganized the senior ranks of the division. Edson took command of
the 5th Marines and Griffith succeeded him as head of the 1st Raiders.
Red Mike’s departure did not take the raider battalion out of the
spotlight. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller’s 1st Battalion,
7th Marines, departed the perimeter on 23 September with the mission
of clearing enemy units from the vicinity of the Matanikau River. Once
that was accomplished, division wanted to place the raiders in a patrol
base near Kokumbona to prevent the enemy’s return. That would keep
Japanese artillery out of range of the airfield.
On the 24th Puller’s men surprised a Japanese unit and routed it, but
lost seven killed and 25 wounded in the process. Division sent out
the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, as a relief force, since Puller had
to use most of his battalion to get the casualties safely back into
the perimeter. Puller then continued on with his one remaining rifle
company and the 2d Battalion. The combined force reached the Matanikau
on 26 September, proceeded down the east bank, then tried to cross the
sandbar at the river’s mouth. A Japanese company blocked the way and
drove the Marines back with heavy fire. Meanwhile another enemy company
moved into defensive positions on the eastern end of the single-log
bridge that served as the only crossing upstream. The Marines remained
ignorant of that move. That afternoon Vandegrift ordered Edson to take
charge of the operation, and sent the raiders along to assist him.
Puller and Edson jointly devised a new plan that evening. In the
morning the raiders would move upriver, cross at the bridge, and then
come back downriver on the far bank to take the Japanese at the river
mouth in the flank. To ensure that the enemy force did not retreat
out of the trap, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, would pressure them
with its own attack across the sandbar. Finally, the bulk of the 1st
Battalion, 7th Marines, then in the perimeter after the casualty
evacuation, would make an amphibious landing beyond Point Cruz to slam
shut any possible escape route. The ambitious plan received division’s
blessing.
After a night of heavy rain, the 2d Battalion launched its assault
at the river mouth, but made no progress against continuing strong
opposition. The raiders, reinforced by Puller’s lone company, advanced
upriver, but soon found themselves wedged into a narrow shelf between
the water and a steep ridge. The Japanese had placed a tight stopper in
this bottle with infantry supported by machine guns and mortars. Bailey
responded in his typical fashion and tried to lead the assault--he soon
fell mortally wounded. Griffith ordered Company C up the ridge in an
effort to outflank the enemy. The Japanese had this approach covered
too. When the battalion commander appeared on the ridgeline to observe
the action firsthand, a sniper put a bullet in his shoulder. With no
outside fire support, the raiders could make no headway against the
dug-in Japanese.
Poor communications made things worse. Edson misinterpreted a message
from the raiders and thought they were across the river. He launched
the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, in yet another assault, this time with
help from additional mortars and 37mm antitank guns, but it met the
same fate as all previous attempts. Upon landing in the enemy’s rear,
the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was surrounded by a large-force enemy
bivouaced in the vicinity. The unit had brought no radios ashore and
consequently could not immediately inform division of its plight.
Eventually the Marines used air panels to signal supporting aircraft.
When that word reached Puller, he wanted the 2d Battalion to renew
the assault to take pressure off his men, but Edson refused to incur
further casualties in a hopeless frontal attack.
Puller eventually extricated his beleaguered force with naval gunfire
and messages passed by semaphore flags. Red Mike then ordered the
raiders to pull back to the river mouth to join 2d Battalion, 5th
Marines, after which both units withdrew to the division perimeter. The
units engaged had lost 67 dead and 125 wounded in the course of the
operation. This aborted action along the Matanikau was the only defeat
the Marines suffered during the Guadalcanal campaign.
Raider casualties during the all-day action had been comparatively
light--two killed and 11 wounded--but that total included both senior
officers in the battalion. Command now devolved upon Captain Ira J.
“Jake” Irwin. The battalion was worn down by two months of steady
fighting, and by the ravages of the tropics. Large numbers of men were
ill with malaria and other diseases. The battalion had seen more action
than any other on the island, and rumors persisted that they would soon
ship out like the parachutists. One raider later recalled that “a more
sickly, bedraggled, miserable bunch of Marines would have been hard to
find.”
The 1st Raiders had one more battle to go on Guadalcanal. In early
October intelligence indicated that the Japanese were building up their
forces west of the Matanikau in preparation for another offensive
against the perimeter. Division headquarters decided to strike first
to secure the crossings over the river. In a plan reminiscent of the
beginnings of the previous operation, two battalions of the 5th Marines
would move down the coast road, seize the near bank of the Matanikau,
and fix the attention of the Japanese forces on the far side. Three
other battalions would cross the Matanikau at the single-log bridge
and attack north toward the sea. Once they cleared the far side of
the river, a force would garrison Kokumbona and prevent further enemy
operations in the vicinity. In addition to strengthening the assault
forces, this time division provided ample fire support. All units were
to move into position on 7 October in preparation for launching that
attack the next morning.
When the 5th Marines deployed forward on 7 October, they ran into a
Japanese company dug in on the near side of the river just inland
from the sandbar. Edson’s 2d Battalion managed to secure most of its
assigned frontage farther upriver, but his 3d Battalion was unable
to break the enemy resistance centered on a well-fortified defensive
position. He committed Company L to the battle and then radioed
division for reinforcements so he could reconstitute a regimental
reserve. Division assigned Company A, 1st Raiders to the task and the
unit marched off down the coast road to bivouac next to Red Mike’s CP.
That night the Japanese on the near side of the river probed the lines
of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, and mauled the company nearest the
sandbar. Early in the morning of 8 October, Edson decided to commit
the raiders of Company A to the task of reducing the Japanese pocket.
He placed Major Lewis W. Walt in charge of the effort. (Walt had been
Company A’s commander until Edson had brought him over as operations
officer for the 5th Marines.) The raiders drove in a few enemy
outposts, but could make little headway against the interlocking fires
of the concealed Japanese positions. Meanwhile, heavy rains during the
night had continued into the day, and division delayed the move across
the river for 24 hours. Vandegrift also decided to alter his original
plan to a quick envelopment of the west bank and a return to the
perimeter.
Based on these changed circumstances and his own observation at close
range of Company A’s predicament, Edson halted the attack on the
strongpoint. His 3d Battalion would continue to encircle most of the
enemy position, while Company A went into the defense on their right
flank. The latter’s position was shaped like a horseshoe, with the left
linking up with the 3d Battalion and facing south toward the bunker
complex, the center facing west toward the sandspit, and the right
on the beach facing north toward the sea. To fill out the thin line,
mortarmen and company headquarters personnel occupied the left flank
positions. The raiders expected a Japanese assault across the river
mouth to relieve the surrounded bridgehead, so the Marines strung
barbed wire at the friendly end of the sandbar. The remainder of the
raider battalion came up the coast road and went into reserve.
Just after dusk the Japanese in the strongpoint rushed from their
positions in an effort to break through to their own lines. They
quickly overran the surprised left flank of Company A and hit the
center of the raider line from the rear. The enemy who survived the
close-quarters fighting in both locations then ran headlong into
the wire, where fire from the remaining Marines cut them down. The
lieutenant commanding the raider company tried to recover from the
confusion and establish a fresh line farther back along the coast road.
In the morning there was some more fighting with a handful of Japanese
who had sought refuge in Marine foxholes. Company C of the raiders
moved up to occupy the abandoned enemy position and killed three more
Japanese still holed-up there. They found an elaborate complex of
trenches and bunkers connected by tunnels to an underground command
post. The Marines counted 59 bodies stacked up against the wire or
strewn about the perimeter. The battalion lost 12 dead and 22 wounded
during this stint on the Matanikau.
The raiders suffered one additional casualty during the operation.
When Red Mike had gone over to the 5th Marines, he had taken with
him his longtime runner, Corporal Walter J. Burak. While carrying
a message along the river on the afternoon of 9 October, Japanese
machine-gun fire killed the former raider. He was the last member of
the 1st Raiders to die in action on Guadalcanal. On 13 October a convoy
delivered the Army’s 164th Infantry to the island and embarked the
raider battalion for transport to New Caledonia. There were barely 200
effectives left in the unit--just a quarter of the battalion’s original
strength.
[Sidebar (page 18): Raider Weapons and Equipment
Given their special priority early in the war, the raider battalions
had ample opportunity to experiment with weapons and equipment. The
result was an interesting collection of items that were often unique
to the raiders. The most famous of these were the various models of
raider knives. One was a heavy Bowie-type knife with a blade more
than nine inches long. These were manufactured specifically for the
2d Raiders and consequently came to be known as “Gung Ho” knives. An
entirely different version, a lighter stiletto-type, was modeled on the
Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife used by the British commandos. These
raider stilettos were issued to all four battalions for the later
campaigns.
The emphasis on rapid movement on foot drove both Carlson and Edson to
emphasize the acquisition of light weapons with a lot of firepower.
Both men rejected the standard heavy machine guns and 81mm mortars
carried by regular infantry and adopted lighter models. The 2d
Raider Battalion was one of the first Marine units to receive the
semiautomatic M1 Garand .30-caliber rifle as standard issue; most
units, including the 1st Raiders, started the Guadalcanal campaign with
the old bolt-action Springfield M1903. The Browning automatic rifle,
the reviled Reising sub-machine gun, and the more dependable Thompson
sub-machine gun, were favored weapons, particularly in the 2d Raiders,
where each fire team boasted a BAR and a Thompson.
Perhaps the oddest weapon carried by the raiders was the Boys antitank
rifle, a 35-pound behemoth firing a .55-caliber round. Edson adopted
these Canadian weapons to provide his men with a light but serviceable
capability against enemy armor. The rifle eventually saw use with other
raider battalions. The heavy round was accurate at more than 1,000
yards, and the 2d Raiders used a Boys on Makin to destroy two Japanese
seaplanes.
The raiders experimented with a number of odd items of equipment,
everything from collapsible bicycles to belly bands. Carlson
introduced the latter, a cloth rectangle that could be wrapped around
the midsection, where it supposedly prevented intestinal disorders.
The 2d Raiders also employed a hunting jacket that could double as
a pack--inevitably it was dubbed the “Gung Ho” jacket. Edson’s men
tried out portable individual field stoves, toggle ropes, and other
innovative items. The eight-foot toggle ropes had a loop at one end
and a peg at the other; they were helpful when it came time to scale
cliffs. The raiders also pioneered the use of camouflage-patterned
uniforms and of burlap strips to break up the distinctive outline of
their helmets.
[Illustration: _A two-man Boys antitank rifle crew mans their weapon
during a training exercise in 1943. Two other raiders provide flank
protection against enemy infantry. The Boys rifle fired a .55-caliber
round guaranteed to penetrate armor._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56107
]
]
_The Long Patrol_
Not long after the departure of the 1st Raiders, it was the turn of the
2d Raiders to fight on Guadalcanal. Carlson’s outfit had been refitting
in Hawaii after the Midway and Makin battles. In early September the
unit boarded a transport for Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, the
primary staging area for most reinforcements going to the southern
Solomons. There they continued training until Rear Admiral Richmond
Kelly Turner (Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific) decided to
land a force at Aola Bay on the northeast coast of Guadalcanal to build
another airfield. He assigned Carlson and two companies of raiders
to secure the beachhead for an Army battalion, Seabees, and a Marine
defense battalion. The _McKean_ and _Manley_ placed Companies C and E
ashore on the morning of 4 November. There was no opposition, though it
soon became apparent the swampy jungle was no place to put an airfield.
On 5 November Vandegrift sent a message to Carlson by airdrop. Army
and Marine elements were moving east from the perimeter to mop up a
large force of Japanese located near the Metapona River. This enemy
unit, the _230th Infantry Regiment_, had cut its way through the jungle
from the west as part of a late-October attack on Edson’s Ridge by
the _Sendai Division_. For various reasons, the _230th_ had failed to
participate in the attack, and then had completed a circumnavigation
of the Marine perimeter to reach its current location in the east.
The Tokyo Express had recently reinforced it with a battalion of the
_228th Infantry_. Vandegrift wanted the raiders to march from Aola and
harass the Japanese from the rear. Carlson set out with his force on
6 November, with a coastwatcher and several native scouts as guides.
Among the islanders was Sergeant Major Jacob Vouza, already a hero in
the campaign. The men initially carried four days of canned rations.
[Illustration: CARLSON’S PATROL