Marine attention soon shifted from Cape Esperance as it became evident
that the primary terminus of the Tokyo Express was the village of
Tasimboko. On 6 September Edson and Thomas won permission from
Vandegrift to raid the area on the eighth. After the loss of three
of their APDs, shipping was at a premium, so the raiders boarded the
_McKean_ (APD 5), _Manley_ (APD 1), and two converted tuna boats for
the operation. The raider rifle companies would comprise the first
echelon; the ships then would shuttle back to the Lunga for the weapons
company and the parachutists. Native scouts reported there were several
thousand Japanese in the area, but division planners discounted that
figure. However, Edson did rely on their reports that the enemy
defenses faced west toward Marine lines. He decided to land beyond the
village at Taivu Point and then advance overland to take the target
from the rear.
When the raiders went ashore just prior to dawn on 8 September, they
quickly realized the scouting reports had been accurate. As they moved
along the coast toward Tasimboko, they discovered more than a thousand
life preservers placed in neat rows, a large number of foxholes, and
even several unattended 37mm antitank guns. In previous days Major
General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi had landed an entire brigade at Tasimboko,
but it was then advancing inland. Only a rearguard of about 300 men
secured the village and the Japanese supply dumps located there, though
this force was nearly as big as the raider first echelon. The Marines
soon ran into stubborn resistance, to include 75mm artillery pieces
firing pointblank down the coastal road and the orderly rows of a
coconut plantation. While Edson fixed the attention of the defenders
with two companies, he sent Griffith and Company A wide to the left
flank.
[Illustration: _This photo, taken on Guadalcanal in 1942, captured
three men who figured prominently in the brief history of the raiders.
LtGen Thomas Holcomb, left front, authorized the activation of the
raiders in February 1942. Col Merritt A. Edson, right rear, played
a major hand in creating the raider concept. MajGen Alexander A.
Vandegrift, left rear, relied heavily on the raiders in winning the
Guadalcanal campaign, then disbanded them in early 1944 when he became
Commandant._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 5132
]
Concerned that he might be facing the enemy main force, Red Mike
radioed a plea for a supplemental landing to the west of Tasimboko.
The last part of the message indicated there was trouble: “If not,
request instructions regarding my embarkation.” Forty-five minutes
later Edson again asked for fresh troops and for more air support.
Division responded the same way each time--the raiders were to break
off the action and withdraw. Red Mike ignored that order and continued
the attack. Not long afterwards, enemy resistance melted away, and both
wings of the raider force entered the village around noon. The area
was stockpiled with large quantities of food, ammunition, and weapons
ranging up to 75mm artillery pieces. Vandegrift radioed a “well done”
and repeated his order to withdraw yet again.
The raider commander chose to stay put for the time being, and his men
set about destroying as much of the cache as they could. Troops wrecked
a powerful radio station, bayoneted cans of food, tore open bags of
rice and urinated on the contents or spilled them on the ground,
tied guns to landing boats and towed them into deep water, and then
finally put the torch to everything that was left. They also gathered
all available documents. As the sun went down, the men reembarked
and headed for the perimeter, many of them a little bit heavier with
liberated chow, cigarettes, and alcohol.
The raid was a minor tactical victory in terms of actual fighting.
The Marines counted 27 enemy bodies and estimated they had killed 50.
Their own losses were two dead and six wounded. But the battle had
important repercussions. The raiders had put a serious dent in Japanese
logistics, fire support, and communications. The intelligence gathered
had more far-reaching consequences, since it revealed many of the
details of the coming Japanese offensive. Finally, the setback hurt
the enemy’s morale and further boosted that of the raiders. They had
defeated the Japanese yet again, and were literally feasting on the
fruits of the victory.
_Edson’s Ridge_
The next day Red Mike discussed the situation with division planners.
Intelligence officers translating the captured documents confirmed that
3,000 Japanese were cutting their way through the jungle southwest
of Tasimboko. Edson was convinced that they planned to attack the
currently unguarded southern portion of the perimeter. From an aerial
photograph he picked out a grass-covered ridge that pointed like a
knife at the airfield. His hunch was based on his own experience in
jungle fighting and with the Japanese. He knew they liked to attack at
night, and that was also the only time they could get fire support from
the sea. And a night attack in the jungle only had a chance if it moved
along a well-defined avenue of approach. The ridge was the obvious
choice. Thomas agreed. Vandegrift did not, but they convinced the
general to let the raiders and parachutists shift their bivouac to the
ridge in order to get out of the pattern of bombs falling around the
airfield.
The men moved to the new location on 10 September. Contrary to their
hopes, it was not a rest zone. Japanese planes bombed the ridge on the
11th and 12th. Native scouts brought reports of the approaching enemy
column, and raider patrols soon made contact with the advance elements
of the force. The Marines worked to improve their position under
severe handicaps. There was very little barbed wire and no sandbags or
engineering tools. Troops on the ridge itself could not dig far before
striking coral; those on either flank were hampered by thick jungle
that would conceal the movement of the enemy. Casualties had thinned
ranks, while illness and a lack of good food had sapped the strength
of those still on the lines.
[Illustration: THE RIDGE