CHAPTER I.

Produced by Chris Curnow, Chris Logan, Joseph Cooper and

the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at

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HALF-CENTURY OF

CONFLICT.

FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN

NORTH AMERICA.

PART SIXTH.

BY

FRANCIS PARKMAN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

BOSTON:

LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY.

1898.

_Copyright, 1892_,

By Francis Parkman.

_Copyright, 1897_,

By Little, Brown, and Company.

University Press:

John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.

[Illustration]

PREFACE.

This book, forming Part VI. of the series called France and England in

North America, fills the gap between Part V., "Count Frontenac," and

Part VII., "Montcalm and Wolfe;" so that the series now forms a

continuous history of the efforts of France to occupy and control this

continent.

In the present volumes the nature of the subject does not permit an

unbroken thread of narrative, and the unity of the book lies in its

being throughout, in one form or another, an illustration of the

singularly contrasted characters and methods of the rival claimants to

North America.

Like the rest of the series, this work is founded on original documents.

The statements of secondary writers have been accepted only when found

to conform to the evidence of contemporaries, whose writings have been

sifted and collated with the greatest care. As extremists on each side

have charged me with favoring the other, I hope I have been unfair to

neither.

The manuscript material collected for the preparation of the series now

complete forms about seventy volumes, most of them folios. These have

been given by me from time to time to the Massachusetts Historical

Society, in whose library they now are, open to the examination of those

interested in the subjects of which they treat. The collection was begun

forty-five years ago, and its formation has been exceedingly slow,

having been retarded by difficulties which seemed insurmountable, and

for years were so in fact. Hence the completion of the series has

required twice the time that would have sufficed under less unfavorable

conditions.

Boston, March 26, 1892.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

CHAPTER I.

1700-1713.

EVE OF WAR.

The Spanish Succession.--Influence of Louis XIV.

on History.--French Schemes of Conquest in

America.--New York.--Unfitness of the Colonies for War.--The

Five Nations.--Doubt and Vacillation.--The Western

Indians.--Trade and Politics 3

CHAPTER II.

1694-1704.

DETROIT.

Michilimackinac.--La Mothe-Cadillac: his Disputes with the

Jesuits.--Opposing Views.--Plans of Cadillac: his Memorial

to the Court; his Opponents.--Detroit founded.--The

New Company.--Detroit changes Hands.--Strange

Act of the Five Nations 17

CHAPTER III.

1703-1713.

QUEEN ANNE'S WAR.

The Forest of Maine.--A Treacherous Peace.--A Frontier

Village.--Wells and its People.--Attack upon it.--Border

Ravages.--Beaubassin's War-party.--The "Woful Decade."--A

Wedding Feast.--A Captive Bridegroom 34

CHAPTER IV.

1704-1740.

DEERFIELD.

Hertel de Rouville.--A Frontier Village.--Rev. John

Williams.--The Surprise.--Defence of the Stebbins

House.--Attempted Rescue.--The Meadow Fight.--The

Captives.--The Northward March.--Mrs. Williams killed.--The

Minister's Journey.--Kindness of Canadians.--A Stubborn

Heretic.--Eunice Williams.--Converted Captives.--John

Sheldon's Mission.--Exchange of Prisoners.--An English

Squaw.--The Gill Family 55

CHAPTER V.

1704-1713.

THE TORMENTED FRONTIER.

Border Raids.--Haverhill.--Attack and Defence.--War to

the Knife.--Motives of the French.--Proposed

Neutrality.--Joseph Dudley.--Town and Country 94

CHAPTER VI.

1700-1710.

THE OLD RÉGIME IN ACADIA.

The Fishery Question.--Privateers and Pirates.--Port

Royal.--Official Gossip.--Abuse of Brouillan.--Complaints of

De Goutin.--Subercase and his Officers.--Church and

State.--Paternal Government 110

CHAPTER VII.

1704-1710.

ACADIA CHANGES HANDS.

Reprisal for Deerfield.--Major Benjamin Church: his Ravages

at Grand-Pré.--Port Royal Expedition.--Futile Proceedings.--A

Discreditable Affair.--French Successes in

Newfoundland.--Schemes of Samuel Vetch.--A Grand

Enterprise.--Nicholson's Advance.--An Infected

Camp.--Ministerial Promises broken.--A New Scheme.--Port Royal

attacked.--Acadia conquered 120

CHAPTER VIII.

1710, 1711.

WALKER'S EXPEDITION.

Scheme of La Ronde Denys.--Boston warned against British

Designs.--Boston to be ruined.--Plans of the Ministry.--Canada

doomed.--British Troops at Boston.--The Colonists

denounced.--The Fleet sails for Quebec.--Forebodings of the

Admiral.--Storm and Wreck.--Timid Commanders.--Retreat.--Joyful

News for Canada.--Pious Exultation.--Fanciful Stories.--Walker

disgraced 156

CHAPTER IX.

1712-1749.

LOUISBOURG AND ACADIA.

Peace of Utrecht.--Perilous Questions.--Louisbourg

founded.--Annapolis attacked.--Position of the

Acadians.--Weakness of the British Garrison.--Apathy of the

Ministry.--French Intrigue.--Clerical Politicians.--The Oath

of Allegiance.--Acadians refuse it: their Expulsion proposed;

they take the Oath 183

CHAPTER X.

1713-1724.

SEBASTIEN RALE.

Boundary Disputes.--Outposts of Canada.--The Earlier and

Later Jesuits.--Religion and Politics.--The Norridgewocks

and their Missionary.--A Hollow Peace.--Disputed Land

Claims.--Council at Georgetown.--Attitude of Rale.--Minister

and Jesuit.--The Indians waver.--An Outbreak.--Covert

War.--Indignation against Rale.--War declared.--Governor

and Assembly.--Speech of Samuel Sewall.--Penobscots

attack Fort St. George.--Reprisal.--Attack on

Norridgewock.--Death of Rale 212

CHAPTER XI.

1724, 1725.

LOVEWELL'S FIGHT.

Vaudreuil and Dummer.--Embassy to Canada.--Indians

intractable.--Treaty of Peace.--The Pequawkets.--John

Lovewell.--A Hunting Party.--Another Expedition.--The

Ambuscade.--The Fight.--Chaplain Frye: his Fate.--The

Survivors.--Susanna Rogers 250

CHAPTER XII.

1712.

THE OUTAGAMIES AT DETROIT.

The West and the Fur-trade.--New York and Canada.--Indian

Population.--The Firebrands of the West.--Detroit in

1712.--Dangerous Visitors.--Suspense.--Timely

Succors.--The Outagamies attacked: their Desperate

Position.--Overtures.--Wavering Allies.--Conduct of

Dubuisson.--Escape of the Outagamies.--Pursuit and

Attack.--Victory and Carnage 272

CHAPTER XIII.

1697-1750.

LOUISIANA.

The Mississippi to be occupied.--English

Rivalry.--Iberville.--Bienville.--Huguenots.--Views of

Louis XIV.--Wives for the Colony.--Slaves.--La

Mothe-Cadillac.--Paternal Government.--Crozat's

Monopoly.--Factions.--The Mississippi Company.--New

Orleans.--The Bubble bursts.--Indian Wars.--The Colony firmly

established.--The two Heads of New France 298

CHAPTER XIV.

1700-1732.

THE OUTAGAMIE WAR.

The Western Posts.--Detroit.--The Illinois.--Perils of the

West.--The Outagamies.--Their Turbulence.--English

Instigation.--Louvigny's Expedition.--Defeat of

Outagamies.--Hostilities renewed.--Lignery's

Expedition.--Outagamies attacked by Villiers; by Hurons and

Iroquois.--La Butte des Morts.--The Sacs and Foxes 326

CHAPTER XV.

1697-1741.

FRANCE IN THE FAR WEST.

French Explorers.--Le Sueur on the St. Peter.--Canadians

on the Missouri.--Juchereau de Saint-Denis.--Bénard de la

Harpe on Red River.--Adventures of Du Tisné.--Bourgmont

visits the Comanches.--The Brothers Mallet in Colorado

and New Mexico.--Fabry de la Bruyère 346

CHAPTER I.

1700-1713.

EVE OF WAR.

The Spanish Succession.--Influence of Louis XIV. on History.--French

Schemes of Conquest in America.--New York.--Unfitness of the Colonies

for War.--The Five Nations.--Doubt and Vacillation.--The Western

Indians.--Trade and Politics.

The war which in the British colonies was called Queen Anne's War, and

in England the War of the Spanish Succession, was the second of a series

of four conflicts which ended in giving to Great Britain a maritime and

colonial preponderance over France and Spain. So far as concerns the

colonies and the sea, these several wars may be regarded as a single

protracted one, broken by intervals of truce. The three earlier of them,

it is true, were European contests, begun and waged on European

disputes. Their American part was incidental and apparently subordinate,

yet it involved questions of prime importance in the history of the

world.

The War of the Spanish Succession sprang from the ambition of Louis XIV.

We are apt to regard the story of that gorgeous monarch as a tale that

is told; but his influence shapes the life of nations to this day. At

the beginning of his reign two roads lay before him, and it was a

momentous question for posterity, as for his own age, which one of them

he would choose,--whether he would follow the wholesome policy of his

great minister Colbert, or obey his own vanity and arrogance, and plunge

France into exhausting wars; whether he would hold to the principle of

tolerance embodied in the Edict of Nantes, or do the work of fanaticism

and priestly ambition. The one course meant prosperity, progress, and

the rise of a middle class; the other meant bankruptcy and the

Dragonades,--and this was the King's choice. Crushing taxation, misery,

and ruin followed, till France burst out at last in a frenzy, drunk with

the wild dreams of Rousseau. Then came the Terror and the Napoleonic

wars, and reaction on reaction, revolution on revolution, down to our

own day.

Louis placed his grandson on the throne of Spain, and insulted England

by acknowledging as her rightful King the son of James II., whom she had

deposed. Then England declared war. Canada and the northern British

colonies had had but a short breathing time since the Peace of Ryswick;

both were tired of slaughtering each other, and both needed rest. Yet

before the declaration of war, the Canadian officers of the Crown

prepared, with their usual energy, to meet the expected crisis. One of

them wrote: "If war be declared, it is certain that the King can very

easily conquer and ruin New England." The French of Canada often use the

name "New England" as applying to the British colonies in general. They

are twice as populous as Canada, he goes on to say; but the people are

great cowards, totally undisciplined, and ignorant of war, while the

Canadians are brave, hardy, and well trained. We have, besides,

twenty-eight companies of regulars, and could raise six thousand

warriors from our Indian allies. Four thousand men could easily lay

waste all the northern English colonies, to which end we must have five

ships of war, with one thousand troops on board, who must land at

Penobscot, where they must be joined by two thousand regulars, militia,

and Indians, sent from Canada by way of the Chaudière and the Kennebec.

Then the whole force must go to Portsmouth, take it by assault, leave a

garrison there, and march to Boston, laying waste all the towns and

villages by the way; after destroying Boston, the army must march for

New York, while the fleet follows along the coast. "Nothing could be

easier," says the writer, "for the road is good, and there is plenty of

horses and carriages. The troops would ruin everything as they advanced,

and New York would quickly be destroyed and burned."[1]

Another plan, scarcely less absurd, was proposed about the same time by

the celebrated Le Moyne d'Iberville. The essential point, he says, is to

get possession of Boston; but there are difficulties and risks in the

way. Nothing, he adds, referring to the other plan, seems difficult to

persons without experience; but unless we are prepared to raise a great

and costly armament, our only hope is in surprise. We should make it in

winter, when the seafaring population, which is the chief strength of

the place, is absent on long voyages. A thousand Canadians, four hundred

regulars, and as many Indians should leave Quebec in November, ascend

the Chaudière, then descend the Kennebec, approach Boston under cover of

the forest, and carry it by a night attack. Apparently he did not know

that but for its lean neck--then but a few yards wide--Boston was an

island, and that all around for many leagues the forest that was to have

covered his approach had already been devoured by numerous busy

settlements. He offers to lead the expedition, and declares that if he

is honored with the command, he will warrant that the New England

capital will be forced to submit to King Louis, after which New York can

be seized in its turn.[2]

In contrast to those incisive proposals, another French officer breathed

nothing but peace. Brouillan, governor of Acadia, wrote to the governor

of Massachusetts to suggest that, with the consent of their masters,

they should make a treaty of neutrality. The English governor being

dead, the letter came before the council, who received it coldly.

Canada, and not Acadia, was the enemy they had to fear. Moreover, Boston

merchants made good profit by supplying the Acadians with necessaries

which they could get in no other way; and in time of war these profits,

though lawless, were greater than in time of peace. But what chiefly

influenced the council against the overtures of Brouillan was a passage

in his letter reminding them that, by the Treaty of Ryswick, the New

England people had no right to fish within sight of the Acadian coast.

This they flatly denied, saying that the New England people had fished

there time out of mind, and that if Brouillan should molest them, they

would treat it as an act of war.[3]

While the New England colonies, and especially Massachusetts and New

Hampshire, had most cause to deprecate a war, the prospect of one was

also extremely unwelcome to the people of New York. The conflict lately

closed had borne hard upon them through the attacks of the enemy, and

still more through the derangement of their industries. They were

distracted, too, with the factions rising out of the recent revolution

under Jacob Leisler. New York had been the bulwark of the colonies

farther south, who, feeling themselves safe, had given their protector

little help, and that little grudgingly, seeming to regard the war as no

concern of theirs. Three thousand and fifty-one pounds, provincial

currency, was the joint contribution of Virginia, Maryland, East Jersey,

and Connecticut to the aid of New York during five years of the late

war.[4] Massachusetts could give nothing, even if she would, her hands

being full with the defence of her own borders. Colonel Quary wrote to

the Board of Trade that New York could not bear alone the cost of

defending herself; that the other colonies were "stuffed with

commonwealth notions," and were "of a sour temper in opposition to

government," so that Parliament ought to take them in hand and compel

each to do its part in the common cause.[5] To this Lord Cornbury adds

that Rhode Island and Connecticut are even more stubborn than the rest,

hate all true subjects of the Queen, and will not give a farthing to the

war so long as they can help it.[6] Each province lived in selfish

isolation, recking little of its neighbor's woes.

New York, left to fight her own battles, was in a wretched condition

for defence. It is true that, unlike the other colonies, the King had

sent her a few soldiers, counting at this time about one hundred and

eighty, all told;[7] but they had been left so long without pay that

they were in a state of scandalous destitution. They would have been

left without rations had not three private gentlemen--Schuyler,

Livingston, and Cortlandt--advanced money for their supplies, which

seems never to have been repaid.[8] They are reported to have been

"without shirts, breeches, shoes, or stockings," and "in such a shameful

condition that the women when passing them are obliged to cover their

eyes." "The Indians ask," says the governor, "'Do you think us such

fools as to believe that a king who cannot clothe his soldiers can

protect us from the French, with their fourteen hundred men all well

equipped?'"[9]

The forts were no better than their garrisons. The governor complains

that those of Albany and Schenectady "are so weak and ridiculous that

they look more like pounds for cattle than forts." At Albany the rotten

stockades were falling from their own weight.

If New York had cause to complain of those whom she sheltered, she

herself gave cause of complaint to those who sheltered her. The Five

Nations of the Iroquois had always been her allies against the French,

had guarded her borders and fought her battles. What they wanted in

return were gifts, attentions, just dealings, and active aid in war; but

they got them in scant measure. Their treatment by the province was

short-sighted, if not ungrateful. New York was a mixture of races and

religions not yet fused into a harmonious body politic, divided in

interests and torn with intestine disputes. Its Assembly was made up in

large part of men unfitted to pursue a consistent scheme of policy, or

spend the little money at their disposal on any objects but those of

present and visible interest. The royal governors, even when personally

competent, were hampered by want of means and by factious opposition.

The Five Nations were robbed by land-speculators, cheated by traders,

and feebly supported in their constant wars with the French.

Spasmodically, as it were, on occasions of crisis, they were summoned to

Albany, soothed with such presents as could be got from unwilling

legislators, or now and then from the Crown, and exhorted to fight

vigorously in the common cause. The case would have been far worse but

for a few patriotic men, with Peter Schuyler at their head, who

understood the character of these Indians, and labored strenuously to

keep them in what was called their allegiance.

The proud and fierce confederates had suffered greatly in the late war.

Their numbers had been reduced about one half, and they now counted

little more than twelve hundred warriors. They had learned a bitter and

humiliating lesson, and their arrogance had changed to distrust and

alarm. Though hating the French, they had learned to respect their

military activity and prowess, and to look askance on the Dutch and

English, who rarely struck a blow in their defence, and suffered their

hereditary enemy to waste their fields and burn their towns. The English

called the Five Nations British subjects, on which the French taunted

them with being British slaves, and told them that the King of England

had ordered the governor of New York to poison them. This invention had

great effect. The Iroquois capital, Onondaga, was filled with wild

rumors. The credulous savages were tossed among doubts, suspicions, and

fears. Some were in terror of poison, and some of witchcraft. They

believed that the rival European nations had leagued to destroy them and

divide their lands, and that they were bewitched by sorcerers, both

French and English.[10]

After the Peace of Ryswick, and even before it, the French governor kept

agents among them. Some of these were soldiers, like Joncaire,

Maricourt, or Longueuil, and some were Jesuits, like Bruyas,

Lamberville, or Vaillant. The Jesuits showed their usual ability and

skill in their difficult and perilous task. The Indians derived various

advantages from their presence, which they regarded also as a flattering

attention; while the English, jealous of their influence, made feeble

attempts to counteract it by sending Protestant clergymen to Onondaga.

"But," writes Lord Bellomont, "it is next to impossible to prevail with

the ministers to live among the Indians. They [the Indians] are so nasty

as never to wash their hands, or the utensils they dress their victuals

with."[11] Even had their zeal been proof to these afflictions, the

ministers would have been no match for their astute opponents. In vain

Bellomont assured the Indians that the Jesuits were "the greatest lyars

and impostors in the world."[12] In vain he offered a hundred dollars

for every one of them whom they should deliver into his hands. They

would promise to expel them; but their minds were divided, and they

stood in fear of one another. While one party distrusted and disliked

the priests, another was begging the governor of Canada to send more.

Others took a practical view of the question. "If the English sell goods

cheaper than the French, we will have ministers; if the French sell them

cheaper than the English, we will have priests." Others, again, wanted

neither Jesuits nor ministers, "because both of you [English and French]

have made us drunk with the noise of your praying."[13]

The aims of the propagandists on both sides were secular. The French

wished to keep the Five Nations neutral in the event of another war;

the English wished to spur them to active hostility; but while the

former pursued their purpose with energy and skill, the efforts of the

latter were intermittent and generally feeble.

"The Nations," writes Schuyler, "are full of factions." There was a

French party and an English party in every town, especially in Onondaga,

the centre of intrigue. French influence was strongest at the western

end of the confederacy, among the Senecas, where the French officer

Joncaire, an Iroquois by adoption, had won many to France; and it was

weakest at the eastern end, among the Mohawks, who were nearest to the

English settlements. Here the Jesuits had labored long and strenuously

in the work of conversion, and from time to time they had led their

numerous proselytes to remove to Canada, where they settled at St.

Louis, or Caughnawaga, on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, a little

above Montreal, where their descendants still remain. It is said that at

the beginning of the eighteenth century two-thirds of the Mohawks had

thus been persuaded to cast their lot with the French, and from enemies

to become friends and allies. Some of the Oneidas and a few of the other

Iroquois nations joined them and strengthened the new mission

settlement; and the Caughnawagas afterwards played an important part

between the rival European colonies.

The "Far Indians," or "Upper Nations," as the French called them,

consisted of the tribes of the Great Lakes and adjacent regions,

Ottawas, Pottawattamies, Sacs, Foxes, Sioux, and many more. It was from

these that Canada drew the furs by which she lived. Most of them were

nominal friends and allies of the French, who in the interest of trade

strove to keep these wild-cats from tearing one another's throats, and

who were in constant alarm lest they should again come to blows with

their old enemies, the Five Nations, in which case they would call on

Canada for help, thus imperilling those pacific relations with the

Iroquois confederacy which the French were laboring constantly to

secure.

In regard to the "Far Indians," the French, the English, and the Five

Iroquois Nations all had distinct and opposing interests. The French

wished to engross their furs, either by inducing the Indians to bring

them down to Montreal, or by sending traders into their country to buy

them. The English, with a similar object, wished to divert the "Far

Indians" from Montreal and draw them to Albany; but this did not suit

the purpose of the Five Nations, who, being sharp politicians and keen

traders, as well as bold and enterprising warriors, wished to act as

middle-men between the beaver-hunting tribes and the Albany merchants,

well knowing that good profit might thus accrue. In this state of

affairs the converted Iroquois settled at Caughnawaga played a peculiar

part. In the province of New York, goods for the Indian trade were of

excellent quality and comparatively abundant and cheap; while among the

French, especially in time of war, they were often scarce and dear. The

Caughnawagas accordingly, whom neither the English nor the French dared

offend, used their position to carry on a contraband trade between New

York and Canada. By way of Lake Champlain and the Hudson they brought to

Albany furs from the country of the "Far Indians," and exchanged them

for guns, blankets, cloths, knives, beads, and the like. These they

carried to Canada and sold to the French traders, who in this way, and

often in this alone, supplied themselves with the goods necessary for

bartering furs from the "Far Indians." This lawless trade of the

Caughnawagas went on even in time of war; and opposed as it was to every

principle of Canadian policy, it was generally connived at by the French

authorities as the only means of obtaining the goods necessary for

keeping their Indian allies in good humor.

It was injurious to English interests; but the fur-traders of Albany and

also the commissioners charged with Indian affairs, being Dutchmen

converted by force into British subjects, were, with a few eminent

exceptions, cool in their devotion to the British Crown; while the

merchants of the port of New York, from whom the fur-traders drew their

supplies, thought more of their own profits than of the public good. The

trade with Canada through the Caughnawagas not only gave aid and comfort

to the enemy, but continually admitted spies into the colony, from whom

the governor of Canada gained information touching English movements and

designs.

The Dutch traders of Albany and the importing merchants who supplied

them with Indian goods had a strong interest in preventing active

hostilities with Canada, which would have spoiled their trade. So, too,

and for similar reasons, had influential persons in Canada. The French

authorities, moreover, thought it impolitic to harass the frontiers of

New York by war parties, since the Five Nations might come to the aid of

their Dutch and English allies, and so break the peaceful relations

which the French were anxious to maintain with them. Thus it happened

that, during the first six or seven years of the eighteenth century,

there was a virtual truce between Canada and New York, and the whole

burden of the war fell upon New England, or rather upon Massachusetts,

with its outlying district of Maine and its small and weak neighbor, New

Hampshire.[14]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Premier Projet pour L'Expédition contre la Nouvelle Angleterre,

1701._ _Second Projet_, etc. Compare _N. Y. Col. Docs._, ix. 725.

[2] _Mémoire du Sieur d'Iberville sur Boston et ses Dépendances_, 1700

(1701?). Baron de Saint-Castin also drew up a plan for attacking Boston

in 1702 with lists of necessary munitions and other supplies.

[3] _Brouillan à Bellomont, 10 Août, 1701. Conseil de Baston à

Brouillan, 22 Août, 1701._ Brouillan acted under royal orders, having

been told, in case of war being declared, to propose a treaty with New

England, unless he should find that he can "se garantir des insultes des

Anglais" and do considerable harm to their trade, in which case he is to

make no treaty. _Mémoire du Roy au Sieur de Brouillan, 23 Mars, 1700._

[4] Schuyler, _Colonial New York_, i. 431, 432.

[5] _Colonel Quary to the Lords of Trade, 16 June, 1703._

[6] _Cornbury to the Lords of Trade, 9 September, 1703._

[7] _Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, 28 February, 1700._

[8] _Ibid._

[9] Schuyler, _Colonial New York_, i. 488.

[10] _N. Y. Col. Docs._, iv. 658.

[11] _Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, 17 October, 1700._

[12] _Conference of Bellomont with the Indians, 26 August, 1700._

[13] _Journal of Bleeker and Schuyler on their visit to Onondaga,

August, September, 1701._

[14] The foregoing chapter rests on numerous documents in the Public

Record Office, Archives de la Marine, Archives Nationales, _N. Y.

Colonial Documents_, vols. iv. v. ix., and the _Second and Third Series

of the Correspondance Officielle_ at Ottawa.

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