Hancock), which, up to this time, had borne the whole brunt of the
fighting. The Ninth corps, now rushing into the extreme left, joined its
weight to that point. The Sixth corps had advanced against Ewell’s
troops, and General Warren’s corps had moved up on the extreme right.
All were now hotly engaged, and pressed the enemy severely. The rebels
soon made a desperate effort to regain the lost works, but the charge
was nobly met by the Second and Ninth corps, and, after a furious and
bloody battle of three hours, the enemy was forced to fall back.
During this time the Union right and centre had charged the enemy’s
position with all the gallantry inseparable from such thoroughly brave
men, but without success; the rebels were found to be, for the time at
least, impregnable behind their powerful works, in force strong enough
to hold their ground against twice the number of the Unionists; besides
which every avenue of approach was guarded by most formidable artillery.
After a temporary lull in the fight, about midday, General Meade made an
effort to turn the enemy’s right; and crowded his troops down toward his
own left, still keeping up a severe artillery and infantry fire. At this
time the rain again began to fall, and continued to become heavier
during the whole afternoon, till night. But the battle, instead of
slackening, became, if possible, still more terrible. The enemy rapidly
concentrated on the right, charged the Unionists, and again the ground
was fought over with desperation. Night at length closed one of the most
dreadful contests on record, after a duration of fourteen hours, and
darkness settled down upon the wet, gloomy, blood-stained battle-field.
The first decided and important success of this series of movements was
that of General Hancock, on the morning of the 12th, which secured an
advance of a mile to the line at that point.
The courage, skill, and determined bravery exhibited upon the part of
all the troops engaged is deserving of the very highest commendation;
and so admirably did every division, brigade, and regiment behave, that
it is not possible to name any in particular as more highly deserving of
praise than the rest. The loss in killed and wounded numbered ten
thousand men; that of the enemy was estimated as being equally severe.
About three thousand prisoners were captured.
Upon the next day—Friday the 13th—it was discovered that the enemy had
fallen into a new position of defence, and had withdrawn his main force
on the left. The rain still fell heavily, so that the roads were
rendered very difficult. Artillery firing, and occasionally brisk
skirmishing, were kept up from time to time throughout the day, between
small bodies of the troops.
It was at noon this day that General Meade issued the following address
to his army:
“SOLDIERS! The moment has arrived when your commanding officer feels
authorized to address you in terms of congratulation.
“For eight days and nights, without almost any intermission, through
rain and sunshine, you have been fighting a desperate foe in positions
naturally strong, and rendered doubly so by intrenchments. You have
compelled him to abandon his fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire
and to attempt to stop your progress, and now he has abandoned the last
intrenched position, so tenaciously held, suffering in all a loss of
eighteen guns, twenty-two colors, eight thousand prisoners, including
two general officers.
“Your heroic deeds, noble endurance of fatigue and privation, will ever
be memorable. Let us return thanks to God for the mercy thus shown us,
and ask earnestly for its continuance.
“Soldiers! Your work is not over. The enemy must be pursued, and, if
possible, overcome. The courage and fortitude you have displayed renders
your commanding general confident that your future efforts will result
in success. * * *
“We shall soon receive reenforcements, which he cannot expect. Let us
determine, then, to continue vigorously the work so well begun, and,
under God’s blessing, in a short time the object of our labors will be
accomplished.”
Upon the next day—the 14th—the enemy, although he had fallen back, still
held tenaciously to the Court House. By this time General Meade’s line
stretched at right angles across the Fredericksburg and Spottsylvania
roads, leaving on its right the corps of General Hancock, and on the
right centre the Ninth corps of General Burnside. General Warren held
the left, and General Wright the left centre. The position of the enemy
was now that of a semi-circular line of earthworks, with rifle-pits here
and there. These works were well established, on commanding heights, the
entire position being flanked on right and left by dense woods. The
enemy was still busily engaged in strengthening his breastworks; and
General Grant’s troops were speedily armed with spades, so that on both
sides the work of intrenching went forward diligently.
During this time much severe fighting was done on the extreme left.
The next day was the Sabbath—the 15th of May—and one of the few Sabbaths
which passed without a battle when the opposing armies confronted each
other. Reconnoissances were made by both Unionists and rebels, and
positions in every direction were still further strengthened, for all
felt that a momentous movement was close at hand. The pickets exchanged
occasional shots, and the dense woods flanking the enemy’s strong
defences were shelled severely, for the purpose of driving out any
lurking foes who might be concealed there. Late in the afternoon a brief
but sharp engagement took place between a force of the enemy and
Birney’s division, in which the rebels were defeated and suffered
considerable loss.
On the 16th the roads were found to be in such a condition from the
recent rains that any movement against the enemy was impracticable.
During the afternoon a fresh breeze sprang up, and the sun shone down
with almost tropical intensity. The roads dried up rapidly, and on the
17th they were found to be in good condition. The sun still shining
brightly, continued to dry them up so well that a movement was decided
on for Wednesday. These days of rest had greatly refreshed the army; the
troops were in fine health and spirits, and eager for work.
It had all along been General Grant’s desire to outflank the enemy, and
force him to abandon his strong works, rather than to compel his retreat
by falling upon him, and, in order to do this, all his movements had
been made against the enemy’s right. He now determined to change his
mode of operations, and to make a bold assault upon the enemy’s left.
With this view, preparations were made on Tuesday night, under cover of
the darkness, and batteries and troops were moved up for the assault.
The new Union line was formed before morning, and ran direct from right
to left. This line was composed of four divisions, commanded
respectively by Hancock, Burnside, Warren, and Wright.
With the first dawn of day, on the morning of the 18th, the assault was
made. The enemy’s skirmishers were driven back at the first onset, and
again the loud, reverberating roar of cannon echoed back from the
surrounding hills. The air was filled with splinters of shell and
whistling shot, flying along on the wings of destruction. The rebel left
was found to be much strengthened to meet the attack against it, for
General Lee, suspecting Grant’s movement, had made preparations to
receive him. Charge upon charge was made upon the rebels, and first one
and then another of their lines of rifle-pits were captured, together
with many prisoners. With cheer upon cheer, the Union troops pressed on,
until suddenly they came upon a dense, impregnable abattis, behind which
lay concealed a long line of riflemen; while behind these again were
stationed a heavy, frowning array of batteries. To advance was to bring
certain, inevitable death upon a countless number of the brave
Unionists, while, at the same time, the prospect of success in the
charge was very dim. The troops were therefore ordered to retreat, and
fell back in good order, under a destructive fire opened on them by the
enemy. Brigadier-General Barlow, commanding the First division of the
Second corps, is entitled to honor as a brave man and a thoroughly
competent officer, for the admirable behavior of his troops under severe
fire.
It was now clear that the enemy’s position at this point could not be
carried except by an incalculable loss of life, and the attempt was,
therefore, for the time abandoned. The Union loss during this short but
sanguinary conflict numbered twelve hundred.
Both armies remained quiet for the remainder of the day, but kept a
constant watch upon each other’s movements.
During the night, General Grant, having ascertained the enemy’s strength
and precise position, sent off a detachment of troops, in command of
General Torbert, to a point on the Richmond and Fredericksburg road,
called Guinea’s Station, situated about ten miles southeast of
Spottsylvania. By this movement the Unionists gained a position in the
enemy’s rear, and destroyed much valuable rebel property along the
railroad. During the next day reinforcements for Grant’s army arrived
from Belle Plains, and a considerable portion of the day was occupied in
receiving and arranging the newly arrived troops. A portion of the
National troops moved toward Guinea Station, but no fighting took place
between the hostile armies, who were at that time within artillery range
of each other, but remained so quiet that not even a gun was fired.
Between four and five in the afternoon, however, firing was heard upon
the Fredericksburg road, which turned out to be from a strong division
of the rebel General Ewell’s corps. The enemy had fallen upon the Union
baggage train as it filed along in rear of the right flank, but were
gallantly met and repulsed by General Tyler’s division of heavy
artillery, armed as infantry. These troops were mostly new recruits,
and, though thus unexpectedly called into action by this sudden
irruption of the rebel raiders, they acquitted themselves with great
credit, and succeeded in checking the enemy’s advance. They were warmly
commended by General Meade. Before the rebels could make a second
charge, or follow up any advantage they might have gained by dint of
superior numbers, Colonel Tannatt’s brigade came to the assistance of
Tyler, and Ewell’s men were effectually brought to a halt. Another
brigade came forward at this point, and the enemy was driven in great
confusion back into the forest.
Again, at five o’clock, the rebels, with the desperation of starving
men, made a second attack on the baggage-trains, but were speedily
driven back.
During these brisk, but deadly conflicts, the Unionists lost upwards of
six hundred men; the rebel loss was not so heavy. For the remainder of
the day, and during the night, the baggage-trains were closely watched,
but no further attempts were made upon them.
From the 20th of May onward, the movements of General Grant contemplated
forcing General Lee to abandon his position at Spottsylvania, and fall
back towards Richmond. Continued efforts were, therefore, made to flank
the rebel army. Nor were these efforts unsuccessful. On May 23, General
Grant’s army was in a position facing westward, extending from Guinea
Station to Milford, while the enemy had fallen back beyond the North
Anna river.
A fight took place at Taylor’s Bridge Ford, on the 23d, in which General
Birney’s division behaved with great gallantry. The bridge, of course,
was the point at issue, and both parties contested the prize with
desperate valor—the rebels striving to hold, and the Unionists to take
it. About five hundred men were killed on each side. The National troops
succeeded in obtaining possession of the bridge, but it was repossessed
by the rebels during the night, and again taken by the Unionists in the
morning.
On the 24th, the whole army crossed the North Anna; and on the 29th it
had crossed the Pamunkey, its base being White House. The rebels
continued to fall back. There was some fighting on the 30th and the 31st
of May, but no serious engagement until the
BATTLE OF COAL HARBOR.
JUNE 1–3, 1864.
At the time this battle was fought, the Eighteenth Army Corps (General
Smith) which was detached from the Army of the James, had reinforced the
army of General Meade. The first charge was made by this corps, which
took and held the first line of the enemy’s rifle-pits, capturing six
hundred prisoners. Finding himself thus attacked on his right wing, the
enemy retaliated by a severe assault upon the National right, thinking
it had been weakened to sustain the charge by the left. Longstreet’s
corps, on the rebel side, did most of the fighting. Warren’s and
Hancock’s divisions were, on the Union side, especially assailed. The
enemy made repeated charges, which were as repeatedly repulsed.
Artillery was freely employed in this fight, and the losses on both
sides were very heavy. The rebels being intrenched, their loss was not
so severe as otherwise it would have been. The Union loss was about two
thousand.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF COAL HARBOR, VA., JUNE 3, 1864.]
Thursday, the 2d of May, proved rainy, and General Grant, for this
reason, delayed a further attack of the enemy, although he permitted one
or two charges, which resulted in no positive success. Skirmishing, of
course, was frequent, owing to the close contiguity of the lines of
battle. The first day’s operations had put the Union army in possession
of Coal Harbor, and General Grant’s design now was to push the rebels
across the Chickahominy river—his ultimate object being to hem in the
army of Lee within the cities of Petersburg and Richmond, isolate those
places on all sides, and then compel the surrender of the rebels, either
through starvation or in one general and desperate battle. The rebel
commander penetrated this design, and, naturally, opposed it at every
point; and so skillful and successful was his resistance, that—as will
presently be seen—he was enabled to prolong this contest through a
period of ten months, holding Petersburg and Richmond all the while, and
keeping open his communications with the south and southwest, by way of
Weldon and of Lynchburg. His defenses, it is true, were of the most
formidable character, and so extensive, that it was impossible for
General Grant to concentrate sufficient force for successful assault, at
any one point, without weakening his own lines, which were far more
extended than the rebel defenses, and thus expose himself to an attack
from General Lee.
The battle of the second day at Coal Harbor—being the 3d of June—was
desperate and bloody. The assault was commenced by the National forces
at half-past four o’clock in the morning. The brigades of Generals
Gibbons and Barlow, of General Hancock’s division, made the first attack
on the rebel lines. It was a dark and cloudy morning, and, at intervals,
rain poured down upon the battle-field. Barlow’s and Gibbons’ brigades
took a portion of the rebel works, but were not able to hold their
prize. They captured many prisoners, however, and then, falling back,
took up an advanced position and intrenched themselves. The Eighteenth
and Sixth corps met with about the same success, capturing works which
they were subsequently obliged to resign, and finally intrenching
themselves in a new position close to the enemy’s line. On the Union
right the battle was less severe than upon the left. Far to the left
General Wilson’s cavalry fought that of Wade Hampton. All day long the
battle raged furiously, and even encroached upon the night—a fierce
assault being made by the rebels at nine o’clock in the evening, which
was repulsed by the soldiers of Hancock, Smith, and Wright. But the
results were scarcely commensurate with the sacrifices made for their
attainment.
On the morning of the 5th, the National troops held their advanced
position, and it was found that the enemy’s left wing, in front of the
forces of General Burnside, had been drawn in during the night. The
Union losses, during the three days operations around Coal Harbor, are
set down at not less than seven thousand five hundred.
For several days succeeding this battle, both armies occupied themselves
in strengthening their respective lines of battle. A truce of two hours,
declared on the 6th, enabled the belligerents to bury their dead and
relieve their wounded.
GENERAL GRANT’S CHANGE OF BASE.
From the 5th till the 14th of June, General Grant occupied himself in
building defensive works, receiving and placing reinforcements,
distributing supplies, and preparing for a movement across the
Chickahominy and the James rivers, in pursuance of his design of
extending his lines of circumvallation around Petersburg, and of pushing
Lee nearer and nearer to the interior rebel works.
On the 12th of June the enemy’s line extended from Bottom’s Bridge along
the Chickahominy, confronting that of Grant at every point. That night
the National forces began to move, crossing the Chickahominy at Long’s
Bridge and at Jones’s Bridge, and marching for Wilcox’s wharf on the
James river. A portion of the troops went by transports from White House
to Bermuda Hundred, General Butler’s headquarters. On Wednesday, the
15th, the entire army was on the south side of the James river, having
lost, in the skirmishing incident to this important movement, only about
four hundred men. White House had been abandoned as a base, the railroad
leading thither being taken up and all the supplies there accumulated
brought safely away. The distance traversed was fifty-five miles.
By this change of base General Grant’s army was augmented by a junction
with General Butler’s, and by alliance with the United States naval
forces on the James river. He had possessed himself, moreover, with a
healthier tract of country in which to operate, and he had narrowed the
scene of his operations. His dispositions for other and cooperative
campaigns had been wisely made—as shown in other chapters of this
narrative—so that he had now nothing to fear from rebel invasion of the
North. Lee’s attention would now be concentrated on Petersburg and
Richmond, and it was evident that the close of the struggle could not
long be deferred.
OPERATIONS ON JAMES RIVER, VA.
MAY 4–10, 1864.
When General Grant assumed command of the armies of the United States,
the headquarters of General Butler was at Fortress Monroe, from whence
he exercised jurisdiction over the Department of Southern Virginia and
North Carolina. The part assigned him in the coming campaign was an
important one, and is thus fully described in the report of the
Lieutenant-General:
“My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion and
capture the enemy’s important strongholds, made me desirous that General
Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would
tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee’s army,
to accomplish this desired result in the east. If he failed, it was my
determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or so
to cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north and
still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well understood,
by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that
it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James river,
in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.
“Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort
Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of
getting possession of Petersburg and destroying railroad communications
as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of
capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective
point of his operations. As the army of the Potomac was to move
simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,
and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of
the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James
river.”
Under date of April 2d, General Grant gave written instructions to
General Butler, in which were more specially detailed his plans for the
opening of the campaign:
“GENERAL: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence
at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative
action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be
accomplished.
“It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large
ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding
on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally
speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to
the interior of the enemy’s country from the territory they have to
guard. By such movements they interpose themselves between the enemy and
the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of
the enemy’s force, if no greater object is gained. Lee’s army and
Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be
directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we
can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the army of
the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it
impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of a movement. I
propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable. The army of the Potomac will act from its present base,
Lee’s army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces
from your command that can be spared from garrison duty, I should say
not less than twenty thousand effective men to operate on the south side
of James river, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you
already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina,
under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the
troops sent into the field from your own department.
“General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,
with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon
thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to
move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as
you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to
be made.
“When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as
possible. Fortify, or rather entrench, at once, and concentrate all your
troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point
directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.
“The fact that has already been stated—that is, that Richmond is to be
your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your
forces and the army of the Potomac—must be your guide. This indicates
the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James river
as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments
in Richmond, the army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of
transports the two armies would become a unit.
“All the minor details of your advance are left entirely at your
discretion. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry
south of you so as to cut the railroad about Hicks’ Ford about the time
of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.
“You will please forward for my information at the earliest practicable
day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the
execution of this order.
“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“Major-General B. F. BUTLER.”
* * * * *