naval officer who had already evinced great coolness and daring in
hazardous enterprises, was selected to take charge of a small launch to
which was attached a torpedo, and sent on the dangerous mission of
attempting the destruction of the Albemarle. Selecting a crew of
thirteen officers and men who volunteered for the service, he passed
several miles of the enemy’s pickets unobserved, and arrived within
twenty yards of the Albemarle before being hailed by her lookouts. The
torpedo boat was then steered under a full head of steam direct for the
ram, which lay at her wharf at Plymouth, protected by a raft of logs
extending outwards about thirty feet. Upon the alarm being given by the
lookouts, a confused fire of musketry was opened by the rebels, which
had little effect. “Passing her closely,” says Lieutenant Cushing, “we
made a complete circle, so as to strike her fairly, and went into her
bows on. By this time the enemy’s fire was very severe, but a dose of
canister at short range served to moderate their zeal, and disturb their
aim. In a moment we had struck the logs, just abreast of the
quarter-port, breasting them in some feet, and our bows resting on them.
The torpedo boom was then lowered, and by a vigorous pull I succeeded in
driving the torpedo under the overhang, and exploded it at the same time
the Albemarle’s gun was fired. A shot seemed to go crashing through my
boat, and a dense mass of water rushed in from the torpedo, filling the
launch, and completely disabling her. The enemy then continued to fire
at fifteen feet range and demanded our surrender, which I twice refused,
ordering the men to save themselves, and removing my own coat and shoes.
Springing into the river, I swam with others into the middle of the
stream, the rebels failing to hit us.” Lieutenant Cushing succeeded in
reaching the opposite shore, and during the next day made his way by
stealth through the surrounding swamps to a creek some distance below
Plymouth, where he found a skiff belonging to a rebel picket, in which
he effected his escape to the fleet. Only one other of his party
succeeded in escaping, the rest being either captured, killed, or
drowned. The Albemarle was completely submerged by the explosion of the
torpedo, and so remained long subsequent to the evacuation of Plymouth
by the rebels. This daring feat excited the admiration of the rebel no
less than of the Federal authorities, and obtained for Lieutenant
Cushing the thanks of Congress, and promotion to the next highest grade
in the service.
CAPTURE OF PLYMOUTH—The main rebel defence of Plymouth being thus
removed, Commander Macomb, the senior naval officer in the Sounds, with
the vessels under his command immediately pushed up the river to
Plymouth, drove the rebels from their rifle-pits and batteries, and on
October 31st retook the town, capturing a few prisoners, besides cannon,
small arms, and ammunition.
CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER, AND WILMINGTON, N. C.
DECEMBER 24, 1864-JANUARY 22, 1865.
During the earlier years of the rebellion, an extensive trade was
carried on through the port of Wilmington, N. C., and her merchants were
growing rich through a traffic with foreign nations, which the most
vigilant efforts of the numerous vessels employed on the blockade were
insufficient to prevent. The many shoals and inlets which traversed and
intersected her coast, the foggy and dark nights, and the experienced
eyes of the native pilots, combined to enable the fleet steamers of
light draught, which were employed in the trade, to make many successful
voyages, with but little risk; while the State government was in receipt
of handsome revenues, her perquisites in a commerce of vast profit and
extent.
Wilmington was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy, and
besides was a point of great strategic value for army movements, which
had been long coveted by the Federal Government. The navy had been
making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with
only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear river was
such that it required watching for so great a distance, that, without
possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was
impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the
entrance of blockade-runners.
The Federal Government had long sought an opportunity to break up this
trade, but it was not until September, 1864, that the exigencies of the
war permitted the equipment of an expedition adapted to the capture and
occupation of Fort Fisher and Wilmington. A large fleet was collected in
Hampton Roads, in the earlier part of that month, under the command of
Admiral D. D. Porter, but it was late in December before all the vessels
and transports connected with the enterprise were prepared to sail for
their destination.
General Grant, in his report of this campaign, gives the following
details of the preliminary operation:
“To secure the possession of these places required the cooperation of
a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the
assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most
formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given
point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well
as that of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public
press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the
exact object of the expedition became a common subject of discussion
in the newspapers both north and south. The enemy, thus warned,
prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition
until the latter part of November, when being again called upon by
Honorable G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to
furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with
Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a conference with
Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. A
force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. The
time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all
would be ready by the 6th December, if not before. Learning on the
30th November that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of
the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that
the expedition should reach its destination before the return of
Bragg, and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the
departure of Major-General Weitzel, who had been designated to command
the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment.
“On the 6th of December the following instructions were given:
“‘CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864.
“‘GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is
to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this,
the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable
grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence
of the greater part of the enemy’s forces now looking after Sherman in
Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment
of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of
where they embark and the amount of intrenchment tools to be taken.
The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on
the main land between Cape Fear river and the Atlantic, north of the
north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected while the
enemy still holds Fort Fisher, and the batteries guarding the entrance
to the river, then the troops should entrench themselves, and, by
cooperating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those
places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the
port of Wilmington would be scaled. Should Fort Fisher and the point
of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops
immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture
Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in
gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a
matter of after consideration.
“‘The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer
immediately in command of the troops.
“‘Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at
or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating
against Richmond without delay.
“‘U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“‘Major-General B. F. BUTLER.’”
“General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for
this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate,
military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go
through him. They were so sent; but General Weitzel has since officially
informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was
he aware of their existence until he read General Butler’s published
official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my endorsement and
papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler’s accompanying
the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda
Hundreds, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had received
all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather formed the idea
that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of
the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several
days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.
“The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any
delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General
Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.
“The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at
the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening
of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having
put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming
rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and
coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to
replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to
the place of rendezvous until the 24th.”
On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up toward
the fort.
The army consisted of General Ames’s division of the Twenty-fourth
corps, and of General Paine’s colored division of the Twenty-fifth
corps, numbering together six thousand five hundred effective men.
The attacking force of Admiral Porter consisted of thirty-seven vessels,
five of which were iron-clads, with a reserve of thirteen vessels, while
the transports and smaller vessels were seventy in number.
Colonel Comstock, chief military engineer of the expedition, thus
describes the defences of the inlet and Fort Fisher:
“The land front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape Fear
river side, connected by a curtain with a bastion on the ocean side. The
parapet is twenty-five feet thick, averages twenty feet in height, with
traverses rising ten feet above it and running back on their tops, which
are from eight to twelve feet in thickness, to a distance of from thirty
to forty feet from the interior crest. The traverses on the left half
bastion are about twenty-five feet in length on top. The earth for this
heavy parapet and the enormous traverses at their inner ends, more than
thirty feet in height, was obtained partly from a shallow exterior
ditch, but mainly from the interior of the work. Between each pair of
traverses there was one or two guns. The traverses on the right of this
front were only partially completed. A palisade, which is loopholed and
has a banquette, runs in front of this face, at a distance of fifty feet
in front of the exterior slope, from the Cape Fear river to the ocean,
with a position for a gun between the left of the front and the river,
and another between the right of the front and the ocean. Through the
middle traverse on the curtain is a bomb-proof postern whose exterior
opening is covered by a small redan for two field-pieces, to give flank
fire along the curtain. The traverses are generally bomb-proofed for men
or magazines. The slopes of the work appear to have been revetted with
marsh sod or covered with grass, and have an inclination of forty-five
degrees or a little less. * * * There were originally on this front
twenty-one guns and three mortars. * * * The sea front consists of a
series of batteries, mounting in all twenty-four guns, the different
batteries being connected by a strong infantry parapet so as to form a
continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses for the protection
of the guns is used as on the land front, and these traverses are also
generally bomb-proofed.” There was also a rebel battery, commanding the
channel, on Zeeke’s island, two miles southeast of Fort Fisher, and
several miles north of the latter were the Flag Pond Hill and Half Moon
batteries, serving as outworks to it.
* * * * *
The expedition was delayed two days waiting for the equipment of a
powder-boat, on which two hundred and fifteen tons of powder were
stored, with the hope of destroying the face of Fort Fisher, by its
explosion on the edge of the beach opposite the works. The gunboat
Louisiana was selected for the purpose, and disguised as a
blockade-runner, she approached the fort before daylight on the morning
of December 24th, was anchored four hundred yards from the works without
observation, and there exploded, producing no sensible effect on the
works. The rebels were not aware of the object of this expedition, until
informed through the northern papers.
[Illustration: VIEW OF A PARROTT GUN BURST ON BOARD THE SUSQUEHANNA AT
THE ATTACK ON FORT FISHER.]
At noon on the same day, the fleet got into position, and bombarded the
fort until dark. They renewed fire on the next morning, and continued it
without intermission all day. More than twenty thousand shots were
thrown from fifty vessels of war, while the rebel response numbered only
about twelve hundred shots. Under cover of this tremendous fire, a body
of troops was landed, on the afternoon of the 25th, with the intention
of storming the fort. The ground in front and rear of the fort was torn
up with shells, and some of the guns dismounted; but a careful
reconnoissance, under the eyes of General Weitzel, revealed the fact
that the fort was uninjured, and that an attempt to storm the place with
the force and material then at the disposal of the commander-in-chief,
could not be undertaken with any probability of success. This view was
sustained by other engineer officers attached to the expedition, and was
confirmed by the evidence of the rebel commander of the fort. The troops
were accordingly reembarked on the transports, and returned to their
former position in the army of the James. The Committee on the Conduct
of the War, after a rigid examination of General Butler’s conduct in
this affair, acquitted him of all blame in the matter.
Almost from the first inception of the enterprise, there was a want of
harmony between General Butler and Admiral Porter, which destroyed all
unity of action, and contributed in great measure, to the failure of the
expedition. General Butler also incurred the severe displeasure of
General Grant, first in accompanying the expedition as its commander,
and finally by his conduct in withdrawing the troops, which General
Grant regarded as a breach of orders, for which General Butler was
immediately relieved from command.
The embarkation was accomplished on the morning of the 27th. General
Grant thus details the preliminaries of a subsequent expedition in which
Major-General A. H. Terry was appointed to command the land forces:
“Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from
the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing
me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the
conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The
natural supposition with me was that, when the troops abandoned the
expedition, the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I
answered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on,
and that I would send a force, and make another attempt to take the
place. This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General)
A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it
consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a
small brigade, numbering about fifteen hundred, and a small siege
train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated
direct to the commander of the expedition, the following instructions:
“CITY POINT, VA., January 3, 1865.
“GENERAL: The expedition entrusted to your command has been fitted out
to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington
ultimately, if the fort falls. You will, then, proceed with as little
delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear river, and
report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter,
commanding North Atlantic blockading Squadron.
“It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding
should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest,
therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely and get from
him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so
that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole
programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and
know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what
he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent
with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to
get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built,
from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the
practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself
against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left
open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of
Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished,
or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.
“My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run
a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear river, while the balance of it
operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher or cut
it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in
possession of the enemy.
“A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in
readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be
drawn from Beaufort as you need them.
“Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.
When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as
you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.
“In case of failure to effect a lauding, bring your command back to
Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.
You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.
“General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to
Baltimore, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be
brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are
heard from. Should you require them they will be sent to you.
“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“Brevet Major-General A. H. TERRY.”
“Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier
general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned in orders
as chief engineer to this.
“It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from
those given for the first expedition; and that in neither instance was
there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely
to the discretion of the commanding officer.”
The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th,
arriving on the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to
the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th,
when it got under way and reached its destination that evening.
The severity of the storm had scattered the vessels of the fleet, as
well as the transports, but on the 12th, the combined force was slowly
wending its way up the widely-expanded mouth of Cape Fear river. Admiral
Porter, in his flagship, the Malvern, took his station at the head of
the gunboat fleet, while the flag of General Terry was waving from the
McClellan. The ships in the long line were lost to view beneath the roll
of the waves, while the whole surface of the water, far as the eye could
reach, was dotted at short intervals by the transports, in regular
order, preceded and flanked by the guardian gunboats.
Signal lights were rapidly interchanged between the squadron and the
blockade vessels near the shore, while an immense bonfire in the rear of
Fort Fisher, gave warning to the inhabitants of Wilmington of the
approach of the fleet.
On the morning of the 13th, the frigate Brooklyn, followed by other
vessels, skirted the shore, at the distance of a mile, throwing enormous
shells into the forest at intervals, and into every spot where it was
possible a rebel force or battery might be concealed. After this
effectual reconnoissance, preparations were made to land the troops, and
at three P. M. it was completed without loss. While this was in
progress, the New Ironsides, accompanied by the monitors, took position
within point-blank range of Fort Fisher, and opened a terrific fire. The
landing was effected upon a strip of hard beach about two hundred feet
in width, five miles above Fort Fisher.
Early in the afternoon the rebel fleet came down to Fort Fisher from
Wilmington, bringing reinforcements and supplies. At half past four
Admiral Porter signaled for the rest of the fleet to come forward and
take part in the bombardment. The fire of the ships was so incessant
that they soon became enveloped in their own smoke, and beneath the
power of the immense missiles hurled into the fort and against its
walls, the solid embankment began to crumble, and the garrison to
forsake their guns.
The troops had, meantime, slowly advanced towards the works, hoping that
a breach might soon be effected, sufficient to warrant an assault. All
night long a slow but constant fire was kept up by the monitors,
affording the garrison no opportunity of repose. At daylight it was
discovered that the flagstaff had been shot away, but at eight o’clock
it was replaced by another, showing the determination of the garrison
still to resist the tremendous force that was arrayed against them.
The troops had now thrown up two lines of breastworks across the
peninsula, extending from the ocean to Cape Fear river, and had advanced
their line to within a mile of the fort.