fighting was very irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills
covered with growing corn, inclosed by stone walls, behind which the
enemy could advance unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines,
Taking advantage of this, the enemy attempted to gain the right of
Richardson’s position in a corn-field near Roulette’s house, where the
division had become separated from that of General French’s. A change of
front by the Fifty-second New York and Second Delaware volunteers, of
Colonel Brooks’s brigade, under Colonel Frank, and the attack made by
the Fifty-third Pennsylvania volunteers, sent further to the right by
Colonel Brooks to close this gap in the line, and the movement of the
One Hundred and Thirty-second Pennsylvania and Seventh Virginia
volunteers of General French’s division before referred to, drove the
enemy from the corn-field and restored the line.
The brigade of General Caldwell, with determined gallantry, pushed the
enemy back opposite the left and centre of this division, but sheltered
in the sunken road, they still held our forces on the right of Caldwell
in check. Colonel Barlow, commanding the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth
New York regiments of Caldwell’s brigade, seeing a favorable
opportunity, advanced the regiments on the left, taking the line in the
sunken road in flank, and compelled them to surrender, capturing over
three hundred prisoners and three stands of colors.
The whole of the brigade, with the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth New
York regiments of Colonel Brooks’s brigade, who had moved these
regiments into the first line, now advanced with gallantry, driving the
enemy before them in confusion into the corn-field beyond the sunken
road. The left of the division was now well advanced, when the enemy,
concealed by an intervening ridge, endeavored to turn its left and rear.
[Illustration: UNION HEROES GRAHAM. WARD. MEAGHER. RICKETTS. KEITH.]
Colonel Cross, Fifth New Hampshire, by a change of front to the left and
rear, brought his regiment facing the advancing line. Here a spirited
contest arose to gain a commanding height, the two opposing forces
moving parallel to each other, giving and receiving fire. The Fifth
gaining the advantage, faced to the right and delivered its volley. The
enemy staggered, but rallied and advanced desperately at a charge. Being
reinforced by the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, these regiments met the
advance by a counter charge. The enemy fled, leaving many killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and the colors of the Fourth North Carolina, in
the victors’ hands.
Another column of the enemy, advancing under shelter of a stone wall and
corn-field, pressed down on the right of the division; but Colonel
Barlow again advanced the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York against
these troops, and with the attack of Kimball’s brigade on the right,
drove them from this position.
On the left of this part of the line, the Union troops having driven
back a determined attack of the enemy, the rebels made a rush upon the
front, but were fiercely repulsed by two regiments under Colonel Barlow,
who followed them through the corn-field and into the orchard beyond. A
building called Riper’s house was a strong point here; and Colonel
Barlow’s advance gave the Union men possession of it, and they at once
occupied it. A section of Robertson’s horse battery now arrived, and in
good time, for Richardson’s division up to that juncture had been
without artillery; and subsequently Captain Graham, First Artillery,
commanding a battery of brass guns, arrived, and taking a position on
the crest of the hill, soon silenced the enemy’s guns in the orchard.
Heavy firing began immediately; and while directing the firing of
Captain Graham’s battery, the gallant Richardson was mortally wounded.
The place of General Richardson was supplied by General Hancock. Colonel
Bunke, of the Sixty-third New York, commanding General Meagher’s
brigade, was ordered to the centre.
The battle raged with uninterrupted fury; and on right and left, rebels
and Unionists strewed the ground with gory corpses. The groans and cries
of the wounded and dying filling up every interval of the battle’s roar.
Dark and darker grew the aspect of affairs. The different battle-fields
were shut out from each other’s view, but all were visible from a centre
hill, from which General McClellan, during the whole day, with his
field-glass held to his eyes, watched eagerly and anxiously the fighting
of the several brave corps under his command.
The afternoon was waning; and things looked very black for the Army of
the Union. At three o’clock General McClellan issued an order to General
Burnside to push forward his troops with all possible vigor, and carry
the enemy’s position on the heights. General Burnside replied that he
would advance up the hill as far as he could, before being stopped by a
battery, placed directly in his path. Upon hearing this, General
McClellan ordered Burnside to flank the battery, storm it, and carry the
heights.
The advance was made most gallantly, the enemy utterly routed, and the
heights carried triumphantly. Night was now approaching, and the enemy
was receiving strong reinforcements from Harper’s Ferry. General
Burnside’s troops were attacked on the left flank, and obliged to retire
to a lower line of hills, near the bridge and the question as to whether
the well-won position on the heights could be maintained, became a
problem of vital importance. Burnside’s brigades were in close columns,
and would not give way before a bayonet charge; and the enemy hesitated
to dash in on the dense masses of Union soldiers. Then suddenly the
rebel left gave way, scattering over the field, but the rest stood firm,
and poured forth a heavy fire upon the Federals. More infantry came up,
and General Burnside found himself outnumbered, outflanked, and
compelled to yield up the position he fought so bravely to win. He no
longer attacked; but, with unfaltering firmness, defended himself, and
sent to General McClellan for help.
McClellan already knew of the sore strait to which Burnside was reduced,
for his glass had not been turned away from the hard-pressed left of the
field; but to send assistance was out of his power. In the valley,
Porter’s fifteen thousand troops were impatient to join the fight; but
when the two Generals, McClellan and Porter, looked into each other’s
faces, each read in the other’s eyes, “They are the only reserves of the
army—they cannot be spared.” As an answer to General Burnside’s desire
for reinforcements, the Commander-in-Chief was obliged to reply:
“Tell General Burnside this is the battle of the war. He must hold his
ground till dark at any cost. I will send him Miller’s battery. I can do
nothing more. I have no infantry.” Then as the messenger was riding away
he called him back. “Tell him if he _cannot_ hold his ground, then the
bridge, to the last man!—always the bridge! If the bridge is lost, all
is lost.”
Till Burnside’s message reached McClellan, no one anticipated that the
battle could be concluded on that day; and few expected how near was the
peril of total defeat. But suddenly and unexpectedly, the rebels halted,
instead of pushing forward, and following up the advantage gained in
recapturing the hill. As the twilight deepened into darkness, the
fierce, wrathful cannonading ceased, and the long, desperately-contested
battle of Antietam was over. For fourteen hours nearly two hundred
thousand men, and five hundred pieces of artillery had been engaged in
this memorable battle. The Army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the
moral depression consequent upon its late severe reverses, had achieved
a great victory over an army elated by recent successes; and, on the
night of September 17th, the soldiers of the Union slept in peace and
triumph on a field won by dauntless bravery, and covered with the dead
and wounded, friends and foes, patriots and rebels.
On both sides the casualties among officers in the battle of Antietam
was unusually numerous. Among the rebel killed were Brigadier-Generals
Starke and Branche, and among their wounded were Major-General Anderson,
Brigadier-Generals Anderson, Lawton, Wright, Ripley, Amistead and
Ransome.
The Union army was called upon to mourn the loss, among many other
valuable officers, of Brigadier-General Isaac P. Rodman, of Rhode
Island. He had left the quiet pursuits of business, and volunteered in
defence of the Government. He entered the service in one of the
regiments of his native State as Captain, and was quickly promoted to a
Colonelcy, and led his regiment in General Burnside’s North Carolina
expedition. He was made a Brigadier for services at Roanoke and Newbern,
and was mortally wounded while acting as division commander at Antietam.
The loss of the Federal army in this terrible battle bears ample
testimony to its courage and endurance. From the official records the
total loss in killed was two thousand and ten; missing, one thousand and
forty-three; total, twelve thousand and sixty-nine. The combined loss at
South Mountain, Antietam and Harper’s Ferry, was twenty-six thousand
three hundred and ninety-four.
The report of General McClellan estimates the rebel loss in Maryland at
thirty thousand men.
General Burnside, whose corps was stationed on the left of the Federal
lines, testified before the investigating committee of Congress, that at
half-past eight o’clock in the evening of the 17th, he went over to
McClellan’s headquarters, and urged the renewal of the attack, saying
that with five thousand fresh troops to place beside his own, he was
willing to commence the attack in the morning. As his corps had
maintained the most critical position during the battle, and had
defended the salient points with remarkable bravery and endurance, while
suffering heavy loss, it may not be amiss to record his testimony in
this place.
General Franklin, whose corps occupied a position on the right of the
Federal lines, also gave testimony before the Commission in the
following terms:
“When General McClellan visited the right in the afternoon, I showed him
a position on the right of this wood, which I have already mentioned, in
which was the Dunker church, which I thought commanded the wood; and
that if it could be taken, we could drive the enemy from the wood, by
merely holding this point. I advised that we should make the attack on
that place the next morning from General Sumner’s position. I thought
there was no doubt about our being able to carry it. We had plenty of
artillery bearing upon it. We drove the enemy from there that afternoon,
and I had no doubt we could take the place the next morning, and I
thought that would uncover the whole left of the enemy.”
No advance was made by the Federal forces on the 18th, which passed away
without any engagement. General McClellan was waiting for reinforcements
under Generals Couch and Humphreys, then on their way, and in the mean
time, had ordered an attack on the 19th. A reconnoissance of the Federal
cavalry advanced to the Maryland shore of the Potomac on the evening of
the 19th, where they skirmished with the rear guard of the rebels, and
captured six guns. General Lee had safely withdrawn his army to the
Virginia shore, and was slowly conducting his retreat to the banks of
the Rappahannock.
Though the battle of Antietam can hardly be classed as a decisive
victory on the part of the Federal forces, in a strictly military point
of view, it was conclusive in its results; and General Lee retreated
into Virginia with a full conviction of his inability to cope
successfully on that ground with the army opposed to him, and thoroughly
dispossessed of the confident expectation he had entertained, that the
inhabitants would flock by thousands to his standard, when his forces
should appear in their midst. Restricted as he had ever been in his
commissariat, he had discovered that no dependence could be placed on
obtaining supplies in a hostile territory, surrounded by a numerous and
vigilant foe, whose well-disciplined and eager cavalry would surely cut
off any supplies from the Shenandoah Valley, long before they reached
the banks of the Potomac. With a loss of thirty thousand men, in killed,
wounded and prisoners, he was compelled therefore to retrace his steps,
which he was allowed to do, deliberately and securely.
M’CLELLAN’S ARMY ON THE POTOMAC.
OCTOBER 1–26, 1862.
At this juncture in military affairs, the cautious policy of General
McClellan once more came into conflict with that of the United States
Government, at Washington. It was McClellan’s desire to reorganize the
army, which had suffered much under the command of General Pope, and
which had just passed through two severe battles. Maryland Heights and
Harper’s Ferry had been occupied and fortified, and, as the Potomac was
low, and easily fordable by rebel raiders, McClellan designed to stretch
his forces along that river, from near Washington, to Cumberland, a
distance of about one hundred and fifty miles, to prevent further
incursions, and to make occasional sallies for reconnaissance or
offensive operations, while the work of reorganization should be in
progress. General Halleck, on the other hand, representing the President
and the War Department, denied the necessity for any delay and urged an
immediate onset.
No onward movement was made until the 26th of October. In the meanwhile,
President Lincoln, visiting the Army of McClellan on the first of the
month, had discussed the whole campaign with that officer, and had
personally inspected the battle-field of Antietam; then, returning to
Washington, he had, through General Halleck, issued an order to General
McClellan, directing him to cross the Potomac and attack General Lee. It
was in pursuance of this order that the advance was commenced on the
26th—the intermediate days having been spent in the work of
reorganization. But this work had not been accomplished without
difficulty. On the 10th of October, the rebel General Stuart crossed the
Potomac, at McCoy’s Ferry, leading a force of two thousand cavalry and a
battery of horse artillery, and made a raid into Maryland and
Pennsylvania. Means were immediately taken to cut off and capture those
forces. All the fords of the river were ordered to be guarded, and
Generals Pleasanton and Stoneman started in pursuit. General Stuart, by
his raid of the 13th of June, into the rear of the Union armies between
the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy, had acquired great credit for
boldness and celerity of movement. Hence the desire to capture him was
all the more eager, on the part of the National troops. But the failure
of a subordinate officer of General Stoneman’s to seasonably occupy
White’s Ford, a point about three miles below the mouth of the Monocacy,
unfortunately left open a chance of retreat, through which, on the 12th
of October Stuart succeeded in making his escape, after a conflict with
the Union forces, which lasted upwards of four hours. The fight took
place near the mouth of the river Monocacy, and, on the Union side, was
conducted by General Pleasanton. The losses were slight, upon both
sides.
The plan of General McClellan’s new campaign, commencing on the 26th of
October, may best be stated in his own language:
“The plan of campaign I adopted during this advantage was to move the
army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the
point of direction for the main army; seizing each pass on the Blue
Ridge by detachments, as we approached it, and guarding them after we
had passed as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our
communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite
with the Eleventh corps and Sickles’s division near Thoroughfare Gap. We
depended upon Harper’s Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the Manassas
Gap Railway was reached; when that occurred, the passes in the rear were
to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in any
direction.
“It was my intention if upon reaching Ashby’s or any other pass, I found
that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac in the valley of
the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear.
“I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that by striking in
between Culpeper Court-House and Little Washington I could either
separate their army and beat them in detail, or else force them to
concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the army of the
Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburgh line of advance
upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended,
it were found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad beyond Culpeper.”
On the night of November 7th, General McClellan received an order from
Washington, relieving him from the command of the Army of the Potomac,
and appointing General Burnside to be his successor. This change was
immediately consummated. The army, at this time, was in fine condition
and spirits, and was strongly posted near Warrenton, its right wing
being across the Rappahannock, and its left resting on Manassas
Junction, the front extending along the line of the Orange and
Alexandria Railroad. The rebels, under Longstreet, were massed near
Culpeper, and it was apparent that a great battle could not long be
deferred. Such was the posture of affairs, when General Burnside assumed
command of the Army of the Potomac.
The impressive and affecting words of General McClellan, in reference to
this passage in our national history, ought here to find a place. They
render a merited tribute to the noble army of patriots, which he had led
through so many perils.
“I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with this brave
army was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest
peril it had then undergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if, by
this report, the army of the Potomac is not placed high on the roll of
the historic armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the nation to which
it belongs. Always ready for battle, always firm, steadfast and
trustworthy, I never called on it in vain; nor will the nation ever have
cause to attribute its want of success, under myself, or under other
commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that noble body
of American soldiers.
“No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the
Commanding General to the private, any lack of devotion to the service
of the United States’ Government, and to the cause of the Constitution
and the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering,
danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comrades dead on all
the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a
nation’s reverence than their survivors to the justice of a nation’s
gratitude.”
The situation of the respective forces was then as follows: The Federal
army, reinforced by the divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles, who had
advanced from Washington, occupied all the region east of the Blue
Ridge, with the right resting on Harper’s Ferry, and the left extending
nearly to Paris, on the road from Aldie to Winchester. The centre was at
Snickersville; with Snicker’s Gap in its possession. The Confederate
line was on the south side of the Blue Ridge, with the Shenandoah river
immediately in its front, extending from Front Royal down to
Charlestown, with the great body of their troops massed between
Berryville and Winchester. On November 4th Ashby’s Gap was occupied
without opposition by the Federal troops. The cavalry corps, under
Colonel Pleasanton, pushed on from Piedmont, and occupied Marguette,
holding the approaches to Manassas and Chester Gap, on the left side of
the Blue Ridge. The condition and spirit of the army at this time were
unequalled by that of any force before organized. On the 6th General
McClellan’s headquarters were at Rectortown near Front Royal. The army
was steadily advancing and the Confederate force falling back, with some
skirmishing. Warrenton was occupied by the Federal troops on the same
day. On the 7th a severe snow storm commenced, and continued throughout
the day. On the 8th the bridge at Rappahannock Station was taken and
held by General Bayard.
The next day was devoted by General McClellan to the transfer of his
command to General Burnside. The most cordial feelings existed between
the two officers, the latter of whom accepted a promotion which he had
before twice declined, only upon the peremptory order of the War
Department. On Sunday evening his officers assembled at his tent, for a
final parting of commander and officers. It was such a scene of deep
feeling as could occur only where officers reposed the highest
confidence in their commander, who had led them successfully through
some of the most fearful battles of modern wars. Monday was occupied in
passing among the various camps, reviewing the troops, and taking a
final leave of both officers and men. A spectator of these scenes has
summed them up in these words:
“As General McClellan, mounted upon a fine horse, attended by a retinue
of fine-looking military men, riding rapidly through the ranks,
gracefully recognized and bid a farewell to the army, the cries and
demonstrations of the men were beyond bounds—wild, impassioned, and
unrestrained. Disregarding all military forms they rushed from their
ranks and thronged around him with the bitterest complaints against
those who had removed from command their beloved leader.”
On the next day, the 10th, he withdrew, taking the railroad cars at
Warrenton. On reaching Warrenton Junction a salute was fired. The
troops, which had been drawn up in line, afterward broke ranks, when the
soldiers crowded around him and many eagerly called for a few parting
words. He said in response, while on the platform of the railroad depot,
“I wish you to stand by General Burnside as you have stood by me, and
all will be well. Good-bye.” To this there was a spontaneous and
enthusiastic response.
The troops were also drawn up in line at Bristow’s Station and Manassas
Junction, where salutes were fired and he was complimented with
enthusiastic cheers. On reaching Washington he proceeded immediately to
the depot, and passed on to Philadelphia and Trenton, where he arrived
early on the 12th.
What was now the military aspect? The movement of General McClellan’s
army, after crossing the Potomac, was towards Gordonsville. This made a
movement on the part of the Confederate general Lee necessary in order
to prevent the Federal army from getting between him and Richmond. For
this purpose he attempted to move from Winchester through the gaps of
the Blue Ridge to Culpeper. The larger part of his force had passed
through, when the gaps were taken and held by General McClellan. At the
same time General Sigel had advanced from Washington, and lay near the
Blue Ridge, covering at once Washington, observing the gaps to the
Rappahannock, and protecting the railroad communication to that river.
The bridge at Rappahannock Station had already been seized by the
cavalry, under General Bayard. The available force of General McClellan
was about one hundred and twenty thousand men; that of General Lee
consisted of about sixty thousand able men at Culpepper and
Gordonsville, and thirty thousand in the Shenandoah Valley, near
Strasburg. The distance from Warrenton to Gordonsville is about fifty
miles, and from Warrenton to the Rapidan, thirty-five miles; from
Strasburg to Gordonsville, by Staunton and Charlottesville, one hundred
and thirty-five miles; and by the only other practicable route, one
northwest of Gordonsville, and perpendicular to General McClellan’s line
of advance, about one hundred miles. In his position it was necessary
for General Lee to defend the line of the Rapidan, or endeavor to effect
a junction with the force in the Shenandoah Valley, under General
Jackson, or fall back upon Richmond, in a country without a line of
defence, with General McClellan close upon him, leaving General Jackson
to shift for himself. The defence of the Rapidan was impracticable from
the course of the river from the Alexandria railroad to the Blue Ridge.
The efforts to join General Jackson would have uncovered Richmond, and
the attempt to fall back on Richmond would have at least hazarded the
demoralization of his army, and enabled General McClellan to turn the
defensible parts of the Rappahannock, and the line of the North Anna.
The appointment of General Burnside was followed by the organization of
a portion of the army into divisions, and a movement to concentrate it
at Fredericksburg.
OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY.
JUNE TO SEPTEMBER, 1862.