SOME GERMAN THEORIES OF WAR.
Before I proceed with my story, let me call your attention to certain
theories of war with which the German General Staff began the campaign.
By a theory of war I mean some plan or scheme which, in the judgment of
those making it, is _likely_ to prove of great advantage, but which can
only be _proved_ to be so by actual practice. Some of the German
theories turned out to be right, others wrong, as we shall see.
If you were to witness a field day of British troops you would notice
that the infantry make their attacks in long, thin skirmishing lines.
The men are widely spread out, and as they advance they offer a small
target to the guns of the enemy. Their losses are thus reduced to a
minimum. The Germans, on the other hand, believe in making their attacks
with their men massed together in close formation.
Troops attacking in close order have certain advantages over those
attacking in open order. First, they can begin their attack with the
least possible delay. Suppose a hundred men are marching forward in
fours, and are about to make an attack. If they are to spread out widely
time will be needed for them to deploy. (See Fig. 2, p. 19.) But if they
go forward packed close together as in Fig. 1, p. 18, they can attack
much more quickly. You can easily understand that the quicker a blow is
delivered, the more likely it is to be successful, for the defenders are
given little time in which to make preparations for resisting it.
Then, again, an attack delivered in mass formation brings much more
weight to bear on the part of the enemy's line against which it is
directed than an attack in open order. If, for example, a hundred men
are hurled against a front of a hundred yards, the force with which they
can assail it is much greater than it would be if the same hundred yards
of front were attacked by fifty men. Where, as often happens, troops
have to advance on a narrow front, say against a bridge, a causeway, a
street, or a defile, they must attack in close order if they are to
succeed.
Of course, when a massed attack is made, a very good target is offered
to the enemy, especially in these days of magazine rifles, machine guns,
and quick-firing field guns, and large numbers of the attackers are sure
to fall. In former wars it has been found that troops so punished break
or are brought to a standstill, and that their attack therefore fails.
The Germans, however, believe that men can be so disciplined that,
though large numbers of them are shot down, the rest will push on and
carry the position. They believe that this great waste of life is worth
while, because the campaign will be over all the sooner, and the total
losses will probably be no greater than they would be in a
long-drawn-out war carried on by attacks in open order.
[Illustration: Fig. 1. Column advancing to the Attack in Close Order.]
Now let us see how this theory bore the test of actual practice. You
will remember that at the Battle of Mons and on other occasions the
Germans made massed attacks on the Allied positions, and though their
men were shot down in droves, they came on again and again, almost
shoulder to shoulder. The theory that men can be so disciplined as to
continue to advance in massed formation, even though they know that
large numbers of them will certainly be killed or wounded, proved
correct. Where the theory broke down was in supposing that the men who
survived the slaughter would be able to carry the position. On some
occasions they succeeded, but in the majority of cases a swarm of
Germans advancing against inferior numbers were reduced by one-fourth,
or even by one-third, in the first few minutes of the rush, and the
remainder were too few to drive out the defenders. So, as far as actual
results were concerned, attacks in close formation proved to be a
failure. The Germans, however, persisted in them, and this led to an
immense wastage of life. They flung away life like water, but, as we
have seen, they did not win that speedy victory on which they had staked
so much.
[Illustration: Fig. 2. Column deploying for Attack in Open Order.]
Another theory of the German General Staff was that no existing fortress
could withstand for more than a few days the effect of high explosive
shells hurled from heavy howitzers. Up to about ten years ago it was
thought that fortresses mounting heavy guns, and fully supplied with
men, food, and ammunition, could hold out for months against a besieging
force. The fixed guns of fortresses had then a far greater range than
any movable guns that could be brought against them, and they were so
powerful that they could, as a rule, put out of action the artillery of
the besiegers.
[Illustration: A German Howitzer for Siege Work.
_Photo, Daily Mirror_.
Notice the caterpillar wheels which enable it to traverse soft roads
without sinking in.]
On page 200 of Volume I. you were told how a howitzer differs from an
ordinary field gun. Let me repeat what I then said. The great difference
between the action of an ordinary gun and that of a howitzer is the
difference between a boy throwing a stone at a mark which he can see,
and the same boy lobbing a stone over a wall so that it will fall on
something hidden from his view. The ordinary field gun has a long, flat
sweep of fire, and is therefore unable to shoot over hills, trees, or
houses, or to drop shells on men lying close behind a bank or in a deep,
narrow trench.
[Illustration]
Look at this little diagram. A howitzer, A, is firing at a fort, B, from
the other side of a hill. The howitzer is invisible from the fort, and
the men firing the howitzer cannot see the mark at which they are
aiming. But a man on or above the hill can see the fort easily, and can
so direct the fire of the howitzer that it can lob its shells over the
hill and drop them directly on the fort. The guns of the fort are
incapable of hitting the howitzer. The shells which they throw pass
right over the hill, and fall a long way behind it.
Until recently the fortress gun was master of the howitzer, for several
reasons. The howitzers then in use were small, and their range was much
less than that of heavy guns mounted in forts. No matter how carefully
the howitzers were concealed or how frequently they were shifted about,
they were sure sooner or later to be "spotted" from the fortress, and
put out of action. The explosives which were then used in the howitzer
shells were not sufficiently powerful to destroy the steel and concrete
of the forts, and there was much difficulty in discovering, whether the
aim of these high-angle guns was true.
The Austrian and the German General Staff had studied all this very
carefully, and they had come to the conclusion that howitzers could be
constructed of such a size that they would be more than a match for
fortress guns. Former howitzers were 6 inches across at the mouth; but
before the war the Austrians built howitzers of from 11 to 12-inch
calibre. This doubling of the calibre meant that the new weapon was
_eight times_ as powerful as the old one. Such howitzers could throw
their shells from an immense distance, and could take advantage of steep
cover so far off that the fortress guns could not reach them. Though the
new howitzers were so heavy, they were capable of being moved from place
to place as soon as they were "spotted".
Not only was the howitzer made much bigger than formerly, but new and
very powerful explosives were discovered, and huge shells were filled
with them. Experiments led the German Staff to believe that these
explosives would utterly destroy the forts, no matter how solidly they
might be constructed. How to aim these howitzers correctly was the only
remaining difficulty. Aeroplanes and balloons solved the problem.
Observers could fly high enough to see the forts, note where the shots
fell, and signal to the gunners so that they could find the exact range.
The Germans believed that no fortress along the line of their advance
could long resist their big howitzers and high explosive shells. The
French, on the other hand, thought that such ring fortresses as those at
Liége, Namur, and Verdun could hold out for a considerable time. During
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Port Arthur, though attacked by
howitzers, held out for eleven months. The French saw no reason why
their forts should not resist for several weeks at least.
From what you have read in the former volumes you know that the German
theory was right, and that the French theory was wrong. Liége, Namur,
Maubeuge, and Antwerp all fell before the high explosive shells of the
huge howitzers in an astonishingly brief time. Verdun did not fall, it
is true, but this was because the French turned it into a new type of
fortress altogether. They made field works at a considerable distance
from the old forts, and moved out the heavy guns to advanced trenches.
Rails were laid down so that as soon as the guns were "spotted" they
could be moved to new positions at short notice. Thus, as I told you on
page 280 of Volume II., instead of fixed forts, each, say, mounted with
ten heavy guns, these same ten guns were "dotted here and there in
trenches rapidly established in one place and another, along perhaps
half a mile of wooded vale, and free to operate, when they moved, over
perhaps double that front." This is the German theory of fortification,
and Verdun was saved because the French adopted it.
Another theory of the German Staff was that high explosive shells could
be used with great effect not only against fortresses but against troops
in the field. In former wars shrapnel[4] was largely used, but in the
present war the Germans believed that high explosive shells would be
more effective.[5] Modern armies, as you know, "dig themselves in"
whenever they can, and fight from trenches. Against troops in deep
trenches with good head-cover shrapnel is not very deadly. When trenches
have been occupied for some time they become little fortresses, with
strong parapets and entanglements of barbed wire in front of them.
Before sending infantry to attack such trenches, the Germans determined
to fire high explosive shells at them, so that the barbed wire would be
torn away, the parapets of the trenches would be blown in, and the
defensive works destroyed. In this respect, too, the German theory
proved correct, and when the trench warfare began in real earnest the
Allies had to follow the German example. Months passed, however, before
their supply of howitzers and high explosive shells was sufficient to
enable them to cope with the Germans on equal terms.
[Illustration: The Effect of Shrapnel on Trenches.
Some four hundred to five hundred balls and splinters spread forwards,
downwards, and fan-wise when the shell bursts.
(_By permission of The Sphere._)]
In Volume I., page 189, I gave you some account of the machine gun
which, as you will remember, discharges automatically and accurately
some four hundred or five hundred shots a minute. As a rifleman can only
fire about a dozen aimed shots in the same time, a machine gun is
equivalent to at least thirty riflemen. It discharges its bullets in a
cone-shaped stream, and is even more deadly than sustained rifle fire.
Prior to the war each battalion in the British army was provided with
two machine guns. The German General Staff, however, provided each unit
of its infantry with a large number of machine guns,[6] which were so
mounted that they could be carried rapidly over every kind of ground.
The result was that the Germans had a very marked advantage over the
Allies in machine firing power. Here, again, the German theory was
correct, and the Allies were forced to follow suit and increase greatly
their supply of machine guns.
The Germans have no faith in the waiting game. They believe that
constant attack is the best form of defence. It is foreign to their
ideas to wait for the enemy to attack them; everywhere and always they
endeavour to strike at the foe. They believe with the American humorist:
"Thrice blessed he who hath his quarrel just,
But four times he who gets his blow in fust."
In order to enable troops to strike swiftly, and, therefore, to take the
enemy unawares, the Germans provided themselves with fleets of motor
cars in which they conveyed their soldiers to the points where they were
needed. The admirable Belgian and French roads enabled the motors to
travel very quickly, and this accounts in large measure for the rapid
pursuit of the Allies. The motor cars were meant to be specially useful
in making those flanking movements by which German generals strive to
envelop their enemies. These flanking attacks, however, were not
successful, perhaps because it was impossible to transport sufficient
artillery along with the men.
[Illustration: The Effect of High Explosive Shells on Trenches.
A breach is made in the wire entanglements and the chief force of the
explosion is downwards.
(_By permission of The Sphere._)]
Finally, let me deal for a few moments with a theory that proved to be
hopelessly wrong, so entirely mistaken that it robbed the Germans of
that speedy victory which they confidently expected, and led to a long
and uncertain trench war in the West. What was this theory?
The German General Staff believed that Paris would prove to be a great
trap for the French. They believed that in no circumstances would the
French Government permit Paris to be abandoned by the French armies.
They thought that if Paris were threatened, one of two things would
happen--either the French armies would be massed round the capital for
its defence, or they would be divided, and some would try to hold the
frontier, while others tried to hold the city. Further they felt sure
that if the French Commander-in-Chief should wish to keep his armies
undivided so that he could fight on the most advantageous ground,
irrespective of whether Paris fell into German hands or not, the French
politicians would interfere and overrule him. Then quarrels and
confusion would arise; there would be no unity of purpose; divided
authority would prevail, and France would go to pieces.
Whatever happened, the Germans felt confident of victory. They had more
men in the field than France could possibly bring against them. If they
fought pitched battles with the full strength of the French forces
outside Paris, they were bound to win, because they were superior in men
and guns. If the French forces were divided, their task would be still
easier; and if the French politicians interfered, France would do much
to destroy herself. Such was the theory; now let us see how it worked
out.
From the very beginning of the struggle the French military authorities
determined that they would conduct the war in their own way, and that
they would not brook any interference from the politicians. They foresaw
all the difficulties on which the Germans counted, and they fully
realized that if they allowed their plans to be hampered by defending
Paris they would fall into a trap from which there would be no escape.
While, therefore, the enemy was making his great drive towards Paris,
and even when he seemed to be on the point of besieging it, they did not
attempt to go to its rescue, but still retreated, so that their line
could be built up anew, and an advance made when the time was ripe. It
is true that a new army had been mobilized in and around Paris, but it
was not meant for the defence of the capital; it was intended for quite
another purpose.[7]
When von Kluck was near the outer fortifications of Paris he discovered
that the German theory was all wrong. He was forced to swerve in order
to follow up the French and British, and in the act of swerving he was
caught, and forced to retreat. Thus that rapid success in the West which
was the very keynote of the German plan of campaign was rendered
impossible.
[Footnote 4: See Vol. I., p. 197.]
[Footnote 5: See diagrams on the following pages.]
[Footnote 6: It was said that the Germans had 56,000 machine guns at
the beginning of the war.]
[Footnote 7: See Vol. II., p. 201.]